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Imagining Cambod ia: Competing Nationalisms in the Second Kingdom (1993 - ) 
Astrid Noren-Nilsson 
This dissertation examines the national imaginations advanced by political party actors in the 
Kingdom of Cambodia (KOC, 1993 - ). It explores three interrelated questions: What do 
different Cambodian political projects imag ine the poli tical contents of the nation to be 9 How 
do these competing imaginations bear on political pa11y actors· claims to represent the nation? 
I-low do competing imagination s of the nation play out in contemporary Cambodian politics? 
This leads to a fourth question: How usef ul can attention to national imaginings be for 
understanding political developments in a post-conflict setting '' In 1993, multi-party democratic 
elections were held and a constitutional monarchy rein stated in Cambodia, in the wake of more 
than two decade s of civil war. Whilst the imperative of nation-building loomed larger than eve r, 
the main pol itical actors continued to advance radically differ ent imaginations of the Cambodian 
nation , each laying claims to exclusively repre sent it. Taking Ben edict Anderson·s definition of 
the nation as an ·imagined community' as a starting point, this thesis considers contemporary 
political contestation in Cambodia in tenns of competing, unfinished, imagined communities. 
They are compe ting insofar as they are elite imaginations, each striving to disseminate a 
part icular und erstanding of the nation , and unfinished, since they are continuously subject 10 
practice s o fre imagination. This thesis proposes that these competing national imaginings 
formed a prominent dynamic inseparable from wider poli1ical contestation in the KOC. It is 
argued that to make the new democratic politics mean someth ing , all political party aclors 
turned to the nation as the most important part of the answer. Political actors redefin ed their 
political projects by rearticulating idea s of the political contents of the nation , and their own role 
in repr ese nting , embodying or defe nding it. Thi s defin ed bids for political legit imac y. Key 
notion s of the new political se ll ing such as democracy , royal ism and populi sm were art iculated 
as part of the same proces s. The dissertation maps out the national imaginations advanced by 
political actor s with an institutional base in Cambodia·s main politica l partie s competing 
e lectorally in the KOC. It examines these as thre e con lending sets of political actors: the 
Cambodian People 's Part y, royalist part ies , and democratic part ies . From differ ent angles , ii 
explores concept ions of the contours and characteristics of the nation and how it is to be 
politically represented , entailing que st ions of the nature of democracy , constructions of the 
people, elected versus inherited leaders hip , embodiment, and , ultimately , continuity and change 
in such conceptualisations. 
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Introduction 
Aims 
What do different Cambodian political projects imagine the political contents of the 
nation to be? How do competing imaginings of the nation play oul in contemporary 
Cambodian politi cs? How do these compe tin g imaginings bear on political party 
actors· claims to represent the nation? By extension , how useful can attention to 
national imaginings be for understanding political developments in a post-conflict 
setting? 
In 1991, several years of negotiations came to a close when four contending factions 
signed the Paris Peac e Agreements (PPA), ending more than two decades of 
Cambodian civil war Out of these four factions, the political parties that would come 
to dominate Cambodian politics in the resulting multi-party democratic system 
emerged. Caroline Hughes wr ites that the last phase of the prolonged civil war split 
Cambodia into two contending nat ions: one under the control of the Phnom Penh-
based government of the People 's Republic of Kampu chea (PRK. 1979-1989) , and 
one under the control of the tripartite coalition resistance government, the Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). These were divided geopolitically , 
in that each enjoyed the backing of co ntending Cold War power blocs; physically , by 
a border of landmines; as well as in imaginations, maintaining separate 
historiographies and future visions with both sides claiming to represent the genuine 
Khmer nation. On the brink of a new era in which the keywords were peace , national 
reconciliation and multi-part y democracy, the imperati ve of Khmer unit y emerged as 
paramount, whilst , with no secure imagining of the Cambodian nation, the outl ines and 
character of the national community were unclear. 1 
Two decades later , at the time of writing in September 2012, a conference has just 
concluded at Northern lllinois University , in which scholars from all disciplines were 
gathered to discuss the theme 'Imagining Cambodia'. Participants were invited to 
exp lore questions of what lies beyond a post-conflict nation, how new histories are 
1 Hughes (2009): 47-48 
being created and what new visions for the future are expressed. These questions are 
of key importance to a wide range of academic disc iplines , yet the ir s ignifi ca nce from 
a political perspective has yet to be adequately exp lored. Two decade s on, political 
science scholar ship has produced a sol id corpus of analyses of how power politics has 
played out in post-PPA Cambodia. We now have the beginnings ofan understanding 
of the workings of fonnal and infonnal institutions in relation to political party 
competition. Yet , a sys tematic analy sis of how political competition is, and has been, 
anchored in more fundamental debates over the character of the national community 
has been missing. 
Taking as a sta rting point Bened ict Anderson's definition of the nation as an 
'imagined co mmunit y' . this dissertation exp lores the ways in which political party 
actors in the multi -party democratic system in the Kingdom of Cambodia (KOC, 
1993-) , the state instituted following the PPA , have advanced diff eren t imaginings of 
the nation . It propo ses that, to make the new democratic politic s mean something in 
post-PPA Cambodia , all political party actors turned to the nation as the mo st 
important part of the answer. Following the PPA, which were intended to unite the 
competing nation s, the imperativ e of nation-building loomed larg er than eve r. Yet the 
main political actors, I argue, continued to advance radically different imagining s of 
the national community 
Considering the political dimens ions of art, Ashley Thompson suggests that there is a 
crisis of representation in today 's Cambodia. ' Political representation, she charges, 
remains inseparable from artistic representation, so that the wartime destruction of art 
raises the que stion of what forn1 the modem nation will take. Thi s thesi s argu es that a 
crisis over the represe ntation of the contemporary Cambodian nation has similarly 
permeated political party competition. In post-PPA Cambodia, political party actors 
continued to make diff erent claims to represent the genuine Khmer nation, basing 
those claims on different imaginings thereof. In this sense, they continued to advance 
competing nations , whilst each laid claims that their imagining, alone, represented the 
true Cambodia. These competing national imaginings emerged as a prominent 
' Thompson (2008): 202- 3 
underlying dynamic structu ring wide r political contestation in the KOC. This 
disse rtation lays out how claims to exclusive nationa l rep resentation formed a much 
more pervasive logic than acknowledged by previous scholarship- one that cuts 
across all political camps. 
The 1991 Paris Peace Agreements and the resulting 1993 multi-part y elections 
constituted but the latest turning point in Cambodian modem histo ry, marked by 
discontinuity. Cambodia has gone through six successive post-independence regimes 
attempting to realise widely different political systems. With the introduction of a 
multi-party democratic sys tem , the factions-turned-parties redefined their political 
projects to compete within the new framework. They d id so by reaniculating, 
brushing up and patching up ideas of the political contents of the nation, and their 
own role in representing, embodying or defending it. This entailed renegotiations of 
the character and contours of the nation and its people , and the role and mandate of 
the national political leadership. Thereby, principal notions of the new political 
setting, such as democra cy, royalism and populism , were articulated as part of the 
same process. Among these notions, that of democracy was key, since, within the 
nominally democratic framework, it provided a language that all national imagining s 
were partly phra sed in. 
The argument of this the sis can be summed up in the following points. Thi s thesis 
proposes that competing imaginings and representations of the Cambodian nation 
fonned a powerful underlying dynamic structuring wider political contestation in 
post-PPA Cambodia. The main political actors engaged in political party contestation 
in the KOC all vocal ly adva nced different claims to represent the nation. The y did so 
by means of , beside , and beyond their political part y programs, in ways that entailed 
the symbolic and discursive contestation of the political contents of the nation. They 
sought to forge links between themselves and the nation, advancing claims that 
posited them as uniquely poi sed to real ise the nation's aspirations. These competing 
bids for representa tion of the nation are crucial for understanding the trajectories of 
different political party actors, and for the making of key political notion s in post-
PPA Cambodia, and, thereby, inseparable from larger contemporary political 
developments. Finally, this thesis proposes that political legitimac y in the KOC was 
no exception to the string of successive regimes in post-independence Cambodia, 
which all finnly tied legitimacy to representation of the po litical community of the 
natio n . Whil st ex isting studie s have focused on the perfonnance -based aspects of 
KOC -era legitimacy , the following argume nt draws out how different bids for 
legitimacy are ultimatel y traceable to the political community of the nation. 
Theoretica l Framewor k 
Benedict Anderso n' s conceptua lisa tion of the nation as an ·imagined community' 
fundamentally rewrote the resea rch agenda for studies in nationalism. Applying 
constructivism to the study of the nation, Imagi ned Communiti es traces the origins of 
national consciousne ss to the modern industrial age of Western Europea n 
Enlightenment. With the demi se of hierarchical fonn s of socia l organisation 
associated with Christianity, economic change sparked the rise of scientific 
discove ries , rapid communication and capitalism, accompanied by the development 
of print-as-commodity. for which Anderson coins the joint term ·print-capitalism'. 
Print-capitalism helped create and disseminate national languages across territories 
pre vio usly lacking a sha red identity. It also spread an idea of·homogeneous. empty 
time· by creating a sense of the simultan eo us activities of different persons within the 
same imagined community. In this way, economic factors helped spread universal, 
homogenous and ·horizontal-secular' notions of national space and time, enabling 
diverse gro ups of people to re late to each other as parts of a national community , 
homogenous in the sense of sharing a past, present and future within a common 
territory with fixed boundari es. 
For A nderson, the nation is an imagined community ·because the members of even 
the smallest nation wil l never know most of their fellow member s, meet them , or 
even hear them , yet in mind s of each lives the image of their communion· .3 Not only 
the nation. but. in fact, ·all communities larger than primordial vil lages of face -to-
face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Com mun ities are to be 
distinguished, not by their falsity-genuineness, but by the sty le in which they are 
3 Anderson (199 1): 6. 
10 
imagined' 4 Ande rson emp hasises the role of creative imagery , ·invented traditions' 
and symbo ls of tradition in the construc tion of modern nations. 
Thi s dissertation take s Anderson·s Imagined Communities as its starting point, by 
pursui ng a range of research di rection s that it has opened up. Firstly, Anderson 
demonstrates that the nation is a historical invention rather than a natural, pre-existing 
entity. All nations, according to Anderson, are imagined artefacts that bestow feeli ngs 
of identity. Becau se all nations are imagined, it is the particular way in which they are 
imagined that become s the key research question, rather than their objective 
·genuineness· Secondl y, Anderson locate s •imagination· at the backdrop of 
economic, social and political cond itions that enable people to conce ive of 
themselves as part of an imagined community. Thus, imaginings of the nation are 
firml y rooted in a structural and material context. Th irdl y. Anderson's argument 
suggests that the nation is real and imagined at the same time. This is because, once 
established, the imagined community instituted a new se nse of se lf , space and time , 
thereby changing the parameters of ac tion and making nationalism a real institutional 
and political agent.5 Whilst nations are constructed entities, they are, at the same time, 
also ·factually existing agents in the modern wor ld order'. 6 
In spite of its analytical advantages. the notion of ·imagined community' has also 
provoked much criticism. not only in regard s to Anderson's pa,ticular historical 
argument, but also in tem1s of more thoroughgoing problem s and contradictions in 
Anderson ·s deployment of thi s noti on . Because of thi s. and because this study 
addresses a different time frame than that addressed by Anderson, Anderson's 
framework is only applied to the present study with a range of modifications and 
qualifications. 
First ly, nationalism is not merely a histo rical phenomenon that succeeded in 
producing unifonn imagined communities around the world. Whilst the historical 
eme rgence of nationalism is well theo rised in the scho lars hip of national ism, the 
' Ibid. 
; Roepstorff & Bubandt (2003): 16. 
6 lbid.: 18. 
II 
subsequent transfonnations of nationalism are generally neglected. 7 Anderson's 
Imagined Communili es addresses the colon ial and immediate post -colonial time 
periods , exclusively. Applying his framework to contemporary nations therefore 
necessitates taking into account the different contexts and characte1istics of nations 
that are long-established, in the sense that they have long been imagined as 
' communities of equals based on a deep horizontal comradeship ' . Around the world , 
these ·im agined communities· can be thought ofas ·unfinished imagined 
communities '. They are ·unfinished imagined communities· in the sense that national 
membership is often contested and their boundaries thus subject to continuous 
contestation and negotiation. 8 In many countries, even though nations are conceived 
of as horizontal communities, they are crosscut by categories of exclusion, often 
along ethno -racial lines. This points to the larger implication that ima gined 
communities are necessaril y ·unfinished·. in the sense that they are cont inuously 
subject to practices of reimagination. Contemporary nations serve as a universal 
classificatory system in a world divided into nation states and are in this sense also a 
spatial, political and historical category of political and social life. 9 Contemporary 
nations can therefore be said to exist in a dialectical relationship between their 
particular histories and the practice of imagination. 10 Theorising contemporary 
nationalisms thus entails considering nations as entities wit h particular histories that 
are subject to continuous practices of imagination and reimagination. \Vhilst 
contemporary rival political projects often claim to represent one and the same nation, 
they imagin e not only the contours but also the characteristics of the nation in widely 
different ways . Employing the notion of ·ima gined co mmunit y' to modern Austria . 
Zimel is concludes that it also applies to how nations are recreated. Austrian political 
parties reinvent ·imagined· communities through rival notions of Austrian 
' nationalism· to compete electorally." Zimelis"s analysis underlines how 
·imagination" of the nation in the contemporary period is necessarily a 
·reimagination·. and how this. in turn. produces many competing fonns of 
contemporary ·nationalisms·. 
7 Itzigsohn & vom Hau (2006): 193. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Roepstorff & Bubandt (2003) : 16. 
'° Ibid. 
11 Zimelis (2010): 6 
12 
Cambodia can be thought ofas an ·unfinished imag ined community' in both of these 
senses. Whilst Cambodia is a long-established nation , in the sense that the successive 
string of politic al projects ever since the emergence of national imagining s in the pre-
independence era have imagined it as a community of equals based on a deep 
horizontal comradesh ip. the contours and character istics of thi s ·imagined 
community· have been imagined and reimagined in sharp ly different ways. In 
contemporary Cambodia , member ship in the national community and related 
questions of citizenship remain contested, particularly with reference to eth nic 
Vietnamese, Chinese and Thai minorities, whilst the communal and national 
identities of indig enous upland minorities and the Muslim Cham , generally viewed as 
bona fide Khm ers, are subject to continuous negotiation. 12 On the national arena, 
competing reimaginations of the nation are today negotiated through party political 
contestation. 
Conceptualising contemporary nation s as 'u nfinished· highlight s thoroughgoing 
difficulties with the Andersonian assumption of ·nationalism· as an unproblematic 
agent of homogenisation. Th is assumption is evident in Anderson·s notion of 
homogeneous empty time, in whic h he posits that the nation •is conceived as a so lid 
community moving stead ily down (or up) history·, and that people. through thi s sense 
of ·calendrica1· time. share a temporal dimension. 13 Post-colonial theory has 
challenged the homogenous nature of the ·nation' by asking the que stion. ·who se 
imagined commun ity 0 • 14 It proposes difference in the articulation of nationalisms , by 
indi cat ing historicall y and culturally specific dynamics in the postcolonial world. 
Anderson·s notion ofcalendrical time has a lso been criticised in tenns of its 
obfuscation of important proce sses of recollecting and retraci ng the pa st. Rather, the 
" Edwards (1996); Jordens (1996); Hinton (2006); Poethig (2006); Ovesen & Trankell (2004); 
Amer (2006): and Ehrentraut (201 1 ). 
1l Anderson (1991) : 26. 
14 Chatterjee ( 1993): 220 challenges Anderson ·s conception of nationalism as composed of a 
set of basic tenets appropriated from Europe by the post-colonial world. He argues that, whilst 
anti-colonial nationalist movements shared the same discursive field as the colonialists, they 
insisted on a form of inner sovereignty and claimed their own ·essential· cultural identity. A 
similar critique of Anderson·s account of Latin American nationalisms is delivered by Castro-
Klaren & Chasteen (2003). who argue that •diverse cultural influences shaped Latin American 
nationalisms· 
13 
nation may be thought to move in sa lvat ional time, ·th e time in which the past can be 
recovered and red ee med· .15 The recovery of the past is vita l to any national project , as 
proce sses of rea ssess ing, rereading , and reirnagining the past are important 
precond itions for imagining alternative futures. 
This suggests that national imaginings, whilst aspiring to create notions of 
homogeneity, make up contentious imaginings promoting difference. To approach 
these content ious imag inings , in turn. necessita tes an extension of Anderson·s 
orig inal concept of •imagined communit ies' . shifting from passive to active 
procedural imagining. 16 This shift entails reconsidering communities. ·not as 
homogenous entities or fictions, but as arenas of struggle, negotiation. and creat ion· 17 
Tanabe suggests that Anderson·s •imagined community' of bounded, homogeneou s, 
empt y time and space is only half of the sto ry. The ·ima gined comm unit y· . he asserts. 
st ill ·remain s rather an ideal. or a model.for a modern nation itself with an 
autonomous, sovereign fonn of political rationality , without addressing other 
moments of imagining where perpetual movements of the marginal integration of 
ind ividua ls and gro ups emerge 18 Thi s reali sat ion has been readily translated into an 
interest in marginalised positions and strategies of response and resistance among 
othered populations. 19 
In Cambo dia, successive brands of nationalism have successfully acted as 
Andersonian agents of homogenisation , in the sense that the success ive string of 
political project s since independence have united around the Cambodian nation as a 
commo n identity. This has entai led a homoge nisation of tim e and space insofar that 
all political project s purport to represent a Cambodia n nation, with a roughly simila r 
temporal and spatia l frame. Yet, at the same time, national imaginings have made up 
contentious imaginings that, whilst nol uprooting the Cambodian nation as the 
15 Craig (2007): 38- 39. 
16 Roepstorff & Bubandt (2003): 16 
,, Tanabe (2008): I 
18 Ibid.: 5 
19 
Cp. how Homi Bhabha (1990): 308-9 argues that the assumption of homogeneous, empty 
time builds on how the ·arbitra 1• nature of the sign· separa tes language and reality. allowing 
Anderson to emphasise the mythical nature of the nation. Instead, he invites us to consider 
nations as ·nar rative construc t ions', where co ntending national co nstitu enc ies negotiat e 
nationness and minori ty discourse speaks ·between times and places·. 
14 
ultimate objec t of allegiance, have shown the boundar ies of nat iona lism as an agent 
of homogenisation. Thi s is certain ly the case at the ·margins· of the nation, where 
ethnic mi nority communal identiti es are negotiated, as a small body of literature 
suggests.1° Contentious imaginings also play out at the centre stage of the national 
politica l scene, where differenl poli1ical actors tied to different political partie s launch 
competing visions of the po litical contents of the nation. Whilst nations as ·ima gined 
communities·, understood as collectives with intersubject ively shared understandings 
of their common identity, all over the world are made up of groups with different 
ideas about appropriate political institutions and practices, in Cambodia, contestation 
goes beyond this to centre on the very fundamentals of how the nation should be 
conce ived, its implications for poli1ical represe ntation and practice , and wh ich 
political project , in turn, shares in Ca mbodian ident ity. In this sense, political 
contestation can be understood to centre on the advancement of competing· imagined 
communities'. 
In contemporary Cambodia, al l actors claim to represent the same, Cambodian nation, 
advancing competing imagining s that correspond to Anderson·s definition of the 
nation as an ·imagined political community that is imagined as both inherently 
limit ed and sovereign·. 21 Yet, in doing so, each of these actors claims to exc lusively 
represent the true Cambodian nation. By the same token , political adversaries are 
'o thered· as false representatives of the Cambodian nation. not sharing in Cambodian 
identity and threatening its very su rvival. " In this sense, rival bids for represe ntation 
of the nation claim rival ·imagined communities·, which make alternative 
conceptualisatio ns out as non-Cambodian. This perspective certainly challenges the 
homogenising aspect of nationalism. Rather than a shared •ima gined community". we 
find competing ones , den ying the shar ed nationalit y of rival bids. This reframes 
Chatte1jee's question. 'whose imag ined community 9 '. bring ing attention to the role o f 
alternative elite imagination s.23 In th is context. it is use ful to follow Tanabe's 
'° Bourdier (2006); Hammer. ed. (2009); Guerin , Hardy, Nguyen & Stan-Tan (2003). 
" Anderson (1991): 7. 
'.!~ Cp. how Hughes (2002b): 168 charges that the rhetorical portrayal of political opponents as 
threats to the survival of the nation, alongside the attempted manipulation of democratic 
processes and institutions, is the major strategy by which Cambodian political parties seek to 
?,ain adva~tage over one another. 
_, ChatterJee ( 1993): 220. 
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invitation to chart active procedural imaginings, reconsidering communities as 
·arenas of struggle. negotiatio n, and creation·. In these arenas, the nation moves 
forward in ·salvational ' time , as the past is constantly reimagined in order to 
negotiate alternative futures. 
This thesis proposes to consider contemporary political contestat ion in Cambodia in 
tenns of competing, unfini shed, imagined communities. They are competing 
imagined communit ies insofar as they are elite imaginings, each striving to become 
hegemonic and gain popular acceptance in order to cement a particular understanding 
of the true characteristics and conto urs of the nation. They are unfinish ed insofar as 
they are continuously subject to practices of reimagination of their particular 
histories. This underlines the role of political elites in reimagining the na tion for 
political gain within a multi-party democratic framework where electoral victmy is 
the main objective of political action. Anderson's ·imagined com munity· refe rred to 
the emergence of a homogenou s vision in society, shared in equal part by all its 
members, who were thereby tied toget her in horizontal notions of equality. Today, 
whilst such a notion of a Cambodian nation as an overarching identity that unites the 
general public in a national soc iety prevails , a prominent dynamic is how political 
ac tors, through different strategies, equal this natio n exclusively with particular 
political projects, wh ilst denying , or questioning, the shar ed nationality of their 
political adversaries. thereby advancing rival •imagined communitie s· Thi s is a study 
of these elite alleged, supposed, and desired vers ion s of the Khmer nation. It thu s 
approac hes the question of the making of the nation from a different per specti ve than 
the stud y of nation-building as political practice and public polic y, wh ich takes an 
interest in the state-led proce ss of building national identity to promote soc ial 
cohesion within the state;" it also take s a different approach from the stu dy of the 
making of the nation at its margins, which primarily examines majorit y- minorit y 
interactions.
25 
Given the limitation s of space, it also omits questions of the making 
and role of tran snational identities, which, whi lst shared across the political spectrum, 
" See, for example, Bloom ( 1990): 55 
" Cp. Amer (2006); Bourdier (2006); Hammer, ed. (2009); Guerin, Hardy; Nguyen & Stan-
Tan (2003); Edwards ( 1996); Jordens ( 1 996): Hinton (2006); Poethig (2006): Ovesen & 
Trankell (2004): and Ehrentraut (2011). 
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were dynamics most strongly associated with the former tripartite resistance.26 In lin e 
with the framework set out by Anderson, this dissertation examines both discursive 
strategies in defin ing the nation and the material context wi thin which discursive 
strategies operate- an often overlooked aspect o f Ande rson's work." It outlines how 
these different imaginings and reimaginings of the nation reflect different possibilities 
and constraints pertaining to the different political identities they invoke and the 
historical discursive baggage they carry. Rather than making a strictly textua l 
analysis, l also include other elements of discourse, such as public speech , art, 
perfom1ance and myths. Finally, whi lst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to assess 
the level of public acceptance and social penetration of these different logics, this 
argument does, to some limited extent, shed light on the viability of these d ifferent 
bids. 
Setting and Context 
On 23 October 1991, the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements (PPA) ended civil 
war between the State of Cambodia (SOC) and the tripartite coalition government , the 
Coa lition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (COOK) ; the last phase of more 
than two decades of conflict. The People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK, 1979-
1989), renamed the SOC in 1989, had been a single-party state under the 
Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), renamed the Cambodian 
People's Party (CPP) in 1991, contro lling the bulk of Cambod ian territory. The 
tripartite coalition govern ment, formed in 1982 between the Party oF Democratic 
Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) , the ant i-communist Kampuchean People s National 
Liberation Front (KPNLF) , and the royalist Front Uni National pour un Cambodge 
lndependant , Neutre , Pacific et Cooperatif(FUNCINPEC), had been based on the 
Thai-Cambodian border , co ntrolling a strip of territory along the border as well as 
enclaves scattered across the heart land. It had represented Cambodia at the UN since 
1982. Following the PPA , Cambodia became subject to one of the largest 
peacebuilding missions in the history of the UN, known as the United Na tion s 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1991-93). This ended PRK-era 
" See Poethig (2006). 
" Wollman & Spencer (2007): 8- 9 
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isolation, when the PRK had found itself on the Soviet-Vietnamese side of the Cold 
War divide, whilst the tripartite government in turn was backed up by China, the US 
and ASEAN. Internatio nal intervention through a variety of international actors has 
since bee n continuous ly implicated in outlin ing the contours of the do mestic polity 
itself, and do mestic strategies of state - and party -building. " 
One month after the signing of the PPA, deposed monarch Sihanouk returned to 
Cambodia to head a Supreme National Council to oversee the transition to a multi-
party democratic syste m prepared for by the agreements. The wide-reaching changes 
that followed the PPA have often been summed up as a triple transition: from war to 
peace, from a socialist People' s Republic to a multi-party democracy, and from a 
planned economy to a free market economy. 29 In May 1993 , general elections 
fonnally introduced mult i-party democracy. Whilst maintaining bitter enmity, the 
different political factions corning out of civil war now became electoral co mpetitor s 
competing through political party vehicles. The exception was the Khmer Rouge, 
who boycotted the 1993 elections and rejected its results. 30 Royalist party 
FUNCINPEC won a surprise victory with 45% of the vo tes, whi lst the CPP arrived 
second wi th 38% of votes. A quadripartite coalition government was fann ed between 
FUNCINPEC, the CPP , and two smaller parties of limited importance: the Buddhist 
Liberal Democratic Part y (BLDP) coming out of the KPNLF , and MOULINAKA. 
Desp ite FUNC INPEC's narro w win. a fifty-fifty power -sharing fonnula between 
FUNCIN PEC and the CPP was put in place introduci ng two prime ministers, two 
deputy prime ministers, and eq ual representation in all ministries. 31 Th e same year, a 
new constitution was adopte d that set out liberal democracy and pluralism as the 
political principles of the nation. A constitutional monarchy was reinstated and the 
~
8 Hughes (2002c): 85. Hughes (2002c): 87- l l l divides international engagement into four 
time periods: international interest in a peace process from the late 1980s tel993; less direct 
international engagement with the coalition government whilst maintaining monitoring. trade 
and aid policies 1993-97; direct intervention through diplomacy. conditionality and 
monitoring following the 1997 July events 1997-98; and a final period since 1998, in which 
international engagement again has operated on the level of diplomacy, negotiations and aid 
eolicies, rather than addressing larger questions of the legitimacy of the government 
•
9 Hughes (2002c): I. 
30 They subsequently established the Provisional Government of National Union and National 
Salvation of Cambodia (PGNVNSC) in 1994. which was dissolved in 1998 when the 
movement disintegrated. 
31 Robens (2002): 523-25. 
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SOC changed its name to the Kingdom of Cambodia (KOC) , often referred to as the 
Second Kingdom - to distinguish it from the first kingdom, which had been abolished 
by the Khmer Republic in 1970." Sihanouk ascended the throne, and the national 
motto, ·nation. religion, king·. was reinstated. A few years into the coalition 
government , the events of 5-6 July 1997 pennanently altered the political landscape 
in favour of the CPP. A de facto coup by then Second Prime Minister Hun Sen (of the 
CPP) ousting First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh (of the FUNCfNPEC), 
clipped the wings of political royalists and cemented the CPP's strong grip over the 
Cambodian political scene , cutting short what some had read as an incipient transition 
to a genuine democracy. The following period was marked by the steady decay of 
FUNCfNPEC , as it entered into successi ve coalition governments with the CPP in 
1998, 2003, and 2008 as the junior partner. Meanwhile, the BLDP was split by 
infighting and dissolved in 1997. In its place, the main party to represent an anti-
Vietnamese, anti-communist alternative was the Khmer Nation Party (KNP ), founded 
in 1995 by Sam Rains y and , after 1998, known as the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). In 
2007 , the SRP was joined by the Human Rights Party (HRP ) to fonn an opposition to 
the CPP. Despite constituting a powerful force up through the 2008 elections , the 
SRP has since been significantly weakened and, at the time of writing , the opposition 
poses no serious challenges to the CPP 
In this political framework , liberal democrac y nominall y provides the forn1at and 
language of political contestation and the constitutional monarchy delineates the 
political space. Yet , the overwhelming dominance of the CPP over Cambodian 
political realities , reconfinned by the I 997 events , compromises, if not contradicts , 
both. Second Kingdom Cambodia can be characterised as an electoral democracy, 
where elections are the main arena of political competition, yet have their own 
limitations. 33 Heder calls it an ·electoral system with many un-free and un -fair 
32 The first kingdom refers to the first post-Independence state under Norodom Sihanouk, 
which was also known as the Kingdom of Cambodia. Preah Reach Anachak Kampu chea 
(1953-1970). The Cambodian monarchy traces its roots in the Angkorean kings from the 
foundation of the Khmer Empire in year 802. The absolute monarchy was replaced by a 
constitutional monarchy in 1947. In 1970. the monarchy was abolished by the Khmer 
Republic. 
33 Karbaum (2011) argues that, since 1993. ·Hun Sen has consolidated an autocratic regime in 
which elections are the only way political competition plays out, and even that competition is 
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aspects' , which he suggests. together with the CPP's monopol y of force, control of 
the courts, perfomiance legitimacy and patronage resources, as well as Hun Sen·s 
benefactions to soc iety, e lectorally marginalise the opposition." Levitsky and Way 
refer to the contemporary Cambodian regime as ·competitive authoritarianism', 
which they define as ·civilian regime s in which formal democratic institutions exist 
and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which 
incumbents· abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-it-vis their 
opponents· 35 These regimes are ·competitive in that opposition parties use 
democratic in stituti ons to contest serious ly for power , but they are not democratic 
because the playing field is heavily skewed in Favor of incumbents' , through 
measures such as electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources 
and varying degrees of harassment and state power.36 As the internationally 
spo nsored peace-building project turned into a democracy-building one, the 
international communit y was increasingly ·Othered· by the incumbent CPP and 
claimed as an ally by the opposition. 37 Meanwhile , the CPP ha s made it clear that the 
suste ntion of the constitutional monarchy depends on its readine ss to accommodate 
the ruling interest, and repeatedly threatened to abolish the monar chy at time s when 
the monarchy has seemed unwilling to comply with this. 
limited'. Citing evidence from Southeast Asia. Dan Slater (2008) suggests that competitive 
national elections amid robust mass mobilisation act as a spur for enhancing state 
infrastructural power through catalysing the construction of mass ruling parties, energising 
state registration of marginal populations and compelling central state authorities to expand 
their coercive monopoly into areas previously controlled by local strongmen or militias. All 
three mechanisms can arguably be identified in Cambodia. 
'" Heder (2012): I 13 
35 Levitsky & Way (20 I 0): 5. This is a useful concept because, as noted by the authors (p. 16), 
other subtypes of authoritarianism, referring to non•democracies with multiparty elections, 
such as electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006) or semi-authoritarianism (Carothers 2000; 
Ottaway 2003), refer to both competitive and noncompetitive authoritarian regimes, whilst 
·competitiveness is a substantively important regime characteristic that affects the behavior 
and expectatio ns of political actors '. Levitsky & Way (2010): 22, 328-38 class ify Cambod ia' s 
trajectory from 1990 to 2008 under ·stable authoritarianism·, in which ·authoritarian 
incumbents or their chosen successors remained in power for at least three 
presidential/parliamentary terms following the establishment of competitive authoritarian 
rule' 
36 Levitsky & Way (20 I 0): 5. 
37
Cp. Brown and Timberman , eds. (I 998); Hughes (2002a): Heder & Ledgerwood, eds. 
(1996); and Lizee ( 1999). 
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What political systems are do mest ic pol itica l actors trying to real ise in this context, so 
rife with contradiction and conflict? The Second Kingdom defies easy categorisation, 
despite the appare nt simpli c ity of overall dynamics that have unidirectionally 
concentrated power in the CPP, and the hands of Prime Minister Hun Sen. 
Scholarship from a polit ical perspective has predominantl y concentrated the enquiry 
into contemporary politics on a strict focus on power pol itics. Other schola rs have 
exa min ed the changing political econo my bound up with th is elusive transit ion , 
where state and social structures have undergone fundamenta l changes, yet, 
ultimately , have served to st rengthen the power of the same el ite. The rhetoric of the 
dominant CPP has , to observers, appeared as little more than a thin ly ve iled disguise 
of the clinging to pow er by the same elite.JS Opposition roya list and se lf~identified 
democratic projects have been understood primarily to expound a react ive rhetoric to 
the context set out by CPP manoeuv rings , and dismi ssed as represent ing sha llow 
populi sm .39 The hollowness in polit ical rhetoric that this has been take n to indicate 
has eclipsed inter est in closer study of contemporary politica l discourse. Mea nwhi le, 
•ideology · has been shown to be an eroded. meaning less concept. by exte nsion 
rendering the question of political imagi nations superfluous , or, at best, peripheral.~0 
This thesis propo ses to reassess these debates, showing how politica l party acto rs 
engaged in a discursive contestation over the outline and character of the nation and 
its political contents, which , in turn, bore on ideas of national leadership and the 
nature and manner of political representation. This discursive contestation was not 
disconnected rhetoric , but intrinsically bound up with post -P PA pol itical compet it ion. 
It took place through a wide range of discursive means: in public speech , political 
writing , scho larship and art. These c laim s to representation se lectively assembled 
components from avai lable discursive mater ial from earlie r , post-independence 
regimes and contemporary global discourses, providing resources as well as 
constra ints to addressing imm ediat e political exigencies. The se cla ims to 
representatio n and their internal cohesion were, in turn, bound up with the appeal and 
38 Heder (2007): 159. 
39 Hughes (2001c): 301- 3. 
'
0 Slocomb (2006). 
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trajectories of different political party ac tors. As such , they were entw ined with large r 
political development s. 
Identity Politics - Politicised Identities and the Post-PPA Nation 
The 1993 adve nt of a multi -party democratic system changed the fonnat and 
language of political contestation, reflecting how it now centred on winning elections. 
Political actors were now electoral co ntenders competing throug h political party 
vehicles within a nominally liberal democratic framework. In their manife stos and 
campaign material s, po litical parties launched lists of ·prin cip les · they purported to 
represent, which commonly included democracy, human rights , and soc ial justice. 
Yet these references to principl es often overlapped between parties and see med vo id 
of meaning - to the point that they served to obfuscate , rather than clarify , policy 
differences for voters." This scena rio baffled observers, who expected that political 
actors competing in elections would have phrased their programs in the language of 
ideology. Joakim Ojendal and Mona Lilja note that ·the idea that the exis tence of 
competing party ideologies is one of the cornerstones of liberal democra cy does not 
seem to have taken root in Cambodian society · .•1 In an oft -quoted Asia Foundat ion 
su rvey from 2003, only 28% of respo ndent s co nsidered political parties' policies , 
views and ideology as motive s for voting, wh ilst, in tenns of poli cy differences 
between the parties , 44% of respondent s sa id they did not know if there were 
differences between partie s, 11 % sa id there were no difference s and 16% said there 
were differences but were unable to specify them."' 
If not evident in the policies and principles flaunted in their campaign materials , then 
the electoral competitors in the new multi-party system did , however, retain important 
differences based on the perpetuat ion , and exacerbation, of identity -based conflict. 
This confonned to a larger trend, obse rved in a range of democrati sating contexts in 
the wake of the Cold War , whereby eme rging political parties functioned as 
'.'. lJn (2005) m. 
- 0Jendal & LtlJa (2009c): 303. 
"Asia Foundation (2003): Ojendal & Lilja (2009c): 303: and Un (2005): 222. 
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'outgrowths of intra-elite contestation· 44 Democratic transition in these contexts was 
therefore conducive to continued domination of the political process by political 
elites, which mobilised along the lines of politicised identity. Multi party elections, as 
a consequence, served to exacerbate conflicts of identi ty rather than ame liorat e 
conflicts of interest. Caro line Hughes identifies how · in Cambodia, political parties 
inclined towards a ·politics of charismatic leadership and mob ilisation around 
politicised identities , rather than a politics of representation· and the articulat ion of 
competitive policy platfonns or policy agendas. 45 Hughes locates this in the continued 
attachment to civ il war strategies and identities of the 1980s , which the parties 
refused to change to a political conflict over pragmatic issues and grassroots 
concerns. The emergence of a multi-party environment did not transfonn the civil war 
conflict over fundamentals into a political conflict over issues , whereby each party 
acknow ledged the others as legitimate political forces. Cambodian political parties , 
she argues, sought to gain advantage over one another by means of two main 
strategies: the attempted manipulation of democratic processes and institutions, and 
the rhetorical portrayal of opponents as a threat to the survival of the Cambodia n 
nation, rather than mere illegitimate participants in politics.46 
This thesis reassesses the promotion of identity-based conflict by politica l party 
actors. Identity-based conflict was, I argue, located in the advancing of competing 
imaginings of the Cambodian nation, each making out the own party or party leader 
as the nation's genuine representative. Responding to a crisis of national 
representation , the full range of political party actors offered different solutions, 
which entailed the forging of exclusive links between themselves and the nation. 
These competing imaginings and articulations of the Cambodian nation thus fon11ed a 
powerful underl ying dynamic structuring wider political contestation in the multi-
party system. The two strategies suggested by Hughes were ultimately rooted in 
larger narratives of the Cambodia n nation. In this way, the main political party actors 
advanced contending nations. 
'"Hughes (2002b) : 166. 
"' Ibid.: 167. 
" Ibid.: 167-{iS. 
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Moreover , political actors did, this thesis lays out, communicate these different 
artic ulations of the nat ion to the electora te. Alt hough their references to ·principles· 
might appear hollow, politica l acto rs did communicate vita l information to the 
electorate about the different political systems they envisaged, mani fest and anchored 
in their identities, through a variety of means. Whilst this somet imes took place by 
means of party programs and manifestos, it perhaps more importantly took place 
outside and beyond these . Hughes 110tes how the behav ior and rhetoric of political 
parti es often communicated messages that contradicted the letter of campaign 
material, writing that ·The mismatch between the letter of campaign materials and the 
behaviour and rhetoric of political parties was so wide as to render political 
manifestos in-elevant to the election campaign, reflecting the subordination of policy 
debates to intra-elite struggles focused on identities that linger from the civil war 
years.' ➔7 This dissertation traces and interprets the messages communicated through a 
full range of measures beyond party man ifestos, and to varying degrees both 
explicitly and impli citly, whic h included public discourse, political writin gs, and 
artistic production. Rather than promoting identities simply inherited from the civil 
war years, however, these messages were tied to changing political imaginings and 
attempts to imbue morphing political identities with meaning to accommodate the 
cha nging soc ial and political context following the end of the Cold War. 
These identitie s, I suggest, focused prec isely on a polit ics of representation. This was 
certainly not a politics of representation in the sense that Hughes refers to, above, in 
terms of·inserting pragmatic grassroots concerns into elite political agendas•.·i8 
Rather, these were elite bids to represent the nat ion through a range of measures that 
equalled a particular po litica l identity with exclusive representation of the nation·s 
aspirations. This distinction explains the otherwise mind-boggling discrepancy 
between the failure of polit ical actors to represent actual grassroots concerns on the 
one hand, and their ins istent claims to representation on the other. This paradox was 
clearly observed in the royalist FVNCfNPEC party. Whilst FUNCfNPEC did very 
little ·to establish a clear relationship of representation with its rural campaigners and 
supporters·, at the sa me time, ·the party portra yed itself as possessed ofa right to rule 
"' Ibid.· 170. 
" Ibid.: 166-67. 
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by virtue of its status as the embodime nt of the natural aspirations of· ·traditional" 
Cambodians for a monarchical system · , claim s that were made by attempting to 
mobilise voters around a party identity of ·ro yal ism· .49 The belief of the political elite 
in their own exclusive abil ity to represent the nation con finned an elite attitude to 
politics observed to be based on the ·co -optation of the broader population into elite-
determined political trajectories· . rather than a turning of political partie s into o rgans 
to represent grassroots-level social forces.50 Yet, at the same time, it was also a 
testament to how central claims to representation of the nation, as defined by the elite, 
remained in the exercise of politics. Meanwhile, the power of the political elite to 
define the Cambodian political traje ctory makes the dynamics of its purported 
representation of the nation all the more important for the analysis of contemporary 
political developments. 
Thi s thesis traces the transfonnation of these political identities , bound up with 
different national imagining s in Cambodia·s Second Kingdom . following the 
changing context after the end of civil war. Cambodian political discour se 
distinguishes between the CPP, royalist parties, and democratic parties, and this is 
also how political actors self-define. The main divide between these three main 
political identities in Second Kingdom electoral politic s is different concep tions of 
how to relate to the nation. The CPP, to fill the vacuu m after abandoning a half-
hearted socialist identity , turned to a brand of populism that equated the party with 
the people, and with Prim e Minister Hun Sen making claims to legitimate national 
leadership through renegotiating historical ideas of kingship. Self-identified royalists 
turned to repr esent the nation through different strategies of embodiment. Self-
identified democrats purported to represent a victimised nation , tracing local 
grievances as microcosms of the ai ling nation. Art iculating these political identities in 
relation to the nation meant staking the boundaries of what it meant to be a royalist , 
democrat, and so on, in a process of co-constitution between such political identities 
and the nation. Thi s, in turn , went hand in hand with the making of the contested 
categories of democracy , legitimate leader sh ip , and the mandate of the reinstated 
monarchy. 
49 Hughes (2002c) : 118- 19. 
;o Ibid. : 126. 
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This gives a picture of a metamorpho sis of identities inherited from the civ il war era . 
Hughes specifies the ·polit icised identiti es' lingering from the civil war yea rs as ·an 
association of FUNCfN PEC and the SRP with instabilit y, anarchy, and the genocide 
of the "Khmer Rouge·• on the part of the CPP, and the casting of the CPP as tra itors 
and " Vietnam ese puppets .. on the part of FUNC IN PEC and the SRP.' 51 Whilst these 
civi l war-inh erited ident ities have cont inued to be propag ated in the two decades 
follow ing the PPA, they have also been accompanied by the emergence of novel, and 
more comp lex, political imagini ngs and attempts to imbu e political identiti es with a 
range of different meaning s. The CPP changed from a civil war era soc ialis t identit y 
to a post-sociali st identity entailing a comp lex mix of contemporar y and historical 
legitimisations, merging historical ideas of kingship with contemporary ideas of 
social mobil ity and mer itocracy. The end of the Cold War -induced coa lition between 
democrats and royalists also resu lted in the transfonnat ion of resistance ide111ities, 
with a rene wed emp hasis on separate royalist and demo crat ic identities. A democrat ic 
identity was defi ned and claimed in very different ways by the SRP and 
FUNCfN PEC, but also by the CPP, and was for all three parti es roo ted in national 
imagining s. The ·reshapi ng of pro -democratic party identities · was thus much more 
complex than previously suggested, involving more actors, and more tension both 
between and within FUN C IN PEC and the SR P. Hugh es de scribes FUNC IN PEC as 
having two core identities: one resistance/democratic opposition identity, and one 
royalist identity focused on ce leb rating the Sangkum legacy. 52 The following 
disc uss ion traces a tension betwee n these two identities , concluding that they did not 
coex ist easily. In fact , these very diff erent vis ions, as we ll as the particular 
reinvention of royalist identity as Sangkum legacy, became increasingly used as a 
conscious atte mpt to justify closer cooperation with the CPP , and was also hijacked 
by the CPP to this effect. It con tribut ed to the breakdo wn of FUNCfN PEC, and , more 
generally , preclude d the possibi lity of ser ious coopera tion betwe en FUNCfNPEC and 
the SRP. It is therefore one exa mple of how these identitie s were inseparab le from 
large r political deve lopm ents in the KOC. 
51 Hughes (2002b): 171. 
;o Hughes (2001 c): 307. 
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These transfom 1ing identities and the national imagining s they were tied to were 
fragmented by tensions , contradictions and confl icts. Some were internal to the 
projects they advanced. For the CPP and Hun Sen, this tension centred on the 
mandate and nature of legitimate leaders hip in a post -soc iali st context, whilst 
building on their revolutionary legitimacy of the recent past. For royalists, their 
central dilemma was how to reconcile the constitutional monarchy with political 
royal ism. Democrats , in tum , struggled to represent a nation not yet really existing , 
but rather in becoming , repre senting the will of the people that they imagined to be 
clouded by false consciousne ss . The se political identities were also destabili sed by 
external challenges , each unse ttled from outside the boundaries of the ow n group. 
The collapsing of boundaries between political identity categories, and the 
rearticulation and hijacking of such identity categories , were bound up with wider 
political contestation. The CPP and Prime Minister Hun Sen were challenged in their 
national leader ship role by the opposition's denunciation of them as national traitors, 
making out their national leadership as symptomatic of a nation turned upside down. 
The crisis of defining · royal ism· left room for the CPP claims to take over the royalist 
identity. Whilst a democratic identity was primarily claimed by the se lf- identified 
democrat ic opposition, (spearheaded by the SR.P), they were challenged by rival 
claims to democratic identity by the CPP and political royali sts . 
These identities were employed to promote political parties in political , including 
electoral, competition. Studying them therefore helps illuminate the trajectories of 
different political partie s. The se identitie s were, however, not confined to political 
party identity as such, in the sense that they were not necessarily articulated in a 
strictl y part y political way. For example, one set of political partie s appealed to a 
royalist identity , whic h transce nded that of the indi vidual party. Moreo ver, royalist 
identity also entailed references to the institution of the monarchy outside the political 
party. That the unit of identity transcended a strict party political divi sion contr ibut ed 
to their susceptibi lity to being claimed and hijacked by actors from rival political 
parties. 
Moreover , many identitie s were individual in nature. This testifie s to the continuously 
personalised character of legitimate leadersh ip in the Second Kingdom, with 
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individual ·strongmen' trum ping pol itical parties as mobilisers of opin ion. 53 Indeed, 
contemporary claims to legitimate power are often made through appealing to the 
legitimacy pertaining to individual identities, wou ld-be archetypes that fuse d ifferent, 
yet interconnected, aspects of power in one identity. Steve Heder ( 1995) ide ntifies 
three ·claims of qualification to rule· in post-independence Cambodia, namely sdech, 
·king' or ·prince, confined to the royal family; neak cheh-doeng, a person wit h 
higher education; and neak t6-sou, a person who has taken part in anned struggle.54 
The adoption of such identities prov ided a manner for actors to negotiate the 
meanings such model s of leg itimac y evoked, reconfiguring them in their favour. Yet 
the se ·p ersonal leg itimi sation s' were also employed to further the particu lar political 
party that individual po litical actors were associated with, whils t not laying c laims to 
constitute a political party identity per se . This tension between personal 
legitimisations and those of the collective party can be seen to underlie the 
contemporary Cambodian politica l landscape . I illustrate this in the seco nd chapter on 
a narrative promoted by Hun Sen, which was essentially a very personal attemp t at 
legitimisation, wh ilst certainly also a claim to legitimacy on the part of the CPI'. 
Appeals of this kind of personalised leg itimacy were made forcefully by Hun Sen as a 
consequence of his attempts to personalise power. In the third chapter, I explore the 
difficulty of transferring legitimacy tied to the person of Sihanouk to his son, 
Norodom Ranariddh , and the FUNC INPEC party. The dwindling credibility of 
appeals to ·incarnat e· or 'embo died· power by political royalists, which resonate with 
the historical legitimation of royals, it is argued, is nothing short of a crisis resulting 
from ho w royal power is converted from something incarnate to belonging to the 
institution of the monarchy. 
Legitimac y Buildin g and the Post -PPA Nat ion 
The different national imag inings advance d by party political actors were intrinsically 
linked to a search for political legitimacy . Thoroughgoing political change in 
Sou theast Asia in the wake of the Cold War has made the que stion of leg itimacy 
paramount in the reg ion. Yet po litical scientists have been relativ e ly relu ctant to use 
53 Hughes (2000): 121. 
'' Heder (1995): 425-29. 
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the concept of legit imacy when analysing reg ional political deve lopments, reflecting 
problems of definition and mea sure ment. In the most influential piece of work in 
recent years on political legitimacy in Sout heast Asia, Muth iah Alagappa right ly 
outlines a picture of the contestation of legitimacy as defining much ofSoutheast 
Asia, including Ca mbodia , in the post-co lonial period. 55 I-le suggests that the key 
elements of legitimacy are shared nonns and values; confom1ity with established 
rules for acq uiring power; proper and effective use of power; and conse nt of the 
governed." According to Alagappa , countries with weak, contested political systems 
and a low level of institutionalisation do not generally emphasise procedural elements 
to confer legitimacy. Instead, the emp has is in pol itical legiti mation shifts to 
norma tive elements, concerned with ·p rescr ibed goals or va lues for soc iety on the 
basis of which the incumbent power holders seek to construct a normative 
framework·, and performance elements. concerned · less with the use of power within 
the law and more with its effective use for promotion of the co llective welfare·. In 
addition. authority may also be cla imed ·on the basis of charisma , a politically 
defining moment , and internat ional support' .57 
Cambodia confonns to this pattern. CPP legitimation is heavily perfonnance based, 
and the party routine ly refers to its achievements in providing domestic in frastructure 
in terms of roads, ho spitals and schoo ls.58 Although the CPP emphasises electio ns in 
its bid to legitimacy, which wo uld appear to be a procedura l element , this emp hasis 
has also been shown to be anchored in a performance -based claim , as elections are 
appea led to in tenns of how they demonstrate the CPP·s capacity to organise them. " 
The CPP has also framed its electioneering practices of gift-giving by alluding to 
shared cultural symbols of the meritorious benefactor, situating them in larger 
political imaginings that are heavily normative .60 Political contestation continues to 
centre on a reinvented civil war-era conflict over fundamentals, turned into a conflict 
ove r the impl ementa tion of procedures. The opposition contests the implementation 
55 Alagappa (1995a): 3. 
% Alagappa (1995b): 15. 
57 Alagappa (1995c): 31. 
; s Hughes (2006). 
;, Hughes (2009). 
60 Hughes (2006). 
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of procedures set forth by the PPA and the 1993 Constitution, includin g election s, 
thereby crippling the appeal of procedural elements in bestowing legitimacy. 6 1 Hun 
Sen, Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy are all known to be charismatic leaders. FUNCIPEC 
and the SRP have continuously portrayed themselves as ·the favored allies of 
Western government s' in order to harne ss domestic confidence and support. 62 The 
CP P under Hun Sen, meanwhile , while maintaining reasonably good relations with 
the US, has cemented a strong relationship with Vietnam and, increasingly, China.63 
The relative efficacy of these con tempora ry bids for political legitimacy remains 
debated. As the basic ingredients for procedural democratic leg itimac y have been in 
place since 1993 , this has been understood to bestow the CPP with a degree of 
external (international) legitimacy , whilst there is no scholarly consensus on whether 
this has also bestowed internal (domestic) legitimacy .64 Though the holding of 
elect ions has come to be viewed by international policymakers as a hallmark of 
internal legitimac y, the Ca mbodian opposition strategies of continuously challenging 
subsequent elections sugge st that the reality is more complex. Some charge that the 
CPP -led government"s use of po litical violence. widespread corruption and 
exploitation of natural resources has led to an internal legitimacy crisis.65 Perhaps as a 
response to such a crisis, the CPP has engaged in a number of efforts to build internal 
legitima cy. In a recent volume, a number of authors explore the CPP states efforts to 
bui Id legitimacy from the perspective of the construction and reconstruction of soc ial 
and political institutions. Kheang Un finds that embedded corruption, nepoti sm, 
patronage politics and government interference engender a negative popular 
perception toward government institutions , particularly the judiciary branch. Yet, he 
argues, the ruling party uses the judiciary, through showcases of ad hoe judicial 
refonn, to legitimise their actions.66 Laura McGrew finds that the bringing of the 
Khmer Rouge to internationall y recognised trials has constituted one state strategy for 
both internal and external legitimacy. 67 Kim Sedara and Joakim Ojendal argue that 
61 Hughes (2002b): 167-68 . 
" Hughes (2002a): 552. 
63 Heder (2012): I 05-8 
6
' Hughes (2009): 33. 
65 Kim (2009): 7-8. 
66 Un (2009): 90-95. 
67 McGrew (2009). 
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decentralisation and local elections have introduced a new rational e for local 
government, whereby the local state increasingly gains acceptance as a legitimat e 
authori ty.68 Sopha! Ear, co nceptua lising political legitimac y to includ e the rul e of law , 
wo rking institution s and popular consent, and operationalising it through exam inin g 
deve lopment outcomes , conc ludes that there has been progress in both interna l and 
exte rnal legitimacy tied to the use of aid post-UNTAC: Ea r finds it ·debatable'. 
however, how much int ernal legitimacy was successfully achieved wi th this aid.69 
John Mar ston , discussi ng NGO movements linked to Buddhi sm, diss ident monks, and 
two reli gious figur es as challengers to state legitimacy, finds an amb iguous 
relationship between re ligion and soc ial legit imac y .70 In sum , the exte nt of the 
incumbent regime's internal legitimacy is unclear, whilst there are increasing 
indications of its ongoing legitimacy-seeking through a range of strategies. 
Fol low ing Barker. A lagappa defines po litica l leg itimacy as ·the be lief in the 
rightfulness of a state , in its authority to issue co mmands, so that the commands are 
obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed to have 
moral authority, because subjects believe that they ought to obey'. 71 He argues that 
the objects of leg itim ation are usually three associated instituti ons of the state , 
namely: the nation state, concerned wit h exp ress ing politi cal ident ity; the reg ime, the 
type of governmen t; and the government, the actual control or exercise of state 
power.
72 
According to A lagappa, the legitimation of the nation state rests on shared 
identity, regime legitim ation on shared norm s and values, and government 
leg itimation on conforn1ity with established rul es and per fonn ance. 73 Nonet heless, 
attem pts to legitimise successive Cambodian regimes and governments consistently 
refer back to the shared identity on which the legitimation of the nation state is based. 
In this context, it may be instructive to consider the nation, as an objec t of legi timacy , 
as the larger frame of refe rence suggested by A nderson, w hich, supplanting earli er 
·cultural systems·. offe rs a new overa rching framework for linkin g fraternity, power 
68 Kim & 0Jendal (2009): 115, 122 
69 Ear (2009): 173. 
70 Marston (2009): 225. 
71 Alagappa(\995a): 2: following Barker(\990): 11. 
" Alagappa ( 1995b): 26. 
73 Ibid.: 30 
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and time. 74 As the framework defining, in tum, also regime and government 
legitimation s, the impetu s to define national imagining s is all the more pronounced. 
The Cambodian post-independence regimes, in their successive string, each attempted 
to build their legitimacy on representation of the political community of the nation. 
Since the I 94 7 emergence of the first Cambodian political party, the Democratic 
Party, Hughe s finds the bottom line of bids for internal legitimacy to be conceptions 
of com munit y. From the Sangkum Reastr Ni yum onwards ( 1955-), successive 
regimes· attempts to promo te their own leg itimac y have been hea vi ly based on claim s 
to defend a national imagining of the community. In creating this sense of 
nationhood, imaginin gs have been paramount, as national identit y has generally 
lack ed administrative shape and has only been manifest in ·ha zy visions· of 
· Khmerness· 75 The se c laims have continuously been contested by rival political 
projects. 76 Power hold ers and the political opposition, alike , have cont inuously made 
claims to legitimacy, mainly by purporting to represent the nation , confim1in g that 
modern nationalisms do not exclusive ly belong to rulers ." 
This dissertation outlin es how , in contemporary Cambodia, bids for internal 
legitimacy , to a hitherto neglected extent, continue to centre on claims to represent 
the nation - transplanted onto the arena of multi-party liberal democracy. Bids to 
internal legitimacy , of the regime and its opponents alike , have in the contemporary 
setting, similar to preceding decades, been directly linked to national imaginings. The 
mixed procedural and performance-based bids for legitimacy as those out lined above 
are ultimately trace ab le to representation of the nation. 78 Rather than a battle of 
political ideologies or policy platforms, contemporary political contestation can be 
understood as a confli ct over representation of1he nmion , tied up with wider power 
dynamics and structures. The contemporary period can be understood , in this sense, 
as an era of identit y politics, integrall y bound up with power po litics machinations, 
74 Anderson (1991 ): 12- 22 situates the origin of nationalism in the decline of a divinely-
ordained dynastic realm, its legitimacy eroded by Enlightenment and Revolution, which called 
f?r a new foundation of legitimacy in time provided by the nation 
7
' Hughes (2009): 34-40 
76 Gyallay-Pap (2007): 72 
77 White (2005): 16. 
78 In support of this, Hughes (2009): 54 tinds that the CPP, since 1993, has used elections to 
promote the idea that the party represents the only viable incarnation of a national Khmer 
political community. 
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tho ugh not simply reducible to a compo nent of it. Th ese imagining s provide a 
necessary prism to qualify Cambodian party political contestation. Th e complex 
inven tions se lectively pick up and emp loy evolving notions of powe r and legitimacy, 
interacting wit h reinvented ·traditional' notions as we ll as earlie r strings of 
reinventions. 
Attention to the importance of national imaginings for domestic legitimi sations 
enta ils reassessing the role of democratic legitimisat ion s in contemporary Ca mbodia. 
Understanding Cambodia ' s socia l. cu ltural. historical. and inst itution al contexts to be 
unreceptive to Western -sty le democracy, cun-ent scholarship is rife with arguments 
that democracy, consequently, does not fonn a basis for legitimate lead ership in any 
straigh tforward way. 79 The body of scholarship examining contemporary democratic 
practice and d iscourse has predominantly so ught to establish the causes for the failure 
of liberal dem ocracy to conso lida te in the Ca mbodian context , and how to classify the 
syste m that has now emerged. 80 These accounts share an understanding that 
Cambodian political actor s pay lip service to the notion of democracy to please the 
international audience, whi lst, in practice , exhibiting distinctly undemocratic , illiberal 
tendencies. Incumbent CPP is und erstood to have made a rhetorical commitment to 
liberal democracy to placate the international community, whilst , in practice , 
deviating from it at will. 81 Th e SRP and FUNCINPEC, meanw hil e, have been argued 
to employ a democratic opposition ident ity abroad, in contradistinction from a 
nationalist resistance identit y flaunted as the primary identit y at home. 82 Democratic 
legitimisations in contemporary Cambodia are thus predominantly understood as 
external in nature, oriented towa rds an in1emational audience. Exasperalion w ith how 
parts of the democratic package have been estab lished and others not has led Ojendal 
and Lilja to suggest that contempora ry Ca mbodia finds itse lf ' beyo nd democracy·, in 
the sense that ·democracy and democratisation have been exhausted as concepts that 
79 Kirn (2007): Mabbe11 & Chandler (1995); Un (2005); Hughes (2006); Mehrnet (1997); 
Blum & Turner (2005); and St John (2005) 
80 E.g. Brown & Timberman, eds. (1998); Karbaum (2011); Croissant (2008); Peou (2000); 
Roberts (2001 ): Sanderson & Maley ( 1998); and Un (2005; 2006). 
81 Cp. Heder (2007b): 161-62; Peou (2000); Sanderson & Maley (1998); and Springer (2010) 
" Hughes (2001c) : 311- 12. 
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can be used with any precision to ana lyse political change and soci al cleve lopmenl in 
Ca mbodia· .' 3 
Thi s dissertation reframe s lh is dilemma by outlining how no1ions of democracy , 
contrary to assumptions, have been central to the domestic legitimising discourses of 
the full range of contending po litical party actors. Whil sl not defined along liberal 
democratic lines , democracy has provided the language for domestic poli1ical 
imaginings, tied up with national ones. This no doubt refle cts how the proce ss of 
imbuing politics with meaning has meant imbuing democracy with meaning, given 
that the prese nt era is nominal ly democratic. The nation has been a ce ntral part of the 
answer to how this is to be achieved. National and democratic imaginings have thus 
evo lved in tandem. Thi s allows the rela tionship bet ween democratic imaginations and 
the nation in con temporary Ca mbod ian political discourse 10 be reasse sse d, along 
with the ro le of democra1ic discou rses therein. In this analy sis, I take my lead from a 
bod y of literature that has shown how a va riet y of interpretation s of the essence of 
democracy are bound up with the histories and contexts of each socie 1y, pro vid ing 
reso urces as well as constrainls to political models and ·reform trajecto ries· 84 Rather 
than measuring local realitie s aga insl predefined concepts of democracy , 1his 
literature maps out national democrat ic imaginings to earn a fine-grained 
understanding of domestic reali1ie s, and assesses this within 1he relationship of 
leg itimacy and political change. Thi s framework co nstitutes a formidable too l for 
illuminating shad es and dimensions of the cur rent proc ess of democratisat ion, as 
cal led for by Ojendal and Lilja. 85 Ap plied to contemporary Ca mbodia, thi s pri sm 
exposes how political party actors advanced different visions of the orga nisa1ion of 
1he polity and popular repr ese ntation framed in the language of dis1inctly national 
fonns of democracy and pre sen1ed as such to the domestic popula1ion. Refe rences to 
democracy were not merely the externa lly moti vated charade that the cu rrent 
83 Ojendal & Lilja (2009b): 2. 
8
~ This suggests that each society has democracy ·sui generis', or, as Benedict Anderson 
( 1990): 148 puts it, ·w e fall into nominal ism when we identify socialism and democracy as 
things that Are- they are only what we make them·. Acknowledging this, a diverse body of 
work has set out to map society-specific discourses of democracy in the Southeast Asian 
region (cp. Anderson (1990; 1988); and Connors (2003)); in Asia (Kane & Patapan (2008)); 
and in communist and post-communist societies (cp. Dryzek & Holmes, eds. (2002); and Lei 
(1996)). 
s; Ojendal & Lilja (2009b): 2. 
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literature would have us believe. On lhe contrary, a larger, discursive contestation to 
establish a hege monic and relevant definit ion of what democracy wou ld mean in the 
particular context of the Cambodian trajectory took place in post-PPA Cambodia 
Can these discourses be characterised as the local isatio n of demands for 
democratisation? Democracy was implanted in Cambodia in the early 1990s as part 
ofa global drive for democrat isation. often referred to as the ·Third Wave". 86 On its 
wake , Oj enda l and Lilja write that ·the old is being affected by libera l democratic 
discourse and loca l var iations eme rg ing ' . They charge that ·the outcome is unlikely to 
match the high ideals of the newborn democracy that guided the UNTAC intervention 
and subseque nt reconstruction support. Instead, we see something else emergi ng. It is 
as yet unclear exact ly what it is, but it is certainly more ope n-ended and less linear 
than what is typical ly anticipated in the reconstruction discourse. ' 87 The discourses I 
describe here are part of that ·something else emerging'. They took place in a larger 
historical context of globalisation , entaili ng the spread of a global liberal democratic 
discourse, and , inevitably , responded to and interacted with the specific change s 
induced in national governance practices associated with this.ss Strikingly, though, 
these discourses are not mo st aptly characterised as the outcome of a process of 
localisation of a global liberal democrat ic discourse. Cer tainly, they were not located 
in a separate realm untouched by liberal democratic discourse. In some ways, 
concerns pertaining to the liberal democratic agenda can be convincingly argued to 
have influenced these domestic discourses, or to have found resonance in them. This 
is most evident in the appeals to mer itocracy in Hun Sen·s discourse, and the 
identification by se lf-ident ified democrats and some royalists with a liberal 
democratic identity . Yet , contestation over the meani ng of democracy revol ved 
primarily around notions of leadership and political organisation , in ways that 
reassessed embodied , hereditary and elected leadership - questions deeply embedded 
in Cambod ian historical and political con text. Political party discourses debated these 
in interaction with each other, engaging in debates that, whilst not self -contained, 
went beyond the parameters of a globa l liberal democratic discourse. 
86 Ibid .: 3 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ojendal (2005): 345. 
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Whilst this point s to the importance of a clo se study of Cambodian histo rical and 
cu ltural realities , it do es not support the widespread tendency wit hin current 
scholarship to write off conte mporary conceptions and realiti es of Ca mbod ian 
democracy in terms of general notions of Cambodian ·politi ca l cultur e'. Ca mbodian 
e lite s have been under stoo d to build on historicall y inherited abso lutist not ions of 
power, so that conte mporary po litical cu lture , hierarchica l, absolutist and patronage-
or ient ed. is see n to be evolving w ithin the framework of suc h a ·traditi onal" conce pt 
of powe r.89 Thi s disse rtati on problematises the assumption o f stra ightforwar d 
dicho tomisations betwee n the modern and traditional legitimation s these accounts 
bu ild on, by giving evidence of how so-call ed ·traditional" notion s and concepts are 
employed by contemporary actors, ye t are marked by contradiction s and paradoxes, 
and are the subject of re invention and conte sta tion. This calls for a mu ch mor e 
precise, historicised account of national and democratic imaginations, suggesting that 
contemporary bid s for leg itim acy are better understood in the spec ific historical 
con text of the entangleme nt of notions of democracy and nati onal identity since 
independe nce. 
These discourses of the nat ion as the end point of political action, and democracy as 
its mean s, engaged with historical Ca mbod ian mode ls of leaders hip , and the moral 
and re ligiou s conceptualisatio ns attac hed to them. It is therefo re vital to include 
culturall y, re ligiou sly and histo rically embedded notions in thi s analysis. 90 As the 
histo rical mod el of leader ship , the institution of the monarch y, underpinn ed by its 
own distinct set of legitimisations, provides a case in point. The reconfiguration of 
legitimacy through changing conceptualisations of historical kingship, identified in 
the wider Southeast As ian region, also took pla ce in contemporary Cambo dia. 
Empl oy ing national vocabula ries and analytical tool s derived from specific cu ltural 
and religious contexts, the regional literature has charted an appa ren t post-Cold War 
·retraditiona lisation·, whereby ideas of kingship have resurfaced. In Laos , a 
communist Peop le·s Republi c attemp ting to transform its publi c face. the party -state 
has increa singly tried to boos t its cred ibilit y by reference to resurgin g ideas of 
89 Mehmet ( 1997): 676; Kim (2007): 4; St John (2005): 415; Mabbett & Chandler ( 1995); 
Blunt & Turner (2005); and Gainsborough (20 I 2) 
90 
Equally. from a Khmer studies perspective, scholars have warned of studying Cambodian 
political culture through application of the vocabulary and tools of political science, only. 
Gyallay-Pap (2007) 72- 75. 
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kingship. 91 In post-c16i m(Yi Vietnam, similarly a remaining com munist regime , but a 
soc iety wit h historical idea s of kingship derived from a Sino-Vietnamese rat her than 
a Theravada Buddhi st tradition , the d6i m&i sta te has begun to explore ancestor 
worship as a foundation for nationali sm.9' Jellema describes how the 06 Temple in 
northern Vietnam, devoted to the eig ht kings of the Ly Dynas ty (IOI 0---1225), enjo ys 
incr easing attention from party and state leaders who ·rememb er the debt" all 
Vietnamese owe to the Ly kings. She reads it as a shift sparked by a commu nist party 
legitimacy crisis following the co llapse of the Soviet Bloc , from the sta tes previous 
defensive martial ideolo gy to a ·kinet ic nationalism ' able to coalesce disparate people 
around the goal of national dev elopment. 93 ln Thai land, the venerat ion of reigning 
king Bhum ibol Aduljadej is mirrored by a cult around historical king Chulalongkom 
(r. 1868- 1910), drawing on expectations of what Buddh ist kingship ca n do for the 
benefit of the nation, whilst also facing a counter narrative that points to how the king 
as a human is fallible by natur e." Also in Cambodia, this dissertation shows, political 
legitimation has been renegot iated in important ways around culturall y embedded 
ideas of kingship , and charting reconfigurations of the relationship between the 
nation , kingship and ideas of Buddhism is essential for unmasking bid s for political 
legitimation in the contemporary context.
95 
Though it shares fami ly similarit ies with 
its neighbour s, the Cambodian case is unique in the region , in the sense that this 
renegotiation has taken place within the framework of a reinstated constitutional 
monarchy. Moreover, in Cambodia , at a difference from the one-party sta tes of Lao s 
and Vietnam , different meanings of king ship and legitimat e leade rship were offered 
by different political acto rs compet ing in the multi-party democratic system and 
became an essential part of party political contestation 
Political legitimacy is an i11heren tly moral concept. Alagappa, for one, under stands 
political legitimacy as the belief by the governed that the ruler is morall y right and 
:: Evans (1998; 2002); and Grabowsky & Tappe (20 I I). 
- Taylor (2007): 8 
93 Jeltema (2007). 
94 Stengs (2009). 
95 Gyallay-Pap (2007) has outlined the modern Cambodian conception of political order as an 
allotropy formed by conjoining the modern \Vestern concept of the nation with indigenous 
notions of Buddhist kingship and the sangha to create a civic religion of loyalty to the 
Cambodian state. Rather than to the swte, this thesis makes the case that loyalty to the nation 
is the central idea that notions of kingship and Buddhism are modelled around. 
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that the people hav e a co rres pondin g ob liga tion to obey their rul er' s comma nds.96 The 
nationalist discourses here explored as projects for establishing legitimate power can 
also be under stood as proj ects through which the moral order in the KO C has been 
negot iat ed, producin g the nati ona l space as a mora l geography. In line with how the 
spat ial organisation of So uth eas t Asian pol ities eme rged intertw ined w ith the moral 
order, the creation of the nation state necessitated new conceptualisations of the moral 
community_97 In toda y ·s Cambodia, ea rlier notions of powe r and moral order have 
been overturned by large-scale upheavals over the two decades preceding the PP A, 
provoking much scholarly interest in the ongoing reshaping of moral words these 
uphea vals ha ve necess itat ed. The bulk of this sc ho larsh ip exp lores the remaking of 
the ·moral geology" of co ntempo ra ry Ca mbodia from the per spec tiv e of the rev iva l of 
Cam bodian Buddhi sm, ofte n from a grassroots, rural per spe ct ive .98 Whi lst these 
studies, to varying extent, place religious revival in its political context, by contrast, 
studies that take elite bid s to reco nfigure the contemporary mora l order as the dir ect 
object of study are few. 99 Thi s di sse rtation aims to correct this bias , by demo nstratin g 
how the poli tica l elite voca lly engage d in attem pt s to reshape and define Cambod ian 
moral geography. Cambodian party political actors, through articulating their national 
visions, were crucial bidders taking part in the remaking of Cambodian moral worlds. 
Partly as a consequence of its inherent moral dimension, legitimacy is an intrinsically 
ambi guous and contested concept that can be thought to onl y eve r be partially 
96 Alagappa (1995): 29. 
9
.,. ln the classical Southeasl Asian states, the spatial organisation of the state linked religion 
and geography, allowing them to co-determine each other. See, for example, Heine-Geldern 
( 1956); Tambiah (1976): and Condominas (1978). The emergence of national thinking 
entailed a consequential restructuring of the moral nature of social and individual identities 
See Hansen (2004; 2007); and Edwards (2004; 2007) 
98 This includes ethnographies of contemporary religion (Guthrie (2004)); contemporary 
millenarian movements and their nationalist overtones (Marston (2004)); the reconstruction of 
village Buddhism (Ledgerwood (2008a); and Satoru (2008)); wider perception s of moral order 
at the village level (Zucker (2008)); rural efforts to re-create moral order through re-
establishing pagodas and consecrating pagoda boundaries and the increasing politicisation of 
the local. Buddhist world (Kent (2007)): monks political involvement (Heng (2008)); and the 
~oliticisation of the sangha (Harris (200 1)) 
9 
important exceptions are Ledgerwood (2008b), who analyses the 1990 water festival as an 
attempt by the CPP to reassert a particular social and political order; Edwards (2008b), who 
explores government strategies to redefine morality through policing social ethics; and 
Hughes (2006), who explores the moral economy of gift-giving by political actors 
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possessed. '00 This is all the more pronounced in Cambodia, given the nature of 
histo1ica l and co nlemporary Cambod ian concep tualisatio ns of power , which merg e it 
with moral considerations. In his1orical Cambodian imagina1ion s, mora l, spiritual and 
political powe r were fused, based on Buddhist notions of mer it and kann ic law 1hat 
underlay Buddhi st king ship. The inlerpla y between merit , wealt h and power was, and 
still is, reflected in language. 101 The word denoting political power , omnach, can-ies 
connotations of1hese differe nt historical sources or indicators of power , such as 
barami (sp iri tual, charisma1 ic power), bon (merit) and mean (wealt h). 102 O1her Khmer 
words for ·po wer' impl y different sha des of moral and religious aut hority . including 
atthipol (influ ence) and barami. The se historical conceptualisa1ions of legi1ima1e 
leade rship contain their own am bigu ities and paradoxes. The structural 
incompatibility between world ly leader ship and Buddhi st values represents an age -
old stand -off in Buddhi st thinkin g on kings hip. 103 Suc h ambiguities were also 
perceived in popular understandings. Discussing the nineteenth century Cambodian 
polity, which und erwe nt large-sca le upheavals in a manner not dissimi lar from recent 
history, David Chandler sug gests tha l, in the eyes of the population, the relationship 
between wealth , power and meril was considered problematic , produc ing gaps in 1he 
nan-ative underpinning social order as high rank followed from merit orious, yet 
unverifiable, behaviour in another life. Th ere we re ·gap s that open be tween what 
ought to happen in the world. what often happens , and the ' ·no rma1· · .104 Fol lowing 
Chandler"s exploration of the dichotomy between the orderly and the disorderly as 
the realms of srok (human sett lements) and prei (the forests) , these no1ions ha ve 
become 1he loci of a debate on an indigenous moral geography. 105 Edwards , follow ing 
Chandler 's hint s to,\3rd s the highly ambiguous nalure of the prei, suggesls 1his to be 
a ·compl ex dialectical terrain· ra1her than a ·bipolar moral geograp hy". ·where 
no1ions of civilized or wild contract, expand and shape-s hift in relation or reaction to 
violations of moral or soc ietal no rms' . Edwards invites us to think of the borderland s 
ioo White (2005): 3. 
101 
The Khmer term for 'merit ', ban , appears in compounds such as bo11-011111acl1 ('power ', 
'authority ') and bo11-sak (' rank'). Edwards (2007): 69 
'°' Jacobsen (2008): 6. 
103 Cp. Harris (2008). 
104 Chandler (2008): 45. Cp. Hansen (2008): 47. 
105 Edwards (2008a): 143. 
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as zones of transfonnation. 106 This suggests that the possession of se/01hor (moral 
power) was never unequivocal or undi sp uted. This ambiguity is only inten sified by 
the blurring of intimac y and hierarchy in the Cambodian context, which has as its 
consequence that ·the closer and more intimate a relationship[ ... ] the more abso lute 
the relationship of authority· .107 Manifest in the close association between notion s of 
patronage and motherhood, this blu1Ting is also present in patron-client relations, 
penneating Cambodian social and political life, which are framed in te1111s of kinship. 
Being invested and merged with apparent intimacy, relations of authority and 
hierarchy can only with difficu lty be assessed in te1111s of the extent of legit imac y 
they ca1i-y for the involv ed parti es. Such ambiguities are arguably present in the 
important role of physical power or strength , kdmleang, as an ingredient of 
contemporary polit ical power. 108 Linking the threat of violence with a promise of 
protection, it radicalises the intim acy /hierarchy nexus, making allempts to distil 
shades of legitimacy problematic. There are therefore fundamental difticulties in 
measuring legitimacy , whi lst it cannot be thought to be possessed in any total sense. 
Thi s dissertation , tracing how moral claims to power were reinvented in the Second 
Kingdom, explores how different political actors attempted to utilise such ambig uiti es 
in their own favour, making their own particular interpretation of the moral right to 
rule hegemonic in contemporary society. Manipulating these ambiguities for political 
gain was therefore an integral part of political contestation. Yet also, precisely 
because of the contested natur e of moral legitimacy , their ability to convince and of 
their interpretation to gain large-scale social acceptance is more problematically 
assessed. Whilst a contestation to redraw the moral geography of the nat ion will be 
outlined, whether, in the end, these bids will be see n to be invested with moral 
legitimacy can have no straightforward answer. 
106 Ibid.: 143, 152 
10' Erik Davis (2008): 226 writes that mothers and patrons are both capable of either properly 
supporting those who serve them or behaving cruelly and thoughtlessly toward them in ways 
that break all bounds of human moralitv. 
108 Hughes (2000): 137. · 
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Cambodian Nationalism in Perspective - Historical Givens 
The concept and vocabulary of the nation was brought to Cambodia by French 
observers during the French protectorate ( 1863-1953). According to Penny Edwards, 
the concept of ·nation· according to the French understanding only reached 
Cambod ian elite consciousness by the first decades of the twentieth century. It was 
translated into the vernacular as cheat, a tenn derived from the Pali wordjati , 
meaning ·birth' . The nineteenth century usage of this term was as a :moral and 
cosmological term that literally had to do with one·s birth·. and , at the turn of the last 
century, ·encompassed a multiplicity of concepts , including ethnic identity and soc ial 
status·. 109 In the first decades of the twentieth century, to be finnl y estab lished by the 
1930s, secu lar literati and the sangha (Buddhist monkhood) increasingly used cheat 
to denote both race and nation, in line with how French discourse at the time used 
·race· and ·nati on' interchangeably. '" Around this time, Edwards identities a ·shift in 
focus from royal ancestry to national genealogy". and to ethnicity as the main locus of 
identity. Race and nation competed with and sometimes defeated royalty as the 
·prim ary object of loyalty· .111 This was paralleled by a shift in the meaning of sasana, 
which was broadened from its turn of the century meaning of ·religion ' , to 
·encompass notion s of race and ethnic ity·. Th e formula ·nation , religion, king· (cheat, 
sasana. mohaksatr), which first appeared in Khmer usage in the 1930s, establis hed 
these three notions as the central notions of the polity, whi lst artanging them in 
seeming equilibrium. Among these, the nation came to define political legitimacy-
seeking henceforth, as any ensuing nationalist project, including all post-
independence regimes , needed to articulate its relation to kingship and the sangha 
either in support or opposition. 112 Th e historical precursors to the formula ·nation, 
religion, king'. the notions ·sdech, sang ha, srok', had denoted slightly different 
meanings from their modern counterparts. Yet these older political fonns were 
important for political reinventions under a nationalist mantle, confinning Anderson·s 
insistence that nationalisms need to be understood in relation to the older political 
'
09 Edwards (2007): \J 
110 Ibid.: 13; 15. 
Ill Ibid.: 15 
1
" Gyallay-Pap (2007): 72 
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forms, pre-modern and early modern kingdoms and empires, out of which they 
113 
emerge. 
The Cambodian case illu stra tes Benedict Anderso n·s definition of the nation as an 
·imagined comm unit y" pa,ticu larly well, in contrad istinction to othe r 
conceptualisations, which treat the nat ion as a political ideolog y,"" a primordial 
category, 115 a po litical principle that follows from industrialisa1io11 116 or that 
emphasise the ethnic origins of modern nationalisms. 117 Anderson charges that 
nationalism as a category is closer to rhe phenomena of kinship and religion, than to 
political doctrines such as liberalism and fascism. 118 He writes Iha! part oflhe 
difficulty of theori sing nationali sm is the tendency to ·hypostas ize the existence of 
Nat ionalism -with- a-big-N (rather as one might Age-wit h a-capital-A) and then 10 
c lass ify --if ' as an ideo logy.·' 19 The ·ima g ined community' is a tacitl y shared cultural 
script, rather than an ideology. Yet, at the same time, as nationalism came to replace 
earlier hierarchical orderings of society, ideologies became essential for reinventing 
the political order so that mode rn nations came to be built on philosophical bases. 
Anderson writes that) ·if everyone has an age. Age is merely an analytical 
exp ress ion·, the rel evant point for our present purposes being that eve ryone, inde ed, 
mu st have an age. Whi lst 1101 reducible to an ideo logy per se, nationalism , therefore, 
requires an ideological basis to exist. The close intertwining of nationalist thought 
and ideology, making a separation of the two difficult, is a recurring theme in modern 
Cambod ia. Cambod ian modern histo ry is characterised by discontinuity , with six 
regi mes following each other since national independence was achieve d in 1953. A 
secon d distinguis hing trait of modern Cambo dia is how the string ofpos t-
independence polit ical proje cts advocating vas tly different polit ical systems all 
c la imed to represent pa,t icu larly national imaginations. 'Nationalism·, in very 
differe nt guises , runs like a red thread through Cambodian modern histo ry. Ahho ugh 
this is widespread in modern soc ietie s, in Cambodia ii is central. Barnett writes about 
113 Anderson (1991): 19-22; and Anderson (2001): 33. 
'" Cp. Freeden (2002): and Finlayson (1998). 
115 Geertz (1973); and van den Berghe (1979). 
116 Gel Iner (1983). 
117 Cp. Armstrong (1982); Connor (1994); Hutchinson (1987); and Smith (1986) 
118 Anderson (1991) : 5 
119 lbid. 
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the pertaining notion that the very identity of the nation is under threat , that ·there can 
be few countries where the theme has been accorded such we ight". 120 National 
imaginings were important animators of all competing political projects and their 
self-professed ideologies, and were sa id to mot ivate Sihanouk's Buddhist Socialism, 
guiding his Sangkum Reas/I· Niy um (People·s Nat ional Community). 1955-1970, 121 
and Lon Nol"s Mon-Khmerism, guiding the Khmer Republic, 1970-1975, 122 as well 
as those of their oppo nents. The political thinking of the Khmer Rouge , climaxing in 
their regime of Democratic Kampuchea , 1975-1979 , conflated the party with the 
nation and the nation with the ·base people· .123 Heder argues that the regimes goal 
was the assimilation of all nationalities into a ·class less Kampuchean people', and 
that the discrimination of certain ethnic minorities was based on an analysis of the 
association of class stratification with certain ethnic groups. The racism and genocide 
of Democratic Kampuchea was thus a manifestation ofa tendency intrinsic to 
Marxist-Lenini st ideology . 124 For Kiernan, the Khmer Rouge were motivated by a 
rac ist and totalitarian ideology that attempted the Khmerisation of the nation as its 
final objective. 125 After the demise of Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge 
mov ement rerouted to an ·end of socialism· , and increasingly portrayed nationalism. 
defined as the mobilisation and victory of the base people , as the underlying rationale 
of the revolution _l26 All these successive projects also put forth different ideas of how 
Th eravada Buddhism and kingship related to the nation. 127 
Contemporary appeals to nationalism relate back in important ways to dynamics from 
the period of the People·s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). I 979-1989. The PRK 
made claims to legitimacy primarily through appeals to an intense sense of national 
threat via continual reminders that the regime constituted the only bulwark against the 
120 Barnett (I 990): 101 
121 
Over the late l 950s and 1960s, Sihanouk developed Buddhist Socialism in a serie s of 
writings published in journals such as Srmgkwn , Kambuja and RCalit ie s Cambodgie1111es. See, 
for example, ·Notre Socialisme Buddhique· in Kambuja , November 1965. Cp Harris (2005)· 
147. Chandler (1991) : 87; Kershaw (2001): 55; and Osborne (I 994): I 35. 
1
" Lon Nol (19 74); and Corfi eld (1994). 
I'3 Marston (2002). 
124 Heder (1997): 109, 112, 146; and Hede r (2005): 39. 
125 Kiernan (1996) 
1
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'return of the Khmer Rouge' Although most Cambodians initially welcomed the 
invasion, there was soon widesp read suspicion of what came to be seen in tenns of 
Vietnamese annexation. Particu larly, the KS project, in which the PRK state 
mobilised Cambodian civilians to lay mines along the Thai border, as well as the 
conscription of a Cambodian anny to prepare for the Vietnamese troop withdrawal, 
were hugely unpopular and brought further loss of legit imacy. 128 Slocomb concludes 
that , 
Despite all of its achievements, the PRK was not genuinely popular. At the 
same time, despite the overwhelming presence of Vietnamese troops and 
adv isers, neither was it unpopular [ ... ] The majo rity of people remained 
indifferent to efforts which attempted to engage them in revolutionary 
restructuring. and evaded when they could the new state·s best effo11s to co-
opt them into schemes for the construction and defense of the country. !.:!9 
Hughes , on the other hand, argues that the open links of the PRK to Vietnam, internal 
displacement, and the splitting of Cambodia into two contending nations, were so 
grave as to cause an internal legitimacy crisis. 13° Certainly the PRK era left a lasting 
imprint in tenns of the sense of urgency it bestowed on conceptualising the national 
community in the Second Kingdom . The question of how the ·nation' was to be 
conceptualised emerged from the war •significantly problematized'. The outlines and 
character of the national commun ity were unclear, manifest in an ·obsessive 
questioning within Cambodian political discourse of the ethnic origins of indiv iduals , 
and exact location of borders'. reflecting 'difficulties in creating any secure 
imagining of the Cambodian nation' or definition of the people. 131 Yet, the imperative 
of Khmer unity was felt more powerfully than ever before. 
This formed the backdrop to dynamics in Cambodia's Second Kingdom . In line wit h 
earlier patterns, national imaginings animated and fed into a wide range of political 
projects. Yet, how these have consistently infonned party politics has not been 
128 Gottesman (2003) : 223- 37 
'" Slocomb (2003): 262 
uo Hughes (2009): 4 7. 
131 Ibid.: 47--48. 
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thoroughly examined. Several existing stu dies of contemporary nationalist disco urses 
examine the ir role in particu lar events or over more limited time periods, including 
the UNT AC period 1992-1993 (Edwards 1996), the persecution of Vietnamese 
communities immediat ely thereafter (Jordens 1996), the 2003 anti-Thai riot s (Hinton 
2006) and the I 997 dual citizenship debate (Poet hig 2006). Additionally , aspects of 
competing constructions of the nation by contemporary polit ical parties have been 
explored by Caro line Hughe s in a series of articles (200 I a; 200 I b; 2005; 2006; 2009). 
Understood in the context of a wider resurgence of populism in Southeast Asia , she 
has give n the nationalist disco urse of the political opposition particular attent ion 
(Hughes 200 la ; Hughe s 200 I b; Hughes 2002a; 2002b), and, to a lesser extent, the 
d isco urse of the incumbent CPP (Hughes 2009). Shifting the focus d irectly to national 
imagin ings , this dissertation shows syste matically how all political parties advanced 
compe ting constructions of the nation. This perspective enables the tracing out of 
patterns and tensions within each competing imagining , and how larger debates 
thereby emerged between the politi ca l parties. In so doing , this study reassesses the 
relationship between some of the categories examined by Hughes, such as the 
relationship between democratic and national imaginings. 132 By expand ing the 
perspective to the full range of the main political party actors, this thesis exposes 
hitherto neglected dim ens ion s of contestation taking place between them in a partly 
different language than theorised by previous scholars hip , as these negotiated ideas of 
the nation and its represe ntatio n through notions of embodiment, genealogy, and 
elected leader ship. 
Ideology, the Nation and the Building Blocks of Contemporary Khmer Politica l 
Discourse 
Nationalism is not an ideology per se. For Anderson , as di scussed above, nationalism 
cannot be reduced to an Ideology with a capital I. Yet nationalism requires an 
ideological basis to ex ist. The close intertw inin g between nationali st thought and 
ideology is a recurrin g theme in mode rn Ca mbodia, where success ive political 
projects attempting to rea lise widely different political systems have paired their 
national imagining s wit h more or less genuinely held ideological bel iefs. Thi s reflects 
130 Cp. Hughes (2001a); Hughes (2001 b); and Hughes (2002a). 
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how the introductio n of modern nationalist imaginings was accompanied by the 
spread of universal political ideologies as standardised building blocks of modern 
political discourse. Benedict Anderson writes about how the ·planetary spread of 
nationalism· was accompanied by the spread ofa ·profoundly standard ised 
conception of politics ' . 133 This shift necessitated its own discursive bases, which, as a 
rule, were created through the translation of key concepts of an emerging universal 
political discourse into vernaculars. Th e very notion of·politics· conceptualised as a 
sepa rate domain, together with concepts such as · ideology' that this nove l domain 
then entailed, were coined as neologisms not long after the birth of Cambodian 
nationalism, in line with a pattern common to many As ian and African societies. 134 
The emergence of modern Khmer political discourse thus went hand in hand wi th 
imagining it as perta ining to the realm of politi cs, as a distinct domain of the 
nation. 135 
Yet, ever since the emergence of national thinkin g, the very notion of ideolog y has 
been a contested category in Cambodia, which has been understood and employed 
differently by Cambodian political ac tors than their Western counterparts. 
Contemporary actors also employ other categories to articulate political imaginations, 
such as historical ideas of embodiment, enmeshed in competing historical ideas of 
representation, wh ich have persisted and been reinvented by political actors. This 
dissertation shows a contemporary contestation over the very categories used to 
define political vision and national representation, positing the doct1inal against the 
incarnat e. Thi s challenges Anderson·s insistence on the homogenising force of 
modem political discourse, taking place in a universal language of ideology. By 
examining these ambiguities , this dissertation offers a reinterpretation of Cambodian 
political thought and the notion of ' ideology' in the contemporary sett ing. 
(1998): 29. 
32. 
135 For Anderson (1998): 32, two provisions enabled the imagination of'pol itics· as a 
distinctly demarcated domain of life. Firstly, ·social practices and institutions need to be set 
up which could not be cloaked in earlier vocabularies pertaining to cosmologically and 
religiously sustained kingship' . Secondly, the world had to ·be understood as one·, so that 
·politics' was something taking place everywhere at the same time, albeit in the context of 
different social and political systems 
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Part of the difficulty in discuss ing political imaginings in the contemporary 
Cambodian context relat es to the inadeq uacy of employing ·politi ca l ideo logy" in an 
unproblematised manner. Thi s, in tum, is indicati ve of more fundamental problem s of 
applying ·ideolog y · as an ax is of analysis. anchored in historica l ambiguities derived 
from how •ideolog y · is an impo,t ed concept. In neighbourin g Thailand. Miche lle Tan 
finds that the term ·ide o logy' has ·never found equivalents in Thai across its variou s 
incarnations·. 136 She explores the word udomkan as a problematic translation of 
political ·ideolog y' and finds that , rather than the domesticat ion of this term, there has 
been an ideolog y of it. Thailand , whic h can be thought to be marked by the absence 
of ideology , resulting in what Tan refer s to as a contemporar y ·pr e-/post-ideo logical · 
predicament , diff ers sharply from the Cambodian case, which has rather seen an 
excess thereof. Yet Tan's warning against cross -country comparisons o f ·coding 
political factions along universal standards of coherence, contrast or tempora l 
sta bili ty · is also pertinent to the Cambodian context. In Cambodia, simi lar to 
Thailand , political standpoints since the spread of Western politic al discourse have 
had to be coded into the lang uage of ideological belief , whilst not always 
corresponding to W estern main stream understanding of the notion in terms of 
coherence, contrast or temporal stab ility. In Khmer, the standard tran slation of 
·ideology ' is monok om ,·ichea, from Sanskrit and Pali (Sanskrit, mono/· idea· , 
·mind' ; Pali, kom (gama) /' associated': Sanskrit, l'ichea /' knowled ge·). 137 Similar 
meanings are regu larly transmitted through the suffix-ni yum (Sansk rit: ·to tend to'), 
tran slated as ·-i sm· ; lillhi , ·b eliefs ' ; and tusana , ·vi sion ' or ·viewpoint". The suffix -
niywn was first used in this fashion by early nationali sts to produc e concepts for 
political self -identific at ion that could read ily be translated as ·-isms · , and thereby 
readil y identified as more or less coher ent ideologies. Penn y Edwa rds discusses a 
1938 editorial in the journal Nagara\'(//W, linked to early Buddhi st nationali sm, which 
136 Tan (2012): 32. 
u, Keng Vannsak ( 1964): 336 proposed •ideology· to be translated as 111011011im111a11 
vichya (from Sanskrit, 1110110/" idea· , 11i111ma11 /"formation'. vichea/- know ledge' ). It has not 
been popularly used or known. (Touch Bora , personal communication. 26 Feb. 20 12.) In Tha i, 
apart from 11do111 kar, two other terms, very similar to Khmer counterparts. are used for 
ideology: mono keti \'ichya and lathi /..,vam chhe11. Khmer 0111dom kote shares a similar 
etymology to Thai udomkcin, but has largely maintained the meaning of ·ideal' or •idealism' 
rather than the conflation between idea and ideal that Tan identifies in the Thai context. Cp 
Sar (1970): Hun (1967); and Ministry of Education ( I 973). 
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explains the journal's name by reference to khmer-niyum , ' Khmerism ' .138 Under the 
1950 Cu ltural Commission, -niyum, by then already established, was officially 
defined as '-is m ' (French-ism e) .139 The rendering of ' ideology' in Khmer has been 
closely tied to different political projects, cast in the particular tenns appropriate to 
the interpretation advanced by different actors. Cambodian communists from the 
Khmer lssarak era onwards used the alternative translation of sate-aram, in what 
seems to be a fairly direct translation of the Vietnamese /u· 11ro11g, literally 
' thought'. " 0 
Studying the nature and role of ideology in the post-independence Cambodian state, 
Slocomb has named the contemporary era ·post-ideological' She contrasts ·30 years 
of ideology· between 1955 and 1984 with a contemporary abandonment of ideology 
by the Cambodian state, hailed in by Hun Sen·s 1985 accession to the post of Prime 
Minister. 141 Yet this obscures ambiguities in the concept of ·ideology' in the 
Cambodian context, both before and after the sharp divide that she draws. The 
discrepancy between the Western idea of ideology and the way that indigenous actors 
have conceptualised their political projects , whilst using some of this language , was 
manifest from the outset. One illuminating example is Sihanouk's ambivalent 
response. Sihanouk argued that post-independence Cambodia needed a politica l and 
soc ial ideology for the purpose of nation-building , and portrayed the creation of the 
Sangkum Reastr Ni yum as the response to this need.' " Yet at the same time , 
Sihanouk was deeply distrustful of the French concept of ideologi e and was even said 
to ·hate ideologies like the Plague'. 143 !nan article entitled ·Le Sihanoukisme· , 
published in Sihanouk's Sangkum Reastr Ni yum-era mouthpiece Sangkum, Tep 
Chhieu Kheng describes Sihanouk ' s viewpoint as follows: 
138 Pach Choeun coined what Penny Edwards (2007): 218 refers to as the 'ideology' of k/1111er 
11iy 11m, a notion that was later taken up by Lon Nol during the Khmer Republic. Cp. Lon 
(1974) 
139 Jacob (1993): 159. 
140 Steve Heder, personal communication, 26 Feb. 2012. 
141 Slocomb (2006): 388. 
142 Norodom Sihanouk. 'Notre Sangkum', le JV!onde, 8 October 1963; and Slocomb (2006): 
378 
143 
Tep, Chhieu Kheng. 1968. ' Le .. Sihanoukisme".· Sangkwn 41 (December) (author's 
translation from French). 
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To define the political line of Samdech Euv, 144 the neo logism •Sihanoukism ' 
has been forged . Is it a doctrine? A new philosophy? Or a new ideology? In 
fact , Sihanouk had no part in the formation of the new term. \Vary of the 
spirit of syste m, he fled willingly the words in •ism ' that express a general 
trend , a little too categorical profession of faith. But the new term has been 
introduced. It is good to try to analyze it. If not a doctrine or a philosophy 
nor an ideology, what is it? ·Si hanoukism · is an attempt, but a successful 
attempt to apprehend the real , to capture the vivid fact in its authenticity 
and dynamism. It is also a way of being, a sort of ·way of life· a ·knowing 
how to behave' for the Khm er people and for all placed in the same 
situation. When we speak of ·Sihan ouk ism' it is almost always evoked in 
political terms. But it is not valid in th is area only . Some other areas (social 
or religious) ha ve for their part their field ofapp!ication. 1-15 
This illustrates Sihanouk ' s conflicting embraceme nt of the •-ism' that had been 
coined , and simulta neo us cont inued attachment to organic ideas of embodiment, at a 
breaking point when the language o f ideology had become hegemonic in world 
politics. 
Contemporary political actors generally avo id the language of ·political ideology' in 
the Western sense ofa grand, totalis ing corpus of princ iples. In political discourse. 
monokum v;chea is virtual ly absent. There are , however, a range of other notions that 
political ac tors employ to explicate their political thinking (kumnit noyobay) wh ich do 
not imply a totalising ideology in the Wester n sense , reflect ing the particular 
problems such a construct poses in the con temporary Cambodian context. Th e 
incumbent CPP has refrained from substituting its fonner communist identity with 
adherence to any other grand ideology. Yet Hun Sen has outli ned his political 
thinking in many diffe rent fonns , by making reference to his political vision, tusana 
noyobay. The leaders of the opposition party SRP , meanwhile , state that the party 
agenda does not correspo nd to any one ideology, either soc ial ist or liberal, whil st 
1
~ An epithet for Sihanouk. 
"' Tep(\ 968): 8 
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incorporating aspects of both; this reflects the pragmatism of the party agenda that 
defies any such simple categorisation. 1-16 
The frustration of framin g political thinkin g as ·ideology' in the contemporary 
contex t is mos t clearly manife st in royalist debat es . Poli tica l royalists mak e refe rence 
to ' royalism', reachniyum , as the ir political identity, indeed making up the ir very 
catego ry of political self -identificat ion. Th e c losest to a mutually agreed 
understanding of what this concept means is the corollary noti on of 'S ihanouki sm ', 
Sihanoukni y um. Yet, Sihanoukism, ever since the creat ion of the tenn , has related 
dir ectly to ideas of a unique mandate of the person of Sihanouk , and is , in the 
co ntemporary cont ext, closely related to ideas of embodiment. In fact, as will be 
shown, contemporary contes tation of royalist discourse has come to centre precisely 
on whethe r Sihanoukism is to be under stoo d as an ideology in the Western sense, 
detached from Sihanouk , or if it remains linked to the body of Siha nouk and, by 
extension, the royal famil y. This test ifies to how constructs with the suf fix - niyum 
cannot be translat ed into ·ideology' in the Western sense , without further 
qualifications. Pointing to how these questio ns remain unresolved in the prese nt day , 
it perhaps also indi cates that a Western-style interpreta tion of what an · ideo logy' 
necessarily must be has gained increasing leg itimacy, much to the detriment of 
roya lists as a politica l force. 
Whil st the not ion of 'political ideology' thus remains an ambiguous concept, modern 
political actors have cont inuou sly se lect ively emplo yed Western -derived politi ca l 
co ncepts in their political discourse , whilst also actually embracing Western-derived 
ideolog ies to different extents. 147 The process of incorporation of fore ign -deri ved 
political notions into the Cam bodi an context can be und erstood following Benedi ct 
Anderson and Thongc hai Winichakul. Rej ect ing notion s of· imitation and derivative 
1
-1
6 Cp. author's interview with Ti oloung Saumura 
t-1
7 Sihanouk's Buddhist Socialism and the Khmer Rouge can be considered two extremes in 
this regard, both in terms of the degree of adaptation of the ·original ' Western concepts and 
the sincerity with which they promoted them. Sihanouk's Buddhist Socialism, created as an 
indigenous Cambodian doctrine that entailed some Western-derived notions such as 
·socialism·, located the beginnings of this ·socialism· with ancient A ngkorean kings. The 
Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, are arguably best understood as having implemented their 
Marxist- Leninist and communist models 
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discourses· , Anderso n cha rges that Western conce pts were ·read abou t and modelled 
from· and that hybridities were conseq uent ly crea ted. For Ande rson. the resulting 
neolog isms and the Western concep t, though clearly not meaning exac tly the same 
thing, 'stood in for anothe r' . 148 \Vriting on processes of what he tenns 
·transculturation· of po litically charged Western concept s in Siam du ring the period 
of colonialism in the region , Th ongc hai Winichakul similar ly suggests that European 
ideas and practices were appropr iated, localised and hybridised in the Siamese 
setting." 9 Winichaku l makes the point that 't he success of the tran sliterated tenn 
indic ates that there are need s in the Thai context for suc h a conce pt , but that ther e is 
no adequate substitute for it' 150 That is, the survival of the concept indicate s that it 
responds to someth ing that some actors in soc iety wish to express, yet the 
transliterat ed fonn retain s a trace of the foreignness of the concept, and there is never 
complete overlap between the neologism and the original foreign concept. 
In Cambodia, contestat ion of emerging modern political conce pts was , from the 
outset , part of wider political contestation, used to articulate the political contents of 
the young na tion . French officials and Francophone Khmer under King Sisowath 
( 184{}-1927), together formulated concepts of a Cambod ian ·n ation ' . ·sou l" and 
' race'. Whilst French remained the language of incipi ent nationalism, the 
vernacularisation of Khmer was envisaged as an integral part of the nation-building 
project. 151 In 1927 , the first Khmer-la nguage newspaper, Kambuja Suriya, was 
produced by the Royal Librar y, followed by the emergence in the 1930s of the first 
open ly political newspapers, magazines and novels in Khm er, including the ' flagship 
publication ' of the early nationalist mo vement. Nagaraval/a, in 1936 .152 This 
confirm ed Ande rso n·s empha sis on the importance of print media in the vernacular 
for the early stages of nationalism. 153 Nagaravatta's contributors advocated the use of 
the Khmer language to spread Khmer-niy um (' Khm eris m' ), and called for Khm er to 
be used as the officia l language and language of educat ion. Neologis ms were coine d 
148 Anderson (1998): 34. 
149 Winichakul (2000): 529. 
150 Ibid.: 530 
151 Heder (2007a): 294. 
1
" Harris (2005): 137- 38; and Edwards (2007) : 188. 
153 Edwards (2007): 188; and Anderson (1991): 37-46. 
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based on the translation of Frenc h tenn s into Khm er, often by Buddhist scho lars 
profici ent in Frenc h, Sanskrit, Pali and Khmer, to the effect that many neo logisms 
turned out to be what Steve Heder describe s as ' Pali-Sa nskrit jawbreakers·, 
unintelligible to virtually everyone. 154 ln the per iod lead ing up to independence, 
lin gu istic divisions accompanied political ones, each correspond ing to distinct 
geograp hic bases, producing thr ee ·po litica l dial ects' wit h para llel vocabularies. Most 
aristo cratic youth in Phnom Penh favoured continu ed Francophonia, whereas some 
democrat nationalists wished to raise the standard of elite -level Khmer. 155 A second 
poli tical dialect was developed by the anti -coloni al and anti-roya list Khmer [ssarak 
movement, which crealed a communist Khmer language by translating basic Soviet 
and Mao ist tenns into Khmer , often using Pal i or Sanskrit , and throwing in some 
Thai-isms influenced by Thai Marxism. 156 Curre nt Khmer concep ts of democracy 
(prach eathipatey), communist (kommuynis), feudalis m (siikdephoum niyum) and 
revolution (padevo/1) close ly follow the respective Th ai translations. 157 They 
prioritised colloquia l Khmer over Vietnamese words, avoided polysyllabic Pali -
Sanskritisms, and did away with social hierarchy markers. This communist language, 
Steve Heder writes, was access ible to peasants and was rapidly popularised. A third 
competing political dialect was developed by the republican-leaning ' Populo 
Movement' (pracheachalana), largely purged ofroyalisrns, yet maintaining other 
social hierarchy markers and elite neologisms whilst adding its own distinct political 
tenn inology. In this way, parallel concepts were expressed through different words, 
according to political geography. For examp le. ' the people was referred to by the 
Franco-aristocratic elite as the pracheareastr; ·the subjects', by the commu nist 
[ssarak as the pracheachun, the simplest formu lation for ·people ', and by the 
154 Hede r (2007a) : 296 
155 Ibid.: 296. 
156 Ibid.: 297-98. ln neighbouring Thailand, the translation of key political and ideological 
words was similarly a highly contested issue, where, from the 1920s to the mid~ 1940s, the 
invention of officia l Thai neologisms discriminated against. retranslated or ·pretranslated · 
radical discourse. Thai Prince \Van invented a range ofpo!itical coinages, some very similar 
to Khmer counterparts, including sangkhom ('soc iety'), nayobai ('policy') , rabob (·system'), 
patiwat ('revolu1 io11'), wiwat ('evolut ion'), ka111111achip (" roletariat'), krad11111phi 
('bourgeoisie'), n111alcho11 ('masses·), sm1gkho11111(yom ('socia lism'), ongkan (·org anisation'), 




Cp. how Thai scholars have explored the problematic translations of prachatipatai 
('democracy') (Connors (2003); and Tejapira (1994): 198); kho111111i1111il ('co mmuni st') 
(Tejapira ( I 994) : 197); sakd inalsakt ina ('feu dalism') (Reynolds ( I 987) ; (2006)); and patiwat 
('revol ution') (Chaloe mtiaran a (2007) : 167,214; and Tejapira ( 1994): 197) 
52 
republicans as pracheapol roath, ·popular c it izens'. Reference to e ithe r of the three 
indicated which wani ng political side one was on, for peasants and elite alike. 158 
Tellingly, today these three tenns are still employed to different exte nts by diff erent 
factions , so that roya lists wi ll typically use the notion pracheareastr, the CPP 
pracheachun and the democratic opposition parties pracheapol roat/ ·1. 
In this context, the state set out to create and define a new ' Khmer· vocabulary of 
more than 3000 tenns as the language of ind ependence, regarded as Khmer, but 
deliberately using foreign voca bulary. 159 A Cu ltura l Commission, created in light of 
·the difficulties encountered in co mpos ing the text of the Constitution of 1946 ' 
produced what was known as ·cultural wo rds' (peak voppothor), published by the 
Ministry of Education in the 1950 dictionary Scitrheanukrorn phearorn khmer, as we ll 
as in Karnbuja Suriya. French words in need of translation were compiled, and the 
commission then took e ithe r a French loan word and ·matched' it to the relevant 
French word, or created a new wor d using Sanskrit and Pali. Th e degrees of overlap 
between the neologisms and existing Khmer and French wo rds varied and worked in 
different directions. In some cases, the new words were intended to cover only some 
meanings of the French word to be translated , while in other cases they were intended 
to translate the full array ofmeanings. 160 The co llection entailed political terms with 
an 'a ura of newn ess' in the Khmer context, 161 such as ' independence·, wh ich the 
Cultura l Commiss io n wante d to coin as issaraph eap ('powerfu lness', ·condition of 
overlordship ' ), but was more popularly trans lated as aekareach ('single kingdo m· , 
·one power') , st ill in use today. Th e notion of se tthi was introduced as ·ri ghts ' 162 Old 
Khmer wo rds such as omnach, wh ich had referred to ·power· in an abstract sense, 
also took on the seconda ry meanings of the French equiva lent, pouvoir, so that it 
came to include the meaning ofa ' powerful stare·. New vocabu lary also confirmed 
the previou s coinage of the ·nation ' as cheat, as we ll as concepts for makin g a 
Marxist c lass ana lys is. including ·wo rker' (kcimmokcir). ·farmer· (kcisekcir) and 
'imper ia list ' (chcikrcipotte). This new voca bul ary was implemented in newspapers 
158 Heder (2007a): 297- 98. 
,;, Jacob (1993) : 157 
160 Ibid.: 158 
161 [bid: 157 
162 Ibid.: 159 
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from the 1950s onwards. 163 During the Sangkum Reastr Ni yum , prompted by urban 
graduates' translation of their political ideas into Khm er, Sihano uk resumed efforts 
towards standardised K.hmerisation of political language. 16" This began in 1967 with a 
National Committ ee of K.hmerisation , which published a glossary providing new or 
stan dardi sed Khmer translations for French tenns. Sihanouk also supported his 
political strategy on the spread of a particular Sihanoukist lingo, disseminated 
through village speeches, leaflets and radio, breaking with the previous confinement 
of the royal word to the palace. The Sihanoukist phraseology set out to strengthen 
ties between the people and its leadership through a range of linguistic and discursive 
devices. 165 The successive regimes of the Khmer Republic , Democratic Kampuchea 
and the People's Republic of Kampuchea all created their particular vocabulary. 166 
Just as the discursive contestation of political concepts fanned an integral part of 
contestation over the nature of the Khmer nation ever since the emergence of the idea 
thereof, so in the post-PPA era the contestation of key political notions has cont inued 
to play a fundamental role in contemporary reimagin atio ns of it. This dissertation 
spells out how this tak es place, through contestation over notions of democracy, 
soc iali sm, royalism, class struggle, freedom rights, and so on. It shows how an 
important part of contemporary political contestation has taken place through 
different political actors manipulating and rearticulating concepts long central to 
modern political discourse, such as democracy, socialism and royalism , and 
mobilising them so as to support different claims to represent the nation. There is also 
an ongoing process of new coinages, often derived from liberal democratic discourse, 
which entails a productive contestation and hybridisation of political concepts by 
political actors. 167 References to these concepts should not be evaluated as part of 
163 Ibid 
'" Heder (2007a). 299- 300 
165 
See Abdou I-Cari me (1995). Abdou!-Carime identifies, amongst other novelties, a new 
usage ofj e and vous, indicating the ·abrupt humanization of political authority·; a passionate, 
theatrical. ·warm· language; and the fusion of interests between Sihanouk and the people 
166 Heder (2007a) : 302. 
167 One example is the notion 'Good Governance', which entered the region with the financial 
crisis of 1997-98. In late 1999 it was translated into Khmer as kar krop krong I ·or, but was 
later substituted for Apliibal keel, (aphi ·high': bal ·upholder· , keel, ·affairs', ·duty') , which 
was first heard in one of Hun Sen's speeches in 2002 and has remained the standard 
translation ever since. (Touch Bora, personal communication, 26 Feb. 2012.) Another 
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coherent or stable universal ' ideologies ' , per se , but more fruitfully in tenns of the ir 
context of articulation , with attention to how they link back to the nation. Moreover, 
the contemporary contestation of polit ical concepts needs to be considered in the 
context of those concepts' particular histories of articulation of meaning. 168 
Methodology 
This dissertation applies an interpretivist framework. lnterpretivism is particularly 
well suited for the purposes of this study , as it attempts to generate understandings of 
a social phenomenon by looking at meaning within the social context within which 
evidence is situated. 169 lnterpretivism typically traces intersubjective realities through 
ethnographic and discursive means. Because of its attention to meaning, it pays 
particular attention to translation of what is observed into academic theorisations 
without changing the meaning of what is experienced by the subjects themselves. 
This is done in order to minimise the importing of meaning. 170 
From an interpretivist perspective, the observer's task is to reproduce as evidence 
both the subject"s actions and the encompassing soc ial structure. 171 This is 
particularly suitable for addressing Anderson's insistence on the imagined character 
of the nation as well as its structural and material rootedness. lnterpretivism takes an 
interest in the subject's own observations of the self and structures. in addition to the 
theorist ' s observations of subjects and structures. The theorist inductively gathers 
evidence that allows him or her to see the problem as the subject saw it. Yet, 
example is the concept of human rights, sett hi 111onus, introduced with the PPA. Ledgerwood 
& Un (2003) find that this concept was not 'grafted onto· an existing political discourse, but 
rather a hybrid was created as local human rights organisations employed Buddhist ideas of 
morality when translating it 
168 
For example , the seemingly novel language of•rights to freedom' precedes the post-1991 
inn ow of global vocabulary discussed by Ledgerwood & Un (2003). Jacob ( 1993): 163 quotes 
the comedy Sombok ot me pa ('A nest without the parents') by Hang Thon Hak , in which one 
of the young characters speaks the sentence, 'Give me the right (sett/ii) to have the freedom 
(seripheap) to fultill my duty (kiiro11eykiich) with justice (y1111e l10r), boldness and heroism 
(viropheap)'; whilst Jacob does not provide the year in which the play was written , each of 
these translated words, including the notions of rights and of freedom , were typical of the New 
Vocabulary created by the cultural commission in the l 950s 
169 1-lopf (2007): 64 
"
0 Ibid 60. 
171 Ibid.: 61----63. 
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acknowledging that a subject's intentions do not emerge directly from the subj ect, the 
subject"s words alone do not constitute evidence, but must be accompanied by an 
account of the relevant socio-historical context. 172 [nterpreti vism therefore also take s 
an interest in the social structures that bear on the meaning ofan individual's actions 
and words. The soc ial structure that provides meanings for the subject's actions and 
words is reco nstructed inductively, recreating the intersubjective meaning of that 
structur e for the subject. Evidence of social structures is gathered through the 
subject's actions and is accompanied by the subject' s own understanding of those 
actions. Hopf suggests the following criteria for assessing interpretivist claims that a 
phenomenon has a particular meaning: the number of times the phenomenon has been 
observed; the span of time ove r which it has been observed; the bre adth, depth and 
distinctiveness of the cultural context in which it appears; the exhaustive treatment of 
the available empirical record; and alternative explanations being compared to the 
evidence and judged inferior. 173 
To this end, 1 apply a twofold methodology. [t builds on, firstly , archival sources, 
combined with, secondly , an ethnographic approach. Thereby, [ combine political 
ethnography with historical interpretation. 174 
For investigating nationalist discourses at the level of political parties, [ have 
conducted an extensive review of Cambodian media during the time period under 
investigation. I have relied primarily on Cambodia New Vision , a monthly 
publication by Prime Minister Hun Sen 's cabinet , which includes Hun Sen·s 
speeches. [ have also reviewed newspapers Reaksmei Kampuch ea, the government 
mouthpiece , Koh Santhepheap, of a more moderate pro-government stance, and, to a 
lesser exte nt , Moneaksekar Khmer, tied to the political opposition; in addition, I 
consulted English -language newspapers Cambodia Daily and the Phnom Penh Post. 
Further , [ have consulted reports, statements, studies, and pamphlets published by 
political parties , the government , and non-government organisations. I have also 
consulted the political writings of political actors themselves. Thi s include s a series of 
"' Ibid.: 62. 
173 Ibid.: 74 
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~ McKenna (1998): xiii proposes this for the study of nationalist politics at the grassroots 
level, whereas I apply it to the level of political elite actors 
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books by Prime Minister Hun Sen, as well as Norodom Ranariddh , which clearly 
outline their political visions. The se have , to my knowledge, not generally been 
consulted in oth er academic ana lyses; thus, l find it particularly meaningful to 
represent them here. Providing another interesting type of source, many politicians 
have now taken to publishing autobiographies. Consulting these personal accounts 
has enriched and infonn ed my understanding of the questions treated by this thesis. 
My line of research has also taken me to tra vel to document contemporary statues and 
to make excursions into art scholarship. I have also engaged in close reading of 
Cambodian historical sources, including chronicle texts. l have then studied all these 
primary sources at the backdrop of the larger seco ndary literature on Cambodia in the 
KOC period, combined with the scho larly literature on histo rical Cambodian 
nationalism, as well as other relevant literature , in order to cany out a historically 
informed interpretation of contemporary dynamics 
Secondly , I have used an ethnographic approach. The ethnographic approach is 
uniquely suited to the purposes of this study , in that it aims to acquire a deep 
knowledge of the soc ial community and the individual. To this end, it gathers data 
through participant observation, deep immersion in a particular social context, and 
open -end ed, discursive , and semi -direc ted interviews. 175 Giving precedence to 
em pirical findings over a priori theorisations, this method privileges the subjective 
content of the relationship of the infonnant, ethnographer and environment. 176 
Moreover , participant observation and discursive interviews are particularly 
appropriate methods for this study , in that they can overcome informants· security 
concerns in contexts where the research might make the infonnant cautious, since it 
naturally involves the emotional knowledge of the observer. 177 
l carried out ethnographic research towards this dissertation during two prolonged 
stays in Cambodia: from September 2009 to Jul y 20 I 0, and from May to Octob er 
201 I. During this time, l immersed myself in Cambodian society and , particularly , in 
the circles of national-level politicians, gaining access to the leade rship and members 
175 Bray (2008): 296. 
176 Skidmore (2004): 35. 
,,- Sluka(! 989): 12; and Skidmore (2004): 33- 34 
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of all main political parties. Participant observation allowed me to deepen my 
understanding of political actors· perceptions and infonn my understanding of the 
wider context at hand. This was complemented by around 80 semi-structured, 
discursive interviews with political actors, which can be categorised as ·e lite 
interviews'. 
The concept of elite interviewing has been employed in two manners. Most 
commonly, ·elite· refers to the socio-economic position of the respondent. Yet others 
have emphasised that ·elite· also refers to the manner in which the interview treats the 
interviewee . Rather than looking for answers within the bounds set by pre-defined 
assumptions, as in standard ised interviewing, in elite interv iew ing, the interviewer 
allows the interviewee to define the problem and question to be explained. Indeed, the 
notion of 'elite' can be extended to people who, whilst not in a political leadership 
role, are experts in their field and can be subject to elite interviewing in this second 
sense. This second sense ties in with this study's epistemological privileging of 
understanding meaning-making and mapping perceptions. These two approaches to 
elite interviewing naturally intersect: 
[ ... ] this approach has been adopted much more often with the influential. 
the prominent and the well-informed than with the rank-and-file of a 
population. For one thing, a good many well-informed or influential people 
are unwilling to accept the assumptions with which the investigator starts; 
they insist on explaining to him how they see the situation, what the real 
problems are as they view the matter. 178 
For the purpose of this study, I carried out elite interviewing in both senses. The 
interviewees were mainly political elites, defined as people in political leadership 
roles, including political party leaders, members of parliament and government 
officials. Moreover, the interviews were premised on the interviewees being treated 
as experts on the topic at hand. This second approach could best fulfil I the aim of this 
dissertation - to unravel political actors· meaning-making and perceptions , by 
178 Dexter (1970): 6-7; cited by leech (2002): 663 
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allowing them the scope to define and explain the questions to be addressed and the 
parameters of the discussion. 
As a method, elite interviewing has several advantages that make it part icularly 
appropriate for the purposes of this thesis. Firstly, one of the most important functions 
of an elite interview is to guide the theorist to understanding what theoretical 
positio n, perceptions, beliefs, values and attitudes the interviewee has. 179 It aims to 
provide an insight into the mindset of politica l actors and an interviewees subjective 
analysis of a particular situation. 180 This is best realised through semi-structured 
interviews with open-ended questions. Open -ended questions are particularly 
appropriate for the exploration of elite perceptions since they allow respondents to 
engage in wide-ranging discussions where they can fully articulate their responses on 
key issues relevant to the research project. They provide an opportunity for 
respondents to organise answers within their own frameworks and articulate their 
own world views without predetennined response categories. 181 Thereby , they 
achieve the purposes of elite interviewing in its second sense , allowing the 
interviewee to defi ne the problem under discussion. The main aim is to get the 
contextual nuance of the response and to ' probe beneath the surface of the response to 
the reasoning and premises that underlie it'. i82 
Secondly, elite interviewing offers the opportunity to establish the infonnal processes 
and considerations that lie behind political practice. 183 By interviewing key 
participants in the political process, the researcher can gain data about the political 
debates and deliberations that inform political action. Thereby , elite interviews can 
shed light on elements of political action that are not clear from an analysis of 
political outcomes or other pr imary sources. 
,-, Aberbach & Rockman (2002): 673; and Richards (1996) : 199 
ISO Richards (1996): 200. 
181 Aberbach & Rockman (2002): 674 
180 Ibid 
181 Richards (1996): 200. 
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Thirdly, elite interviews can provide information not recorded elsewhere, 
compensating for scarce and limited documentary evidence. 184 The first-hand 
testimony from direct participants al lows the researcher to ask questions about issues 
highly specific to the research objectives. 185 
Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing 
The flexibility of elite interviewing employing open -ended questioning exacerbates 
its validity and reliability issues. 186 Firstly, problems of access can easily make 
sampling unrepresentative. 187 Secondly, the reliability of the interviewee can be 
questionable. 188 This is related to a third potential hurdle - the issue of power 
relations between the interviewee and interviewer. The interviewee is concerned with 
presenting his or her own viewpoint in a favourable way, and, ultimately, controls the 
infonnation passed on. 189 
Davies suggests three specific criteria for the additive use of elite interviews to be 
considered reliable. First ly, the infonnation should be obtained from a first-hand 
witness. Secondly, the level of access matters , and senior-level elites should be 
viewed as more reliable. Thirdly, the interviewee's overall displayed reliability 
should be assessed. 190 
In carrying out the present study, I have taken a number of measures to address these 
potential hurdles. Most fundamentally , I was fortunate enough not to encounter a 
substantial problem of access, which could have caused severe bias. I enjoyed the 
enom1ous privilege of being granted interviews with the leaders of government and 
the leaders of all main political parties, including: Prime Minister Hun Sen of the 
134 Ibid.; and Davies (2000): 74 
185 Tansey (2007): 766-68. 
186 
Berry (2002): 679. Validity refers to ·how important is the measuring instrument to the task 
at hand?' The issue of reliability refers to ·how consistent are the results of repeated tests with 
the same measuring instruments?' 
187 Richards ( I 996): 20 I 
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CPP; Prince Norodo m Ranariddh, long-tenn leader of FUNCfN PEC and , at the time, 
President of the Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP); Keo Puth Reasmey, President of 
FUNCINPEC; and Sam Rainsy , leader of the SRP. I believe that one of the main 
values of this dissertation lies in how it has assembled a unique array of infonnation 
granted to me as a researcher by key contemporary political actors. 
I have also employed a number of measures to mi nimi se other risks assoc iated with 
elite interviewing. Firstly , I maintained awareness of how infonnation supplied by the 
interviewee is ofte n highly subjective and, secondly, that the interviewee generally 
has a purpose in the interview. 191 As noted by Berry , the first problem does not loom 
as large when the main objective of the research is to trace the interviewee s' point of 
view. 192 As this project is fundamentally concerned wi th meaning-making , the 
subjective nature of the infonnation suitably addresses the objec tives of this research. 
Secondly, to counter a dynamic in which interviewees attempt to fully control the 
direction of the interview , I adopted a semi-struct ur ed approach , referring back to an 
aide memo ire during the course of the interview to ensure that all relevant topics were 
covered.193 
To support the findings and guard against self-serving accounts, I have also used 
multiple sources to cross-check collected data. 194 These include document s, memoirs, 
and other secondary sources , which I have outlined under archival sources. As Davie s 
argues, muhi-methodolog ical ·triangulation ' , providing a cross-reference between 
interview data and archival records , is particularly applicable to elite interviewing as 
a political science tool. 195 Cross -checking interview infonn ation with written 
documents helps situate it in context, and , in turn , aids the interpretation of the 
written documents. 196 Where relevant documentary material exist, I have employed 
the triangulation triad proposed by Davies: primary sources (interviews , published 
first-hand accounts and documentary sources (published or archival)), with published 
191 Richards (1996): 201. 
190 Berry (2002): 680. 
193 Richards (1996): 201. 
194 Tansey (2007): 766 
195 Davies (2001): 73. 
196 Richards (1996): 200 
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secon dary source infonnation available. lnfonnation was then cross-referenced both 
between and within those data types. 197 Whereas the original use of triangulat ion 
(Webb et al.) treated elite interviews as purely corroborat ive, elite interviews can also 
be additive when archival infonnatio n is scarce and conditions for val idity have been 
met. 198 lnter view material meeting these cr iteria is occas ion ally used additi vely in this 
study. 
Sampling and Interview Design 
The select ion of interviewees for thi s thesis builds on non-probability samp ling . Th e 
control over the selection pro cess allowed for the inclusion of key political actors, 
which enabled me to collect testimony from the central players involved in shaping 
the contemporary Cambodian political landscape. Non -probability sampling, rather 
than probability sampling, is understood to be particularly suitable for a number of 
purposes aiding towards the aim of this dissertation , namely establishing what a set of 
people think, corroborating what has been established from other sources, and 
reconstructing infonnal reasons behind decision-making; whilst it is less suitable for 
making inferences about a larger population , which is not the aim of this thesis. 199 
There are two general approaches to non-probability sampling. A positional approach 
defines the set of respondents according to the positions they hold, whereas a 
reputational approach selects respondents according to the exte nt to which their peers 
co nsider them influential in a particular political arena. ' 00 I have combined the 
positional and reputational approaches. This study includes political actors whom 1 
identified as highly relevant to the project in light of the key positions they hold, and 
whom I then approached for interviews. 20' Th ese political actors then refetTed me 
onwards to other political actors they suggested to be high ly influential , and whom 1 
then incorporated into the research. 202 Pur suing these two approaches corresponded to 
197 Davies (200 l ): 78. 
198 lbid.: 75. The concept of triangulation was first proposed by Webb et al. (1966) 
:: Tansey (2007): 769. 
- Ibid.: 770. 
2°' Ibid 769. 
202 Ibid.: 771. 
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employing two methods of samp ling. Main ly, I employed ·purposive sampling ' . In 
this method , the study's purpose and the researcher"s knowledge guide the selectio n 
process. Th e researcher identifies the particular respondents of interest and samp le 
those deemed most appropriate. This is a relevant method when the research entails 
interviewing a pre-defined and visib le set of actors. 203 I also employed ·snowball 
sampling'. also known as the cha in referral samp ling method. In this method , the 
researcher identifies an initial set of respo nden ts, and then requests them to suggest 
other potential subjects of relevance to the object of study. The researcher then 
repeats this process until the sample is sufficiently large for the purposes of the study. 
The main advantage of this method is that it helps to identify political actors with 
hidden influence or with influence that exceeds that which is publicly known. 204 This 
method is particularly suitable for research concerning high profile politicians for 
whom issues of privacy and secrecy are of ulmost concern. 205 
Respondents were interviewed in person. When possible , respondents were 
interviewed on two or more occasions to clarify uncertainties and ambiguities. The 
research design employed a semi -structured method , incorporating both relatively 
structured and relatively unstructured components at different points. Whereas 
structured inter views rely on a fixed schedule , unstructured interviews rely on a ser ies 
of topics to be covered and /or prompts intended to direct the respondent in particular 
directions; the wording and order of questions can be altered during the course of the 
inter view. Each interview schedule started with a relatively unstructured initial phase. 
During this phase, I asked questions about the interviewees personal background and 
political career, and its most important features relevant to the interview. This was 
followed by a more structured stage, in which the account given by the interviewee 
allowed me to select and modify appropr iate questions from a more general purpose 
list. 206 Questions were open-ended , allowing the interviewee to organise answers 
within his or her own frameworks and to define the problem under discussion. 
::: Ibid. 770. 
- Tansey (2007) : 770. 
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Cp. how Davies (2001), for this reason, finds snowball sampling suitable for interviewing 
intelligence agents. 
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Case Selection 
This dissertation maps out the national imaginings advanced by political actors with 
an institutional base in Cambodia's main political parties compet ing electorally in the 
KOC multi-party democratic system. It examines these as three contending sets of 
political actors: the CPP, royalist parties and democratic parties. This categorisation 
follows Cambodian political discourse and correspo nds to how political actors self-
define. A fourth major political force in Second Kingdom Cambodia, the Khmer 
Rouge , is not included. This is because the Khmer Rouge did not compete electorally 
in the KOC. Whilst the Khmer Rouge was a signatory of the PPA , their concerns that 
a neutral political environmen t had not been ensured led them to boycott the 1993 
elections and reject its results. 207 In 1994 , the Khmer Rouge movement was declared 
il\egai. 208 In response , the Khmer Rouge set up the Provisional Government of 
National Union and National Salvation of Cambodia (PGNUNSC) , an unrecognised 
government in opposition to the KOC. The Khmer Rouge thereafter engaged in 
continuing guerrilla warfare until the movement's disintegration. completed in 1998 
The first chapter of this thesis examines a na1Tative promoted by Prime Min ister Hun 
Sen of the CPP. Hun Sen is not synonymous with the CPP , and it is argued that the 
narrativ e testifies to the increasing personalisation of political and symbolic power to 
the Prime Minister, in many ways trumping his party. At the same time, as the Prime 
Minister of subsequent CPP-led governments and Vice President of the CPP, Hun 
Sen ' s renegotiation of his political identity bear s on the renegotiation ofCPP 
legitimacy. It is part of the reinvention of a revo lutio nary identity inside the new 
framework of a nominally liberal democratic system and a constitutional monarchy, 
after the party has shaken off its socialist mantle. The subsequen t chapter turn s to 
examine royalist imaginings of the nation. It includes actors associated with political 
parties that claimed a royalist identity, including FUNCrNPEC, Norodom Ranariddh 
Party (NRP) , and the Sangkum Jatiniyum Front Party (SJFP). The following chapter 
examines the national imaginings of actors associated with self-identified democratic 
parties, with roots in a political faction associated with an anti-Vietnamese, anti-
207 Roberts (2001): 93- 103. 
208 Chandler (1999): 179 
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Communist identity. This include s the Sam Rainsy Party (SR P), the Buddhist Liberal 
Democratic Party (BLDP), the Son Sann Party and the Human Rights Party (HRP). 
Each chapter addresses a slightly different focus within this framework. The first 
chap ter takes the perspective of the politics of memory, the political use of art, and of 
historical myths and legends in creating, renegotiating, and disseminating national 
imaginings. The subsequent chapter chart s the difficulty in transposing historical 
ideas of the nation's political representation associated with the monarchy to a party 
political vehicle, looking at diverse stra tegies emp loyed to ach ieve this. It offers a 
close case study of the process of transposing a pre-party political language and 
grammar of national representation to the party political framework with an 
associated language of ideology and doctrine, delineating the elements and challenges 
entailed. The following chapte r more spec ifically reassesses domestic debates about 
democratisation. Wh ilst all chapters outline and discuss the intersection of domestic 
Cambodian national and democratic imaginings, this chapter offers a more focused 
examination of this nexus. Though each chapter is tied predominantly to one political 
actor or set of actors with political party roots, each also includes references to other 
political party actors most directly engaged in or targeted by the questions negotiated 
in each particular context. Apart from these more confined debates pertaining to the 
individual chapters, a larger debate emerges across the chapters. From different 
angles, they are all concerned with conceptions of the contours and characteristics of 
the nation and how the nation is to be represented by the political leadership, entailing 
questions of the nature of democracy, constructions of the people, elected versus 
inherited leadership, embodiment , and, ultimately, continuity and change in such 
conceptualisations. In the concluding chapter, I pull these strands together to offer a 
comparative discussion 
Ethical Considerations 
The Cambodian political context is fraught with lingering conflict and high tension , 
and there are incidents of politically motivated violence. Therefore, ethical 
considerations were crucially important throughout the research process 
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Firstly, considerations for the protection of infonnants guided my cho ice of 
methodology. The ethnographic approach, as noted above, is particularly appropriate 
for con texts in which interviewees may experie nce caut ion in engaging with the 
researc her. Discursive and semi -di reeled interviews leave it to the interviewee to 
decide the boundaries of the interv iew contents and empower the interviewee with the 
right to veto how deep into any particular context to prod . Moreover , as intervie ws 
took place in person , the researcher"s emotio nal knowledge was naturally involved. 209 
The interviewee ' s secur ity concerns were therefore mitigated whilst the researcher 
learned to recognise particularly sensitive infonnation 
Interviewees were given the oppo rtunity not to be named , and so me interviewees 
asked to remain anonymous. 1 have simply referenced these interviews as ·author ' s 
interview ' . followed by date , to distinguish them from one another. There were also 
instances of interview contents that, whil st relevant to the arguments made here, were 
not used due to their sensitive nature. Yet, I have ensured that such infonnation 
underlies and complements my understanding of the questions here discussed, and 
confinns and strengthe ns the arguments here made. 
Note on Translation and Transcription 
In carrying out this research , I relied heavily on my studies of the Cambodian 
language , also known as ·Khmer·. I started these studies in the summer of 2005, 
whe n, aided by a grant from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) , 
Univers ity of London, I attended a language schoo l in Phnom Penh for several 
months. Subsequent ly, I have been able to continue my study of Khm er on a largely 
independent basis , through academ ic as well as other work , which has ever since 
remained focused on Cambodia. Upon graduating from SOAS, I lived and worked in 
Cambodia from 2006 to 2007. Returning to England to pursue an M Phi l at the 
University of Cambridge, the Gates Cambri dge Tru st funded fieldwork in Cambod ia 
for my MPh il dissertation in December 2007 and the summe r of 2008. Wh ilst these 
prolonged stays in Cambodia were indi spensable for developing my knowledge of the 
'
09 Sluka (1989): 12; and Skidmore (2004): 33-34. 
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overall social and political contex t, they were also linguistically beneficial. These 
previous lan guage studies aided me greatly when I returned for my doctoral 
fieldwork, carried out from September 2009 to June 20 I 0 and May 2011 to October 
2011. Interv iew s were carried out in three languag es: Khmer , English and French 
High-level government officials were often accompanied by official translators, who 
provided Khmer-English translation. Some interviewees, who had been schooled in 
the French language, preferred to be interviewed in French. I have also consulted a 
large amount of Khmer-language books and documents. All translations from Khmer-
language sources, interviews as well as printed materials, unless otherwise stated, are 
my own. 
Through out this dissertation , I base transcriptions on the Franco-Khmer transcription 
system. The Franco-Khmer transcription system was set forward by Franklin E. 
Huffm an in 1983, building on an earlie r transcription system employed by the French 
during the period of the French protectorate of Cambodia. Its main advantage is how 
it closely follows KJ1mer pronunciation. 210 It is the transcription system most 
commonly used by political scientists. By contrast , the other main syst em used in 
academic writing , the Pou system devised by Savero us Pou in 1969, is a 
trans literation system. It is therefore more commonly employed by scholars relying 
heavily on written texts , often within the disciplines of literature , religion and the 
arts.211 
Whereas the Franco-Khmer tran script ion system, as originally devised, included 
many diacritics to distinguish between different vowel sounds , academic wo rks of 
recent years have tended to drop many of these. Tran scriptions in this dissertation 
follow the Franco-Khmer transcription system as reproduced by 1-leder and 
Ledgerwood (1996: xvii). This chart retains on ly one of the original diacritics (a). 
"
0 Marston & Guthrie (2004): ix. See Marston & Guthrie (2004): ix-x for a discussion of the 
comparative advantages of the Franco-Khmer transcription system versus the Pou system 
(Lewitz ( 1969)). 
211 Ibid. 
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Hun Sen: The Sdech Kan Narrative 
On 5-6 July 1997 , Cambodia's Fir st Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh was 
overthrown by Second Prime Minister Hun Sen , ending their co-premiership and the 
coalition government between royalist party FUNCfNPEC and the Ca mbodian 
People·s Pa11y (CPP) which had been instated in 1993. A few years thereatier , a 
narrative started spreading in Cambodia. This centred on the idea that the life of 
Prim e Minister Hun Sen was somehow intimately connected with that of sixteenth-
century king Sdech Kan, a man of the people who rose through his own prowess to 
topple the king at the time. Although this was always suggested implicitly , the idea 
conv eye d was that the prime mini ster was the reincarnation of the legendary king. 
Since the 1993 reinstatement of the monarchy and of a multi-party system, fo llowing 
on from more than a decade of one-party rule under the CPP and its predecessor, the 
Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP ), a rickety relationship had 
developed between the royalists and the CPP. With the reinstated monarchy, Nat ion , 
Religion and King (Cheat, Sasana , Mohaksatr) became the national motto of the new , 
second Kingdom of Cambodia. These tlu·ee notions and their historical precursors 
stand at the centre of historical Cambodian imagination s of power and moral order. 212 
The reinvention of the Sdech Kan narrative can be understood as P,im e Minister Hun 
Sen·s bid to remould the relationship between the nation , religion, and the monarchy 
in his favour, using a potent cultural legend which invokes a deeply engrained tension 
between inherited and non-inherited leadersh ip within Khmer Buddhist kingship. The 
reinvention of the na1Tative is in thi s way central to the reworking of boundaries of 
power in the second kingdom between the monarchy and the royalist faction on one 
hand, and the CP P, and, primarily, Hun Sen on the other. 
The naiTati ve has wider Southeast As ian resonances, with similar goings-on in, for 
example, Bunna, Thailand and Laos, 213 where historical kings have been used to 
'.
1
' Heng (2008): 310. 
_1.> See, for example, on Burma, ·Burma: The end ofan era or a dynasty's beginning?', 
Irrmvadd y , 26 Jan . (201 I); on Laos, Grabowsky and Tappe (201 \), and on Thailand , Stengs 
(2009), and Phongpaichit and Baker (2008). 
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bolster political legitimacy , at the same time as the idea of reincarnation has spread. 
As examples of · performative politics·, each of these interacts with the fabric of 
political, historiographical and moral imagination s of their polities in different ways. 
In looking at the Sdech Kan narrati ve, l seek to trace the meanings and consequences 
of reincarnating this particular king in the contemporary Cambodian context. This 
chap ter exam ines what the Prime Minister's claim to incarnation entails, and how this 
attempts to remodel the ·ideal' configuration of political power in contemporary 
Ca mbodia. It is thus concerned specifically with what it understands to be claims to 
legitimacy on behalf of Hun Sen , rather than of the CPP as a party. As the Prime 
Minister of successive CPP-led governments , the legitimacy-seeking strateg ies of 
Hun Sen necessarily affect the legitimacy of the CPP. How ever, the narrative here 
discussed accords Hun Sen a unique personal role. It can therefore be understood in 
the context of Hun Sen ' s increasing consolidation of political pow er not only vis -a-
vis rival political parties , but also within the CPP. In the period leading up to the 
second kingdom , the then State of Cambodia (SOC) leaders had tried to assert their 
legitimacy as rulers of Ca mbodia ahead of the reinstatement of the constitutional 
monarchy by means of se izing control of the right to define the concepts nation, 
religion , and king to their own advantage.214 In offering a further redefinition , the 
Sdech Kan narrative makes new claims that go beyond those of the SOC period when 
the trium virate of Hun Sen, Heng Samrin and Chea Sim acted as kings ceremonially 
and politically. By engaging with historical ideas of kingship , the Sdech Kan 
narrative posits Hun Sen himself as the legitimate national leader. 215 The narrative is 
complicit in the increasing personalisation of symbolic and political power finnly tied 
to the person of the Prime Minister. 
Changing Conceptualisations of Kingship 
"' Ledgerwood (2008b) : 213 
~
15 
Steve Heder identifies three ·c]aimsofqualitication to rule ' in postcolonial Cambodia 
being sdech, ·king· or ·prince ', a title associated with the royal family; neak cheh doeng, a 
person with higher education ; and neak tiiso 11, a person who has taken part in armed struggle. 
H un Sen routinely portrays him self as a military figure , 11eak tdso11. His claims to being a neak 
cheh doeng are epitomised by his election into the Royal Academy of Cambodia (RAC) on 28 
April 2010. Performing Sdech Kan can be seen as his ultimate claim to being sdec/1. See 
Heder (1995) 425-9. 
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Sdech Kan is known in Khmer historiography as the quintessential neak mean bon 
(man of merit). He is a famous and controversia l figure who, after killing a 
supposedly unjust king , ascended the throne himself. By invoking him, the narrative 
engage d with ideas of kingship itself. 216 Th ese ideas are enmeshed in historical 
Cambod ian Buddhist conce ptualisations of authority and moral order, link ing power 
to kannic laws of rebirth based on merit accrued in previous existences. Since the 
establishment of Theravada Buddhi sm as the dominant religion in the country, 
kingsh ip has been bound up with the notion of neak mean bon.217 The neak mean bon 
is associated with revolutionary act ivities, typically denoting a man who rises to 
power through his own prowess. His right to rule is a conseque nce of the 
accu mulation of good deeds in previous lives. When recogni sed, his merit bestows 
him with the leg itimacy to take the fate of the country in his hands or to ascend the 
throne.218 The neak mean bon is a potent cultural concept alive in Cambodian 
collective memory. 219 
Cambodian kingship was traditionally associated with extraordinary virtue, leading 
the country to prosperity ." 0 The organic link between the moral behaviour of the king 
and the welfare of the kingdom was conceptualised as a structure which , as in 
theories of kingship in many other parts of the world, presumed the unity of the 
phys ical , mortal body of the king. and his myst ical body. the ·body politic' 221 In 
Khmer Buddhist kingship, Ashley Thompson identifie s the roya l body as ·one in a 
series of substi tute bodies, including the Buddha and the stDpa, each being an imag e 
of Mount Meru, which substitute one for the other in substituting for the kingdom or 
the universe governed by the dharma' 222 The 'ki ng as a subs titute body' meant in the 
216 Heder (2007: 162) suggests that Hun Sen has ·occasionally attempted to present himself as 
a neak mean boun'. and quotes a 1993 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) repoI1. The reinvention of Sdech Kan is a first more or less coherent form of 
narrativisation to frame such claims 
217 
Harris (2005): 50; for a discussion of the historical Sdech Kan as a 11eak mean bon see 
Khing 2008 : 6; see also Thompson (2004a) on the neak mean ban during Cambodia's Middle 
Period (i.e., after the fall of Angkor and before the French protectorate, c. 1450- 1863) 
218 Khing (2008): I 
~~9 Ibid 
--
0 Thompson (2004b); Kent (2008). 
:!:!J See Kantorowicz's (1957) class ical study of the king's two bodies as a political theology of 
early-modern Western monarchies 
'" Thompson (2004b ) : 92 
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Khmer Buddhi st context that Khmer royal ty had multiple subst itut e bodi es, and that 
the king was ·b oth transcendent or uni versal and uniquely particular'. 213 Th e 
conceptio n of just leade rship/kingship in Cambodia is epito mised by the Preah Bat 
Thommik (Dhanni c Kin g or Just Ruler) , a concept with messianic overtones , also 
engraved in the popular mind. 224 Thi s Ju st Ruler is though t to uphold what is known 
in Theravadin terms as the dasavidha-riijadhamma, the ' tenfold virtues of the 
righteous king ', and to enj oy invulnerabi lity.225 In a ·traditional· conceptualisat ion of 
the ideal configuration of political powe r, the Preah Bat Thommik was env isioned as 
a chario teer , supporting himself on the two wheels of state affairs (anachakr, the 
pillar of Che{l(), and Buddhism (Putthichakr , the pillar of Sasana) to lead the people 
forward.226 
The neak mean ban and the Preah Bat Thommik overlap co nceptually. 227The we ll-
known nineteenth -century prophecy Putt/, Tumneay foretells the appearance of the 
Preah Bat Thomrnik as a neak mean bon who will come to pacify Cambodia af ter a 
period of violent upheavals. 228 These upheavals turn the world upside down: 
traditional values undergo a complete reversal, Buddhi sm is des troyed, and the 
ignorant gain power. Now largely associated with the Khmer Rouge period , the Putth 
Tumneay has been seen by many pol itica l opponents , including the royalist faction, to 
apply to the coming-to-power of the incumbent regime. 229 They point to the 
commun ist origins of the CPP and the modest backg rounds of the party ' s leaders . The 
recuning messianic search to find the Preah Bat Thommik persists in the second 
'.'.' Ibid: 91 
--' Heng (2008): 310 
22
) Ibid: 313. The ·tenfold virtues of a righteous king' (dasavidha -rctjadhamma) are d(ma 
(charity), sila (morality), pariccaga (self-sacri11ce), [,jjava (honesty), 111addava (kindness), 
tapa (self-control) , akkoda (non-anger) , avihimsa (non-violence), khanti (tolerance), and 
m'irodhana (confonn!ty to the law). See He ng 2008 : 317-18 
"' Ibid: 310 
2
2i Khing (2008): 22, suggests a complete overlap between the Preah Bm Thommik and neak 
mean ban through the conceptual link ·ctharnmik = bodhisatta = neak mean boun· Acco rding 
to de Bernon 1994: 91 , the word 'dhammik ' [thommik], part of the Cambodian royal title, 
designates in Putth Tu11111eay not only a just monarch , but also the warriors who submit only 
;~Juct~ntly to the sovereign Bodhi sattva 
;;, Kh,ng (2008): 21; de Bernon (1994): 91. 
-- On the assoc1at1on of the upheavals described in Puah Tumneay with the Khm er Rouge , 
see Mo11land (1994) : 82; Smith (1989) : 18- 23; Ledgerwood (2008b): 216. 
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kingdom ." 0 Royalists have nurtured the idea of reinstated king Norodom Sihanouk as 
a just leader, as the father of peace and nationa l reconc iliation. 231 
The reinvention of the Sdech Kiin narrative can be understood as a counter-narrative 
to a reading of Putth Tumneay whic h casts Sihanouk , and the royalist faction with 
him , as the rightful leaders of the nation. Immediate ly befo re the restoration of the 
monarchy, when expectat ions of the imminent coming of the Preah Bar Thommik ran 
high , Hun Sen, Chea Sim, and Heng Samri n, as the then SOC leaders , tried to 
distance themse lves from the infide ls mentioned in the Putth Tumneay by sponsoring 
Buddhist ritual activity. 232 Then, shortly after the July 1997 events, Hun Sen made 
reference to the short and violelll war. lasting only as long as it tak es " to fry a 
shrimp·'. which according to Putth Tumneay hails in a new era of prosperity-
thereby see mingly casting himself as the Preah Bat Thommik. 233 In 2003, Hun Sen 
seemed to suggest an association between himself and King Jayavannan V ll, the 
quintessential Preah Bat Thommik, using the language ofreincamation .234 Hun Sen's 
subsequent revival of Sdech Kan represents the emergence of a full-fledged counter-
narrative to a royalist reading of the Putth Tumneay, with the Prime Minister casting 
himself as a saviour figure, whilst omitting the other two members of the CPP top 
troika. 
This counter-narrative engages with an age-old tension between inherited and non-
inherited leadership , dee ply engrained in Buddhist thinking on kingship and in the 
Khmer political and cultural context. The productive tension between inherited and 
non-inherited leadersh ip is entailed in the tenns sdech, generally translated as •king· 
or ' prince ', and samdech, an honorific accorded by the King to non-royals including 
the CPP-s leaders. These titles historicall y covered a semantic range within and 
outside of actual ' kingship ', an amb iguity persisting into the present day. The Old 
Khmer or igin of the word sdech is derived from the root verb tac. 'to detach. to 
030 See Heng (2008) : 313 
231 
Some Cambodians consider Sihanouk as the Preah Bat Thommik or as a Bodhisattva, 
which would make him a 11eak 111ea11 bo11. See de Bernon (1994): 93; Khing (2008): 22 
'" Ledgerwood (2008b ): 216. 
233 De Bernon (1998). 
234 
Hun Sen released a press statement denying that he was a reincarnation of Jayavarman V ll ; 
this was prompted , he stated, by how many people believed this to be the case. Ledgerwood 
(2008b): 219 
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separate, to be superior'. and was used to designate people of the ruling class, only 
thence the king. 235 Utilising this pre-existing tension, the Sdech Kiin narrative 
employs the neak mean bon imaginary to glorify and exalt non-hereditary leaders h ip. 
Thereby it engages with questions debated by a rapidly changing monarchy which is 
internally fractured over the meaning of a constitutional monarchy and how it can be 
reconciled with political royalism. Following his reinstatement as king , Sihanouk 
continuously sought a political role for himself, often ending up closer to the CPP 
than to FUNC INPEC. Sihanouk's 2004 abdication in favour of his son Sihamoni, 
who is disinterested in assum ing a political role , has given Cambodia a constitutional 
monarch along Western lines. Meanwhile , Sihamoni's half-brother Ranariddh , as the 
leader of FUNCfNPEC until 2006, manoe uvred his way through coalition 
governments with the CPP that compromised his political independence, as well as 
his roya l stature. The Sdech Kiin narrative relates to these different actors and their 
agendas in different ways. It is primarily understood to justify the July 1997 events 
and Ranariddh's political downfall. More broadly , it undermines the leg itimacy ofa 
national leadership role for royal family members, and particularly the idea of 
Sihanouk as the father of natio nal reconciliation. By revealing a telling absence of 
rival rumours concerning the actual occupant of the throne, Sihamoni, it highlights 
the actual throne's hollowness 
Although the ·traditional' ideal configuration of power as the trinity of nation, 
Buddhism and kingship persists in Cambodia today, contestation over the relationship 
among the three has coloured Cambodian politics ever since Independe nce. Ian Harris 
charges that the idea of the king as indispensable to the flourishing of Theravada 
Buddhism may be a kind of caricature of Khmer Buddhism. 236 The Sdech Kim 
narrative can be understood as the latest response to a long-standing legitimacy crisis 
of this trinity, in important ways fonning a continuity with that of Sihanouk. 
Sihanouk ' s Sangkum Reastr Niyum (People·s Socialist Community, 1955-70) and its 
'
35 Pou (1998): 656. Pou (1992: 508) defines the Old Khmer meaning as ·To be aloof, above 
all. The supreme one. Sacred beings, espec. Princes. (Of these) To be, stand. move · 
~
36 Harris (2008). Anti-colonial Buddhist nalionalism was non-monarchist and sometimes anti-
monarchist, and several people at its heart later rose to prominence in the Khmer Republic. 
Their thinking was informed by larger debates within Buddhist thinking on kingship. Harris 
(2008: 82- 88) identifies both Theravada canonical sources and Cambodian chbaps, post-
canonical sources, which justify insurrection as a consequence of misrule. 
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Buddhist socialism, launched as a social and political foundation for buildi ng 
independent Cambodia , was said by Sihanouk to build precisely on the ·traditional" 
base of the monarchy and Buddhism as 'irreplaceable factors ofunity'. 237 Sihanouk 
claimed direct descent from Jayava nnan VII , the model Preah Bat Thommik, and 
likened his Sangkum Reastr Ni yum to the Angkorean era. 238 Yet at the same time, 
Sihanouk referred to the popular legend of King Trasak Ph 'aem, a neak mean bon, to 
justify his 1955 abdication in favour of his father Suramarit , and his new role as 
chairman of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum. According to legend , Trilsilk Ph"aem was a 
gardener of the Sam re minority, renowned for his skill in growing sweet cucumbers. 
Acting on the orders of the king to kill any intruder , the gardener one night killed a 
trespasser who then turned out to be the king himself. In recogn ition of the gard ener's 
obedience, the gardener was then made king and started a new dynasty of popular 
origin. Harris notes that ·by drawing on the legend. Sihanouk was able to replace the 
idea of rule by traditional quasi-divine right with a slightly more democratic and 
popular notion of exclusive political power ' .239 This was reflected in how around the 
same time Sihanouk started to be called by the newly invented kinship-term Samdech 
Euv, oft en translated as ·Monsignor Papa·. rather than by Sanskrit and Pali terms 
hitherto associated with high status. 240 Ever so slightly , kingship was shifted towards 
a more democratic ideal, by referring to the neak mean ban imaginary. 
In the second kingdom. genealogical lines are again central to the royals· claims to 
legitimacy. Meanwhile, in contemporary society, historical imaginations of 
overlapping substitute bodies, whereby the king embod ies the people and the state, 
persi st. Alexandra Kent tells the story of how two middle-aged Cambodian women 
set out to recover the king·s body through spirit performances in order. ultimately. to 
reconstitute Cambodia .24 1 Just as these women use their bodies to channel that of the 
king , as the substitute in tum for the body soc ial and the body po litic , the Sdech Kiln 
or Norodom Sihanouk (1965): 14 
238 Edwards (2007): 250. 
239 Harris (2005): 146. 
::--1o Sihanouk was granted the title of dha111111ik mahClrclj [thommik mohareach] (great righteous 
king) in the 1947 Constitution, but renounced it by abdicating. He occasionally referred to 
himself as king-monk (Harris 2005: 144). In contrast. legend has it that after Trfts:ik Ph'aem 
ascends the throne, the title PrecJ/1 Bat Tlwmmik is added to his royal title, underlining the 
overlap between the neak mean bon and the Preah Bat Thommik. See de Bernon ( 1998): 91 
24 1 Kent (2008). 
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perfom1ance can be understood as a mirror response by the Prime Minister to reorient 
Cambodia - through replacing the ailing monarchy. Through becom ing the 
substitute body ofSdech Kan, the Prim e Minister plunges himself into a series of 
associations , ultimately representing what in the modem context is imagined as the 
nation . The discourse surround ing Hun Sen·s reincarnation ofSdech Kan can be 
under stood as a bid to articulate and cement an interpretation of legit imate leader ship 
to define the present era and to negotiate future political developments; a concern 
which goes beyond that of convincingly , in any straightforward sense, aspiring to be a 
neak mean ban or Preah Bar Thommik. 
Performative Politics in the Second Kingdom 
By (re) incarnating or perfom1ing Sdech Kan , Prim e Minister Hun Sen has tapped into 
the sphe re of emotion, drama and perfonnance , testifying to what an important part 
such performance plays in contemporary Cambodian politics. Ju lia Strauss and Dona\ 
Cruise O'Brien identify three distinct modes ofperformative politics as the politics of 
·affect, emo tion and drama·: state rituals, primarily staged ceremonies: theatrica l 
performance by politicians and activists, such as electio ns and street protests; and 
individual or micro -perfonnances, including speeches or events intended to engage 
people's emotions and rally support. 241 The performances of the Sdech Kan na1Tative 
predominantly belon g to the third type. The Prim e Minister makes individual 
perfom1ances in the fonn of elaborat e speeches. There are also indi vidual and micro-
perfonnances by different members of the political e lite and their c\ientelistic 
networks , khsae. Performing the Sdech Kan narrative exa lts the importance of Hun 
Sen·s bureaucratic, military and economic networks , which make up what Steve 
Heder has referr ed to as an · involuted fac;ade state· w It has tied together government 
officials with artists and academics who have been mob ilised in an ongoing process 
of enlist ing intellectuals into the Prim e Minister's network. In a way, the narrative has 
become an inverted ·facade· by providing a platform for these individuals to come to 
the surface of public space, reinforcing existing power structures and integrati ng a 
242 Strauss and Cruise O'Brien (2007): 2-3 
243 1-leder (2007): I 62. 
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new set of people into them. Their performances includ e the erec tion of statues of 
Sdec h Kan across the country, a book about Sdec h Kim, and the work of a resea rch 
team to locate Sdech Kiin's capita l. Th e narrative has also been disseminated 
nationwide through the media. 
These public spectac les co ntain their own internal logic , aspirations and express ions. 
In contrast to Cambodian elections, wh ich could be said to (sometimes 
schizophrenicall y) interact with both an international and domestic audience, the 
perfom1ances discussed here are aimed quite exclusively at a domestic audience. As a 
realm ·thoroughl y saturated with symbo ls. as the script for the performance e ither 
implicitly or expl icitly calls upon trope s, symbols and metaphor s presumed to be well 
understood by those audiences·. performative politics alludes to and draws meaning 
from a sphere of shar ed understandings."' It thus naturally intersects wi th the 
politically embedded co ntes tation of social memories. Sdech Kan was already a 
controversial figure in Cambodian collective memory prior to his recent reinvention, 
with interpretations of his rule ranging from a republican one making him out to be a 
false revolutionary to a royalist one casting him as a simple usurper of the throne. "' 
The most recent rein vention thus picks up and utilises tropes and symbols fresh in the 
collective memor y. The performance can paradoxically be understood as a 
particularly ·sincere· medium by which Hun Sen communicates wit h the citizenry. Its 
indirect communications convey important messages, yet these are always subject to 
interpretation and bound to the context of the performance's enactme nt. 
Sdech Kan: The 'Or igina l' Narrat ive 
Sdech Kan , also known by his royal name Preah Srey Chettha, is known in Khmer 
history as the commoner who became the leader of a popular upri sing toppling King 
Srey Sokonthor Bat (r. 1504-12). Though several written versions of the story ex ist, 
Adhemard Leclere narrates the story of Sdech Kan as follows. 246 Kan belonged to the 
:!-W Strauss and Cruise O'Brien (2007): 3 
'" Saing (1972); Tauch (1995) 
246 
Leclere ( l 914) : 235-78. The account given in Leclere (1910) is largely identical, but omits 
king Srey Sokonthor Bfif s dream. Leclere does not provide a reference for the chronicle on 
which he based his account. But see Eng(\985) (1969]: 8-19 which largely mirrors Leclere's 
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temple -servant class. When his sister was offered to Srey Sokonthor Bat as a 
concubine, Kan came to live in the royal palace where he soon built up a certain 
sta nding. One night in 1508, Srey Sokonthor Bal had a nightmare in which he saw an 
ominous neak (dragon) drive him out of the palace and wreak havoc on the kingdom. 
Gathering with all the members of the royal family and court dignitaries, who o ffered 
him ca ndles and flow er garlands, the king then had a vision of two dragons hovering 
around either side ofKan·s head. Immediately thereafter. he received news of 
ominous signs from all parts of the kingdom . Perturbed , King Srey Sokonthor Bat 
gathered his fortune-tellers, who foresaw that he would be toppled by a man born in 
the year of the dragon , a man who would reign in the direction of the eas t. Given that 
Kan was indeed born in the year of the dragon , the king schemed to have Kan killed 
in what was to seem like a fishing accident. The king 's ignoble plot failed. however, 
as Kan was warned by his sister who had overheard the conversation. Escap ing the 
king·s trap. Kan fled eastwards to build up an army. Ma rchin g against Srey 
Sokonthor Bat in 1512 , Kan finally defeated the king, who was struc k down by one of 
his aides. Thereafter, Kan ruled benevolently over Cambodia, bringing order and 
prosperity. He introduced the first curre ncy in the kingdom, the sleung, with the 
image of a dragon imprint ed on it. How ever, a few years into his reign, a civil war 
broke out in 1516, wh ich ended in 1525 with Sdech Kan being kill ed by the so ldiers 
of King Chant Reach ea . The story allows plenty of space for interpretation as to 
whether Kan was a traitor or a just warrior rising against an unjust king. Historians 
have dwelt on the Sdech Kan sto ry becau se it is perce ived to tell important things 
about what Michel Tranel terms the ·psycho-sociological reality' of Ca mbodi an 
history, whilst aspiring 10 histo rical truth- va lue.247 
Sdech Kan and the Roya l Family: (Re)birth of a Modern Saga of Rea lpolitik 
account as retold above, whilst providing a lengthier account of events. LeclCre·s 19 10 article 
was reprinted in Tran el (ed) (2002). Khin (ed. and !rans .) (1988) dis cusses Sdech Kiln' s reign. 
but does not retell the legend recounted above. for which Khin instead references Leclere's 
19 I 0 account (p. 258). 
,r Tranel (2002): preface . 
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From the ea rly 2000s onwards, Prim e Mini ster Hun Sen started bringing Sdech Kan 
to mind in a number of speec hes. Several remarks by the Prim e Minister seemed to 
suggest that there was an intimate co nnection betwee n him self and Sdech Kan. The 
simil ar itie s between Sdec h Kan and Hun Sen were given particu lar attention. Th ey 
were both born in the yea r of the neak (dra gon). Jus t as Sdech Kan came from the 
class of temple- se rvan ts, Hun Sen famous ly spent part of his youth as a pagoda boy. 
The main simi larity , al luded to implicitly, was the idea o f a commo ner, rising throu gh 
his own revolutionary prowess to govern the polity by topp ling an unjust king . 
This narrative emerged in the context of Hun Sen·s restructuring of relations between 
him se lf and the royal family to the detrim ent of the latter, and particularly in relation 
to his ultimate outmanoeuvri ng of Prin ce Ranar iddh. Ranariddh was dealt the major 
blow by the Ju ly 1997 events that ousted him as co -pr ime minister , effective ly 
ending any real in fluence he might have had over national politics. The Sdech Kan 
narrative appeared in the afte1111a1h of the 1997 events, in a period when Ranariddh 
was strugglin g to reinsert himself into national po\itic s.2.J8 In 2006, the conflict 
between Ranariddh and Hun Sen reached a new peak. leading to Ranariddh· s 
resignation from the presidency of the ational Assembly in March. The same 
month, the Nat ional Assembly amended the co nstitution enabli ng it to pass bills with 
a simp le majori ty, rather than the prev iously required two -thirds majo rity. Th is move 
effect ively eliminated royalist party FUNC INPEC as a political acto r with agency. 
Short ly before Ranariddh's res ignation , on 26 February 2006 , Hun Sen went with his 
wife Bun Ran y to visit what had been identified as Sdec h Kan's former capital , 
Sro lop Prey Noko r in Kompong Cham province. Here, Hun Sen gave a speec h, 
prov iding the fullest acco unt to dat e of his pe rspec tive on Sdec h Kan. Hun Sen sta rted 
out by declaring that a religious ceremony had been conducted to ask pennissio n 
from former king Sdech Kan·s spir it for a res toration effo rt a imed at developing 
Srolop Pre y Nokor into a tourism site. He then spoke at length abou t how the 
deve lopment of Sro lop was to take place. An irri gation sys tem was to be con struct ed, 
bringing wate r to the 213-hectare inner area of the fonner city or palace, as we ll as 
:!.JS Ranariddh was appointed President of the National Assembly in 1998, and again in 2003. 
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almost 2,000 hectar es in the vicinity; 519 me tres of the seven-metre-high city wall 
were to be rebuilt. Water reservoirs around the palace were to be restored. Ca nals 
were to be dug, ranging from 2,750 to 4,000 metres long. Fou r water gates were to be 
put in, and a new water system extending the water current from the canal to be 
co nstructed. Two other canals were to be restored together with a number of water 
regu latory mechani sms. As Hun Sen concluded. · 1 think we have a long-term 
involvement here. ' 249 
Hun Sen went on to narrate his version of the Sdech Kan story: 
After the Ponhea Yat reign, Cambodia was ruled as a Kingdom that was divided into 
three separate areas ... The war later broke out. It is interesting to study its cause for the 
sake of preventing mistakes in the present. King Preah Srey Sokonthor Bcit had a 
concubine whose brother was named Kftn. One day the King dreamed ofa fire• 
breathing dragon and fortunetellers spread rumors of instability believed to originate 
from K3n, since everyone was unhappy about him being promoted from the status of 
an outcast. A plot to kill Kan was hatched but Kan was saved by a secret letter from his 
sister and fled to gather forces, which later fought and defeated the forces of the King 
Srey Sokonthor Bat. He became King himself and was named Preah Srey Chettha. 
Sdech K§.n or Preah Srey Chettha did a wonderful work in what should be termed a 
democratic revolution because he liberated all outcasts under his area of control. 
Because of this he became the strongest commander and King in his own right. 250 
Hun Sen continued the speec h by addressing the deal struck between the CPI' and 
opposition Sam Rain sy Pany (SRP) for the const itutional ame ndment men tioned 
above, requiring a simple majority rather than a two -third s majority to pass a law in 
the National Assembly. Hun Sen referred to his recent audience with King Sihamoni 
to address rumour s that this · reconciliat ion approach' would lead to the monarch y"s 
downfall. Hun Sen had informed the king that the constitutional amendme nt was 
aimed merely at avoiding a political deadlock , not at abolishing the monarchy. He 
249 
Hun Sen, ·Visit ofSamdech Hun Sen and Bun Rany to the former Royal City of'Sanlob 
Prey Nokor in Kompong Cham·. Cambodia New Visio11 (CNV), 97, 28 Feb. 2006. 
250 Ibid. This account of the Sdech Kfin story as typically referred to by Hun Sen evidently 
picks the parts of the legend that serve to deliver his message whilst omitting other parts, such 
as how Sdech Kan was ultimately killed and replaced by another monarch. 
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further stated that the C PP should be ca lled the monar chy's supp orter, ' if not the 
monarchisf , and that anyo ne wishing to abolish the monarchy had to first ·get me 
[Hun Sen] out' .251 In his speech the Prime Minis ter had expl icitly addressed the 
rece nt moves affecting the royal ist part y by cla imin g to be the mo narc hy's defender. 
He had also given a mu ch longer accoun t retelli ng the historica l legend of Sdech Kan 
defeating the king at the time , and he had delive red it al l at the site of'Sdech Kan·s 
cap ital. If read as a stateme nt on the pre sent situat ion, this latt er part seemed to 
contrad ict the more expl icit assert ions. 
Short ly after the speech, Ranariddh resigned from the presidency o f the Natio nal 
Asse mbly, perhap s giv ing clues 10 his reading o f the above speec h and to which 
performance he attributed ·sincerit y' One month later , Hun Sen delivered anot her 
forceful speech reiterating the Sdech Kiin stor y. This time, he drew exact parallel s 
betwee n present and past ac tors. stat ing that ·we should not be afra id to get exposed 
to history as some people should'. and that ·we sho uld not be afraid of the truth 
recorded by history·, as, presumably, othe rs shou ld.252 He noted the histo rical events 
as proof that ·all are born equal ' , and that •it was not true at all that some peopl e are 
born to be respected peop le and so me are not . a mes sage not lost on the royal 
family.253 
Sdech Kan, the Win-Win Policy and Nat ional Reconciliation 
Hun Sen·s reinvention ofSdech Kan trans mit s a particu lar idea of national 
reco nciliation in contemporary Cambodia. Hun Sen has sta ted that he has taken late 
Lao prime minister Kaysone Phomvi hane·s way of national reconciliation foll ow ing 
the 1975 revolution as a mode l for the recreation of the Cambodian monarchy , in 
terms of how Kaysone·s new regim e dealt with the Lao monarchy that it replaced. ';' 
Thi s, he has specified, particularly refer s to how Kaysone integrated leading royal ists 
:!si Ibid. 
252 Hun Sen. ' Inaugurating Buddhist temple in Serei Suosdei Pagoda', CNV, 99, 27 Apr. 2006. 
253 Author's interviews with senior royal family members suggest that they generally perceive 
of Hun Sen ·s references to Sdech Kan as a pledge to take revenge on the monarchy, by means 
of invoking their wrongdoings against Sdech Kan . 
.:!;~ Author's interview with Prime Minister Hun Sen, 29 Sept. 201 I 
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such as fonner prime minister Prince Souvanna Phouma into the new regime. 255 
Through these meas ures , in Laos, royal ists came to lend traditional notions of 
legitimacy to the new regime. 256 In Cambodia, FUNCINPEC has been weakened by a 
ser ies of coalition govern ments with the CPP, whilst King-Father Sihanouk 
sometimes appeared more supportive of Hun Sen than of FUNCINPEC. 
Paradoxically, Laos·s transition from monarchy to a people·s republic has provided 
the model for the reverse transition in Cambod ia to a constitutional monarchy from a 
comm unist system.257 
The Sdec h Kan narrative supports this agenda, further inserting the fate of the 
monarchy into a disco urse of nationa l reconciliation. In many of Hun Sen 's speeches, 
the reinvention of Sdech Kan has in different ways been integrated into supporting his 
claims to be the main architect ofpeacebuilding in post-conflict Cambodia. Royalists 
and other members of the political opposition generally identify the signing of the 
Paris Peace Accords (PPA) on 23 October 1991 between the SOC governme nt and 
the tripartite resistance coa lition as the end of the civil war. Crediting Sihanouk with 
the successfu l negotiation of the PPA and pointing to how he presided over the 
Supreme Na tional Council (SNC) , the transitio nal government during the peace 
process, the idea of Sihanouk as the father of national reconciliation constitut es a 
main claim to legitimacy for second kingdom royalists in resonance with the 
prom ises of the Pwth Tumneay. Hun Sen, whilst still regularly referring to Sihanouk 
as the father of peace and national reconciliation, has increasingly downplayed the 
imp ortance of the PPA, pointing to how the peace accords were the product of 
external intervention and to how civil war between the new government and the 
255 \.Vith the establishment of the Lao People·s Democratic Republic in 1975, Souvanna 
Phouma became ·Counsellor to the Government', King Savang Vatthana abdicated and was 
appointed ·Counsellor to the President·. former Crown Prince Vong Savang was appointed 
member of the Supreme People·s Assembly. and Prince Souphanouvong was made President 
o_fthe new republic. Stuart-Fox (I 997): 170. 
~'
6 In a further parallel to contemporary Cambodia, the use of traditional notions of legitimacy 
became even more pronounced following the collapse of communist ideology in the late 
1980s, when the Lao regime turned to employ a Buddhist discourse centred on righteous 
kings. Today, historical kings have increasingly been integrated into what Grabowsky and 
Tapp~ refer to as an ·official national hero pantheon· See Evans ( 1998): 70; Grabowsky and 
Tappe (2011 ); Evans (2002) 
257 This is even more paradoxical given that the Laotian transition is believed to have entailed 
putting the king to death. Ex-king Savang Vatthana, his wife and two sons are believed to 
have died under arrest in Houaphan. Evans (1998): 99-100. 
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Khmer Rouge resumed after their conclusion.258 Instead, Hun Sen credits his win-win 
policy, whereby defectors from the Khmer Rouge (KR) were offered full integration 
into Cambodian society, with having achieved national reconciliation with the 
integration of the last KR forces in 1998.259 The wi n-win policy thereby achieves the 
promises of7 January 1979, celebrated by the CP P as the ·nation's second birthday', 
when the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation, out of which the PRK 
government would develop, with Vietnamese backing, overthrew the Khmer Rouge-
regime of Democratic Kampuchea. 
The reinvention ofSdech Kan advances an idea of the curbin g of royal power as 
integral to national reconciliation and prosperity. Whilst the win-win policy 
constitu tes Hun Sen's final defeat of the Khmer Rouge , the Sdech Kan narrative 
represents how he has clipped the royalists· w ings, leading to the ir reintegration into 
national politics under the leadership of the CPP. The reinvention ofSdech Kan also 
supports the attribution of post-conflict national reconciliation to Hun Sen·s win-win 
policy, outperforming Sihano uk. In a number of speec hes, Hun Sen has recalled how 
the wa r that broke out during Sdech Kan·s reign started a period of civil war lasting 
over three hundred years , until Hun Sen ended the chaos. 260 Here Sdech Kan and Hun 
Sen, rather than overlapping , are intrinsically linked as instigator and conciliator 
respective ly of a defining phase of Cambodian history. National reconciliation is 
typically defined as the 1998 integration of the last Khm er Rouge defectors under the 
win-win policy. At other times, Hun Sen links the achievement of the win -win policy 
in 1998 to the July I 997 events. 161 These were justified by Hun Sen as a counter-
258 See Hun Sen·s speech at the twentieth anniversary of the return of Sihanouk from exile and 
Sihano uk 's nin et ieth birthday, CNV, 164, 30 Oct. 201 I, in which 1-iun Sen, whilst still 
referring to Sihanouk as the ·father of peace', stops at emphasising ·the brilliant reflection· of 
Sihanouk and Monineath in ·the creation of[t he] policy of national reconciliation and 
healing· 
259 See, for example, Hun Sen, ·Speech at Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
Jakai1a, 16 Mar. 1999"Jakarta, 16 Mar. 1999 , cited in Chhay (2007): 79. 
260 In yet other speeches, Sdech K§.n brings peace in a straightforward parallel to Hun Sen 
more than three hundred years later. See Hun Sen, ·Inaugurating Buddhist temple in Serei 
Suosdei Pagoda· 
261 For speeches in which Sdech Kii.n's killing of Srey Sokonthor Bat is linked to the win•win 
policy, as the start and end·point of civil war respectively, see, for example, 'Address to the 
closing session of the national conference: .. Peace. national reconciliation and democracy 
building: Ten years after the Paris Peace Agreement" ... CNV, 45, 22 Oct. 200 I;· Address on 
the occasion of the acceptance of the Honorary Doctorate Degree of Political Science from the 
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attac k ag ains t an a lliance be tween royali sts and the Khm er Rouge . Th e Jul y 1997 
even ts are the reby tied up with the win- w in po licy, and togethe r made to defi ne 
na tiona l reco nci liatio n in the second kingdom. 
Establi shing Origin: Co-creating Hun Sen and Sdech Kan 
The reinvention of Sclech Kan built cruc ia lly on academic wor k on the historical Kiin 
by fonn er vice -preside nt of the Royal Academy of Ca mbodia (RAC), historian Ros 
Chant raboth. Having spent the previous thirty yea rs in France , Ros was called back to 
Ca mbod ia in 2000 to he lp set up the Roya l Aca demy re -established the pre vious 
year. 262 He imme diate ly se t abo ut the task of ide nti fy ing the loca t ion ofS dec h Kan·s 
seco nd cap ital, reco rded by hi stor ical sources as Sro lop Doun Tip ichey Prey Nokor. 
Ros·s research team decide d to searc h for it in Ko mpong Cham·s Tbou ng Khmom 
district, follow ing Khmer histor ica l sou rces. 263 Find ing a square brick wa ll at the 
nea rby site o f the pre-Ang korean temples Banteay Prey Nokor , the resea rch team 
co nc lude d that th is matc hed the desc ripti on of Sdech Kan·s cap ita l in Khm er 
sources. 26" T he deve lopment of the area for touris m was com menced at the height of 
the confl ict with Ranaridd h in 2006. As part of this, the pagoda known var iously as 
Wa t Angko r K.nong, Wat Prasat or Wat KJ1mau, which stands in the middle of the 
area, has been renovate d. The pa goda consists of a newe r vihear, raise d on the s ite of 
an olde r one; beh ind it, the re are two sma ller, pre -Angkorean prasat. So far, however, 
Sro lop has yet to become a popula r dest ina tion for domestic tourists in sp ite of 
telev ision broadcasts that adve rtise the site as a place for leisure and his torica l 
d iscovery . 
University of Ramk hamhae ng. Kingdom o f Tha iland·. CNV, 46. 15 Nov. 2001; for a speech in 
which 1998 as the end-point of national divi sion since the time ofSdech Kan is put explicit ly 
in re lation to the 1997 events, see ·Inaugurating Bayon TV/ Radio broadcast station·. CNV, 
I 10, 11 Mar. 2007. 
262 The RAC. the nat ion 's highest academic body. falls direc tly 
under the O ffice of the Co unc il of Ministers and its Min ister DPM Sok An, Hun 
Sen 's c lose assoc iate. In Ap ril 2010. Hun Sen and Sok An we re ap pointed as full members of 
the RAC , and in April 20 11 Hun Sen was appointed its Honorary President 
.:!
63 Lec lere ( 1914): 252 situates Srolop at the border of the historical pro vinces Tboung 
Khmom and Ba Phnom. 
'" Ros (2007): 225. 
83 
Locating Srolop in Kompong Cham prov ided another para llel be tween the traj ecto ries 
of Sdech Kiln and Hun Sen. Hun Sen was born in Steung Trang district, Kompong 
Cham in 1952 ; he claims to ha ve joined the maq uis in Kompo ng Cham· s Memot 
district in 1970, and late r marr ied Bun Ran y in Tboung Khmom dist rict , Kompong 
Cham, where they a lso lost their first so n. The narrativisation of Hun Se n· s li fe as a 
neak tftsou, a person who has taken part in armed struggle, prior to assuming national 
leaders hip outl ines a se ries of events taking place in Komp ong Cham, well engrained 
in the popular imaginatio n. Hun Sen has explic itly put his per so nal history of 
revo lutionar y strugg le in the area in relation to that of Sdec h Kan. In his speech 
delivered at his visi t to Sro lop Prey Nokor, Hun Sen started out by recalling that not 
on ly had severa l senior C PP leader s lived in the area durin g the revo lution , but also 
that he and his wife had a memorable history there. 165 He recall ed how he and his 
wife had reunited in the area afte r two months of separation, citin g wide ly known 
songs about the fate of a woman separated from her husband , and compared his sto ry 
to that ofSdec h Kan, finding it no less pitiful. 266 Thi s was arguably in tende d to ensure 
that the we ll-kn own sto ry of Hun Sen' s revolutionary activities throughout the 1970s 
- including his ultimate toppling of the Khm er Rouge-regim e - wo uld henceforth 
invoke the image of Sdec h Kiln. In a later speech deli vered in Memot in 2007, Hun 
Sen out lined his relation to the area as follows: 
everyone knows that I have started my political life in rvlemot from April 4. 1970 as 
I decided to join the Maquis in response to the appeal made by Samdech Preah 
Norodom Sihanouk ... At another juncture, on June 20, 1977. I left the district of 
Me mot to lead the struggle movement for national liberation against Pol Pot's 
genocidal regime, which later achieved the victory on January 7, 1979. However, 
another event that shocked me the most happened right before this building ... My first 
son died on November l 0, l 976. My other son, who is also here today, was born not 
far from this place. January 5, 2007 is indeed our 3 l st wedding anniversary. \Ve got 
:!
65 Hun Sen. 'Visit ofSamdech Hun Sen and Bun Rany to the former Royal City·. 
:!
66 These episodes from Hun Sen's and Bun Rany's li fe during the time of revolutionary 
struggle have been made famous through songs such as Tukkh srey bdey proar (The sorrow of 
a woman separated from her husband). authored by the PM himself. It is included in Chhay 
2005. 
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married in the commune ofChrab, Tboung Khmom District with twelve other pairs 
My star had been full of dangers, not just simple hardships and comforts ... 267 
In this speech, Hun Sen describes his distress when in 1976 his wife Bun Rany, 
pregnant, is sent to work at the site of Srolop Prey Nokor. He takes her to nearby 
Memot to give birth, but during the night she delivers the baby he is away on a 
mission. Returning the next morning, he finds his first-born dead. Hun Sen asks for a 
proper burial, but is denied even thi s. He remarks. ' I was accused of being a traitor 
for a long time, but I knew that it was not my time yet. I could have taken revenge 
because I had a pistol with loaded chamber already in hand. I did not do it. ' Instead, 
Hun Sen leaves Memot on 20 June 1977 for Vietnam . From there, Hun Sen builds up 
his anny and power base, cu lminating in his revenge- the toppling of Democratic 
Kampuchea on 7 January 1979. In this neak tasou nanative, well-known to the 
public, Hun Sen's revolutionary activities recall those ofSdech Kan. Like Sdech Kan, 
when accused of treachery and struck by misfortune, Hun Sen 'kills his anger' and 
escapes eastwards, to Vietnam, where he builds up an anny that eventually returns to 
topple the regime. 268 The Sdech Kan narrative resonates with the earl ier 
narrativisation suITounding Hun Sen, an association encouraged by the prime 
minister, and draws strength from this. 269 In turn, this analogy bestows Hun Sen·s 
personal revolutionary history with the range of meanings attached to that of the 
historical king. 
Drawing a 'New Vision' from the Past 
261 
Hun Sen, ·Opening Junior High School Bun Rany - Hun Sen Memot', CNV, I 08, 5 Jan. 
2007. 
268 Although Hun Sen now claims to have joined the rnaquis in 1970 responding to Sihanouk's 
call to arms, during the PRK., he claimed to have joined the resistance in 1967, long before the 
anti-Sihanouk coup of 1970. For the former , see, for example , Chhay (2007): 32. On his 
claims during the PRK, see Kiernan (1985): 254. 
269 The consequence of aligning the neak tciso11 narrative with that ofSdech Kfin, is, evidently, 
how this shifts the enemy from the monarchy to the Khmer Rouge; and further serves to 
conceptually link the monarchy to the Khmer Rouge, as suggested above. This could also be 
read to indict Sihanouk_ whose call to arms Hun Sen now claims to have motivated him to join 
the revolution which would go so frightfully wrong that he had to overturn it; emphasising 
Sihanouk's alleged complicity in the horrors of Democratic Kampuchea. 
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Ros was com missio ned by the Prime Minister to author a book about the historical 
king. Publis hed under the nam e · Preah Sdech Kan· in October 2006. the book was 
intended to find a political doctrine and ruling strategy in Khmer history for how to 
best govern, develop and rebui ld the nation .'7° Funded privately by the Prime 
Minister and first lady Bun Rany, 5,000 copies of the book we re distributed to 
libraries around Cambodia. 271 Ros identified three major political events in Khmer 
history which had changed the way of governing, when a commoner had dared to 
stand up to dismantle a royalist regime. These were the rise to power of, in turn, 
Tra sak Ph·aem in the thirteenth century, Sdech Kan in the sixt eenth century , and 
lastly Lon Nol, through his 1970 coup which overthrew Sihanouk as head ofstate. 272 
These extraordinary events, Ros state d, begged the question of why so many people 
had come together to overthrow the king. As a character routinely referred to at times 
of conflict between a commoner and the king , when the commoner would typi cally 
be likened to Sdech Kan as a traitor and usurper, he sought to reexamine Kan .'73 
Setting out to context ualise Sdech Kan·s rise to power and to scrut ini se the idea s and 
actions of King Srey Sokonthor Bat , Ros·s findings thus aspired to offe r insight s to 
guide contemporary politics. 
In his preface to the book, Hun Sen interpreted its findings as follows: 
Preah Sdech Kan has been continuously written down in Khmer 
history as a man who betrayed the King, or a usurper . . 
note that Preah Sdech K§.n was a Khmer, born in the class of 
temple -servants, that he was not a man who betrayed the King. or 
a usurper. as is always said.:!-4 
:?·o Ros (2007) : 1; all citations from this book are the author·s own translations 
:i·i Leang Delux, •History: Hun Sen finances a book about Sdach Korn·, Cambodge Soir, 29 
Mar. 2007 . A second edition was released in 2007 . See Bo Proeuk, ·Hun Sen-sponsored 




'" Ros (2007): 3-4 
173 The seriousness with which Hun Sen takes allegations of being a traitor to the nation was 
highlighted by how he warned critics of the 7 January ceremony that anyone accusing him or 
senior government officials of being a ·national traitor· would be arrested. See Cheang Sokha 
~~~d Rebecca Pu?<ly, ·Don·t call me a traitor: PM'. Phnom Penh Post , 10 Jan. 2011 
· Hun (2007): 1. 
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Hun Sen suggested the following points to be reexamined in order to provide a better 
understanding ofSdech Kan·s actions: 
• The manner of doing things and the behaviour of King Srey Sokonthor Bat 
• The popular movements throughout the country which joined Sdech Kan ·s 
struggle against the King. 
• The monks and pagodas that had previously received support. benefit s and 
privileges from the King and Royal family turned to support and protect Preah 
Sdech Kiin. 
• What was the reason that brought people from all classes to rise up to fight the 
King? 
• What kind of problems did Khmer society have with the tenfold conduct of 
the King,ju stice, society, agriculture and economy during the period of King 
Srey Sokonthor Biit? 
• Can Preah Sdech Kiin, who escaped his attempted murder by the King just to 
survive, be considered to have committed an act ofbetrayal? 2- 5 
These points can also be read as out linin g a ·timeless· scenario centred on the 
relationship between an unvirtuous king and an emergin g neak mea n bon. Applied to 
the re lationship between the royalist faction and Hun Sen , these sugge st that in the 
period prior to Hun Sen·s actions to limit the royalists· power , there was so meth ing 
problematic about the behaviour of the royalist faction, that Hun Sen enjoyed the 
unanimous support of the people and of the sangha, and that their suppo 11 indicated 
underlying societal problems ste mming from the morally f1awed conduct of the 
royalists. It suggests that Hun Sen was justified in curbing the power of the royalist 
faction by alluding to the imaginary of the Preah Bat Thommik. It is becau se of the 
royalists' failure to uphold the ·tenfold virtu es of the king ' which define the Preah 
Bat Thommik that the people and sa ng/Ja rally to protect the neak mean ban. 
Reas sess ing the histo 1ical Kan also offered an opportunity for the Prim e Minister to 
re invent his political identity. Kan provides Hun Sen with a new vision to guide the 
present era. 276 Kan 's political thinking is sa id to hav e rested on two conceptual 
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innovation s; freedom ri ghts (se trhi seriph eap) and class strugg le (tiisou vannah). 
These radical innovations predated the emergence of simil ar notion s in Europe, 
making Cambodia the birthp lace of democratic politics. 277 In Hun Sen·s preface, we 
read: 
Preah Sdech Kan ... can be considered as a brilliant hero in the 
world , who raised the doctrine and visio n of freedom rights. and 
was the first to speak about and practice this, in the sixteenth 
century. France , famous as the coun try of human rights, started 
discussing freedom rights only in the eighteenth century. 
Something even more specia l is how Preah Srey Chettha Preah 
Sdech Kan raised the theory of c lass struggle to become the base 
of building Cambodia. Karl Marx , the father of Communi sm, 
raised this thought and wrote down the theory of class struggle 
only at the end of the nineteenth century. :ns 
These two conceptual innovation s together make up early democratic beliefs , 
providing a blueprint for contemporary politics: 
Can the political theory of Preah Srey Chettha Preah Sdech Kan 
that advances freedom rights and class struggle, which became 
the base in building the nation, the motherland, be considered to 
be the first step in history towards democratic belief s? Also, for 
my own vision, I can note that the doctrine and activity of Preah 
Srey Chettha Preah Sdech Kan has the characteristics of the first 
democratic revolution of the people in Cambodian history, thanks 
to Sdech Kan who liberated them from the class system, letting 
there be freedom and equalit y in socie ty .. 
The toppling of the unjust monarch results from the belief in freedom right s and class 
strugg le and constitutes a national democratic revolution, which in tum is posited as 
"' Ros (2007) : 271. 
::: I-lun(W07): ii-iii 
- Ibid: Ill. 
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an integral part of the very fabric of the nation. ' 80 This particu lar nationa list vision 
turn s the trinity of Nation, Religion , and King on its head and not only closely knit s 
together the notion of democracy with opposition to a morall y flawed royalist faction, 
but also situates this wit hin broader idea s of equality and social mobility. The leader 
who dares to cha llenge the hereditary leader achieves the democratic revolution and 
embodies the nation 's aspira tions 
The conceptualisation of democracy as a fusion of class struggl e and freedom rights 
refas hions an earlier discourse which finnl y integrated the notion of democracy as 
part of revolutionary history. Hun Sen invoked both concepts during the PRK, 
depicting democracy and the securing of freedom rights as the unchanging objective 
of the Cambodian revolution ary que st pur sue d through cla ss struggle from the pre-
protectorate era onwards. 281 Having cast off his previous social ist identity, the 
changing revolutionary imagina ry provided by Sdech Kan allow s Hun Sen to reorie nt 
the notion of democracy to respond to the no vel threat of the re instated monarchy. 282 
In this attempt to reconcile the Marxi st concept of class st ruggl e with freedom right s, 
now primarily imagin ed as part of a liberal tradition , Hun Sen echoes and challenges 
Sihanouk, whi lst inher iting the same parado xes that Sihanouk once faced . Just like 
Hun Sen, Sihanouk identified the beginnings of Ca mbodian soc ialism in the 
monarchy- but with Angkorean king s . These were taken to have demonstrat ed 
incipient socialism through the traditional pattern of land use whereby the king was 
the guardian rather than proprietor of the land. making Cambodians · free men·. and 
through eco nomic and social project s such as irrigation project s and hospitals. 283 The 
280 In some of the PM's speeches. it is the very death of Srey Sokonthor 83.t that marks the 
national democratic revolution. See Hun Sen, 'Ed ucational achievements in 1-(.ompong Thom's 
Santuk District°. CN V, 121, 11 Feb. 2008 
281 Hun (1991): 76, 280. 
282 Reflecting the transformation of regime identity with the transition to a free market 
economy, Kan is credited not only with having invented Marxist-term class struggle, but also 
commemorated for having introduced Cambodia's first monetary unit, the sle1111g. The 
National Bank of Cambodia has reproduced the s/e11ng coin. See National Bank of Cambodia, 
·Cambodia ancient naga coin nordic-gold proof-like coin·, 
hllp://www.nbc.org.kh/en°lish/nbc 0 allery/more info.php?id=4, accessed I July 2012 
183 Sihanouk stated that ·we must go back to the past to find the veritable origins of a 
socialism that did not yet have this name. The installers of this socialism were our Kings of 
Angkor.· Norodom Sihanouk (1965): 18 
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Sdech Kan na1Tative is a counter-na rrative to Sihanouk's, in that it challenges 
socialism's Angkorean roots by ascribing the beginnings of class struggle to a neak 
mean ban. It offers an alternative, moral, genea logy of just leadership where the 
emphasis lies on a notion of democracy , which neatly cuts it off from the aristocratic 
kings who came before and after Sdech Kiln. 
Statuemania 
The intended overlap between Hun Sen and Sdech Kan is perhaps most prominen1ly 
manifested in the statues ofSdech Kan that have started dotti ng the Cambodian 
landscape. The first statue of Kan was made in 2006 by a student at the Royal 
University of Fine Arts (RUFA) in Phnom Penh. An equestrian statue of Sdech Kan 
was thereafter commissioned for Srolop from a team of sculptors at RUFA by Oknha 
Sim Vanna, a native of Kompon g Cham involved in the deve lopment of Sro lop, upon 
order s from Hun Sen. Subsequently, stat ues modelled on the one in Srolop have been 
erected in Preah Vi hear and Kep provinces and at the Ministry of Comme rce in 
Phnom Penh ; a further one is to be erected in Bantea y Meanche y pro vince. At lea st 
two different sculptors have been commissioned to make these. There are two main 
variations to the statue; an equestrian and a standing pose. The faces on these stat ues 
c learly resemble Hun Sen's. Indeed the scu lptors for the Srolop statue, which 
subsequent statues have generally been modelled on, were instructed to mak e 1he face 
similar to the Prime Minister's. '" Sculptors from the same team also made one of two 
stat ues of general Ta Di , erected near Preah Vihear temple , commissioned to 
resemble Hing Bun Hea ng, ch ief of Hun Sen·s bodyguar d unit. 285 All of these statues 
have been commiss ioned by members of the pol itical elite as a means of showing 
1heir loyalty to the Prime Mini ster. 286 One sponso r of a Sdech Kan statue explained 
~8~ Statues ofSdech Kan·s four closest aides. namely Oknhas Vieng , Veang, Lompeang and 
Sral (see Eng (1985) [1969]: 242- 3), are being crafted al !he time of writing, to accompany 
the statue in Srolop. Whilst it is unclear whether these are being made in the likeness of 
~
8
~1ticul~r individ~als, this possibility ca~mot be excluded. 
~ One 1s equestnan and the other stand111g; one of these was commissioned by Hing Bun 
Heang, and the other by Bayon TV, owned by Hun Sen·s daughter Hun Mana. A section of 
the Prime Minister's Bodyguard Unit is stationed at Preah Vihear 
286 The statues in Kep and at the Ministry of Commerce, both erected in 20 I 0, were 
commissioned by Minister of Commerce Cham Prasidh, the statue in Preah Vihear, erected in 
2011, was reportedly commissioned by the son of four-star general Kun Kim, Deputy-
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that he had the statue erected in recognition o f how the Prime Mini ster feels that he 
shares the same fate as Sdech Kiin.287 
Some time afte r these scu lpture s of his torical figures made in the likene ss of present-
day political leaders sta rted emerging, the Prime Minister declared that sc ulpture s of 
contemporary leaders were forbidden. In June 2010, Orn Yentieng, personal adviser 
to the Prime Minister and head of the Anti-Corruption Unit, was chastised in public 
by Hun Sen for ordering a 3-metre-high stat ue of the Prime Mi nister to be put in front 
of the Anti-Corruption Unit. The statue was removed , and Orn Yentie ng had to offer 
a public apo logy. The rea so n given for the removal by Hun Sen ·s cabinet chief , Ho 
Si thy, was that making stat ues of living people ran coun ter to Cambod ian culture, 
according to which statuary was sa id to be associated wi th honouring the dead. 238 
Fo llow ing this incident, all display or sale of statues of top leader s was ordered to be 
stopped. 
How can we account for the see ming paradox that the making of portrait-statues of 
historical figures in the likeness of the political leadership is encourage d, whilst 
portrait-statues overtly dep icti ng po litical leaders have been forbidden outright" A 
stat ue of the historical Sdech Kiin, with what seems to be the Prime Minister's face, 
makes particular clai ms which go beyond those of a statue plainly representing the 
PM. Portrait-statuary as a genre in Khmer art was since Angkorean times bound up 
wit h wors hip ping the merit of the king as the statue was seen to represent the king as 
dharma , embodying moral order. 289 The statue served as a bridge between future and 
past. in that the future kings' dharma in turn was embod ied by the ma intenance of the 
statuary and thereb y the moral order. 290 In modem time s, man y of these ancient 
statues conti nue to be venerated by royal family members and ordinary Cambod ians 
alike, maintaining their association with Khmer royalty and with nation al political 
Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) and chairman of Hun 
Seti's advisers; and the statue in Banteay ivleanchey, yet to be erected, reportedly by governor 
of Banteay Meanchey province Ung Oeun and DPM Yim Chhay Ly . 
.::s7 Author's interview. Aug.201 1 




- Thompson (2008): 187. 
290 Ibid: 186-7. 
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integrity which follow s from their ·co smic ordering ro le'. 191 Co ntemporary worsh ip 
of statuary. in different ways assoc iated with toda y"s king , is bot h of the sta tuary as 
representations of ancient kings and of the statuary as incarnations.292 The political 
embeddedness of thi s worship is we ll-docum ented , such as in the case of the stat uary 
of Stec Gamlari ' , also know n as the Leper King . and Yay Deb, spon sored primarily 
by royal family member s.293 
The recent statuary of Sdec h Kan com pet es with ancient royal statuar y as embodied 
memori es of the roya l past, off ering new ly manufactured memorie s belonging to a 
different imagined lineage - one whic h uproots the very idea of genealogy. By 
tapping into th is series of connotations, Hun Sen claims the mora l ancest ry of a riva l 
imagined community, joined with Sdech Kan through the statue to embody natio nal 
leade rship. 294 Ju st as today"s royal ty through the interm ediar y of the statues is 
·end owed with divine stat ure, the Sdech Kan statues in so me se nse co nfer an 
association with the imm ortal and divine. 295 Conve rsely, and more sinisterly, a direct 
depicti on of present leaders , cou ld suggest if not their deat h (as suggested by the 
Prim e Ministers cabinet), then at least their mortalit y. 296 It is perhaps no co incidence 
that the oth er per so n rep rese nted in this iconographic fonn, through the statues of Ta 
291 Hang (2004): 113, 125 
'" Ibid: 113 
.:!
93 A cement replica of Stec Gaffllati" was erected at Wat Unnalom in Phnom Penh by CPP 
officials ahead of the 1993 national elections, seemingly to compete with the royal cult - yet, 
in the words of Hang, its cult turned out to be a ·discreet" one. Ibid: 122-3 
:'.
9
~ That association with royal statuary is an association primarily with national leadership 
rather than with kingship as such is clearly evidenced by an incident during the Khmer 
Republic. when the statue of Bral.l A,ig Smi.kh Cakr, the Leper King, at the Phnom Penh 
riverfront was beheaded in an attack on Lon Nol. who as the national, Republican, leader at 
the time the statue was then imagined to substitute for. See Marston and Guthrie (2004): 87-
88. 
195 Hang (2004): 113-14. Classical Cambodian portrait-statues typically represemed kings. 
princes or high dignitaries after their death in their divine aspect. See Coedes ( I 960): Pou 
(1998) : 653~69 ; Thompson (2008) explores the conceptual complexities of the portrait-statue 
in terms of the relationship between king and the god it represented, suggesting that the old 
Khmer portrait-statue ·was and is conceived as the posthumous abode of the person/god 
embodied within, and as an embodimenroft he reign of successive kings' (p. 203). 
~
96 The notion of invulnerability is well documented as central to social and political 
imaginations across Southeast Asia as a core of imaginings oft he foundation of political 
power. See, for example. Turton (1991), and Day (2002). Invulnerability is an 
important characteristic of both the neak mean ban and the Preah Bat Thommik. Turton 
(I 99 I): 171; Khing (2008): I 0; Heng (2008): 313. 
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Di at Preah Vihear. is the per son with the utm ost res pons ibility to prot ect Hun Sen's 
personal sa fety. 
The sta tuary a lso plays a decisive role in spat ially definin g the natio n. Perhaps in line 
wit h ling ering mandala co nce ptuali sat ions of space, the contest for ce ntral autho rity 
in the capital is pri vileged , as it defin es the contes t to repr ese nt the nation and defin e 
its borders . Contemporary wo rship of royal sta tuary acts to maintai n the sub stituti on 
between anc ient and modem cap itals.297 The erect ion of a Sdech Kan stat ue at what 
has been identifi ed as the anc ient capit al ofSro lop symbolically shifts the nati on' s 
subst itut e centre to Hun Sen·s home prov ince . Imag ined in the co ntext ofnew--0ld 
struggl e with roy als, the statue particularl y pro vide s a counterpoint to the worship of 
royal statuar y in a mirror fashion link ed with national reconciliation afte r the 1997 
eve nts.198 The role of the recent statuary in claimi ng the right to define the nation·s 
bounda ries is perh aps most obv iou s in the placement of the sta tues of Ta Di at Preah 
Vi hear temp le, the centre o f a bord er conflic t wi th Thailand. By estab lishing an 
ident ification between the ancient monument and Hun Sen·s netwo rk , the se create a 
link between the newe r stat uary and a roya l site which is the focus of much 
contemporary nationa list sentiment.199 
Conclusion 
Though he publicly clai ms to be the monarchy's defender. Hun Sen makes use of his 
implied reincarnation of Sdech Kan to remodel the re lationship between the natio n, 
Buddhism and kingship to weaken the national leade rship role of the monarc hy and 
the royal ist faction in Ca mbodia 's secon d kingdom. By drawing on the historical 
amb iguity betwe en inherited and non-inh erited leader ship that the histor ical 
::; Hang (2004) 124-5. 
- Sihanouk phrased h1s return to Angkor after the 1997 events to ·pay his respects to the 
statues· as a metaphor for reestablishing peace and reconciliation in their wake. Thompson 
(2008): 181. In 1998, Sihanouk and Queen ivlonineath sponsored a pavilion for Yay Deb 
shortly before a summit to resolve conflict in the wake of the first national elections after the 
1997 events . Hang (2004): 116. 
:?
99 See funher how Thompson (2008): 203- 6, traces how the struggle for central authority 
through identification with monuments was bound up with the representation of the nation and 
borders at the time of the 2003 anti-Thai riots. 
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Cambodian monarchy entai ls, kings hip is challenged from within its very disco urse , 
and genealogy is uprooted. The reinvention of Sdech Kan exalts non-hereditary 
leaders hip, which is inserted into a modern discourse of democracy , equa lity and 
even soc ia l mobi lity. Hun Sen's re incarnat ion ofSdech Kan can be under stood as 
fundamentally a bid to embody national leadership, rather than to incarnate kingship 
as such . As the man of prowess at the centre of the polity, Hun Sen per so nally 
represents the nation. Defining Hun Sen as a man possessing merit, the narrative 
testifies to the importance of moral claims in contemporary Cambodian politics. In its 
different fonns of expression, his reincarnation as Sdech Kan powerfully deliver s the 
message that Prime Mini ster Hun Sen is personally the arc hitect of post -conflict 
national reconciliation , peacebui lding, and democracy in Cambodia, and that these 
achievements are founded, in turn , on his curbing of royal power. 
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Royalist Nat iona lism - Between Embodiment and Doctri ne 
How do Second Kingdom royalists imagine the nation and how do they envisage their 
own relationship to it?300 The monarchy and ideas of representation to guide social 
organisation evolved intertwined in Cambodia. Historical Cambodian 
conceptualisations of political repre sentation developed around the monarchy, 
positing a direct link between the kingdom and the monarchy. Theories of kingship 
presumed the unit y of the physical, mortal bod y of the king , and his mystical body , 
the 'body politic'. When the ·body politic· started to be imagin ed as the nat ion, it was 
the nation that the king was thought to embody. Such idea s were very much alive 
when, in 1993 , a constit utional monarchy was reinstated after more than two decades 
as a republic, and fonner king Norodom Sihanouk again ascended the throne. 
Royalist party FUNCINPEC gained an electoral victory the same year, widely 
attributed to the popularity of Sihanouk, and went on to fonn a coalition government 
with the CPP. Wh ilst marking the end of a two decade long struggle to reinstate the 
monarchy , this did not signa l that the role of the monarch y, intimat e ly bound up with 
questions of natio nal representation, had been pennanently settled. Rather , it marked 
the beginning ofa contestation of the mandate of the modern Khmer monarchy, and 
of the role and miss ion of political royal ism. The challenge for royali sts in the KOC 
was to work out and define a way for royal ism, as a party political force, to rep resent 
the nation. In othe r words , their task was to transfer regal legitimacy to the party 
political vehicle, FUNCfNPEC, which would compete in elect ions. 
The main item on FUNC INPEC's political agenda, the rein stat ement of the 
monarchy, was achieved whe n Sihanouk ascended the throne on 14 June 1993. 
Together with the First Kingdom national anthem Nokor Reach (' Royal Kin gdom') 
300 On 15 October 2012, King-Father Norodom Sihanouk passed away in Beijing, China. This 
chapter was prepared before the passing of the King-Father, and there has not been sufficient 
time to amend it to take the King- Father 's passing into account. Th is chapter, however, in 
reflecting on the evolving dynamics of the Second Kingdom, examines from different angles 
the difficulty of transferring legitimacy associated with Norodom Sihanouk to other royalist 
actors and the FUNCINPEC party. As such, it offers an in-depth account of the unmatchable 
significance ofNorodom Sihanouk. the relevance of which has only been heightened by his 
paning. It thus offers a backdrop to the formidable challenges now confronting royalist actors. 
95 
and national flag, both of which had been replaced with the 1970 abolishment of the 
monarchy, the national motto. ·nation. rel igio n, king· (cheat. sasana, mohaksarr), was 
restored that same year. Acco rding to You Hockry, newly appo inted FUNCINPEC 
Co-Minister of Interio r at the time, Hun Sen suggested that the word ·happiness' 
(sopheak mongko/) be added to the motto, to add considerations of welfare and 
development , but he later gave in to objections from the royalist side. 30 ' The 
import ance that royalists accorded to the fonn ulaic purity of the motto was derived 
from their objective to establish the historical continuity of the monarchy , as eternally 
bound up with the trajectory of the nation. Echoing how in the immediate post-
colonial period Sihanouk portrayed monar chical institutions to bridge pre- and post-
co lonial Cambodia (and portrayed the colonial e ra to be an ' inauthent ic abyss'), 
royalists in the Seco nd Kingdom, in many ways, dismissed the period beginning with 
the institution ofa republic in 1970 as an aberration. 302 The coup d"etat of 1970 had 
put the very ex istence of the nation in peril, and the return of the royals in 1993 
promised nothing less than its restoration. 303 To promote this idea, Second Kingdom 
royalists sought to naturalise the ·king, nation, religion· trinity as an unchanging 
foundat ion of Cambodian social order, in a manner that would guarantee a political 
role for themselves. 30' Yet this enterprise proved exacting , which reflected , as is 
traced out below, both the historically contested nature of its configuration and the 
variety of different meanings launched by contemporary royalists anchored in such 
historical ambiguities. 
As the Second Kingdom progressed, political royalists were increasingly fragmented 
over the conte nts and mandate of political royal ism and the corollary role of the 
constitutional monarchy. FUNCfNPEC entered into success ive coalition governments 
with the CPP. In government, FUNCINPEC noto1iously engaged in rent-seeking 
behaviour that discredited the party in the eyes of the public and fractured it 
internally.30 5 ·Political royalism' became an increasingly meaningless notion. From 
JO! Author·s interview with You Hockry . 
. ,o, On the immediate post-colonial period, see Edwards (2007): 9 
303 See, for example, Norodom Ranariddh (1998): 189. 
304 FUNCINPEC party statutes pledge to 'try hard with all methods to protect the national 
mono .. nation, religion. king"·. Cf. FUNCINPEC. 2005. Statut es and Internal Regu/arions (I 
iv); and FUNCINPEC. 2006. Swtwes and lnrema/ Reg11/ario11s ( \. iv). 
Jo; Cp. Roberts (2001): 126-30. 
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its victory in the 1993 elections, receiv ing 58 out of 120 seats, FUNCINPEC steadily 
decreased its share to hit rock bottom in the 2008 national elections, receiving merely 
2 out of 123 seats. Paralle l to this, the mandate of the monarchy was increasingly 
cemented as a ·strict form· of constitutional monarchy, to be contrasted with the 
larger mandate implied by ideas of the king as the embodiment of the nation. 
Whilst the overall trajectory of political royal ism went steadily downward, this 
chapter lays out how a multi-faceted and rich strugg le to imbue royalist politics with 
meaning took place. Political royalists (FUNCfN PEC and sister parties), I argue, 
made multiple, elaborate bids to represent the nation in the post-PPA era. They 
alluded to historical ideas of embod iment in a contemporary reinvention of incarnate 
politics. They struggled to develop a doctrinal identity to vest their claims in the 
language of ideology. They advanced theorisations of how democrac y in the Second 
Kingdom necessarily remained tied to the monarchy. They thus advanced a rich array 
of bids to legitimacy , many of which hitherto unexamined, each attempting to 
establish a unique link between the nation and political royalists. 306 
These negotiat ions within the royalist camp are central to larger contemporary 
renegotiat ions of the categories making up the Cambodian political landscape. Since 
historica l ideas of political representation developed around the monarchy , 
contemporary debates within the royalist camp about the nature of represe ntation, 
entailing ideas of embodiment versus a doctrinal identity and hereditary versus 
elected leadership , have brought the renegotiation of these questio ns to a head. 
Examining these negotiations is also crucial for reassessing political imaginings and 
debates in the royalist political parties. In a 20 I 0 note by fonner FUNCINPEC leader 
Ranariddh on the topic. ·The contributions of the Royalist Party FU, CINPEC led b) 
306 The following chapter lays out how royalists sought to build a separate identity, and made 
their claims to legitimacy, from within the parameters ofa separate, royalist identity. I thus 
stress the importance of the negotiation ofa separate royalist identity, in contradistinction to 
Hughes (2001): 311- 12, who argues that, for FUNCINPEC as well as the SRP, whilst the 
primary identity international!y is that of democratic opposition, the primary identity 
domestically is that of nationalist resistance. Whilst this chapter addresses the partial, yet 
never total. overlap of FUNCINPEC and SRP party identity through evolving resistance 
identities, it situates this overlap in relation to parallel constructions ofa separate royalist 
identity among FUNCINPEC party actors, who all, first and foremost, portrayed themselves 10 
the electorate as royalist. 
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HRH Prince Norodom Ranariddh', Ranariddh typically summed up the ac hievements 
of FVNCfNPEC party under his leadership ( I 993-2006) as the return of two 
fundamental princip les: liberal and pluralist democracy, and the restoration of the 
constitutiona l monarchy. 307 Yet , as is outlined below , the reinvention of historical 
ideas of royal legitimacy, such as embod iment, impacted on the meaning of both of 
these cornerstones of FUNCINPEC's legitimising languag e. A fine -grained study of 
the reinvention of link s lo the nation is therefore cruc ial for analysis of broader 
developments in the trajectory of political royal ism. 
The difficulty of royalist bids to representation, this chapter outlines, followed from 
difficulties in transposing ideas of legitimacy associated with the historical monarchy 
to the contemporary party political arena. The royalists· contemporary renegotiation 
of these questions built on recent historical elaborations of such ideas. Royalist 
politics, thus, pro vided an are na for these historically inherited debates to play out in 
the contempora ry setting. The contemporary enterprise of the transfer of legitimacy to 
the party pol itical con text resulted in ma ny inc onsistenc ies. Royalists vac illat ed 
between ideas of embodiment, doctrine and genealogy. 
Many of these questions had previously been debated by Sihanouk , as head of the 
first (and last) post-independence royalist reg ime, the Sangkum Reastr Niyum 
(People ·s Social isl Community, 1955-1970). The Sangkum Reastr N iyum supp lanted 
Cambodia's brief constitutiona l monarch y. whic h had been introduced under the 
French protectorate in 1947. Contemporary bids to legitimacy were therefore 
articulated in important ways around a renegotiation of Sihanouk's ideas. 
FUNC IN PEC and other royalist political parties looked back to Sihanou k's Sangkum 
Reas(!· Ni yum, and the practices and beliefs expou nded by Sihanouk during this time , 
as a direct model for Second Kingdom Cambodia. Retaining a rosy and nostalg ic 
glow as Sihanouk's se lf-proclaimed ·oasi s of Peace· before the outb reak of c ivil war. 
the Sangkum also provided a unifying rallying point for royali sts, many of whom had 
scattere d in different directions thereafter. It was also a sideways loo k to the 
reinstated monarch, Sihanouk, who was enjoying widespread popularity and was 
30
' Sam, Nora. 2010. Note of the Day 6: The Contributions of the Royalist Party FUNCINPEC 
Led by HRH Prince Norodom Ranariddh. 
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widely imagined to incarnate the nation. Sihanouk was celebrated as the father of 
national reconcili ation, having presided over the signing of the 1991 Paris Peace 
Accords; an association encouraged by Second Kingdom royalists. Yet, in turnin g to 
Sangkum as a model , Second Kingdom royalists were left to pick up from its 
incon sistencies and paradoxes. In the celebration of Sihanouk, his personal legitimac y 
was further strengthened; however this personal legitimacy contributed only 
marginally to the legitimacy of politi cal royalists on the whole. 
The many, often contrad ictory, royalist appeals to legitimacy can thus be under stood 
to reflect a breaking point , as royalists were attem pting to work out how the 
legit imacy of the monarchy could be transferred to a royalist political party within the 
framework of a constirutional monarchy. This contemporary context differed from 
that of the Sangkum era. The Sangkum was described as a political ·movement ' 
rather than a political party - whilst nonethe less functioning as one in the 1955 
elections. Moreover , in the Sangkum Reastr Ni yum, the question of the relationship 
between kingship and a political fonn ofroyalism were partly suspe nded in an 
ambiguous 'mona rchy wit hout a king' , with Sihanouk acting as Head of State as an 
abdicated monarch. As just resistance became the main political identity of the 
royalist faction in the 1970s and 1980s, these fundamental questions of the role of the 
Cambodian monarchy and political royalism were further deferr ed. The contemporary 
renegotiation thus followed from these historical ambiguities , conserved in the person 
of Sihanouk. In this, particular dilemmas surfaced, centred on a tension between ideas 
of embodiment and doctrine , and the deep-seated stand-off between larger questions 
of inherited versus non-inherited leader ship, merit, and genealogy , that it entailed. 
In the following , I proceed to explore Second Kingdom royalists' attempts to 
establish a meaningful link between political royalism and the nation through four 
interlinked tensions. Firstly , I look at a productive tension between unity and 
diversity, seen various ly in the tension between the royal family as a unified group 
versus the diverse politi cal tendencies it embraced, and between the royal family as a 
·truly national', suprapo litica l force versus the necessity for royal family memb ers to 
take a particular political stand. Secondly, I exp lore a tension inherited from the 
Sangkum era , centred on the reconciliation of kingship with a political fonn of 
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royal ism. Th irdly, turni ng to royalist conceptualisations of democracy, I examine a 
tension between contending visio ns of royalist democracy as a Sangkum-derived 
discourse and of royalist democracy founded in a ' democratic opposition' ident ity. 
Fourthly, I turn to exp lore success ive attempts at reinvent ing a Sihanoukist identity 
from the perspective of a tension between doctrinal identity versus idea s of 
embodiment, whic h this came to centre on. All of these interconnected tensions 
engaged in crucial ways with the person and legacy of Sihanouk, bot h as the leader of 
the Sangkum Reastr Niyum and as contemporary monarch and King-Father. The 
failure to work out each of these tensions, it is argued, contributed to the overall 
failure to establish a link betwe en the nation and political royal ism. Firstly, as royalist 
nation alism came to be strongly assoc iated with national unity under Sihanouk, the 
historical and co ntemporary presence of diverse political tendencies with in the royal 
family stood out uncomfortably , and, ultimately, cripp led political royal ism by 
placing national unity above partisa n politica l action. Secondly, the failure to 
establish a clear mandate of political royalism meant that the very foundation ofa 
party political fonn ofroyalism was missing. Thirdly, both contending democratic 
discourses became increasingly meaningless for asserting a political royalisl identity. 
Fourthly, whilst ideas of embodiment were increasingly sidelined, attempts to tum the 
Sihanoukist legacy into a doctrine ultimat ely made it susceptible to hiijacking by rival 
political parties. The combined effect was that the very foundation, form, and 
contents of political royal ism as a force to represent the nation remained unaccounted 
for. 
Royalism: Unity in Diversity? 
The 1993 gathering of the great majority of royal family member s in FUNCINPEC in 
many ways formed a discontinuity with the recent past, when member s of the royal 
family had scattered over a diverse range of political tendencies. Second Kingdom 
royalists united from sharply contrasting political backgrounds. Whilst man y had 
joined FUNCfNPEC after its 198 1 creation by Sihanouk, many had only at times ( or 
mor e rarely not at all) sided with Sihanouk during the two preceding decades. Second 
Kingdom royalist politics can, in this sense, be understood as an enterprise of uniting 
a dispersed family from various politica l camps. Many who had not cons istently sided 
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wit h Sihanouk after his 1970 ouster were given prom inent roles post- I 993, both in 
the Royal Palace and in party politics. This included royals who had actively 
su pported the Khm er Republic, such as Sisowat h Thomico , the present head of 
Sihanouk's cab inet, and Sisowat h Sirirath, deputy President of FUNCINPEC (2006-
). Many had been self-identified social ists of different types. In an apparent 
co ntradic tion , Sisowath Thomico claimed to have joined the Khmer Republic ou t of 
Trot skyist convictions. 308 Other senior figures had joined the Khmer Rouge 
revo lutionaries , such as Sisowath Ayravady , the present head of Kin g Sihamon i' s 
cabiner. 309 The two roya l family members who had remained in Cambodia during the 
Peo ple's Republic of Kampuchea and both worked for the Heng Samrin reg ime, the 
late Sisowath Lola and her sister Sisowat h Pong Neary Lolotte , were a lso integrated 
into new royalist politics. Sisowath Lola was instrumental in aiding the negotiations 
between Sihanouk and the PRK and later SOC governme nts leading up to the PPA , 
whilst Sisowath Lolotte was given an important ceremonial role in the Royal Palace 
and granted the honorific title 'S amdech· by Sihanouk." 0 
This e lasticity is arguably derived from a producti ve tension betw een unity and 
diversity characteristic of the royal family and, with them, royalist politics. The 
relatio nship between the part and the whole, particularity and universality , is centra l 
to conceptualisatio ns of kingship wo rld wide ." 1 ln historical Cambodian 
co nceptualisations of the royal body as one in a series of substitute bodies, the king 
was ·at once a pa rt for the who le and the who le in a part ' , meaning that the king was 
at once a part of the whole of the communal bod y, and, simultaneously, a who le in 
and of himself- or rather, Thompson writes, a pote nti al whole. m The king was , 
308 Author's interview with Sisowath Thomico, 20 May 20 I 0. Even Sihanouk, in his day, 
rep011edly stated that he would have been a leftist ifhe was not a member of the royal family. 
See Osborne (1994): 145-46. 
309 Sisowath Ayravady worked as a translator at the Democratic Kampuchea Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, together with her husband, Ngo Pin, later a Secretary of State for 
FUNCINPEC. Sihanouk's son, Norodom Narindrapong, once in line to become king, 
remained a convinced Pol Potist until his death in 2003; he was, however, not integrated into 
royalist politics post-1993 
310 Author's interview with Sisowath Pong Neary Lolotte 
311 In medieval Europe, the king's two bodies (the body natural and the body politic) were 
thought to depend on each other so that they formed ·one unit indivisible, each being fully 
contained in the other' . Kantorowicz ( 1957): 9. cited in Thompson (2004b): 92. 
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ultimately , a merely pote ntial whole, tes tifying to the contested nature of th is ideal 
situation. In the contemporary context, as in the entire post- independence era, this 
friction between the pan and the whole, now imagin ed as the nation, took expression 
in a tension between the roya l family acting as a unified faction on the one hand , 
versus the diverse pol itical tendencie s it embraced on the other. Th is, in tum, 
emanated from a tens ion between the monarchy and the royal fami ly as a truly 
natio nal , suprapolitica l force on the one hand, versus the need to take a particular 
po litical stan d as royalists str ived to become political actors within a multi -party 
framework (and to ensure that there would always be a royal fami ly member on the 
winning side) , on the other. 313 
Th e way this tension played out can be understood as a major theme of Second 
Kingdom royalist polit ics. Th e imperat ive of royal invo lvemen t in the nation·s 
shifting political fortun es had prompted fam ily members to invo lve under different 
po litical banners during previous decade s, when royalist side-takin g was often messy 
and pragmatic . Roya list identity as a unif ying force above pa rtisan riva lries was now 
the chief reason why previous political affiliations were excused within the faction, 
enabling a regathering into one party. This was testified to in personal accounts of the 
motives both for leaving the side of royalists led by Sihanouk, and for later 
reconci liation . The Khmer Republic provides a case in point, as Sihanou k· s cousin, 
Sisowath Sirik Matak, was instrumental in its establishment, and the 1970 coup has 
often been understood as a coup by the Sisowath branc h aga inst the Norodo m branch 
of the royal fam ily. Today, fonner supporters of the Kluner Republic, Sisowath 
Sirirath and Sisowath Tho mico, both emphasise that the Khmer Republic was not 
·R epub lican· per se. stressi ng instead its anti-Sihanoukist charac ter base d on the 
disapp roval of Sihanouk·s c lose ties with the Non h Vietnamese commun ists at the 
time .314 The conflicting logics of the responsibil ities of royal family members in this 
313 This tension has had to be negotiated by all Southeast Asian monarchies engaging in the 
making of nation states following the demise of absolute monarchies. For a discussion on the 
role of actors of royal blood engaging in complex alliances and side-taking in the making of 
postcolonial Laos, see lvarsson & Goscha (2007); for an account of how the Thai monarchy 
has built its legitimacy on promoting a view of itself as suprapolitical, see Winichakul (2008). 
Jl -1 Having left Cambodia in 1958 to study in France, England. and Japan, Sisowath Sirirath 
was recruited to the Khmer Republic by his father, Sirik Matak. He states his main motivation 
to have been anti-communism. His cousin. Sisowath Thomico, on the other hand, returning 
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are noticeable in Sisowath Thomico's exp lanat ion: ·The peop le fighting against the 
Lon Nol-regime were Vietnamese. As a Cambodian, as a member of the Royal 
Family, I took the decision to stay and fight them. I think that the sec ret mission of 
every royal family membe r is to fight for the country.' Thi s illustrates the perceived 
necessity for a roya l fami ly member to invo lve under any political banner. Further 
testifying to the perceived need tha t the roya l fami ly emerged on the winning side 
(precisely in order to safeg uard the family"s suprapo litical ro le), Sihanouk's cousin. 
Sirik Marak, was sa id to have taken sides with Lon Nol in order to protect the royal 
family, who mostly remained in Cambodia during the Republic. 315 
Accounts of the reasoning behind the integration of the two sisters, Sisowath Lyla 
and Sisowath Lolotte, into the Heng Samr in regime offer a simi lar logic. The two 
sisters remained in Cambod ia during Democratic Kampuch ea and were the only royal 
survivors to remain after liberatio n. Lyla was recruited to work at the PRK Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and became Deputy of the United Front of the National Salvation 
of Kampuchea (UFNS) and Member of Parliament for Takeo. 316 Lolotte later 
explained her late sister's dec isio n to work with the government in the following 
wo rds: ·The government needed to assemble all the minoriti es, including the royal 
family. She represe nted the royal family in the Communaut e. [ ... ) It was the work 
that ma ttered to us. Socialism, or not socia lism, it was the work, and remaining in the 
country.' This reasserts the roya l nece ss ity to remain in the nation. even as a 
marginalised part of it. Her words further highlight how , in the PR.K nation , the royal 
from studies in Paris, claims to have been a ·far-leftist' who disagreed with the Pol Potist 
analysis of Cambodian society along Maoist lines (in favour ofa Trotskyist reading), and 
considered the Khmer Republic to be a necessary stage on the road to the final revolution. See 
author's interviews with Sisowath Thomico, 20 May 20 10, and Sisowath Sirirath, 13 May 
2010. 
315 Most royal family members remained in Phnom Penh during the Khmer Republic, 
including Queen Kossomak. They lived rather freely until 1973, when a son- in-law of 
Sihanouk bombed the presidential palace, following which some royal family members were 
jailed and many were put under surveillance. Sylvia Sisowath, who remained in Cambodia 
until 1974, stated: ·Most ofus [member s of the royal family] stayed during the Khmer 
Republic. We had no reason to leave our country. The Republicans were not against the royal 
family.· See author's interview with Sylvia Sisowath 
316 Sisowath Lolotte and Sisowath Lyla were reunited in Phnom Penh in September 1979, 
where they lived together unti l Lyla passed away in 1994. Lol olle was called by Lyla to work 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whe re she briefly worked at the Political Department before 
changing to work in the r,._tinistry's nursery. 
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family had been reduced to the status ofa minority , a tiny fraction of the national 
community that could never aspire to representing its wholeness. Thi s underline s ju st 
how far the monarchy had come from histor ica l co nceptu alisa tion s o f its role, 
mani fested preci sely by the discrepancy bet ween their parti cu larity and the nation al 
whole. 
The shared und erstanding of thi s tension arguably a ided sub sequent reconc iliation. 
Accord ing to Samdech Lolott e . ·HM Sihanouk forgave eve rythin g to eve ryo ne. ( ... ] 
When he came back . it was like there had been no prob lem happening at a ll.' 317 
Sisowath Thomico and Sisowath Sirirath had already been reconc iled wit h Sihanouk 
in 1979. Thomico explained to Sihanouk through Queen Monin eath , his aunt , that he 
had ju st chosen ·a d ifferent path ' ; later that same yea r, he was appo inted as their press 
attache. 318 Meeting Sihanouk and Monin eath in Janua ry 1979 in New York , Sisowath 
Sirirath accepted Siha nouk 's invitation ·to unify a ll the Ca mbodia n forces ove rseas'. 
S isowa th Sirirat h was thu s made Sihanouk's repr esentativ e in Ca nada and the US , 
and became FUN C IN PEC's ambassador to the UN in 1982. 319 
After 1993, the roya l emph as is on unity was paramo unt. Royal fami ly member s 
share d a percepti on that they needed to act as a unified faction in orde r to , in turn , 
se rve as a unifyin g force for Cambodia. This need was onl y he ightened by the disco rd 
of the preceding deca des. Sisowa th Sirirath ca ptured a typ ical sen tim ent: 
If you compare wilh all countries in the world, they only went through a 
transition between communism and capitalism. Cambodia is different - we 
went through five different regimes during 60 years. The royal family is a 
unifying force for Cambodia. Without Sihamoni and Sihanouk, Cambodia 
would not be a unified country .3.:!0 
3 17 According to Samdech Lo!otte, during the PRK, Sihanouk even sent a representative to 
identify members of the royal family in the country; the representative found Lyla and Lolotte. 
Testifying to his unchanging concern, Sihanouk thereafter regularly sent money to Lo\otte. 
See author's interview with Samdech Sisowath Lolotte 
318 Author's interview with Sisowath Thomico, 28 May 20 I 0. 
319 Author's interview with Sisowath Sirirath. 25 May 20 I 0. 
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0 Author's interview with Sisowath Sirirath, 13 May 20 I 0 
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Royal family membe rs gathered around Sihanouk ' s role in ove rsee ing the peace 
proc ess that conc luded wit h the 1991 Pari s Peace Accords (P PA). Roya lists, togethe r 
with other memb ers of the po litica l oppos ition, identify the sign ing of the PPA on 23 
October 1991 betw ee n the Peop le's Republi c of Kampuch ea (PRK) gover nment and 
the tripanite resistance coalition as the end date of civil war. Pointing to how 
Siha nouk pre sided over the signing of the PPA , the idea of Sihanou k as the father of 
national reconciliation constitute s a main cla im to legitim acy for Second Kingdom 
roya lists .321 At the conc lusion of the peace process, Sihanouk returned to Cambod ia 
as Chainnan of the Supreme Natio nal Co unc il (SN C) , a large coa lition gove rnment. 
Ranariddh has stated that , ther eby, in Sihanouk. the ·m onarchic principle of a national 
community without any exc lusio n· was reali sed.322 With Sihanouk ·s rein stat ement as 
a cons titution al mona rch two yea rs later , th is suprapol itical role was tied to the 
reinstate d constitutiona l monar chy. 
Unity under Sihanouk was see n as a preconditi on for nation al un ity and, as part of 
thi s, the roya l family naturall y had to come together around him. This neat ly 
illu strates cont emporary perceptions of part and whole - that gat herin g aro und 
Sihanouk wou ld ena ble him to hea l the nati on. Thi s also defined ideas of what 
royalist nation alis m must mean. Royal ist natio nalism was de fined by the irrep laceabl e 
role of royals in nati onal reco nciliation, assoc iated with the suprapolitica\ role of 
Sihano uk. It is difficu lt to exaggerate how finn ly the idea of roya list nat iona lism was 
thereby tied to the idea of unit y and national reco nciliation , and raised above partisan 
politi cs. This was manifest in Sisowath Ayravady·s definiti on of·nat ional ism·· 
3
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1 Whilst 23 October was originally a public holiday. the CPP later removed it. Hun Sen has 
increasingly downplayed the importance of the PPA, instead crediting his •wi n- win policy' 
with having achieved national reconciliation . Cp . Hun, Sen. [n.d.]. Ywhesastra chnea chnea: j 
jo 11111otch robos Samd ech Niyokroat hm11111rey H1111 Sen (" The win- win strategy: 5 points of 
Samdech P1\if Hun Sen·). In 2008, Hun Sen announced that celebrating the anniversary of23 
October was ·meaningless·. and that the opposition would be free to do away with the 7 
January celebration if it came into power. In the wake of Sihanouk's passing, the CPP-led 
government redesignated 23 October as a public holiday in October 2012. See Soy, Heng 
2009. ·Hun Sen: Celebrating the l 991 Paris Peace Accords is Meaningless.' January 12 
http://ki-med ia.b logspot.eo.uk/2009 /0 I /hun-sen-celeb rati 11°-1991-paris-peace.html (October 
27, 2012). Cambodia Herald . 20 12. ·Government Redesignates October 23 as Public 
Holiday.· http:// khmerization.blo0 spot.co.uk/2012/ 1 0/government-redesionates-october-23-
~ (October 27, 20 I 2). 
"' Norodom Ranariddh ( I 998) : 155 
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When I lhink about nationalism, I always look into the past, to what 
Cambodia as a monarchy has been going through. 1993 was an important 
date for the sake of nationalism. Sihanouk reunified all political parties or 
factions. [ ... ] Royalist nationalism truly exists. For at least 70% of the 
people, nationalism is bound up with Sihanouk.313 
In spite of the ce lebratio n of a llege d unity , royal fam ily members had little else but 
Sihan ouk to unit e around. At the mo st basic leve l, the common ident ity as members 
of the roya l family was proj ected to hold them together und er one politica l labe l as 
·ro ya lists" As a consequence. ·ro yal ism · , reach niyum, was primarily defi ned as ·the 
political thought of diff eren t roya l family members·_m Yet, in itself, this em phasis on 
the incarnate perpe tuated the same tension. 
FUNCfN PEC became a famil y affai r, off erin g positions to roya l family members 
eage r to be invo lved, and placin g less emphasis on pre viou s political experience. 
Sisowat h Phe anuroth , returning to Cambod ia in I 993 after 26 apol itical years in 
France , qui ck ly moved on to become Vice Governor of Phn om Penh. He later 
exp la ined his political invol veme nt as ·th e way to so cial ise and be part of the family 
was to be invo lved in FUNC!NPEC. It was a natura l way to go'. 325 Sihano uk also 
expanded the roya l famil y by gra nt ing royal titles to more dista nt relatives and in-
law s.316 
Since the brief int roductio n of party politics, roya l family mem bers had, however , 
encom pass ed diver se political stra nd s. Indeed, it was three princes who, in I 946, 
founded the very first political parties in the kin gdom . Prin ce Sisowat h Yuth evo ng , 
found er of the Democratic Party (DP), Prin ce Norodom Na rind eth, found er of the 
Liberal Part y, and Prin ce Norodom Montana , founder of the Progres sive Democrat s, 
articulated ea rly po litical pro grams in diff erent directions from Sihanouk 's late r 
313 Author's intervie,v with Sisowath Ayravady. 
324 Author·s interviews with Sisowath Ayravady, Sisowath Pheanuroth, Sisowath Panara 
Sirivudh 
315 Author's interview with Sisowath Pheanuroth. 
316 For example, Eng Mary was made a Princess (Preah Ang N[jas) by Sihanouk in 1992; 
Sisowath Thomico was made Prince; and Sisowath Pongneary Lolotte was bestowed the 
honorific Samdech. 
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one. 327 As is discus sed further below , Yuth evo ng, particularly , is commemorated by 
royal family member s as an early roya l nationalist. Thi s con stitut es an alternative 
genea logy of royalist nat ionali sm, tracin g the o rig ins of indigenous 'de mocratic ' 
thought to Yuthe vong rather than to Sihanouk. 
Thi s fluidity persi ste d po st- I 993 , when senior roya ls joined rival political parti es . 
Asked what Sihanouk thought about thi s, one of his neph ews rema rked: ·He had one 
so n who was the leader of FUNCfNPE C [Ranaricldh ], one son in CPP [Chakrap ong], 
and then Na rindrap ong [another son) was supporting Pol Pot- what shoul d he say? 
He accepted it. ·323 Mea nwhile , royal family members often remained c loser to each 
other across the fault lines of political parti es than was apparent. Thi s can be 
understood partly as a conscious, enabling strategy, ensuring that royals would not be 
lef t out of the wi nnin g side. In tum , it was rooted in more profound incongruiti es in 
reducin g the royal catego ry to party politi ca l a ffili ation. 
Thi s state of affairs cripp led political royal ism and underm ined roya l c laims to 
represent national unity that were so centra l lo its bids for leg itim acy; a dynamic 
which was intensified by Ranariddh 's respo nse. Whilst the themes o f peace and 
nati ona l reco ncili ation are primaril y associated with Sihanouk , Ranariddh has tried to 
recreate similar legitimacy for himself as the bringer of peace and national 
reco nciliation. On e exam ple of thi s is how Ranariddh has justified his acceptance of 
the 1993 po wer-sharing form ula in terms of emulatin g his father·s examp le in 
prioritising peace and national unity. The power-sharing fonnula was a main factor 
enablin g the CPP's cont inued hold on nati onal politic s and gradual marg inalisation of 
FUNC lN PEC. Ranariddh' s ex planation therefo re justifie s the singularly most 
important move in und ermining politi ca l royal ism. Ranariddh stresses that he agreed 
to the power -sharing form ula at Sihanouk' s request , in order to ave rt civ il war 
following the threat of territorial secession by the movement led by his half-broth er, 
Norodom Chakrapong. 329 Whil st the exac t dy namics of this course of eve nts remains 
307 Chandler (1991 ): 30. 
J:?SAuthor's interview with Sisowath Thomico, 28 May 2010 
309 Cf. Sam, Nora. 20 11. Note of the Day 23: The So-Called •insanity0 · ofSa mdech Krom 
Preah Norodom Ranariddh. 
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debated, Ranariddh' s exp lanation seems largely accurate. 330 The language emp loyed 
by Ranariddh to out line his deci sion has , however , a particular resonance. For 
example, at a 2011 campaign speec h for the Norodom Ran ariddh Party ( wh ich 
Ranar iddh headed fol lowing his 2006 ouster from FUNCINPEC), Ranariddh told the 
audience that it was because of the threatened secess ion that he agreed to share state 
power , lest Cambodian territory be split and civil war ensue. Sihanouk, he sa id , 
encouraged him to agree . ·to save Cambodian people"s lives· , and ifhe had not, all 
tho se present would be dead. For thi s reason , he stated, ·1 sac rificed myself for the 
nation ', and ·sacrificed the elect ion result which made me the winner'_JJ, In 
employing this language, Ranariddh draws on regal legitimacy as an actor above 
parti san political gain, taken to define royalist nationalism. The Prince regally 
sac rifice s selfis h political interest for the larger int erests of the natio n as a who le, 
following from how the royal s are ultimately responsible for maintaining a 
suprapo litica l conscience for national reconciliation. The consequences of this line of 
rea son ing , however, differ great ly between the monarchy and politica l royal ism. By 
defining royalist nationalism as opposed to supporting any partisan affiliation, th is 
reasoning ec lipses the politi ca l party fonn of royalism. 
Embodied Politics: Constitutional Monarc hy and Political Royalism 
A seco nd tension in roya list po litics followed from royalists' failure to agree on the 
mandate of the reinstate d constitutional monarchy, as well as on what role political 
royali sm could and should play. Although such questions have been debated in many 
democratising contexts, in Ca mbodia, this debate followed the particular 
reconfigu ration of the problem by Sihanouk's post-independence regime. To a great 
extent. it reflected a paradox created by Sihanouk·s 1955 instillltion of the Sangkum 
Reastr Niyum, which left questions of the mandate of the Khmer monarchy and 
Khmer polit ical roy a l ism unre so lved and preser ved in the very body of Sihanouk. The 
330 It is clear that Chakrapong did publicly proclaim a breakaway zone in June 1993, shortly 
after the elections, and lhat Sihanouk favoured a fifty-fifty power-sharing solution, even 
before the threatened secession. See, for example, Roberts (2001): 109- 13. Ranariddh is quiet, 
however, on the role played by the CPP in the threatened secession, alleged by some. 
331 Author's fieldnotes. NRP election campaign, 4 June 2011. Oudong village, Kompong Speu 
province. 
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unsettled question of how to reconcile kingship with a political fonn ofroyali sm 
bec ame a central paradox for royalists in the KO C . To re so lve thi s, Ranariddh and 
other political royalists took recour se to hi stor ica l idea s of emb odiment. The se we re 
more successful in ju st ify ing Sihanouk's role , and, perhap s. that of the constitutional 
mon archy as a whol e, but less so for justifying political roya lism as a separate forc e. 
Thi s suggests a failure to ju stify the very existence of politi ca l roya lism, rooted in the 
parti cular historical handling of this problem by S ihanouk' s post -independ ence 
regime. 
Histo rica l Khm er conce ptuali sa tions of king ship em pha sise the inherentl y inca rnate 
rol e of the king . The idea of embodim ent , rath er than the idea of elected leadership , 
can be understood as the faul tline between Western liberal concep tuali sat ions of 
legitimate leader ship an d historical Khmer ideas ofk ing ship .332 As noted above , the 
organic link bet wee n the moral behav iour of the king and the welfare o f the kingdom 
was histor ically co nceptualised as a structur e that presumed the unit y of the phys ica l 
body of the king and his mystica l body , the ·bod y politic·. In the Angkorean period , 
the king was assoc iated with the div ine, a link co ntained in the Brahmanic co ncept of 
the devaraja. 333 With the sp read of Thera vada Buddhism, the righteous king was 
thought ofas a dhamma raja, a king rulin g in accor dance with the Buddh a 's 
tea chin gs. 334 Harri s w rites that his be nevo lent power ·was no lon ger con sider ed so 
mu ch an ex pre ssion o f his di vinity; rat her , it was co nsider ed a reg iste r of how close ly 
he adhered to the eterna l laws of existence (dhamma), as discovered and enu ncia ted 
330 Thompson (2008): 186-87 
333 Although devaraja later came to denote ·God-King· in popular usage, Angkorean 
inscriptions very rarely describe royals by this term. Instead, they identify the dew1raja as a 
sacred, mobile object that the king would bring to his capita l (Edwards (2007): 22; Harris 
(2005) 11- 12; Kulke (1993) : 355; Woodward (2001): 257- 58; Kulke (1978); and Vickery 
(1998)). Saveros Pou ( 1998): 667 argues that kings became worshipped as gods after their 
death, which has been misunderstood as their having been considered God-Kings during their 
lifetime. Because of the important role of statuary in linking the king and the divine, the 
academic debate on the relationship between the king and divine has largely been carried out 
in the discipline of art history. Cp Coedes (1960). Thompson (2008): 185 suggests that ·A king 
was associated with a certain god and would be po1trayed in that god's image, if not during 
his lifetime surely after his death. Like the father, the son both worshiped and was to be 
worshiped in the image of the supreme god.' The contemporary notion, O.tirep-khsatr ('God-
King·), was only introduced as part of the New Vocabula ry (Jacob ( 1993): 159). 
334 Harris (2005): 302. 
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in the teachings of the Buddha ' .335 Khmer Buddhist cosmology posited Khm er 
royalty as having multiple substitute bodi es throug h the merit , dhamma, the y 
accumulated, including the kingdom and the entire universe. The king was regarded 
as a reposito ry of merit symbio tically linkin g, through his perso n, the state and the 
cos mos.336 
It was in the imaginations of French protectorate-era scholar s seek ing to define 
Ca mbodian poli tical imagi nation s that the mona rch was turned into an incarnation of 
the nation .337 In the 1930s, a few Western-educated indi vidual s linked the Western 
co ncept of nat iona lism wit h indigenou s notion s of kingship and the Buddhist sangha 
to create a civic re ligion of loyalty to the nation. Following the Th ai co unterpart Chat, 
Sasana, Phramahakasat, whic h had been introduced in neigh bouri ng Thailand by 
King Rama VI (r. 19 10-25), the slogan ·nation, rel igion, king· (cheat. sasana. 
mohaksat) first appeared in Khmer usage.338 The Khmer histo rica l precu rso rs to these 
noti ons, Sdech. sangha, srok, had denot ed slight ly different mea nings from their 
modern cou nterparts, and the ir relationship was not fixed in the implied equilibrium 
and equality of th is fon11ula. Yet whe n Sihano uk asce nd ed the throne in 194 I , the 
alleged unity between nation, religion, and king, since times immemoria l, was 
ce lebrated .339 Contestation over the re lation ship between the three component s of this 
trin ity would non ethe less per sistently co lour Cambodian politic s henceforth. 
Sihano uk 's Sangkum Reas tr N iyum tried to sett le confl ict prec isely by prom ising that 
it wo uld assure that the motherland returned to its past g lory by g iving ·the trinit y· its 
'true sense'; this was an enterprise that, however, became ambiguous.340 
rn Ibid.: 80 
116 Ibid.: 80; cp. Thompson (2004b): 91. 
337 Edwards (2007): 13 quotes Etienne Aymonier, writing in 1896 that. ·The Nation has long 
been accustomed to the idea of not separating its own existence to that of the royal house. The 
monarch is the living incarnation. the august and supreme personification of 11atio11ali1y. · 
JJS Gyallay-Pap (2007): 72; Edwards (2007): 118, 169. On the creation of the three pillars in 
the Thai context, see Reynolds (1977): 274-82. 
339 Cp. Gnoc Them's 1950 pamphlet, ·Nation, Religion, King', which describes the three 
words as ·very meaningful' in every country and the "foundation of all other words'. Gnoc 
Them (1903-1974) , schooled in Ballam bang and Thailand, had joined the Tripitaka 
Commission in the 1930s, defrocked in 1936, and became the editor of Kampuja S111ya in 
1938. On Gnoc Them, see Edwards (2007): 223, 308-9 
34° Cp. Norodom, Sihanouk. 198-. Swtuts de Sa11gk11111 (Article 3). 
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A great part of the contempora ry challen ge for political royali sts stems from 
ambiguities in Sihanouk's 1955 replac ement of the first const itutional monarch y, 
institute d in 1947, by his Sangk um Reastr N iyum. Sihanouk abd icate d the throne to 
make a comebac k as a ·fu ll-time politic ian' as Chair man of the Sangkum. 341 His 
father , Suramarit , ascended the throne , but upon Suramarit's deat h in 1960, no new 
mona rch was appoin ted. Siha nouk's abdication was made out as a precondition for 
his polit ica l lea dersh ip ro le. Yet, although Sihanouk denied this, his politica l 
popu larity could not be eas ily disentangled from h is previous kingshi p, wh ich he 
ret aine d in all but title in the eyes of most citizens."' As Cha inn an of the Sangkum , 
Sihanouk certainly did bene fit from and even encourage popular be lief in him se lf as a 
God-King embodying the na tion. 343 indeed, Sihanouk mad e a po int of tracing the 
history of Cambodia in tem1s of the Ca mb od ian monarch y, which he equa led with the 
destiny of the Khmer people. 344 The tens ion between Sihanouk' s abdica tion as a 
precond ition for political activ ity, at the same time as his leg itimacy sti ll rest ed on his 
prev ious king ship, can be understood as a constitutive paradox of Sangkum that le ft 
fund amen tal qu est ions conce rning the mand ate of the Khmer monarchy unresol ved 
and co nserved in the very body of Sihanouk. Thro ughout the Sang kum , the regime 
wo uld bui ld its legitimacy on advanc ing the idea of supposed orga nic relations 
between Siha nouk and the peop le, a vision that would find doctrina l expression in 
Sihanouk' s Buddhi st soc iali sm. A ll leg itimacy was inve sted in Sihanouk , personally , 
a lthough it was not clearly defined on what gro unds. 
341 Chandler (\991): 78. 
342 A contemporar y observer wrote that 'Sihanouk denies this, calling attention to the number 
of unemployed kings in the world. Sihanouk's royal blood may have smoothed the path to 
political success but it certainly did not ensure it, and Sihanouk today habitually behaves as if 
he were campaigning for a national election.' See Armstrong (1964): 20 
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3 Chandler (1991 ): 78 cites a brochure put out by the Sangkum government ·This abdication 
was justified by [Sihanouk's] fervent desire to serve better his people by whom lie is 
worshipped as a God. In sho1t, he wanted to give his people the necessary strength to fight 
favoritisrn and oppression ... and lead them back to the tradition of a glorious past.· This 
neatly illustrates the conflation between Sihanouk's abdicated and royal stature during 
Sangkum 
J-1-1 See, for example, Norodom, Sihanouk. • La Monarchie Cambodgienne & La Croisade 
Royale pour L' independance', [undated, originally in Rea\ites Carnbodgiennes, May 24-Sept 
13, 1958] 
Ill 
Sihanouk, himself, ha s consistently emphasised how the Sangku m-era moves meant 
that power was invested in him personally. At the time, Sihanouk did not treat the 
monarchy as an eternal give n, but rather as a temporal framework that might soon 
have outlived its days. He envisaged saving the nation as his own personal mission, 
whi lst giving an oath never to resume the thron e and pledging not to appoint a 
successor. 345 Five decades later, in his memoirs , Shadmr o,·er Angkor, Sihanouk 
portra yed Sangkum as a nece ssary ste p towards ful filling the political logic of the 
constitutional monarchy. Sangkum limited the king's involvement in politi ca l affairs , 
whilst tra nsce ndin g the const itutiona l monarchy to hail in a uniqu e system of gu ided 
democracy. 346 S ihanouk recognised that he had , ·in esse nce abo lished the monarchy" 
with his abdication and portrayed the task to save the country as his per sona l mission, 
eve n ou tside the framework of the monarchy. In this sense, Sihano uk·s pe rsonal 
impor tance transcended that of the monarchy as an institution." ' 
The assessme nts of historians ofSihanouk·s motives for his abd ication and 
hibernation of the throne add context ual nuance to these deci sions. Sihanouk ' s 
abdication certainly ·ope ned up a new political game · allowing Sihanouk to emerge 
as a dedicated politician , shirking his royal, ceremo nial duti es. It is unclear , howeve r, 
to what extent the move was premeditated and tactical, ra ther than a spo ntaneous 
str ike of fortune .348 Sihanouk predicted that the a1Tival of communis m in Ca mbodia 
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5 Sihanouk made this statement with the oath to never resume the throne: -And this I have 
always said, too, the day when our Monarchy, by order of the popular will or international 
contingency, ceases to be a harmonious and useful framework, I would not hesitate to take the 
initiative myself in sacrificing it and orienting the nation toward other roads and assist it to 
accomplish in peace and without bloodshed the revolution of its choice.' Norodom, Sihanouk. 
Rea/ires Camboclgi ennes, 3 August 1962: 9 
346Sihanouk sums up the transition from absolute monarchy to Sangkum as follows: ·111 the 
space of eight years, Cambodia had moved forward from an absolute monarchy to a 
constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and on to an original form of guided 
democracy via the National Congress of the Sangkum. The role of the monarch had been 
reduced - at my initiative- to a symbolic one. Power of decision was in the hands of the 
Prime Min ister and his cabinet. reinforced by the direct participation of the people.' Norodom 
~0't'7°tt~1? t~1~1!\;:· not yet come for this. For the people, the monarchy and Buddhism 
equalled the nation. Thus, while fighting to retain the monarchy, I opposed choosing a new 
monarch. I knew in my own mind that in taking this stand I was. in eff ect. abolishing the 
monar chy in e1·e1y thi11g but the form. I had faced 11p to this with my own abdication. But the 
monarchy continued to be the greatest single unifying influence in the country, and a 
too sudden break would only benefit our enemies· Norodom Sihanouk (2005): 61 
348 Chandler(19 9 1): 78 
l l2 
would ultimately dismantle the institution of the monarchy, and so his move was in 
preparation for this envisaged transition. 349 On a more basic level, as the monarchy 
was now considered an illegitimate institution for political decision-making amongst 
the Cambod ian political e lite, Sihanouk's ambition was to tra nsce nd the multi-party 
elections they supported, and instead win acceptance for a national union governmen t 
without political parties , where he co uld play a role. 350 Once having abdicated , 
Sihanouk, who had swo rn not to return to the throne himself, was cautious of 
someo ne more strong-willed than his father ascending the throne; this came to 
determine Sihanouk 's decision to hib ernate the throne upon his death. 351 The 
hibernation was therefore not so much a bid to avoid antagonism of different royal 
factions 352 as an outright attempt by Sihanouk to ensure that he would remain 
Cambodia's unchallenged leader. S ihanou k ca lled a referendum for Chief of State. 
which Chandler refer s to as a 'c harade (given the lack of voting secrecy). which 
resulted in Sihanouk's overwhelming victory. 353 Upon bein g e lected Cambod ia's first 
non-monarchic Chief of State , Sihanouk assumed the constin1tional powers of a 
mona rch, wh ilst renouncing the monarch·s ce remonial responsibilities. Whil st Queen 
Kossomak stayed in the palace as a sym bol of the mo narchy, Sihanouk reportedly 
paid less attention than previously to royal ceremony. 354 Sihanouk organised elections 
for the National Asse mbl y in 1962 and 1966, yet the power s of the Assembly were 
reduced to near insignificance; whilst biannual Natio nal Congresses were to ensu re 
that decision-making was consensual under the direction of Sihano uk. The bases of 
regime legitimacy were thereby firmly invested in Sihanouk himself. 
349 Norodom, Sihanouk. Ri!alites Cambodgie1111es, 3 August 1962: 9 
350 On this last point, see Chandler (1991 ): 79. 
351 Were Ranariddh, his eldest son, to be appointed king then, as a minor, his powers would 
have been assumed by a regent. This was not unlikely to be Prince Monireth, an uncle of 
Sihanouk whom Sihanouk was wary of promoting, suspecting him of royal ambitions. 
Moreover, when reaching majority, Ranariddh could provide another counterpoint o 
Sihanouk. Sihanouk also opposed appointment of his mother, Kossomak, as queen in her own 
right, in all likelihood over similar caution of increasing her influence. Chandler (1991): 115-
16. 
35
~ Cp. how, in Spain, the throne was similarly hibernated under Franco because Franco was 
wary of antagonising different royalist factions. Franco restored the monarchy in 1947, yet, 
not until 1969 was Juan Carlos appointed as designate monarch, and no king was appointed 
until after Franco's death in 1975. See Maddens & Vanden Berghe (2008): 82 
353 Chandler(199\): 116-17. 
3
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The Sangkum heritage lef t Second Kingdo m royali sts 1wo main cha llenges. Firstly, 
the y needed to rein state the va lue of the reintroduced constitut ional monarch y, whic h 
23 yea rs of hiatu s had shown , with even mor e ce nainty than 1he hibernation of the 
throne , not to be an inalterab le, timeless national inst itution. Seco ndly, they needed to 
give va lue to FUNC IN PEC part y as the vehi cle of political royali sm, in spite of how 
Sihanouk could not ac t to cont inue the conflation betwee n the royal element and 
per so nal political prowess in po litical leader shi p. 
Both these dilemma s nec ess itated a re-reading ofSi hanouk· s leadership role during 
the Sangkum Reas lr N iyum. To rees tabli sh the intrinsic link betw een themse lves and 
the nation , roya lists turned to historical idea s of embodim ent. Sihano uk's leade rship 
ro le during the Sangkum was derived from how he embod ied the monar chy, and 
ther eby the nation. After the introdu ction of a co nstitutional monarchy , his kingship 
had to be exercised outs ide its trad itional, abso lu1ist framework. The Sangku m 
arrangement pro vided this mechani sm, allowing Sihanouk to act out his royal role 
ou tside the institution of the mon arch y. Den ying that Sangkum entailed either the 
abolition in disgui se of the monarchy or , te lling ly, its ' disembodiment", Ranariddh 
writes: 
[ ... ] one measure needs further examination: the hibernation of the Throne 
(1960). Hypocritically, some have wanted to see a kind of abolition in 
disguise of the monarchy at the initiative of the ex4 King himself. Others, in 
the field of political science, have analysed it as an imprudence which 
disembodied [dis incarnait] the monarchical institution and got the popular 
masses used to a power without King. To this it is easy to reply that Prince 
Sihanouk did not ever conceive of the institution of Head of State as an 
instrument of destruction of the monarchy; it was on the contrary about a 
skillful construction destined to assure its survival avoiding blockages and 
strife which would have resulted from the appointment of a new monarch. 
In terms of the effects on popular opinion. of a ·monarchy without King·. to 
confirm it one would need to measure the aptitude of the peasant masses to 
grasp the j uridical subtleties and the constitutional distinction between a 
monarch and a Head of State- old monarch•titular of all royal prerogatives. 
Especially since it must also be considered the extreme personalisation of 
power - royal or as Head of state it matters little - that Sihanouk realised 
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Finally, it should be added that that abdication and return to power after a 
phase of retreat [retrair] is one of the constants of Khmer history. The 
reform of 1960 institutionalised in all respects a traditional mechanism.355 
What we see in thi s quote is the sel f-consc iou s sty ling of the monarchy acco rdin g to 
histori ca l idea s of embodiment. Ranariddh outlin es an exceptiona l role given to 
Sihanouk by virtue of his royal status, wh ich allows him even to abdicate and late r 
ret urn. Indeed. the king' s period ical absenc es and much anticipated retu rns are a 
disting uishing trait of the Khmer monarc hy.356 As Thompson wr ites, S ihanou k's 1955 
abdication , in keeping with this histor ical tradition , was predicated on the idea o f the 
kin g's mu ltipl e bodies. In Th ompso n 's read ing. the abdication protected kings hip 
which is not elec ted and never can be (as the subst itu tion of bodies does no t follow 
changing public opin ion) from the enco unter with democra cy; thi s prin c iple allowed 
Sihan ou k to be e lec ted only after his abdicatio n.m In Ranari dd h's readi ng. the 
abdication allowed Sihanouk to maintain king ship , in a way that transcended the 
limit s of the inst itutiona l form of the monarchy. Sihanouk 's fa ithfuln ess to his 
ance stral past aver ted the · fet ishism of mo narc hism as a form of governme nt ' . His 
abdication mark ed, ·conforming to histo rical tradition ', that ·the roya l function co uld 
not be reduce d, by its titular. to advantages of prestige or interes t.[ ... ] Duri ng the 
Resistance, as in all his notes and dir ect ives, the Prince -Kin g has taken it as a rule not 
to reason but on the func tional nec ess ity of a chief of sta te, king or elected pres ident , 
little does it matter' 358 In thi s way, Ranariddh attemp ts to reconcile a ll of Sihanouk's 
various capac ities afte r his abdication, with Sihanouk inhabiting multipl e substi tute 
bodie s. Sihanouk incarnated kingship in eac h of these capacities - including as an 
elected leader. 
Contemporary roya lists, in fact, needed to show how the substit ution of bodi es - a 
characteristic that cannot be suspe nded and rea ssum ed - was consistent ly maintained 
by Sihanouk , who in 1993 again ascended the throne . Sihanouk , as the reinsta ted 
constitutional mon arch , was rep resented as the incarnati on of the nation. Ran ariddh 
355 Norodom Ranariddh (1998): 135. 
356 Thompson (2004b): 109- 11; see also Thompson (2008): 180-81. 
357 Thompson (2004b): 109. 
358 Norodom Ranariddh ( 1998): 160 
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speaks of the monarchy as being constituted by man and action, inseparabl e from 
eac h other , emphas ising its embodi ed qualit y.359 Even the 1993 constitution , 
Ranariddh argues , did not exc lude suc h organi c relat ions betwee n the king and the 
people. 360 Th e re-embod iment of ·man and action' was necessa rily tied to Sihan ouk: 
The constitution of 1993 is above all the resto ration of the legitimacy of 
Noro dom Sihanouk. But it does not rea lise the effective return to power of 
the prince, it only assures the recognition of his work and the restitution ofa 
symbol where rhe man and acfion are insepa rable. the monarchy. [ ... ) 
History teaches us that restorations are generally a compromise between the 
past and the integ rati on o f revo lutionary ste ps. [ ... ] In ce rtain resp ects, thi s 
ana lysis, de void of illu sions, holds true for Cambodia. In othe rs not: we 
need to take note that authority was restored not only as an abstract 
principle, but 011 a personal basis in Sihanouk as an 1111i111errupred 
i11cammio11 of the natio11a! struggle a11dfight agai11st oppression. 361 (Italics 
aul hor·s ow n.) 
These ideas of emb odime nt dete rmin ed the natur e of the newly instated co nstitutional 
mon arc hy. Ranariddh trace s idea s of embodiment to the concept of the God-King, 
devaraja. For Ranaridd h, Sihanouk's legitimacy rested in age-o ld beliefs in the 
Cam bodi an king as a God -King: 
Cambodia, lradilionally, is a Kingdom. Th e people of Cambodia are ve ry 
attached to the royalis t system. B111 for them, it is the Royal Family. The 
traditional one, the original one, is the concept of God-King. It is not , you 
can not compare it, to the Parliamenta rian or Constitut ional Monarchy of the 
United Kingdom for instance. I ad mir e very much the English people , they 
ado re the royal family. But for Cambodia, the origi nal idea is the God-King 
Even my father, he is ve ry liberal. But , he is seen as a God-Ki ng. ( ... ] It is 
very deep ly anchored into the Camb od ian me ntaliti es. [ ... ] My father 
stepped down and he formed his own pa11y: the Sangkum Reasrr N(vum. 
But, the me ntality of Cambodians: God-Ki ng since thou sands ofyears .362 
m Ibid.: 263. 
360 Ibid: 279. 
361 Ibid.: 263-64 
36::!Aut hor's inter view w ith Noro dom Ranariddh 
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As a God-King , Sihanouk·s role transcended that ofa strict ly const itutional monarch 
along wes tern European lines. Ranariddh considers the phra se that ·the King reigns 
but does not govern' in the 1993 const itution. to be ·adapted to the socio-po litic a l 
realiti es of the European parliamentarian monarchies·. This formula. he states, does 
not correspond to the Cambodian popular mentalit y, and it is therefore necessary to 
adapt it to the Cambodian environment. 363 Whil st not explic itly spelling out how, he 
charges that its danger is that the rural masses, finding that the king is no longer their 
natural protector and dispenser of benefits, instead rum to political parties tying them 
in bonds ofdependence. 364 The idea of embodiment infonning ideas of kingship 
thereby lies behind Sangkum-derived conceptions of democrac y advanced by 
FUNCINPEC under Ranariddh, which are discussed in detail below. 
The idea of embodiment was also advanced to sup port political royal ism . The 
incarnate nature of the monar chy was projected to bestow legitimacy on all roya l 
fam ily members, who , to so me degree, shared in the ability to incarnate the monarchy 
and thereby stand in for the nation. This is see n in Ranariddh· s above quot e, in whic h 
he argues that Ca mbodian popular attachment is to roya l family member s rather than 
the monarch y as an instirution. Ranariddh has rep eatedl y phrased his political role in 
the lan guage of embodiment, whilst precisely what he claims to embody reflects the 
shifting larger political context. The notion of embo diment thereby ties together 
diverse claims to legitimacy , including ideas of democracy and resistance. 
Thi s is clearly manif est in Ranariddh's 1997 account of his sou rces of legitimacy. 
Under the headline 'The Bottom of the Probl em: Cambodian Leg itimacy· , he asks: 
·111 Cambodian political life, who incarnat es what in 1997?' (Italics author·s own) 
Ranar iddh then lists his multiple so urces of legitimacy: 
• Legitimacy of traditional essence: in a country without point s of 
reference , searching for its roots, he incarnates, in the shadow of the 
king, monarchical values forged by Buddhist tolerance and concerns of 
the common good. 
363 Norodom Ranariddh (1998): 289. Cp. 1993. Constitution of Cambodia (Article 7). 
36
-1 Ranariddh also notes that the formula does not preclude royal intervention in the event ofa 
grave crisis. 
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• Legitimacy of national order: without any ties of dependence, even to 
the country that received him in exile. He owes neither his past, nor his 
present power to them 
• Legitimacy of resistance 
• Liberal and Western academic legitimacy, open to everyone·s 
comprehension, respectful of the freedom of expression of all 
• Above a\11 democratic legitimacy. It was the Khmer people who in 1992 
gave him the mandate - as a representative of Sihanouk, who never 
withdrew his confidence in him; but also as an autonomous person! 
• National legitimacy365 
Whilst historical ideas of embodiment singled out the king based on merit rather than 
genealogy or e lections, the Camb od ian monarchy has evolved to incorporate elective 
ele ments framed by genea logical restraints. To justify a role for themselve s, Second 
Kingdom royals stressed genealogical lines. Embodim en t needed to be thought of as a 
hereditary quality , equally for the Crow n and for political royal ism. Whilst lauding 
the Crown's e lective nature , Ranariddh has also argued against an ove remph asis on it, 
charging that the principle of heredity is at the roo t of the monarchy. 366 Meanwhile, 
Ranariddh's royal descent was used to legitimate his leader ship of FUNC IN PEC. 
suggesting that the ability to incarnate the nation particularly appl ied to him , as 
Sihano uk 's olde st son. 367 Ranariddh has occa sionally made reference to himself as a 
God-King, and FUNCfNPEC under his leadership has portrayed itself as a veh icle to 
ach ieve a ·union of people and prince· , close ly mimi cking the Sangkum. 368 
The effectiveness of these strategies has been mixed. Ideas of emb odim en t have 
co ntinued to bestow legitimacy on Sihanouk. 369 To what exte nt Sihanouk ' s imagined 
incarnation of the monarchy has carried over to the office of the constitutional 
mon archy is unc lear; indeed , the failure ofS ihamo ni' s 2004 appo intment as King to 
365 Ibid.: 177-78. 
366 Ibid.: 268, 280, 281. 
36
' Hughes (2001c): 308. 
368 Ibid 
369 Cp. Kent (2008). 
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s1ir much social or political commotion suggests that the significance of the king is 
declining. 370 Ranariddh" s repeated claims of national embodiment, meanwhile. have 
failed to garner sup port. This is unsurp rising , given how Sihanouk has continued to 
pla y a central role in Cambodia as a constitutional monarch , and also as the much-
revered King-Father after his second abd icat ion in 2004. As Ranariddh derives his 
royal claims from Sihanouk, he ends up seco nd lo a man who has often contradicted 
him in public , somet ime s publicly supporting Hun Sen rather than his son. This, in 
turn, stems from a more general crisis of reconciling kingship with a political fon11 of 
royalism following the personalisation of power to Sihanouk under Sangkum. By 
advancing ideas of embodiment, political royalists hoped to re insta te legitimacy to 
Sihanouk as well as themselves. Yel, in perpetuating the idea of Sihanouk incarnating 
the monarch y, the y have yet to convincingly justify the existence of a political 
royalist faction. 
Royalist Conceptualisations of Democracy 
FUNCINPEC and the SRP have come together under a democratic banner at crucial 
poinl s of time , contesting the fundam enta l ·rules of the game , such as elections. A 
shared democrati c opposition identity has, at these times , been the basis of claim s to 
represe nt the nation. Parallel to this, royalists routinely draw on understandings of 
democracy that differ from both Western liberal democratic underslandings and those 
of the self -identified democratic opposition. Hughe s argues that the SRP and 
FUNCINPEC share a ·democratic opposition· identity , oppo sing the legitimacy of the 
CPP on the ground s thal it views the CPP as authoritarian, and claims that, be side this 
core identity , FUNC lNPEC has as its seco nd core identit y ' royal ism · and its appeals 
to the Sangkum legacy. 371 Yet these two identities did not simpl y coexist but , instead , 
entail enonnous tension in tenns of their visio ns of how ro organise soc iety, which 
are readily visible in 1he contrasting democra1ic imagining s exp lored below. Both of 
the se sets of democratic conceptualisations, it is argued, were imagined by different 
FUNC lNPEC actors to be ' royalist ', and integrated into their definitions of 
·royalism·. Rath er than mutually exclusive identities , they can be understood as two 
ro Hughes (2009): 50 
371 Hughes (2001c): 307. 
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poles on a continuum , so that the same actor could refer to both at different points of 
time. 
Below, a discour se is traced that , framing itself as distinctl y royalist, made reference 
to Sangkum-derived concepts of democracy. It offered unique conceptualisations of 
demo cracy in the Cambodian context, which ran directly contrary to the liberal 
democratic conceptions that Ranariddh has occasionally claimed as the basis for 
FUNCrNPEC identit y. Ye1 these concepts were increasingly used to ju stify 
cooperation with the CPP, and have become increasingly meaningle ss for asseriing a 
polit ical royalist identity. This disco urse was closely assoc iated with Ranariddh, 
who, as leader of FUNCrNPEC 1993-2006, to a large extent defin ed party political 
royal ism. 
Following this discourse , I trace a democratic opposition identity. This en1ails 
reference to an anti-communi sl, anti-Vietnamese resistance identity, as suggested by 
Hughes, but also reference to liberal democratic imagining s of relations of 
accountability between the electe d leadership and the electorate, co upled with the 
suppo rt of a strictly constitutional monarch y. It was primarily associated wi1h a 
separate group of FUNCINPEC actors who advocated closer cooperation with the 
SRP. Yet it is argued that their vision of royalist democracy ultimately also lost 
meaning as an a11iculation of political roya l ism. due primaril y to Ranariddh" s 
outmanoeuvring of these elemen ts and policies to the opposite effect. Moreover, 
whe n Ranariddh was eventually sidel ined, this res istance identity was claimed by 
pro-CPP elements and royal famil y memb ers associated with this second stance were 
prompted 10 join Ranar iddh , who they had no further faith in, in order to defend the 
involvement of royals in politics. 
Rovalist Democracv as a San°kum-Derived Discourse. 
Liberal democracy is characterised by how the ' sovereignty of the nation is assumed 
to be distributed evenly among the citizens ' . This contrasts with Cambodian model s 
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of kingship, which posit an organic relation between the people and the king. 372 As 
noted above, Ranariddh argues that the 1993 cons titution does not exclude organic 
relations between the king and the people .m A continued allegiance to such beliefs 
has contin uously coloured interpretations of democracy in KOC royalist politics. 
Ranariddh's main claim to democratic legit imacy has been electo ral leg itimacy -
seemingly in line with liberal democratic political imaginin gs. As the leade r of 
FUNCINPEC, Ranariddh has repeatedly claimed democratic legitimacy by virtue of 
FUNC INPECs victory in the first national elect ions in 1993.m Yet , rather than 
refen-ing his democratic credentia ls to FUNCINPEC having a particularly 
·democratic' policy agenda that would ensure the equal distribution of sovereig nty 
among citizens , Ranariddh has typically alluded to how he embodies the aspirations 
of the national com muni ty, in line with historical conceptualisations of the king·s 
representation of the people. The 1993 victory has been extended to prove that 
Ranariddh personally enjoys popular support and that, as a conseque nce, any idea he 
launc hes is inherently democratic. This ove rlay is widely made among royalists. 
Democratic ideas are typically see n as intrinsically linked to royal ism, which is 
proven by how the roya l party is believed to be supported by the people if there are 
free and fair e lections. 375 This min-ors simi lar beliefs by the self -identified democrats, 
who similarly judge the will of the people to be obscured by various CPP stra tegies 
and, therefore, not adequa tely represented in elect ions subsequent to 1993. Yet 
royal ists differ in how their claim s to popular support are situated in larger ideas of 
kingship and political royalism as representation through organic relations. 
372 Thompson (2008): 186-87. 
373 Norodom Ranariddh ( 1998): 279 argues that the king's status is constitutionally 
ambiguous, as the 1993 Constitution of Cambodia does not specify whether the king is 
re_pre~entative of the people, co-sovereign with the people, or an aulOnomous authority. 
n Ibid.: 178. 
375 This logic is also evident in the following quote by Ranariddh. under his pen name Sam 
Nora, in explaining why FUNCINPEC, after his ouster from the party leadership, was clearly 
not a Sihanoukist party: ·Jn that sense, we do not believe that the '·neo-FUNC INPEC" under 
the current leadership, can be considered anymore as a Sihanoukist political party. The voters 
of the 2008 general elections did not make any mistake. In effect, how a party which pretends 
to be Sihanoukist could get only two seats in the current National Assembly?' See Sam. Nora. 
2010 . . \ '01e of 1he Day 5: Is 1he ·.Veo-F U.VCJ,\PEC ParlJ' a Sihanoukis1 Par1y? . The premise 
is that, since Sihanouk embodies the aspirations of the people, a failure to attract voters 
primarily indicates a failure to represent Sihanouk. 
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In his book , Droit Public Cambodgien ("Cambodian Public Law'), Ranariddh 
elaborates on the meaning of democracy. 376 The book offers Ranariddh' s analys is of 
the Cambodian state and political and judi cial institut ions, from Angkorean times up 
until the contemporary period, discussed with refere nce to notions of the nation, state, 
sovere ignt y, democracy , and legitimacy. In the book, Ranariddh asks the centra l 
question: In the Cambodian context, is democracy compatible with the mon arc hy?377 
His response is scho larly and starts by noting how democracy has become a 
worldwide myth of modernity wit h widespread mobi lisational force . He identifies a 
general world trend whereby , afte r power was initially personalised, authority was 
conferred on the absolute, theocratic monarchy. In a second stage, power and 
sove reignty were transfetTed to the people, which marked the transition to a 
democratic system. This gradually erased the idea of sovereignty by hereditary 
means. This is not to say, however, that the abolition of the monar ch ic forn1 of state 
nece ssari ly mu st follow from this final stage. Instead, Ranariddh charges that , within 
a democ ratic framework. the monarchy retain s value as a nationa l sy mbol , the ·more 
irreplaceable the more fragile the country is· For this, he tak es the British and the 
Thai monarchies as examples , underscoring how the British monar chy has come to 
serve as an archetype for modern liberal democracies. 378 The preservation of the 
monarchy rests on tradition - the ·cumulative and inalterable consensus of 
generations' .379 
In Cambodia , however , the monarc hy and democracy are not only compat ible, as in 
Britain and Thailand, but they are also link ed by an unfailing tie. This stems from the 
originally elective nature of the Khmer Crown. 380 Ranariddh quotes Thiounn Thioum, 
who , in this, saw the affinnation that popular sove reignty exis ts in perfect hannony 
376 This book is an adaptation of Ranariddh 's doctoral thesis. According to Ranariddh 's 
preface, it was prepared for publication before the July 1997 de facto coup. In the first preface, 
authored in March 1997, he states that the thesis has exclusively didactic and pedagogical 
intentions: to prepare young Cambodians for higher education in law so that they may assume 
their responsibilities as citizens and as future administrators or cadres of the national private 
sector. It aimed to insti!l a number of indispensable notions and values of a modern state, 
which had been extinguished under the trauma that had shaken Cambodia after 1970 (i.e. the 
Khmer Republic). 
m Norodom Ranariddh ( I 998): 61. 
rs Ibid· 61-62 68 
379 [bid.: 64-65: . 
380 Ibid.: 65. 
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with the Cambodia n monar chic institution. 381 Ranariddh wr ites that , wh ilst the 
development of an absolute mon archy later blurred the line , thi s tie at least rem ained 
in fonn - invigorated by the 1947 co nstitution - which put popul ar representatives in 
the body that e lected the king , aga in reconfim1ed by the 1993 const itution. This tie , 
Rana riddh states, exp lains the history of the Cam bodi an mo narc hy from 1950 to 
1960. which saw the affirmation o f a ·m odern conceptio n of Kh mer de mocracy. as 
Sihanouk launched a new solution to the problem of elected vers us inheri ted 
leadership. 
For Ranar iddh , the rea l qu es tion in thi s context concerns the exercise of power wit hin 
a democrat ic system; that is, ho w to ensure that democracy , in tenn s of the people 
being the ho lde rs of sove re ignty. is best realised. Contrasting ·r epresentat ive 
democracy· w ith ·dir ect democracy·. Ranar iddh charges that under a sys tem of 
representa tive democracy, such as that of Fran ce , po wer is tak en from the popular 
masses and g iven to a dominan t political c lass. Th e ·n ation· , as the holder of 
sovereignty, is then nothing but an abstraction , whilst real power comes to lie with its 
represe ntatives . This system gives no place to the expression of the people's wi ll, 
apart from the delegation of power by the vote. 382 Ranariddh out lines how the 
monar ch, in such a sys tem, can step in to com pensate for the democrat ic defic it 
caused by its shortcomings - arguab ly offer ing a model for contemporary Ca mbodia. 
Th e imperfection of represe ntat ive democra cy is manif es t in the flaws of e lect ions, its 
main instrument, as opposed to the referendum, the main instrument of the direct 
democracy . Contras ting the ·traps· of e lections w ith the ·virtues ' of the referendum . 
Rana riddh charges that ·the e lection is not a mag ica l process to ap point authentic 
rep rese ntati ves of the State but has scope on ly to the ex tent that it testifi es to a · real 
conse nsus' by the governed. Yet, he charges , a rea l and mor e w idesp read conse nsus 
can be marked by the attac hment to the monarchic principle and ·to the one that 
embod ies it', i.e. the K ing. Here arises the t ie of compat ibilit y between democracy 
and the monarchy. The monar ch assumes the quality of a national symbol and 
guarantor of the common interest, rather than a ruler in the strict sense. In times of 
381 Thiounn (1952) 
381 Norodom Ranariddh (1998): 66. 
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crisis , the monarch's role may temporarily be even grea ter. 383 Th e monarch thus steps 
in for the shortcomings of representative democracy in guaranteeing consensus and 
nati onal unity. 
Ranariddh ' s preferred system, however. is that of direct democracy. 384 Ranariddh 
distrusts the political party as the basic unit of popular representation , which elections 
rest on, and has a positive eye to the gathering of different political tendencies under 
one and the same organisational structure . The cruc ial point to consider for the 
realisation of democracy is not a multi-party versus one-party system, Ranariddh 
charges , but the decision-making structu res internal to a party. A grouping of various 
national trends in a sing le but flexible struc ture allowing ample space for internal 
freedom of expression, he deems, is not incompatible with democracy. 385 He warns 
against the multiplication of political parties without a doctrine or with simila r 
doctrines , judging that a few parties shou ld be enough to 'i ncarnate ' the major 
national tendencies. The multi-part y system has never been the sign of a healthy and 
efficient democracy , he charges , but rather a factor of political manipulation. Indeed, 
the multip licat ion of political part ies ·without doctrine· is dangerous for real 
democracy. since partisan secession ' in order to impose one's view ' does not funher 
increase the democratic sp irit.386 
Thi s vision of direct democracy emu lates Sihanouk's mode l of democracy during the 
Sangkum Reastr Niyum in important ways, transposing its ideas ofan organic 
relationship between the ruler and the people to the contemporary context of a multi-
parry system within the framework of a constitutional monarchy. In Sangkum, 
Sihanouk reproduced ideas of an organic relationship between the leade r and the 
people, as ' the King in person was posited as the embodi ment, interpreter and 
guarantor of popular aspiration, guardian of harmony, and repository of Khmer 
culture and memo ry'. 387 The Sangkum emphasised consensus and national unity. 
383 Ibid .: 68 
384 Ranariddh engages with no polltical theorists in this discussion. 
associated with developing ideas of direct democracy, is instead 
overlooking how democracy can lead to oppression. See ibid· 70. 
385 Ibid .: 71 
386 Ibid.: 71- 72 




According to its statutes , the Sangkum, rather than a political party, was the symbol 
of aspiratio ns of the ·Petit Peup le· , the ·true People of Cambodia·. Th e Sangkum was 
' a Nationa l Gathering[ ... ] defending the National Unio n [ ... ] for the return to good 
traditions which created the grandeur of Cambodia in her glo riou s past. These 
traditions are the People·s Community with its two natural protectors: Religion and 
the Throne ." 88 Democracy was thus understood as organic unity, and the body politic 
made out to be ·a democratic , creative organism whose members would live together 
as one family in social and racial harmony" 389 The chief mechanism for this was the 
National Congress , a new version of direct democracy that replaced parliamentary 
democracy , wher e members of the Sangkum movement voted through a show of 
hands. 390 The National Congress ini tiated policies , later turned into laws by the 
National Assembly, and was to mediate conflicts between the Assembly and the 
cabinet. First instituted in 1955, 28 National Congresses were held until 1970. These 
ideas were laid out in Sihanouk 's ·Buddhist socialism'. the self-professed regime 
iden tity. 391 
Ranariddh writes that Cambodian -style democracy in the Sangkum was based on a 
·coherent doctrinal basis· assuring the ·originality and efficacy" of what would soon 
be known everywhere as ' Cambodian democracy' It consisted of three main. 
interrelated components: a social opening, a national union, and direct democracy. 392 
Ranariddh ' s evaluation of Sangkum concludes that Sangkum -sty le democracy 
uniquely responded to the ·socio -cultural level of development ' of Cambodia at the 
time , which did not correspond to the ·pre-establi shed sc hemes' of Western 
democracy . The Sangkum , known as ·Cambodian-style democracy· (la democrati e 
388 Norodom. 198- . Stawt s de Scmgkwn (Article 4): 2- 3. 
389 Hughes (2006): 4 73 
39° Kershaw (200 I): 51; and Chandler ( 1991 ): 84. See also Norodom. I 98- . Statut s de 
Sa11gku111 (Section 3) 
391 Over the late 1950s and 1960s, Sihanouk developed Buddhist socialism in a series of 
writings published in journals such as Sangkum , Kambuja and Reali tees Cambodgienn es . See, 
for instance, 1955. Sangkum I (June); cp. Harris (2005): 147. Chandler (2000): 199 calls 
Buddhist socialism a ·ramshackle ideology' , and Kershaw (200 1 ): 55 refers to the ·blatant 
philosophical inconsistency of the doctrine'. Observers have also noted Sihanouk's confessed 
lack of knowledge of political theory, his pragmatism, and how he was influenced by other 
leaders at the time rather than studies on political thought. See Chandler {1991): 87; and 
~~bome(l994): 13_5 
-Norodom Rananddh (1998): 133. 
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cambodgienne), was specific to Cambodia , yet nonetheless possessed 'globa l 
authentic ity' .393 Ranariddh offers the assessment that: 
The real problem, in fact, for Sangkum was not to caricalUre a Western-style 
democracy for which the democratic phase of our history which had just 
come to a close had demonstrated the dangers and ambiguities, but to 
integrate the peasant masses far removed from classical democratic values 
into a system listening to the people and to its actual needs. To avoid that 
the People would continue to be mystified, the Sa11gk11m asserted itself 
fundamentally as an anti-Party regime, that is, anti-establishment. Hence its 
hostility to classic ·bourgeois' formations, instruments and beneficiaries ofa 
moderate democracy, which were pushed to dissolve after 1956.394 
Here, Ranariddh criticises Cambodia ' s short experience of parliamentary democracy 
before the Sangkum , and lauds its d issolution of the ·bourgeois formations' of riva l 
political parties. 395 This , he charges, was the democratic value of the Sangkum. 
ln advancing his own democratic vision, Ranariddh explicitly refers back to the 
particular articulation of democracy during the Sangkum Reastr Niyum. 396 Expressing 
a similar reluctance to impose strict schemes of Western democracy, he can thus be 
understood to instead favour the specifically Cambodian-style democracy he has 
identified in the Sangkum. Ranariddh identifies a straight parallel between post-PPA 
national reconciliation and Sihanouk ' s achi evement of independence. 397 Ranariddh, 
therefore, finds Sangkum-era political institution s to prov ide a valid model for the 
KOC to duplicate outright. He supports this be lief by refe rencing FUNC INPEC's 
1993 electora l victory , which he considers an affinnation that the people support the 
'political log ic ' of reintroducing the Sangkum-era constitution. This , however, has 
393 Elsewhere, Ranariddh discusses the question of cultural specificity in more detail, in 
relation to the notion of ·general interest' (see ibid.: 40-4 l ) . Here , he likens the historical link 
between the Cambodian king and people to a social contract, concluding that this facilitates 
conceptions of ·general interest' (widespread in the modern wo rld) in contemporary 
Cambodia. 
394 fbid.: 136 
395 Particularly , the Democratic Party was incorporated into the Sangkum from 1957. 
396 lbid.: 67. 
197 fbid.: 259. 
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been prevented by international constraints (as it would have reduced the UNTAC 
intervention to merely a restoration of Sihanouk's power) and domestic constraints 
(the tight grip on state structures by the preceding regime). 398 
Whilst accepting the 1993 constitution as a matter of fact, Ranariddh and other 
royalist actors have repeatedly referred back to the Sangkum-era articulation of 
democracy, partly in conflict with it , in advancing a royalist democratic vision. This 
can be summarise d under the three notions of social opening, national union, and 
direct democracy; the three doctrinal bases Ranariddh identifies for Cambodian -style 
democracy under the Sangkum. Yet the contemporary context is radically different 
from that of Sangkum, when Sihanouk dominated the totality of the political scene. 
As a consequence, these references have become increasingly void of meaning, and 
have either been suscept ible to takeover by the CPP , or ill-masked justifications of 
any attempt to get some limited share of power. 
The Social Opening. 
Ranariddh characterises ·the social opening· during the Sangkum era in the following 
terms: 'The social opening built on the integration of the royal tradition of aiding '·le 
petit peuple within a modernised framwork of third -world socialism, but without 
participating in their [the people's] too often mystifying nature.' 399 He then references 
Sihanouk's Considerations sur le socialisme Khmer, a document in which Sihanouk 
outlines an indigenous Khmer socialism with roots in the Angkorean monarchy. 400 In 
this document , Sihanouk finds proof of the beginnings of this socialism in how the 
Angkorean kings reali sed great public works for the benefit of the peasants, who 
retained ow nership of the land. He quotes historical King Jayavarman Vll' s famous 
dictum: · He suffered from his subjects· illnesses more than his own : because it is the 
suffering of the public that is the suffering of kings, and not the ir own suffering. ' 40 1 
398 Ibid.: 266 
399 Ibid.: 133 
--IOO Norodom, Sihanouk. 1961. Ministry of Information. Considerations sur le socia/i sme 
Khmer. This essay thus preceded Sihanouk's 1965 Notre Socialisme B011dclhiq1.1e, which 
provided a further elaboration 
401 Norodom Sihanouk (1961): 4-5 
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Sihanouk then situates his nationalisation of industries and collectivisation of 
agriculture in this context, listing the wide range of communal projects this entailed. 
The social open ing in this sense of provision and protection , bestowed by a ruler who 
can provide healing by virtue of how he embodies the body politic , remained central 
to Ranariddh's vision of what democracy must mean in the KOC. The constitutional 
formula ·the king reigns but does not govern· was therefore even perilous. 402 
'U naware of .. constitutional nuances•·,• Ranariddh writes, 'the rural masses in 
particular will misunderstand that the King is no longer, as before, the dispenser of all 
benefits and the natural protector against the abuses of the officials.· This. he fears , 
will make them likely to tum away from a power unable to meet their expectations 
(i.e. the monarchy) to find help elsewhere; ·particularly in political parties which are 
infinitely more binding than the King in their demands of loyalty or dependence , so 
that democracy and freedom will suffer from this change. 403 
With the king's ab ilities to prov ide circumscribed by the limits of consti tutional 
monarchy , the social opening took expression in how FUNCfNPEC under Ranariddh 
continuously engaged in development activities , framed as directly modeled on 
Sihanouk's activities in the past. Yet the overwhelming discrepancy in ability to 
provide between the CPP and FUNCfNPEC to the latter's detriment made 
FUNCfNPEC vulnerable to CPP criticism over their failure to actually provide. 404 
Caroline Hughes demonstrates the centrality of gift-giving practices as an ·invented 
tradition· for the CPP in contemporar y Cambodia. Here , 1 would like to draw 
attention to two further dynamics, which qualify the negotiation of the symbolic 
dimensions of gift-giving in contemporary Cambodia and, in tum, have directly borne 
on the viability of ·ro yal ist democracy'. Firstly , the social opening , as argued above, 
was not solely a historical legacy but, in theory and practice , an important part of the 
contemporary reinvention of royalist democracy. Secondly, whilst Hughes rightly 
acknowledges that Hun Sen drew on the legacy of Sihanouk in gift -giving , Hun Sen 
did not stop at this, but took these practices as his basis for explicitly arguing that the 
40
' 1993. Constitution of Cambodia (Article 7). 
403 Norodom Ranariddh (1998): 289 
404 Hughes (2006): 476. 
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CPP was a continuation ofSangkum, outperforming Ranariddh 's FUNCINPEC. 
These clams evidently gained force by how ideas of provision cont inu ed to fom1 an 
important part of democratic legitimacy for the contemporary royalist faction 
The CPP has purported to follow the line of the Sangkum ever since Sihanouk's 1991 
return to Cambod ia. Five days thereafter, Frings writes, a CPP statemen t declared that 
it professed ·domestic and foreign policies in line with the Sangkum Reas[tr] Niyum 
led by Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk ' . A c ircu lar adopted by the CPP standing 
committee established that. ·Samdech has expressed great satisfaction with the 
current political line of our party and state, regarding it as the continuation of the 
policy of the SangkumRess[tr} Niyum party [sic] that he led before 1970'. The CPP 
was made out to be the· Little Brother of the Sangkum Reash · Niyum Party' , a title 
said to have been bestowed by Sihanouk himself. 405 Yet , as Frings notes, Sangkum 
Reastr Niyum 's Buddhist socialism was not a Marxist socialist regime. 406 Moreover, 
the CPP under Hun Sen has challenged both (as argued in the preceding chapter) 
Sihanouk ' s Buddhi st socia lism and (as is argued later) its contemporary 
rearticulations by royalist actors. Rather , CPP discourse has developed during the 
course of the KOC to portray the party as rightful heir to the line of Sangkum Reastr 
Ni yum , primarily in terms of development activities, claimed to be directly modelled 
on those of the Sangkum-era social opening. This is seen in the following statement 
by Hun Sen: 
l am now setting aside my time to visit our people like what was done by 
HM the King in 1940s, 1950s and l960s and CPP has always followed that 
model. I used to mention that we have a great university, that is HM the 
King and Samdech Preah Reach Akkeamohesei [Queen Monineath] who 
have always firmly associated themselves with our people and Buddhist 
parishioners through activities for development.407 
405 Frings ( I 995): 359-60. 
406 lbid: 360 
..io7 Hun. Sen. 2004. ·Inaugurating a Buddhist Hall of Common in Srey Santhor.' Cambodia 
New Vision 72 (January). 
129 
In fact , Hun Sen has claimed to directly derive his notion of ·people's democracy' 
from the Sangkum Reastr N iyum, pointing to the shared prioritisat ion of efforts to 
' rebu ild" the cou ntry (i.e. development activities). 408 Integral to this is an ·art of 
sharing ' resources, part of which invo lves private donat ions by party officia ls to 
publ ic projects. Hun Sen has portrayed this as the social and political line of the CPP 
and earlier KPRP ever since 1979 , inherited from the Sangkum Reastr Niyum. This is 
accompanied by an emphasis that , were the CPP to lose elections, sharing would 
come to an end, as the peop le wou ld no longer be ab le to request help from CPP 
leaders. 409 This cou ld be said to neatly fulfil! Ranariddh ' s prophecy that support being 
provided by political parties will result in imposition of party demands for loyalty for 
provision. Yet, this was indeed also the case for FUNCrNPEC , which reinforced the 
logic of provision as a precondition for political legitimacy. Together with 
FUNC INPEC ' s continued reliance on such practices without the necessary material 
resources , this weakened the royal ists. 
Apart from the FUNCINPEC party apparatus , royalist actors also relied on 
purported ly humanitarian organisations for carrying out the royal function of 
provision. There is an intimate association between the idea of healing and historical 
conceptions ofkingship. 410 Ashley Thompson outlines how Jayavarman Vll ' s maxim , 
' The suffering of the people is the suffering of the king· , quoted by Sihanouk, above , 
.ms 'There is no other option but to continue with people's democrac y under the leadership of 
CPP- a concept that is similar to Sa11gkw11 Reastr Niy 11111. Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk 
led a crusade for independence from French colonialism and rebuilt the country under the time 
when there were seriou s threats of wars from countries around us. I am so proud and thankful 
that Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk and Samdech Preah Akka Mohesai al ways allowed 
their Sangkum Reastr Niy um to be mentioned as predecessor of the Royal Government's 
efforts in rebuilding the country.' Hun, Sen. 2007. ·Keynote Address at the Opening 
Ceremony of the Samdech Hun Sen's Tree Nursery Station at Tamao Mountain.' Cambodia 
New Vision 117 (October). 
409 · it is about the art of sharing which is a pa11 of the CPP's policy in bringing about 
development to the country from 1979 to the present I think this has brought us to a clear 
political and social line. Sharing resources has been a tradition ofCP P since 1979 and it was 
also done in the time of Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk's Sa11gk11m Reasrr N(vum or to be 
frank since when the earth exists because Cambodia also enjoys donation and assistance from 
the rich countries as well.[ ... ] Judging from what they said as soon as CPP loses the elections 
there will be no more sharing and people could not request helps from leaders ofCPP . This 
would help our people make political choice in the upcoming elections.· Hun, Sen. 2007 
'Inaugurating Junior High School Hun Sen - Srah Banteay · Cambodia New Vision 110 
(March). 
'10 Thompson (2004b): 91 
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is derived from a ·certain conjunction of the physical health of the people and the 
soc ial health of the kingdom through the figure of the king'. She suggests that 'in 
Cambodia, attempts to heal the king, the community, or the individua l subjects of the 
king inev itably have recourse to comp lex strategies of integration , embodi ment, and 
substitution between these various co -implicated bodies. ' 411 The king, then, plays a 
crucial role in the healing of national community. 
The Cambod ian Red Cross (Kakiibat Krohom Kampuchea; CRC), then known as the 
Khmer Red Cross Society (Samokom Cheat Kakiibat Krohom Khmer), was originally 
founded in February 1955 , shortly before the establishment of the Sangkum. 412 Since 
its early beginning, the CRC received unique recognition from the government as its 
auxiliary. 413 It has since enjoyed a unique mandate as a quasi-governmental 
organisat ion, basing its work on the help of volunteers to distribute aid to victims of 
natural disasters, soldiers, orphans etc. Min-oring his larger role in peacemaking, 
Sihanouk led the reunification of the CRC between 1992 and 1994.414 This integrated 
four different Red Cross groups operating in the respective occupied zones during the 
civi l war from 1979 onwards , illustrating the politicisation of the organisation. 415 
Ranariddh's w ife, First Lady Princess Mary Eng, became President, re-establishing 
royal control over the institution after the hiatus brought by the 1970 Khmer 
Republic. 416 
Envisaging her work for the Cambodian Red Cross as a particularly royal task, 
Pri ncess Mary Eng would later describe the reunification of all waITing factions that it 
entailed , and its provision of aid , as the very meaning of royalist nationalism in the 
"' Ibid.: 93. 
~
12 The organisation was renamed the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) in 1979 
m Men & Dickens (2005): 31. 
"'Ibid. : 27 
"'Ibid. : 7 
4 16 Presidents of the CRC: Samdech Preah Reach Kanitha Norodom Rasmi Sobhana (1955-
67); Queen Norodom Monineath (1967- 70); Chuop Samlot (1971- 73); Phlech Phiroun 
(1974-75 , 1979- 1992); Princess Norodom Marie Ranariddh (1993/4-1997 /8); and Bun Rany 
(1998 - present). Honora,y Presidents: Queen Kossomak (196 I); Sihanouk assumed High 
Patronage of the Cambodian Red Cross (1962); and Her Majesty Queen Norodom Monineath 
(since 1994). 
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KOC. 417 Parallel to her work for the CRC, Mary Eng also headed her own 
organisation, Sobhana. Named after Princess Rasmi Sobhana, who had originally 
founded the CRC, it was estab lished by Mary Eng in 1985 and its activities were 
expanded nationwide following the peace process. 418 These activi ties included 
training villagers on textiles and handicraft, sponsoring education for girls, and 
establishing a variety of health projects. These effec tively carried out practices 
associated with the 's ocial open ing' alongside FUNC INPEC party structures , 
engaging the wives of party functionaries in humanitarian work. Accompanied by the 
wives of FUNCINPEC ministers, sec retaries of state, and undersecretaries of state, 
Mary Eng travelled to beneficiary villages wher e they educated village women on 
hygiene and sanitation, aided by medical practitioners, and handed out free medicine. 
Mary Eng estimates that approximately 200,000 people have benefited from Sobhana 
project activities since 1993. For Mary Eng, the activities of the organisation have 
followed a distinctly royal tradition of royals personally exploring and addressing the 
people 's needs, which she aimed to transpose to the party political context. She 
explained it as: 'Most of the vo lunteers belong to FUNCINPEC: they are wives of the 
ministers , secretaries of state and undersecretaries of State. I want them to understand 
only that you have to love your country and especially the people because they need 
you . You have to under stand and been yourself there. that is what I have don e.' 419 
The political and symbolic importance of such strategies of provision is highlighted 
by how, following the July 1997 de facto coup against Ranariddh, Bun Rany replaced 
Princess Mary Eng as President of the Red Cross in 1998. Since then, the Red Cross 
under Bun Rany has become increasingly publicly exalted. 420 Sobhana, on the other 
hand, has drastically reduced its activities. The First Lady 's ca retakin g ab ilities and 
wider association with healing inter sects with the conceptual and historical role of 
royals on a number of levels. Paralleling the conso lidation of power by Hun Sen and 
4 17 Author's interview with Eng Mary 
418 The name Sobhana also reflected Eng Mary's appreciation for Rasmi Sobhana as a 'second 
mother-in-law· who had taken care ofRana riddh when he was young. See author"s interview 
with Eng Mary. 
~~: Au_thor's interview with ~ng Mary 
- This can be contrasted with the CPP working groups, the backbone of CPP strategies of 
provision, which remained an open secret, in that they were mentioned in the news but with 
no public documentation available, and were directly associated with voter mobilisation at the 
local level. 
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his network, it has finnly integrated practices of gift-giving into personalised claims 
to embody nation -building in line with historical conceptualisations of kingship. 
The discourse adopted by the CPP on the CRC emphasises ancient Cambodian 
indigenous roots of mutual aid and so lidar ity, and credits the CRC with help ing 
Cambodia find her way back to this tradition. In a speech, Hun Sen stated: ·Th e 
Cambodian Red Cross has helped Cambodia by enabling the Cambodian people to 
exp ress, in an institutionalised way, our anc ient culture of helping each other. This is 
a trait that is found in the core of our civilization, inherited from our forebears but one 
we have been unable to nurture in our dark recent history. The CRC has help ed all of 
us re-awaken this important trait.'421 This is strikingly similar to how, describing 
voluntary work together as one of the principal characteristics of Khmer socia lism, 
Sihanouk wrote that. ' The ideals of mutual aid and sol idari ty between a ll social 
classes of the Sangkum Reast,· Niyum are the motors that drive the people to provide a 
vo luntar y effort to serve the Khmer community and nation. ' 422 
Indeed , an important reason for the exaltation of Bun Rany' s Pres idenc y of the CRC 
is arguably its distinctly royal overtones of the ability to 's tand in for the suffering of 
the kingdom ' . By offering medical relief to the citizenry, Bun Rany carries out a task 
with inherent royal overtones. If Hun Sen·s autobiography is used ' as a metaphor for 
the resurgence of the natio n after " the ashes of Democratic Kampuchea"'' ,423 then the 
increasing focus on his wife carrying out caretaking functions completes the family 
metaphor. 424 This division of labour is naturally aided by how Bun Rany worked as a 
nurse during the years of revolutionary struggle until withdrawing, in 1979, to raise a 
fam ily; her experience as a nurse allows her to legitimately provide medical advice. 415 
The characteristics with wh ich Bun Rany is described close ly invoke the srey krop 
leak, or the Khmer ideal woman, a discourse with widespread legitimacy in 
421 Hun, Sen. 2005. Talk at the Third General Assembly of the Cambodian Red Cross 
~~aktomuk Conference Hall, Phnom Penh. Quoted in Men & Dickens (2005): 5. 
'-- Sihanouk ( I 96 l ): I I. 
'" Hughes (2006): 473-7 4. 
4
~
4 The most comprehensive example of official narrativisation of Bun Rany's life to date is 
Huot (n.d.), Red Rose of the Afekong, which provides an account of Bun Rany's life from 
childhood to her activities as President of the CRC . 
.J:!S See, for example, the CRC-produced video, 'Medical Practitioner and Woman Understands 
Women', in which Bun Rany gives medical advice to women about to give birth 
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contemporary society. 426 Thereby , Bun Rany has become the perhaps foremost 
exa mpl e of the ·feminization of moral order°, a return to traditional socia l values in 
tenns of gender, whic h Edwards iden tifies in contemporary Carnbo dia.427 Just as a 
trad itional discourse ties the fam ily's prosperity to fema le activit ies, Bun Rany's 
virtues are relevant to the prosperity of the ent ire nation. 428 In CRC material , such as 
songs frequently bro adcast on national telev ision , Bun Rany is typically por trayed in 
a motherly role towards the nation, and referred to as a ·saving mother' (neak mdae 
sangkroas) . This portrayal has significant ly royal overtones, echoi ng the way that 
Queen-Mother Monineat h was commo nly referred to as Samdech Mae (Mylady 
Mother), and some tim es Samd ech Yeay (My lady Grandmother) , just as the less 
frequent appeal of Hun Sen as /ok puk mirrors King-Father Sihanouk's nickname , 
Samdech Euv (Monsignor Papa), and now Samdech Ta (Mons ignor Grandfather). 429 
Indeed, underl ining how important it is for the CRC (under Bun Rany) to be 
acknow ledged as the very same CRC of the royal past , a Royal Decree (kret) of 6 
May 2002 officially recognised the Cambodian Red Cross as the successor of the 
original Cam bodi an Red Cross, established in 1955.430 
The CRC has produced a number of songs, which are frequently broadcast on the 
Bayon TV network. 431 These songs typically acknowledge the royal or igin of the 
organisation , characteris ing Bun Rany"s work as the continuatio n of the roya l work 
426 Cp. Ledgerwood (1996); Roeun (2004); and Lilja (2008): 70. 
427 Edwards (2008): 228 ; and Jacobsen (2008): 4 
~
28 Ledgerwood (1996): 143. In Khmer Buddhist conceptualisations, a woman's vi ttue. in 
itself , is a sign of previous meritorious behaviour, and will bring safety, order, and prosperity 
to her family. In this sense, any woman acts as a substitute for the family, and the first lady, 
necessarily, for the nation 
-c9 Indeed, the CRC can be said to contain a wider 'familiarisation' of political power, 
integrating the wives of senior CPP leaders as well as business tycoons (oknhas) into its 
structures . The Central Committee of the Fitih Term of Office (2011 - ) thus includes as First 
Vice President, Annie Sok An, wife of the Minister of the Council of Ministers Sok An; 
Second Vice President, Choeng Sopheap, wife of oknha Lao Meng Khin; Nhem Sophanny, 
wife ofNational Assembly Vice President Nguon Nhel; Men Pheakdei, wife of late National 
Police Chief Hok Lundi; and four oknhas, namely Ly Yong Phat, Mong Rithy, Kith Meng, 
and Lim Chhi v Ho, among whom Kith Meng is National Chamber of Commerce President, 
and Ly Yong Phat and Mong Rith y are CPP senators . See 2011 . CRC Newsle/ler 3: 45--47 
43° Cambodian Red Cross. 20 l0. · Preah reach kret sdey pi kar tot110I skoal kakiibat krohom 
Kamp11c/1ea· [Royal decree on the recognition of the Cambodian Red Cross] 
-ui Bayon TV, one of the main TV channels in Cambodia, is owned by Hun Mana, daughter of 
Hun Sen and Bun Rany. Since 2009 until present, these songs have been broadcast on a daily 
basis. 
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handed down. Typically, they also employ royal language. 432 Severa l CRC songs 
paraphrase Jayavarman VII's famous dictum. suggesting a deliberate attempt to inse11 
the first couple 's patronage of it into the context of kingship and hea ling. One song 
declares that, · Wherever there is a victim, there is Lok Chumteav Bandit, ./JJ President 
of the CRC, descending to help. Samd ech Techo434 and Lok Chumteav Bandit are 
powerful (sakseth) gods who save lives , they are like a fathe r and mother. The 
suffering of the people is the suffering of both of them, distributing wealth to help the 
CRC provide help. ' 435 In this song, as in a number of other songs popularised by the 
CRC, Hun Sen and Bun Rany are desc ribed as nothing short of ·divinities ' (tevota) .436 
This echoes how historica l conceptualisations of the healing conflated royal and 
divine status by posit ing the king as a substitute body of the Buddh a as a healer. 437 
The above so ng stretches the saving capacity of the first couple to tell the audience 
that the first co uple are divinities , vested with magical power (sakseth)- a form of 
power associated with royalty. 438 
This illustrates not only the similarity of legitimisation between the CPP and the 
Sangkum, but also FUNC INPEC's failure to reinvent the royalist provision-based 
identity to its advantage. Provision was envisaged as a cornerstone of royalist 
democracy and remained the practical way for actors associated with FUNCfNPEC to 
relate to the electorate. Both the loss of Presidency of the CRC and, more genera lly, 
that they were outmanoeuvred by the CPP as providers of benefits, can therefore be 
.u:; Royal language forms a particular register of Khmer , with its own distinct vocabulary 
reserved for royalty . 
. m Bun Rany was awarded the title Lok Chwnteav Kittipritt Ba11di1 by the Royal Academy of 
Cambodia in 20 I 0. 
-1
3
-1 Epithet for Hun Sen 
.. 
35 Samdech Techo iiphirochun [·The hero Samdech Techo'] 
people are easily victimized. Lok Ch11111teav Bandit pities and helps victims 
which wants to save the people. Because the suffering of the Khmer subjects is the suffering 
of both (Hun Sen and Bun Rany]: they need to be saved' 
.. 
36 See, for example, the songs Tusana monusiirhor krop chrong chroey [· A complete 
humanitarian vision'], which states 'Husband and wife are living gods [tevota ros] who help 
victims they descend to help because of pitying their nephews and nieces[ .. . ] They will be 
our mother and father for a long time to come, their hearts will not leave their nephews and 
nieces.': and Biindam Lok Clwmteav Bandit [·The advice of Lok Chumteav Bandit']. 
'°7 Thompson (2004b): 96. 
438 ·cp. how in the Lao and Thai contexts, the notion of saksit is similarly an important 
criterion for the contemporary cult of royals (Evans(\ 998): 30, I O 1-3. 
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understood to have caused a resulting ·democratic deficit" for the royalists. 439 This 
also testifies to the importance of a material base for realising this vision of royalist 
democracy. Without such as base, royals have a less-than-royal stance; whereas 
conversely , political actors with the ability to provide can be thought to overtake 
some of the royal aura. This brings up questions of the overall liberty of royalists to 
pick-and-choose in their legitimising discourse. With provision deeply engrained in 
ideas of kingship , their ability to move away from such ideas was constricted. The 
above quandary was , in this sense, indicative ofa larger problem of the viability of 
transposing royalism to the party political arena. 
The National Union. 
Ranariddh writes about the Sangkum-era national union that it was ·key to the 
system, part of the essence of the monarchic power as the protector of all.[ ... ] It 
postulates that no political tendency, current of thought , or faction should be excluded 
from the national community or the political dialogue. ' 440 This notion is central to 
Ranariddh's political analy sis of the KOC , and manifest in his distrust ofa multi-
party system and how he, instead, advocates the gathering of different political 
tendencies under one structure, as outlined above. 44 1 
Ranariddh and other actors have repeatedly appealed to the idea of a national union to 
frame FUNCfNPEC policies. Ranariddh has continuously appealed to the value of 
consensual politics in order to justify the sequence of coalition governments fanned 
with the CPP in 1993, 1998, and 2004 , claiming to act in confonnity with the wishes 
of Sihanouk to solve political crises. 442 As a reinstated monarch , Sihanouk also 
repeatedly advocated some variant of a consensus-based national union , al though 
under the guise of a multi-party political system. When the 2003 general elections 
resulted in the CPP failing to gain the two-thirds majority required to form a 
439 Author 's interview with Princess Eng Mary. 
440 Ranariddh (I 998): 133-34 
:: Ibid. 7L . . _ 
- As mentioned above, Rananddh blames the 1993 coal1t1on government on Chakrapo ng's 
threatened secession. Subsequent coalition governments are portrayed as pragmatic measures 
to solve political crisis in conformity with the wishes of Sihanouk. Cp. Sam. 2011. Note oft he 
Da v 23 
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government on its own, FUNCINPEC and the SRP formed the ' Alliance of 
Democrats· , contesting the election results and each c laiming they would refuse to 
join a coalition government if Hun Sen remained Prime Minister. King Sihanouk then 
proposed a tripartite coalition government between the CPP, FUNCINPEC and SRP , 
which resulted in a meeting on 5 November 2003 in which the three parties agreed to 
fonn a coalition government under Hun Sen as Prime Minister. 443 A senior 
FUNCfNPEC official explains it as follows: 
There was a meeting between Sihanouk, Hun Sen, Ranariddh and Sam 
Rainsy. Sihanouk said ·Having an opposition is contrary to Cambodian 
culture. We shou ld all join together to work towards reunification like 
during the Sangkum.' Then there was also a very small democratic 
opposition, but it was included in the Sangkum. Everyone agreed, also Hun 
Sen, Ranariddh and Sam Rainsy . It was even decided which po1ifolios 
would go to whom to set up a new government. But after Sam Rainsy left 
the meeting, he phoned Ranariddh to decline. [ ] The opposition wants to 
stay in opposition!
444 
Although this exact course of events is not corroborated by written sources, the quote 
is significant because of how it clearly situates Sihanouk·s encouragement of a 
tripartite coalition government in the context of the Sangkum idea ofa national 
union."' It explicitly sets out that a democratic opposition wou ld be contrary to 
Cambodian culture. Here, democracy in the sense of a conflict of ideas is fraught with 
danger, and the possibility of democratic division (which Sangkum sought to 
counteract) is a real threat to contemporary politics. The significance of this account 
is further heightened by how it offers an alternative explanation of what led to the 
effective end of cooperation with the SRP and a joint opposition agenda. When 
.i.u New York Times. 2003. ·world Briefing I Asia: Cambodia : Coalition Government. ' 
November 6. http://www.nytimes.com /2003 / l l /06/world/world-brieflng-asia-cambodia-
coalition-government.html?src~pm (October 26, 2012) 
.W➔ Author's interview with Anand Noranariddh 
.ws The CPP seems to certainly have favoured a two-party solution. Outlining his case against 
the '5 Novembe r ' 03' agreement , Hun Sen stated that a tripai1ite coalition government would 
result in constitutional ambiguities on how to dissolve the government in case ofa coalition 
partner leaving, and in regards to the National Election Committee (NEC) , and stated that he 
was in favour ofa two-pa1ty coalition with FUNCINPEC. See Hun, Sen. 2004. 'A Visit to the 
Kompong Raing Bridge Construction.' Cambodia New Vision 73 (February). 
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FUNCrNPEC proceeded to fonn a two-party coalition government with the CPP in 
2004 , marking the end of cooperation with the SRP (which has since remained deeply 
distrustful of FUNCrNPEC), Ranariddh received heavy criticism also from inside the 
party for agreeing to the coalition government. 446 By referring to Sihanouk's 
suggest ion of a national union, the story of these events is turned around to portray 
the democratic opposition as sowing seeds of discord in a fundamentally non-
Cambodian manner. 
Yet the reference to a national union, when advanced from a position of political 
marginalisation rather than national leadership, carries different meanings and 
implications than Sihanouk's original ideas. This is underlined by Ranariddh ' s 
increasingly vocal opposition to the very idea of a Cambodian political opposition 
following his ouster from FUNCrNPEC leadership in 2006 , when campaigning for 
his new Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP) and attempting to advance it as a potential 
coalition partner for the CPP. Ranariddh argued that an opposition is contrary to 
Cambodian culture , precisely by reference to Sihanouk"s 2003 advice to form a large-
scale coalition government. "' He judged the Cambodian oppos ition ·sterile and 
·inefficient'. referring to it as the ·champion of division ' . which he derived from how 
alien the very notion of a political opposition is in the Cambodian cultural context. 448 
A communication from his pen name. ' Sam Nora· , thus read 
Prince Ranariddh has noted 'There're also three possibilities offered to him 
The first one would be to join the CPP ? The Prince refused it, for the 
reasons belong to him alone. Second would be to join the opposition. The 
Prince also refuses it. He thinks that in Cambodia, it doesn't have any 
+-1
6 Sam Rainsy's agreement to sign the 2006 constitutional amendment (which required a 
simple majority rather than a two-thirds majority) in parliament, which made the 
FUNCrNPEC redundant as a coalition partner, is generally understood as an act of revenge 
following the 2004 coalition government between FUNCfNPEC and the CPP. 
44 7 ·The so-called "middle path' is nothing else but the implementation of valuable advice 
given by our venerated Samdech Ta, Samdech Ta Tuot to I-l.E. Sam Rainsy and Samdech 
Krom Preah Norodom Ranariddh, with the presence of Samdech Hun Sen, during the meeting 
in the Royal Palace on November 5, 2003.· Sam, Nora.2011. Note of the Day 24 : Samd ech 
~~·om Preah Norodom Ranariddh ·s ,\,fiddle Path 
Sam, Nora. 2010. Note of the Day J · The Opposition Parti es in Cambodia are the 
Champion of Di vision 
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culture of opposition. On the other hand, the Cambodian opposition is sterile 
and incapable to unite.'449 
Ranaridd h argued that there are three political forces in Cambodia: the CPP, the 
royal ists. and the ' oppositions'; he thus juxtaposed the royalists and the opposition. 450 
The royalists, div ided into ' new FUNC INPEC and the NRP , needed to be reun ified 
in the framework ofa ·real royalist party· , the NRP . for ·the Royalists, Sihanouk ists 
and others Patriots' to represent a second political force. The opposition consisted of 
the SRP and the Human Rights Party (HRP). Ranariddh even referred to these three 
forces as the new political ·t riptych· (kfimleang noyobay bey) in Cambodia, recalling 
the nationa l motto of nation, religion, king. 451 The existence of roya lists as a third 
pole, neither opposition nor ruling party, was said to be unique to Cambodia."" 
Ranariddh branded his polit ical bid to reunify the ·Royalists, Sihanoukists and 
Patriots· into one national force that would neither join the opposition nor oppose the 
CPP, as the ·middle path'. 453 Th is recalled how, duri ng Sangkum, Buddhist socialism 
was said to represent a middle path to the Co ld War, split between the free world and 
com munism, and between the domestic right and left. Sihanouk cast his middle path 
as distinctly Buddhist, tied to what was celebrated as age-old national religion 
safeguarded by Cambodia ' s historical kings ."'" Ranariddh , on the other hand , defined 
his middle path as the ' participation of the royalists /nationalist in the state powers and 
administration, in a process of peace , stabili ty and deve lopment, leading towards real 
national reconciliation and un ity' .455 This consisted of the royalists and nationalists 
participating in the legislative (Senate and National Assembly), execut ive 
(government), and local state powers (commune, district , and provincial councils); 
what cou ld only be realised through cooperation with the ruling C PP: 
"
9 Sam, Nora. 2011 . .Vote of the Day./ 7: The 1\'RP ·s Middle Path · Rationale and Justification 
450 Sam, Nora. 2010. Note of the Day 14: The Roy alists wi//1i11 the National Co111n11111iry (Part 
/) ; Sam, Nora. 2010. Note of the Day 15: The Royalist s within the National Co111111unity (Part 
2); and Sam, Nora . 2011. Note of the Dav 38: The Political 'Triptych ' in Cambodia 
~:: Sam. 20 I I. Note of the Day 38 
- Sam. 2011. Note of the Day 24 
453 Sam. 201 I. Note of the Day 47 
454 Norodom, Sihanouk. 1965. 'Notre Socialisme Buddhique.' Kambuja 8 (November); 
Hughes (2009): 40; and Girling (1971 ): 5 
455 Sam. 2011. Note of the Day 24: Samdech Krom Preah .\"orodo111 Ranariddh 's ,\fiddle Path 
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Hence , the quasi magic formula: the political force , represented by the 
Royalists , Sihanoukists, Patriots , ADDED to the other one , the CPP , to 
serving , altogether , Cambodia. That one is not servitude, but a real 
cooperation and collaboration , to resolving altogether , the problems of 
national interests , in stability , peace and in the framework of a rule of law. 
The Pr ince refuses thus the idea of using the Royalists, Sihanoukists and 
Patriots , to oppose and fight against the ruling Party. Such a way will 
represent for them and , in a long run , for our country a mortal danger. 456 
Thi s sta nce of advocating collaboration with the CPP was summed up in NR P· s 
campa ign formula, 'don ·t confront - add ' (kom bok-bauk). 457 
Yet Ranariddh ' s middle path , which attemp ted primarily to justify coalitions with the 
stronger CPP as, necessarily, its junior partner , differs sharply from that of Sihan ouk, 
whic h put Sihanouk finnly in contro l of his political adversar ies. Indeed, this was the 
main source of friction as royal family members gathered around Ranariddh after his 
2006 ouster, many disapproving of his dependent stance. Other senior royalists , 
advocating a much more confrontational stance vis-a-v is the CPP, heavily criticised 
what they cons idered to be Ranariddl1s subvers ion of the Sihanoukist idea ofa 
middle path. One of them charged: 
I don ' t understand Ranariddh's thinking. They (NR P] don·t campaign to 
win. They campaign to be in coalition with the CPP! They call it a middle 
way. They represent themselves not like a leader , but like a mistress , a 
second wife. ·Honey, I will vote with you for this , but not for that. For that 
one , I support the opposition. For this one , I vote with you honey. ' For me, a 
political party cannot campaign like that. You must campaign to win1
458 
, ;, Sam . 2011 . Note of the Day 47 
457 
Author's field notes. Ranariddh campai gn speech , 4 Jun e 20 11. Oudong village , Kompong 
Speu province 
458 Author's interview , 10 July 2011. 
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Direct Democracy and the National Concress. 
Ranariddh writes about the Sangkum-era practice of direct democracy that ·The third 
concept, .. direct democracy•· is a unique form of Khmer democracy. [ ... ] It is the 
technique to put the new doctrine into practice and above all expresses a refusa l to see 
power confiscated by an intennediary of offic ials , whether elected , or civil 
servants .' 459 This was primarily real ised through the National Congress, which 
Ranariddh credits with hav ing been successful in tenns of political decisio n -making , 
whilst criticising its inefficacy in ensuring accountability. Ranariddh suggests that 
this might have been resolve d through the interpe llation of officials 'wi thin a 
framework of authentic direct democrac y ' entrusted to loca l congresses. 460 The 
medicine for the ills of the sys tem would ha ve been more consequent application of 
direct democracy , rather than less. 
In advancing his own democratic vision, Ranariddh contrasts the current 
repre sentati ve democracy with an ideal direct democracy. He deplores how the 1993 
constitution makes no provisions for a referendum. ln outlining the virtues of a 
system of direct democracy , Ranariddh refer s to the multiple interventions attempted 
by Sangkum to invo lve citizens in the management of public affairs, namely the right 
to petition , referendum , and revocation of representative s, and , above all, the National 
Congress." ' The National Congress was in fact provided for by the 1993 constitution, 
whic h set forth that a yea rly Nation al Congress, chaired by the king and open to all 
Khmer citizens, would have the mandate to infonn citizens on various matters, to 
raise issu es and requests for the sta te to solve, and to adopt recommendations for 
consideration by state authorities and the National Assembly. 462 In spite of the 
constitutional pro vis ion , the National Congress has yet to be convened . FUNCrNPEC 
under Ranariddh has per sistent ly campaigned for the king 's right to head a National 
Congress and to realise two other constitutional provisions: the king's right to preside 
over the Supreme Council for Anned Forces , a body not yet created; and the righ t to 
preside over the High Counc il of Magistracy, including the right to grant royal 
"
9 Norodom Ranariddh ( 1998): 134. 
::: Ibid. 279 
lb1d.: 67. 
46
' 1993. Constitution of Cambodia (Chapter XII. Articles 128- 30) 
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pardon. 463 For Ranariddh , direc t democracy stems from the organic relation ship 
between the people and the monar ch, which he believes is a relation ship that cannot 
be subst ituted by an elected parliament or exec utive. In thi s sense , the Nat iona l 
Congress is an instrument without comparison for direct democracy, at the same time 
as it cannot rema in confined to a simpl e ·co rrective'. as in the present constit ution ; 
that is, it needs to be anchored in larger pro visions for direct demo cracy, which treat 
the peopl e as an organ ic whole. From this follows how Ranariddh objec ts to the 
liberal democratic langu age of indi vidual rights of citizens in the 1993 constituti on. 
Ranariddh lament s how the techniqu es imagined for assur ing tha t ·the Khmer people 
is the master of the country's des tiny·, are limit ed to ·cla ssical reci pes of 
represe ntative , liberal , plurali st democrac y', wit h the ·correcti ve' of the Nat ional 
Congress; and how ther e is no head ing in the 1993 constitution that lays out the role 
and powers o f the ·Khmer Peop le'. 464 
Yet the calls for a National Co ngress today carry different meanings from those of the 
Sangkum era, and highlight the hollowing out of meaning from political royalism. 
Whereas the National Congress during Sangkum served as the main mechanism for 
commu nicat ion between a paternal istic ruler and the peopl e, and thereby served also 
to give a semblance of power-sharing, in the KOC it was invoked as a means of 
investing the constitutional monarch wit h some limit ed powers. T he political 
hannl ess ness of such claims is perhaps best illustrated by how the reinstatement of 
constitutional tight s to the king emerged as the main point that FUNCIN PEC and the 
N RP could unite around in negotiations about merger in the years following 
Ranar iddh 's 2006 ouster. Both the post-2006 FUNCINPEC and the NRP campaig ned 
for the reinstatement of the king·s co nst itutional powers and. as a main pat1 of this. 
prom oted the idea of the Natio nal Co ngress. 465 Asked in a press conference what the 
two parties had to offer ·now that monarchi sm and Sihanoukism we re outdated· , the 
party leaders referr ed to two unr ea lised co nstitutional pro visions: that the king shou ld 
head a Supre me Council for Armed Forces , and that the king should head a Natio nal 
463 Ibid.: Articles 287-88. 
464 Ibid.: Artic le 279. In fact, Chapter I ll of the constituti on addresses ·Th e rights and 
obligations of Khmer citizens·. 
465 FUNCfNPEC. 2006. Kolokar noyobay sdngk hep koncibdk FUNCINPEC: 6. See also 
author's interv iews w ith Keo Puth Reasmey, 8 June 20 10, and Yo u Hockry 
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Congress. FUNCfNPEC President Keo Puth Rasmey recalled their response as 
follows: 'The re are two things to be a royalist that are mentioned in the constitution. 
We are royalists, ifwe win the elections we will make sure that the King gets both of 
these powers.' 466 That is, royal ism had by then been eroded to refer merely to 
protecting the constitutional powers of the king. Ultimately, it further helped define 
the king as a pur ely constitutional monarch 
Royalism as 'Democratic Opposition' 
Appeals to Sangkum-style democracy coexist with parallel appeals to a democratic 
opposition identit y . There were thus two parallel democra tic logics invoked by 
royali st actors. Whilst this did not mean that FUNCfNPEC was sp lit in two clear-cut 
camps, different actors have more strongly associated themselves with either of the 
two. Whilst Ranariddh has associated himself more closely with Sangkum-derived 
ideas of democracy , another group in FUNCINPEC's leadership advocated for 
FUNClNPEC to assert itself as an opposition party, and was more willing to ally with 
the political opposition than to fonn coalition governments with the CPP. Thi s group 
of royalists was disappointed by Ranariddh ' s lack of oppositional sta nce. The y 
understood FUNCfNPEC to be a party that believed in a multi-party, liberal 
democratic system, as well as having a co nstitutiona l monarch that reigned but did 
not rule. They envisaged the 'royalist' political agenda as the protection of the multi-
party democratic system, various freedom rights, and the constitut ional monarchy. 
The y took pride in how FUNCfNPEC helped achieved the PPA in tertns of how it 
overturned the one-party syste m, established that Cambod ia would be a liberal , multi-
party democracy, and outlined the rights of the citizens: and in the resulting 
constitution of 1993, which contained pro vis ions to this effect. 
To support their claim s of a democratic identity , some FUNCfNPEC actors invoked 
an indigenous democratic legacy, derived not from Sangkum but from the 
Democratic Party (DP) founded by Prince Yuthevong in 1947. The DP posed a 
fonnidable challenge to Sihanouk at the time - to the point that Sangkum was se t up 
¼
6 Author's interview with Keo Puth Reasmey, 8 June 2010 
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partly in response to it. As Cambodia's first Prime Minister, Yuthevong had overseen 
the drafting of the 1947 constitution , which instituted a constitutional democracy and 
invested more power in an elected assembly than the chief ofstate. 467 In creating a 
liberal democratic framework through the 1993 constitution , some claimed to have 
looke d back to Yuthevong·s framework set out by the 1947 cons titution , using it as a 
model. Sisowath Sirirath phrases it this way: 
When Yuthevong died, he was the PM of Sihanouk He wrote the first 
constitution of democratic Cambodia in 1947. \Ve used this and changed it 
gradually. After FUNCfNPEC won the elections in 1993 and we drafted the 
constitution, we took a lot of wordings from Yuthevong's Constitution, such 
as the line ' free. independent and neutral' We took a lot from Yuthevong 
But 90% of it has been changed by the CPP since then through amendments. 
Now it is not allowed to have more than 200 people demonstrating in the 
street. We are s!ow!y moving back to another phase. Our newspapers are 
very free and fair in looks only, but you don ·1 see the opposition parties on 
TV. This is not democratic. There is only one voice. This is not in 
conformity with our vision.468 
Thi s can be understood as an attempt to argue for the royalist root s of an indigenous 
democratic movement , which is used to support a more general identification with a 
liberal democratic agenda based not on Sangkum-style national consensus but on a 
multi-party system, freedom of demonstration, and freedom of press. Invoking 
Yuthevong's name in this sense invoked shared intellectua l origins with the se lf-
identified democratic oppositio n, which repeatedly makes such demands. Such 
references to Yuthevong typ ically contrasted him favourably with Rana1iddh, and, at 
times, Sihanouk . In one example of such a reading , a royal family member criticised 
Sihanouk and Ranariddh for their ·paternalistic' leadership style, before concluding 
that Yuthevong, on the other hand , because of his work for a multi-party democratic 
system and constitutional monarchy in Cambodia. was the ' pride of the family'. 469 
'
67 Chandler(l991) : 35-36 
➔68 Author's interview with Sisowath Sirirath, 13 May 2010. 
➔69 Author's private communication, September 2012 
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References to Yuthevong, therefore, in some sense, offer an alternative genealogy of 
royalist nationalism. 
The tension between these co-existing logics has been a constant source of frict ion 
within FUNCfNPEC. Ranariddh 's ideas of democratic representation founded in 
ideas of organic relations contrasted sharply with the conflict ing vision of 
FUNCfNPEC as a liberal democratic party, promoting relations of strict 
accountability betwee n the elected and the e lectorate. Proponents of the latter 
criticised the hierarchical vision of society envisaged by the circle around Ranariddh, 
a vision mirrored by FUNCfNPEC party structu re. Whilst it was by no means a coup 
by a more liberal democratic faction, the party co up in 2006 that ousted Ranariddh 
did highlight tensions in the part y resulting from Ranariddh's strong grip over party 
internal affairs. After the resulting effective implosion of the royalists , actors who 
identified with a liberal democratic identity blamed the downfall of political royal ism 
on the failure of FUNC INPEC leaders , especially Ranariddh, to work out a royalist 
identity based on what they considered to be modern democratic ideas of equa lity. 
This exasperation was expressed by a senior aide to Prince Norodom Sirivudh, 
testifying to the tension between two contrasting views in the party of the royalist 
stance on democracy: 
So, when you [the author] write about royalism, who do you include as a 
royalist? What does royalism mean now? I don't know what royalism means 
anymore. fn the 1990s, many foreigners were suspicious of royalists, 
thinking it [royalism ) is too pyramidical. r used to explain it like ' \Ve are 
modern democrats who believe in having a King , as well as multi-party , 
liberal democracy. ' But in actual fact, there is a contradiction. We do not 
have the maturity to have a constitutional monarchy like in the UK. The 
concept for the Prince and others, is still the God-King it is really a 
pyramid , so hierarchical. So it is a contradiction in terms with the idea of a 
constitutional monarchy. [ ... ] I think there is a contradiction that we cannot 
overcome, between the idea of a constitutional monarchy and democratic 
ideas [ on the one hand], and the old pyramidica! idea, what monarchy means 
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in Cambodia - absolute [on the other]. I don't know what political royalism 
could mean in Cambodia.
470 
To this disenchanted group , FUNC INPEC's pyramid organisation made it a less than 
democratic party , which, together with a lack of internal discipline, weakened it 
FUNCINPEC leaders, they claimed, showcased a liberal democratic identity by virtue 
of their association with liberal democratic countries where they had spent lime in 
exile , yet failed to substantiate this claim: 
As a political party, FVNCINPEC had a platform but had problems wilh the 
daily management, administration , and some visions were not there. The 
base perspective was to receive some vision from the top.[ ... ] People think 
that we are from a liberal culture so we are democrats, but I think people 
from FUNCINPEC knew nothing about democracy or liberalisation. They 
only speak the word. I spent some pa1t of my life in a democratic country , 
the discipline is there, otherw ise it is anarchy. FUNCINPEC was a total 
mess-up. Ranariddh made the decisions, but the decisions were not 
respected.
471 
This group took practical measures to forn1 concrete alliances with the self-identified 
democratic parties. In 2003 , then Secretary General of FUNCfNPEC Norodom 
Sirivudh proposed the Alliance of Democrats (AD) between FUNCINPEC and the 
SRP. The effort to bridge the differences between royalists and se lf-identified 
democratic parties was repeated by Sisowath Thomico·s 2006 establishment of the 
Sangkum Jatiniyum alliance. The formation of a joint democratic opposition 
foundered , however, on several reasons. A decisive one was the power balance within 
FUNCfNPEC , which tilted in favour of Ranariddh. Ranariddh ' s 2004 decision to call 
off the AD and fonn a coalition with the CPP was a turning point for relations 
between FUNCfNPEC and the SRP that permanently ended trust between the two 
parties, and also alienated and embittered those within FUNCINPEC who identified 
closely wi th a shared democratic opposition identity. 472 
470 Author·s interview with Pok Marina. 
471 Author's interview with Sisowath Pheanuroth 
472 
See, for example , author's interviews 12 July 2010, 10 July 2011 
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A seco nd main impediment was deep-sea ted distrust by royali sts, even those who 
assoc iated closely wit h a democratic oppos ition identity , of the SRP being anti-
roya list, either in the sense of being anti -co nstit utional monarchy (Repub lican) or 
anti-Sihanouki st. Royal fam ily members are general ly convinced that Sam Rainsy 
hold s Sihanouk responsible for his father Sam Sary 's death , and, in spite of his 
outward support of the constitutiona l monarchy, believe that he ho lds deeply ant i-
royalist sentiment s in both of the above senses. 473 One senior royal fami ly member 
who had previousl y been the driving force behind cooperation betwee n FUNC IN PEC 
and the SRP thus typically remarked: ' Sam Rainsy is sti ll anti-ro yalist , beca use 
Sihanouk killed his father.·"' Thi s has co ntinu ously acted to prevent close 
cooperat ion, even at times when these acto rs have appeared to have a joint agenda. In 
1994, Norodom Sirivudh resigned from his posts as Co-Dep uty Prim e Ministe r and 
Minister of Fore ign Affairs follow ing Ranariddh's expuls ion of Sam Rain sy from the 
post of Minister of Finance. 475 Yet Sirivudh and his aides deny that the two men 
shar ed a common agenda, preci se ly by po inting to Sam Rainsy ·s perce ived ant i-
royalis t stance. " 6 Sisowath Thomico has sim ilarly claimed to have lost hope of 
cooperatio n with the SRP after see ing a French doc umentary in which Sam Rain sy 
·spoke unju stly ofSihanouk'. 477 Trust was further damaged by the publicat ion o f 
book s by Sam Rain sy and his siste r Sam Emmaran e that were highly criti ca l of 
Sihanouk. 478 
Thirdly, wh ilst the democra tic visio n propagated by Ranar iddh and that ofroyalism 
as democratic opposition were primarily assoc iated with two different sets of acto rs, 
.m Sam Sa1y helped Sihanouk found the Sangkum Reastr Niyum, but fell out with Sihanouk 
and died under unclear circumstances in 1962, after having fled Cambodia. 
474 Author·s interview. 10 July 2011 
"' Cp Roberts (2001) : 156. 
·-H
6 A uthor's interview with Pok Marina and author's interview I O July 2011 
-m Author·s interview with Sisowath Thomico, 28 May 20 10. Sisowath Thomico, Sam 
Rainsy, and Tioulong Saumura studied at Sciences Po (Paris) together in the early l 970s, and 
were also all activists (who would later militate against the Khmer Rouge). According to 
Sisowath Thomico, they split because Sam Rainsy was more political, whilst Thomico wanted 
the struggle to be broader, envisaging it in terms of culture and civilisation. In the magazine 
An11vatli, Thomico wrote articles about the strength of Cambodian civil ization, Sangkum 
Reastr Niyum and Buddhism 
-1
7s Author's interview with Sisowath Thomico, 28 May 20 I 0. 
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these stances were , in reality , more like two end points on a continuum with many 
royalist actors intermittently associating themselves with either pole. In the wake of 
his calls for royalists and the SRP to unite , Sisowath Thomico would, as explored 
below. attempt to revive Sihanouk's doctrine , elevating Sihanouk's Buddhist 
socialism to a guiding ideology for the KO C and advocating the implementation of its 
ideas of direct democracy . His vac illatin g stance manifests how ideas of democracy 
derived from Sihanouk remained a prominent , if not inescapable , part of royalist 
discourse and thinking, bringing real difficulty in uniting with the non-royalist 
democratic opposition. 
Rovalism as ·Democratic Opposition' and the Legacy of the Resistance. 
If a j oi nt 'democratic opposition· identity with the SRP was difficult to form , then a 
'democratic opposition' identity based on the legacy of the PRK-era ·resistance· was 
mor e successful. A dynamic that pushed FUNCINPEC towards a 'democra tic 
opposition ' identity, in this sense, was the defection of members of the former 
KPNLF faction to FUNCfNPEC. In 1998, the Son Sann Patty , successo r to the 
KPNLF, merged with FUNCfNPEC. Fonner KPNLF fighters had continuously 
joined FUNCfNPEC, following the fonnation of the first coalition government in 
1993; the disintegration of its successor party , the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party 
(BLD P); the Jul y 1997 events, which forced actors to take sides between Hun Sen 
and Ranariddh; and, finally , the implosion of the Son Sann Party the following year. 
As a consequence, most of the fonner KPNLF leadership ended up in 
FUNCINPEC. 479 Fonner KPNLF joined the FUNCfNPEC because of their shared 
anti-communist, anti-Vietnamese national resistance identity, as well as the access to 
patronage structures this connection granted, as seen in the following quote: 
' In 1997, everyone jumped from Son Sann 10 FUNCINPEC. They don! want to go to the CPP 
- that is a different school of thought. They consider FUNC[NPEC, from the national 
resistance. To go to the CPP, they climb slowly. In FUNCrNPEC , if you are good with 
Ranariddh you can jump up. , ➔so 
.n9 Author's interview with Huy Vora 
480 
Aut hor's interview with K eo Puth Reasmey, 8 June 20 I 0 
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This suggests the importance of lingering ties from the resistance. Senior royalists 
generally thought the defunct KPNLF /BLDP / Son Sann Party faction to share with 
them a democratic identity defined in tenns of the anti-communist resistance 
struggle. 481 They emph asised Son Sann·s loyalty to Sihanouk, wh ich they contrasted 
with the more ambiguous stance of Sam Rainsy. One senior adviser within 
FUNCfNPEC exp lained the relationship between FUNCfNPEC and the parties 
coming out of the old KPNLF faction as , ' it is like democratic ideas [held by 
KPNLF /BLDP /Son Sann Party], versus another democratic faction [FUNCfNPEC] 
that emphas ises the role of the King. We are both the successors of the old 
Democratic Party. ' 482 
FUNClNPEC and fonner KPNLF generally considered themselves to share a 
democratic identity, defined as anti-com muni st, anti-Vietnamese resistance. Within 
this framework , the difference was outlined as FUNCfNPEC being royalist and 
KPNLF ·nationalist" (meaning neither monarchist nor anti-monarchist). 483 The 
KPNLF contained both members loyal and opposed to the monarchy and Sihanouk 
Royalists could accept fonner KPNLF fighters, such as General Dien Del (fonner 
general in the Khmer National Anned Forces (FANK), the army of the Khmer 
Republic, and co-founder of the KPNLF) , into their ranks more easily , as their 
previous opposition was understood (and to some extent perhaps redefined) as anti-
Sihanoukist (opposing Sihanouk·s perceived pro-Vietnamese stance) rather than 
fundamentally Republican. This tied them to the shared, basic , anti-communist, anti-
Vietnamese stance. The limitations of the contemporary constitutional monarchy after 
Sihamoni·s ascension on the throne , in turn , made FUNCfNPEC more palatable for 
fonner KPNLF fighters. 434 Their support of the monarchy was fundamentally 
opponunistic , based on the perception that rural people still supported the monarchy, 
481 Author's interviews with Pok Marina, Keo Puth Reasmey, Eng Mary, Ek Sereyvath. 
482 Author's interview with Pok Marina 
483 See, for example, author's interviews with Dien De l and Huy Vora 
484 
Cp. author's interview with Dien Del: · 1 prefer Sihamoni to Sihanouk - he correctly does 
his job. Sihanouk has too much political tactic and always suppo11s the Vietnamese.[ . . . ] 
Sihamoni follows the constitution, I think he is a very good king. I can tell you that the 
situation of Cambodia now is because of Sihanouk.[ ... ] They [FUNCrNPEC leaders] know 
me, they know that I am not really a royalist , if I said I like the monarchy , but now we have a 
good King.' 
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and the need to follow the people to gain votes. Th is could not be disentang led from 
the resistance lens , which prioritised anti-commun ist struggle as the goal of national 
politics. This was expressed by Dien Del as: 'Nationalis m is not like before. If you 
were a nationa list you went to the Republic, now you go to the monarchy. [t is the 
tendency. ·435 This opportunism also explained their dislike of Sam Rainsy, who they 
considered democratic but not monarchist, and therefore alienated from the political 
will of the rural electorate. 486 
On 18 October 2006, Prince Ranar iddh was ous ted as President of FUNCINPEC at an 
extraordinary party congress that turned him into the party •historical leader'; what 
can be understood as the endpoint of his gradual weakening after the July 1997 
events. The new FUNCINPEC leade rship explained this in tenns of a divide between 
fonne r resistance fighters and the circle around Ranariddh, which had 
disproportionately promoted returnees and (particularly) royal family members at the 
expense of fonner resistance fighte rs.437 They claimed to want to democratise 
FUNCINPEC, by transferring more powers to its mid - and lower ranks, staffed by 
many fonner resistance fighters. Whilst Ranariddh had been party President for life , 
the Presidency now became subject to election , and decision-making powers were 
transferred to the steering committee. FUNCINPEC leaders accused Ranariddh of 
having planned to change FUNC INPEC into the· Prince Ranariddh Parry ·, which 
Ranariddh denied. 488 They portrayed it as Ranariddh wanting to create his own party 
identity , free from the shadow of Sihanouk, even comparing him to ·an 18 year old 
who wants to be free from his parents · 489 
485 Ibid 
486 Cp. author's interview with Dien Del ·\Ve cannot accept Sam Rainsy. He is democratic, 
everything is good, but he is not a monarchist. Openly he cannot be against it. I think people 
1~-the countr~side ~re sti_ll closer to my position than to Sam Rainsy.' 
Author's interview with Keo Puth Reasmey . 8 June 2010 
488 According to Keo Puth Reasmey, new president of FUNCINPEC, Ranariddh had prepared 
to dissolve FUNCINPEC and proclaim a new party, upon which another group of people had 
arranged to bring FUNCINPEC under Nhek Bunchhay's control. According to the 1\'RP 
version, Ranariddh was aware that Nhek Bunchhay was planning to take over FUNCfNPEC, 
and waited for Nhek Bunchhay to act first, whilst expecting to set up his own party thereafte1 
See author's interviews with Keo Puth Reasmey, 8 June 20 I 0. and Anand Noranariddh. Keo 
Puth Reasmey's assessment seems correct: 'There were preparations made behind the scenes 
for both men.· 
➔S9 Author's interview with Keo Puth Reasmey, 8 June 2010. 
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The party coup was effectively the takeover of FUNCfNPEC by a faction that, by all 
accou nts, enjoyed the close support of the CP P. It can also be understood in tenns of 
the tension between royal ist and resistance identit ies, which lent itself to CPP 
manipu lation. Returning royal family members , other returnees from Western 
countries, and fonner res istance fig hters , had long competed for power in 
FUNCfNPEC. Relat ively few royal family members were involved in resistance 
activities in the border areas .490 Yet royal family members returning to Cambodia in 
the early 1990s came to occupy FUNClNPEC's top positions at the expense of 
resistance fighters. Moreover , non-royal returnees from the west, who also came to 
occupy positions at the top of the party ( with high levels of competence and personal 
wealth), were expected to show deference to royalty , resulting in disaffection and 
disloyalty. 491 The 2006 party coup reflected discontent with Ranariddh 's leadership 
and testified to the strength of loyalties between former KPNLF and FUNClNPEC 
resistance fighters. General Nhek Bunchhay , new FUNCfNPEC Secretary General , 
instrumental in masterminding the party coup , was backed up by other fonner 
militar ies, both from FUNCfNPEC and KPNLF. He had been the main point of 
contact within FUNCfNPEC for former soldiers to join the party , and had cul tivated 
their allegiances. 491 Following the split, the new FUNCfNPEC leaders continuously 
claimed to represent prev iously neglected resistance fighters. For example, Princess 
Mary Eng, at that point separated from Ranariddh who remained in FUNCfNPEC, 
stated that Ranariddh had left those who fought with him ( whereas she stayed with 
those who fought) and criticised royal family members following him to NRP for 
generally not having taken part in the resistance. 493 FUNClNPEC's continued royalist 
credentials were additionally maintained by Keo Puth Reasmey, new party President, 
married to Sihanouk's daughter , Norodom Arunreasmey; and by Sisowath Sirirath , 
Second Vice Preside nt and Arunreasmey's ex-husband. Ranariddh's supporters, 
490 These included, for example, Norodom Ranariddh, Eng Mary, Norodom Sirivudh, and 
Norodom Chakrapong. 
491 Hughes (2001c): 309. 
492 This included Dien Del, who joined FUNCINPEC actively after 1997, after originally 
having turned to FUNCINPEC after the failure of the LOP to win seats in 1993. Dien Del later 
stated: ·1 would have liked to join FUNCINPEC even before the 1997 but some leaders were 
too proud - they look down on other people. They didn't connect with our military past I 
didn't need that. They have no way to take the FUNCINPEC military up.' See author's 
interview with Dien De!. 
493 Author's interview with Eng Mary 
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meanwhile, fonned a new, sma ll party in October 2006, named Norodom Ranariddh 
Part y (NRP). 494 The party was known as the ' Nat ionali st Party· between 2008-2010, 
during which time Norodom Ranariddh was in self- imposed exile, and again in 
August 2012 onwards. following Ranariddh ' s exit from the political scene. 495 The 
party enjoyed the support of the majority of politically involved royals, and includ ed 
both returnees and a few fonner resistance fighters , both from FUNCrNPEC and 
KPNLF. It emphasised the role of CPP manipulation in engendering the sp lit.496 
Royals in the new FUNCrNPEC leadership were quickly sidelined in 2008 when Hun 
Sen announced that royal family memb ers Keo Puth Reasmey, Sisowath Sirirath, and 
Norodom Arunreasmey would not be part of the new government , whilst Nhek 
Bunchhay and other non-royalist resistance fighters would. By then , the debate was 
radicalised to centre on the involvement versus the non-involvement of royal family 
members in politics. Royal family members associated with a democratic opposition 
identity saw themse\ ves constrained to take a sta nce for Ranariddh, who they 
remained uncon vinced by. If anything , Ranariddh's ouster seemed to funher prov e to 
them that Ranariddh was a hopeless card, yet they needed to gather around him more 
than ever. 497 Meanwhile, the CPP control led FUNCIN PEC even more fim1\y than it 
had under Ranariddh's leade rship 
Doctrine versus Embodiment: Reinventing Buddhist Socialism and Sihanoukism 
-l
9
.j T he Khmer National Front Party changed its name to NRP on 16 October 2006. 
495 The Nationalist Party and the NRP have had the same party symbol, a map of Cambodia 
and the motto ' freedom , sovere ignty , 1erritorial integ rity' (seripheap, mep ethey, boronoph eap 
tek dey), with the difference being that the NRP symbol featured Ranariddh's picture on top 
The name ·Nationalist Party' [Kanapak Chea/111) 11111] was intended to make people think of 
Sihanouk 's nationalism. as well as to be similar to the ·N RP ' . See author's interview with Hu y 
Vora. 
-1% Author ' s interviews wilh Anand Nora nariddh and Ngo Pin. You Hockry , Minister of 
Interior (1993- 1998 and 1998- 2003), who, together wilh Ranariddh, was responsible for 
appointing FUNCINPEC provincial governors , governors of district s and chiefs of districts , as 
well as police commissioners during these periods , thus blamed the lesser representation of 
resistance fighters in FLJNCIN PEC on their low er education. See author's inter view with You 
Hockry 
49 7 Author's interv iew s with Ngo Pin, Sisowath Panara Sirivudh, and Sisowath Ayravady. 
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FUNCINPEC and , since 2006 , its sister parties , claim to represent 'royalism', reach 
niy um, One key way to bestow the concept of royal ism with meaning has been to turn 
to Sangkum as a legacy to unite around, reinventing ideas of 'Sihanoukism' 
(Sihanouk niy um) and ' Buddhist social ism ' Yet these reinventions highlight tensions 
as to wha t extent Sihanoukism and the legacy of Sangkum lends itself to provide a 
party political ideological identity , rooted in deeper tensions in the royalist project 
between embodime nt and doctrine, Ranariddh, as outlined above , has referred to 
Buddhist socialism as his model for democracy in the Cambo dian context, tying 
democracy to the Khmer monarchy, He has consistently argued for these conceptions 
from the perspective of embodiment , whereby he and other royal family members are 
in a unique position to incarnate the nation's aspirations. Other self- iden tified 
royalists have attempted to make Sihanoukism relevant by advocating it as a political 
ideology. Yet thi s ' disembodiment' ofSihanoukism made it suscept ible to being 
claimed by any political group. This danger was illustrated at the time of division of 
political royalists after 2006 , when , following Ranariddh's ouster from FUNCfNPEC, 
royalists divided into three parties: FUNC INPEC, the NRP , and a short-lived 
Sangku m Jatiniyum Front Party (SJFP). The ensuing debate came to focus on the 
contents of the Sihanoukist heritage, particularly the tension between embodiment 
and a doctrinal identity to be distilled from it. 
Turnina Buddhist Socialism into an ·Ideolo 0 v' for the Second Kin°dom. 
One of the most outspoken attempts to revive the legacy of Sangkum took place in 
2006 , as an attempt to save political royalism that was in disarray. In March , 
Ranariddh had resigned as head of the National Assemb ly after the const itu tional 
amendment had been passed allowing motions to be passed with a simpl e majority 
rather than the previous ly required two-thirds majority , and thereby making the 
exist ing coalition between the CPP and FUNCTNPEC redundant. FUNCfNPEC was 
also plagued by internal divisions, beset by rivalry between Ranariddh and 
FUNCfNPEC Secretary General Nhek Bunchhay. At the time of this crisis , shortly 
before Ranariddh ' s ouster from the FUNCfNPEC Presidency in October, Prince 
Sisowath Thomico, Sihano uk ' s adopted son and head of his personal cabine t, 
announced that he would fonn a broad coa lition political party to unify all royalists in 
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Cambodia, which was to take the ideology of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum as the basis 
of its political platform. 498 This was intended to resolve the crisis of the involvement 
of roya ls in politics and to address deepe r problems in Cambodian society rooted in a 
lack of vision. 499 
In July 2006 , Prince Thomico launched the Sangkum Jatiniyum alliance with four 
small political parties at the fonner royal capital Oudong, a symbolically important 
location. 500 During the following weeks, Thomico toured the Cambodian countryside , 
screening Sihanouk ' s Sangkum -era films, le Cid and Twilight , as well as 
documentary footage about infrastructure projects undertaken by the Sangkum Reastr 
Niyum governments. 501 In August, the Sangkum Jati Niyum Front Party (SJFP) held 
its first congress. 502 Shortly thereafter, a ceremony was organised at Wat Phnom in 
Phnom Penh where pa rticipants swore an oath to sacrifice their lives for Cambodia's 
independence , sove reignty , and territorial integrity , and ·to protect the King and 
Queen forever·. 503 
498 A nephew of Queen-Mothe r, Monineath , Sisowath Thomico gave up his royal title in l 970 
and fought for the Khmer Republic. Returning to Paris in 1973, Thomico founded the journal 
An11vath , where he advocat ed for social and political change in Cambodia. According to 
Thomlco , it was at this time that he first sta1ted writing articles about how Sangkum Reastr 
Niyum and Budd hist socialism could be useful to this end, claiming that: 'It was a way for me 
to have my own revolutionary ideas put in place. It was the way for Cambodia to reach 
revolution, through the spirit and culture of Cambodia . I was for non-violence . I thought we 
will do the revolution peacefully , through ideas. Buddhist Socialism could have been the basis 
to reach Cambodia to that final goal. ' See author 's interview with Sisowath Thornico , 20 May 
2010. 
499 A third reason was to ensure that Ranariddh would have an alternative party political 
vehicle to FUNCINPEC, if necessar y. See author 's interview with Sisowath Thomico , 20 May 
2010 
500 The royal capital (1618- 1866) Oudong houses royal stupas from this period. During the 
Sangkum period , the site was con sidered so invested with royal power that flying over 
Oudong was prohibited (Monipong (2008): 135). Samean , Yun and Douglas Gillison. 
·Thomico Annou nces Alliance with Fringe Parties ,' The Cambodia Daily, 28 July 2006 
501 Samean , Yun. ·Thomico Visits Four Provinces , Shows Movies ,' The Cambodia Daily, 9 
August, 2006. 
SO:! Samean, Yun . 'Thomico ' s New Party Holds First Congress in Capital ,· The Cambodia 
Dail y, 21 August 2006. 
503 Thomico also urged the UN and the international community to monitor the 2007 
commune election s and 2008 national election s, and accused FUNC INPEC of inaction when 
the media broadca st anti-Sihanouk songs from the Khmer Republic in October 2005, around 
the time that Hun Sen threatened to dismantl e the monarchy if King Sihamoni did not sign the 
supplemental border treaty with Vietnam. Thul , Prak Chan and James Welsh. 'Thomico , 50 
Party Faithful Swear Oath to Country ,' The Cambodia Daily , 11 September , 2006. 
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Thomico attempted to revive an elusive doctrine Sangkum was said to have been 
founded on, arguing that Ca mbodia had to find a way to develop the country through 
a coherent ideology. 504 The Sangkum Jatiniyum Front Party reflected Prince 
Thomico 's perception that Cambodia had suffered a loss of political visio n, and that 
contemporary Ca mbodia was undergoing similar social transitions as during 
Sangkum. Reviving Sihanouk's ideology was thus intended to procure a political 
vision and respond to social change. Th omico sought to remind the divided royalist 
faction what monarchism in Cambodia would mean , and find them a ·new vision' 
through the values of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum. In particular , he perceived his 
challenge to be the tran sfonnation of the celebration of Sangkum from advocating 
Sihanouk as a person into a project of reminding others of his political heritage by 
explain ing the ' ideology ' of the Sangkum Reastr Ni yum 
Thomico advanced his ow n reading of Buddhist socialism and suggested that it could 
be applied to contemporary Cambod ia . A high school student during Sangkum, 
Thomico based his understanding of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum period on family 
testimonies and his studies of Sihanouk's writings at the time. 505 He took ·Buddhi st 
soc ial ism' to mean that Cambodia could find an indig enous way of thought by 
turning Buddhist philosophy into political ideolog y. The contents of this •ideolog y' 
included ideas of direct democracy and a national union. Thomico perceived the 
legacy of the Sangkum to be particu lar ly applicable to the social and political context 
of the Second Kingdom for two reasons. Firstly, Cambodian society desperately 
needed to find an · indigenous and unique ideology ' to guard economic development 
against the perils of globalisation. During Sangkum, Buddhist soc ialism had 
represented a middle path to the Co ld War split between the free world and 
communism. In the contemporary context, Prince Thomico turned against models of 
economic development imposed by intern ational financial institutions , such as the 
!MF and WTO , which he argued were unsuitable for an emerging economy like 
Cambodia. Following a middle path in the present context would mean letti ng 
Cambodia find her 'ow n way' of development , whi lst steering clear of unchecked 
capitalist development. Secondly, Thomico stated, the nation was presently facing a 
504 Author's interview with Sisowath Thomico, 20 May 20 I 0. 
505 Ibid. 
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similar soc ieta l shift to during the Sangkum era. Sangkum had been a way for 
Sihanouk to unite the nation through uniting political parties , intellectuals, and the 
el ite. This had entailed unification of a disunited royalty , as the three main political 
parties during Cambod ia ' s first brief experie nce of parliamentary democracy were 
founded by princes. 506 The present gove rnment, Thomico argued, faced the same 
problem of a confli ct of generations , with young people making up a huge majority of 
the population. As young peopl e are set apart from the o lder generations by a 
different range of experiences and a higher level of education, Thomico imagined 
them to have a different vision of the political content of the Cambodian nation. He 
believed this new generation to be at odds with what he described as the 
governme nt ' s author itar ian sty le of governing and wa rned that if their de mands were 
not met, Cambodia would head to further conflict. Thomico proposed lo solve this by 
sett ing up the National Congress provided for by the const itut ion , considering it a 
uniquely suitable mechanism for identifying tensions in Cambodian society through 
exchanging views in open discussion. 507 The con temporary challenge , in his mind , 
was to modify the congress so as to find a way to truly enable the younge r generat ion 
to speak out, and to mix all different views into one , common vision. For Thomico, 
the lack of dialogue within political parties today demonstrated clearly that th is cou ld 
not be done through politica l parties. Rather, the mission was to create dialogue in 
soc iety, generating ideas that cou ld later be developed by political parties. ln this 
creation of dialogue , he envisaged the monarchy to have a unique opportun ity as an 
overarching, unifying institution, to set up dialogue between all different components 
of Cambodian society. 
·Sihanoukism': Embodiment versus ldeoloav. 
Prince Thomico, in fact , advocated not on ly the ideology of Sihanouk , but also the 
man. Short ly after setting up the SJFP , he called for the Nationa l Assemb ly to 
disband, transferring all powers to Sihanouk to head a Government of National 
Union. ln the ensuing debate , Hun Sen both asserted the limits of a constitutional 
506 The Democratic Party, Liberal Party and Progressive Democrats. 
507 Care should be taken to organise the congress slightly differently, Thomico argued, from 
during the Sangkum , to ensure that it really would provide an opportunity for free speech 
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monarchy and advanced a reading of political royalism that precluded the 
involvement of royal famil y members in politics. This was a bid to settle the debate 
between the incarnate versus the ideological in royalist politics in a very concrete 
manner. Shortly thereafter, Ranariddh was ousted from his Presidency of 
FUNCINPEC (which came to be headed by more junior royal family members and 
non-royals) by the party coup widely believed to have taken place with the backing of 
the CPP. ln the ensuing scenario , contestation between the three self-ident ified 
royalist parties came to centre on the right to define ' Sihanoukism' as ideology versus 
embodiment. 
In September 2006, Thomico stated that conditions for free elections had not been 
met and called for the National Assembly to disband , transfetTing all powers to 
Sihanouk as Prime Minister ofa Government of National Union. 508 Hun Sen retorted 
that these demands to dissolve the government equaled a coup against the 
constitution, and that anyone who wanted to dissolve the National Assembly should 
·prepare their coffins·. ' 09 Hun Sen recalled the limits ofa constitutional monarchy by 
separating the monarchy as an institution from the monarchy as royal family 
members, with the words: ·] warn them again that the Monarchy belongs to no one 
They should not use its influence for their interests. ' In early October , President of 
the National Assembly and CPP honorary President Heng Sarnrin called for the 
introduction of a Bill barring royals from politics, allegedly in order to place royals as 
politically neutral at the very highest level in society. 510 This was supported by Sam 
Rainsy, who referred to an international model of const ituti onal monarchy. ln early 
February 2007, Sihanouk asked royal fami ly members to end their involvement in 
508 Sisovann, Pin. 'Prince Thomico Plans Petition Asking Assembly To Disband,' The 
Cambodia Daily, 15 September 2006. Thomico later speci tied that, since conditions for free 
elections had not been met, democracy could only be re-established through a government of 
national union until the following elect ions. Delux, Leang and Soren See low. 'Formation of a 
Government of National Union - Thomico is Defending Himself From All Provocation,' 
Cambodg e Soir , 25 Seplember 2006 
509 Sen, Hun. 2006. 'Visiting the People in Kompong Chhnang Province.' Cambodia New 
Vision 104 (September); see also Sisovann, Pin and James Welsh. 'Hun Sen Calls for Prince's 
Party Ouster,' The Cambodia Daily, 28 September, 2006. 
510 Samean. Yun. ·Assembly Complains of Lengthy Royal Absences,' The Cambodia Dai~v, 5 
October 2006. 
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Ca mbodian polit ics. 511 A few days later, Prime Minister Hun Sen called on royal 
family members to, themse lves , submit a legally binding Bill banning them from 
engaging in politics ahead of the 2008 national elec tion s; this , however, did not 
happen. 512 
Hun Sen has increasing ly portra yed himself as the new ' monarchist' , precisely by 
safeguarding the constitutional monarchy within its boundaries and ensuring that it is 
strict ly separated from political royalism. 513 In his speeches, Hun Sen has incr easingly 
represented the CPP as heir to the Sangkum legacy- claiming , as noted above , that 
the notion of ·people's democracy' is simila r to the Sangkum. 514 Whilst , as noted 
above , the CPP has claimed to be the successor regime to the Sangkum ever since 
Sihanouk 's 1991 return , this has , following their expressed preference for having 
royals barred from politic s, been accompanied by claims of being ·monarchist ' . Hun 
Sen has supported these c laim s mainly by portraying himself as the one to have 
accomplished the Pari s peace negotiations by allowing Sihanouk to sit at the 
negotiation table, and to have been the one to benevolently allow Sihanouk to return 
to Cambodia thereafter, personally making the arrangements for Sihanouk to stay in 
the Royal Palac e. He has also attributed the establi shment of the Second Kingdom 
and consequent national reconciliation to 7 January, stating that Ranariddh , in a letter , 
has admitted this to be the case. 515 To be a ' monarchi st ' now shifted meaning to refer 
to the protection of a strict constitutional monar chy. 
In the new political landscape after Ranariddh 's ouste r from FUNC INPEC. there 
were two self -proclaim ed royalist parties , FUNCINPEC and SJFP , as well as a 
511 Heng. Reaksmey. ·Retired King Sihanouk Defends PM Hun Sen,' VOA Kluner , 2 February 
2007 
si::i Sakada, Chun. ·Hun Sen Says Royalists Should Abandon Politics,' VOA Kl1111er, 5 
February 2007; See also Hun. Sen, Lor Chandara and John Maloy. ·Royals Could Initiate 
political Exit,' The Cambodia Dai~y, 6 February 2007. 
'
13 Cp. Hun, Sen. 2007 . ·Graduation Ceremony and Diploma Presentation in CUS.' Cambodia 
New Vision 117 (October). 
si-1 Cp. Hun, Sen. 2007. ·Keynote address.' Hun Sen has also sometimes like ned him self to an 
adopted son of Sihanouk , seemingly trying to tap into Sihanouk's royal legitimacy. Hun, 
Sen. 2007. 'Exce rpts on Interpretations Concerning Royal Palace.' Cambodia New 108 
(January). 
515 Hun, Sen.2011 ·Graduat ion Ceremony at the Vanda Institute.· Cambodia New Vision 155 
(January). 
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faction loyal to Ranariddh that developed into the Norodom Ranar iddh Party (NRP). 
All three claimed Sihanoukist credentials. Whilst the SJFP was founded on the 
justificatory claim to bring back Sihanouk·s Sangkum, Rana riddh boasted about 
being Sihanouk ' s son. whereas FUNC INPEC , in turn , was the party originally 
founded by Sihanouk. To prove its royalist credentials, FUNC lNPEC organised a 
large ceremony for Sihanouk's 84th birthday. against Sihanouk ' s exp ress w ish.516 
FUNCfNPEC also attempted to discredit the SJFP by casting it as Repub lica n, 
referring to Thomico's previou s side-taking for the Khmer Republic. 517 To add to the 
confusion , whilst Sihanouk was widely believed to have some link to the SJFP, which 
was also charged by Hun Sen, Sihanouk pub licly distanced himself from the SJFP, 
charging that it was an anti-royalist and anti-Sihanouk political maneuver.518 Yet, 
although all parties claimed his support, Sihanouk offered no straightforward public 
support for either one. 5 19 
The contestation between the three parties came to centre on the possibility of turning 
Sihanouk's heritage into an ideolog y. Sihanouk , in his time, had ref used references to 
' ideology", wh ilst struggling with the need to create a terminology for his own private 
thinking , which had been dubbed •Sihanoukism ' . As noted in the introduction , Tep 
Chhieu K.heng in a 1968 artic le entit led 'Le Sihanoukisme' in Sihanouk's flagship 
publication Sangkum , examining what Sihanoukism could poss ibly mean, concluded 
that: 
To define the political line of Samdech Euv, the neologism •Sihanoukism' 
has been forged. ls it a doctrine? A new philosophy? Or a new ideology ? fn 
fact, Sihanouk had no part in the formation of the new term. Wary of the 
spirit of system, he fled willing ly the words in •ism' that express a general 
trend, a little too categorical profession of faith. [ . .. ] If not a doctrine or a 
philosophy, nor an ideology, what is it? 'Sihanoukism' is an attempt, but a 
516 Samean, Yun. ·f 'pec Hosts Contentious Birthday Celebration,' The Cambodia Dai~y, 
Tuesday, 31 October 2006. 
517 Samean, Yun. ·Ranariddh. Thomico to Form Alliance,' The Cambodia Dai~y, 7 November 
2006. 
518 Leang, Delux and Soren Seelow. ·formation ofa Government of National Union' 
5 19 Author's interview with Khieu Suon. Sihanouk referred to the ousting of Ranariddh from 
FUNCINPEC as a ·coup de parti·, the meaning of which provoked heated debate amongst all 
factions. Vong, Sokheng, and Charles McDermid. 'FUNCINPEC Prince Hails ''Royalist" 
CPP,' Pl,110111 Penh Post, 3-16 November 2006 
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successful attempt to apprehend the real , to capture the vivid fact in its 
authenticity and dynamism. It is also a way of being, a sort of ·way of 
life ' a ·knowing how to behave· for the Khmer people and for all placed in 
the same situat!on .. 
520 
Th is resistance aga inst employing 'Sihanoukism' as an ideology was now reiterated 
by Sihanouk. When Tho m ico started to claim the Sangkum heritage as an · ideology' 
guiding the SJFP , Sihanouk released a statement asking Thomico , the party he wo uld 
fonn. and FVNC lNPEC. never to refer to either •Sihanoukism ', ·the Sihanoukist 
ideolog y', or ·the ideals ofSihanouk'. 521 
The new FUNC lNPEC leadership ignored, howe ver. Sihanouk's both historical and 
contemporary objections to branding Sihanoukism an ideology. FVNCfNPEC 
continued to claim to represent Sihanoukism, referring to it as doctrine. According to 
Keo Puth Reasmey , new President of FVNCfNPEC, Sihanouk could no longer make 
claims to own Sihanoukism. Sihanoukism should rather be understood as a general 
theory of leadership: 
Sihanoukism - it is not the love of the body of Sihanouk. rt is like a theory 
of leadership of a country. Sihanoukism means neutrality, territorial 
integrity, sovereignty and independence. An ideology of how to lead the 
country. Serving the people. All these kinds of criteria. \Ve call it 
Sihanoukist. We claim it. We see Sihanouk as a principle of party . Thi s is 
Sihanouk for us - a principle. It is an idea that animates our group. We want 
to implement Sihanoukism in developing Cambodia, because we saw in the 
I 960s during his 16 years of power that Cambodia was prosperous; there 
was justice; independence; and sovereignty. Khmer s had pride. We were not 
beggars of money from the international community. Prince Sihanouk has 
developed a theory of how to lead. Cambodia must develop, thinking of 
sovere ignt y and independence. That is what Sihanouk has done in the 
I 960s, we want to take it to implement it again. Before and after [Sihanouk], 
it has not been good. Only the Sangkum Reast1· N(vum had Sihanoukism. 
s.:!o Tep, Chh ieu Kheng . 1968. 'Le --s ihanoukisme•·_' Sa11gk111n 41 (December) 
S.:!l Norodom, Sihanouk. 2006 . Statement, Phnom Penh , 30 June. The statement was in French 
and referred to Sihanoukisme, / 'ideologie Sihanoukiste, and Jes ideaux de Sihanouk. 
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[ ... ] Thomico [ ... ] wrote a letter to me, that I sho uld stop us ing the name of 
Sihanouk, otherwise it will affect the name of Sihanouk and the Royal 
Family. [ ... ] I said ·Why did you say so? Sihanoukism does not belong to 
Sihanouk. It is not the person . ft is the idea that Sihanouk has invented to 
lead the country. ff we think it is good, we take it. lt is the book, the theory 
Like Buddhism, Chri st ianit y, Mao ism. [ ... ] There is a difference between 
Sihanouk and Sihanoukism. And if you do not dare to promote Sihanoukism 
we do. Sihanoukism will be the spirit in the head of the people. ( ... ] This 
should not stop me from promoting Sihanoukism. \Ve bring the gospel 
Even without Sihanouk, Sihanoukism is still here . ft is the principle of the 
party, one idea that animates us.
522 
Th is was paralleled by FUNC INPEC leaders· support of the appropriation of the 
' royalist' label by the CPP . Prince Sisowath Sirirath, new Second Deputy Pres ident of 
FUNC IN PEC, thus stated in a press conference that ·Now , the most Royalist party is 
the CPP - without them this country could not be called the Kingdom of Cambodia. 
They are the true royalists , because, without Samdech Hun Sen, how can the 
monarchy survive? · 513 
Conversely, for the ousted Ranatiddh , it became vital to assert Sihanoukism as 
possessing an incarnate qualit y, not reducible to ideology. In a note entitled ·Js the 
Neo-FUNCINPEC party a Sihanoukist pm1y?' Ranariddh asks how Sihanoukism can 
be defined and gives the following answer 
Sihanoukism is not an abstract concept or simply an ideology A real 
Sihanoukism is what our venerate d King Father Norodom Sihanouk, the 
Architect of the November 9th 1953 National Independence, incarnated. The 
latter is also the guarantor and the fierce defender of the independence, as 
far as the national sovere ignt y and the territorial integrity [sic]. Territorial 
integrity must be perceived as the defence of our land borders (the East, 
North and West) and sea limits. It should also be a practice ofa real national 
union and concord. It sho uld also be a practice of social justice, in particular 
that one of the so-called •minor people '. It is for that reason that the latte, 
5:!:!Author's interview with Keo Puth Reasme y, 8 June 2010 
513 Vong , Sokheng , and Charles McDermid. ' FUNC INPE C Prince Hails ·'Royalist' ' CPP'. 
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continue to adore and to venerate our beloved Samdech Euv , Samdech Ta 
and Samdech Ta Tuot.
524 
A Sihanoukist pa1iy must finally be autonomous 
and being able to freely conclude any alliance with other political parties 
Cooperation with the latter , in patiicular with the ruling party , to the benefit 
of our country is neither alienation nor a submission. This is the authentic 
Sihanoukism.
525 
Sihanoukism is thus necessarily tied to the person of Sihanouk, evident in the further 
elaboration offered by Ranariddh: 
For the people of Cambodia , Sihanoukism means this. Not only royalty , but 
my father is the father of the nation. He preserved the territorial integrity, 
the sovereignty of the nation , social justice , dev e lopment , well-being: it is 
the practical way to approach Sihanoukism , instead of talking about a 
simple theory. Even Gaullism , you know, Gaullism, what does it mean? De 
Gaulle for the French people , for the world , he is the liberator of France. 
What he represents, it is this. \Ve should, in my opinion , continue to have a 
practical approach of Sihanoukism. I am a Sihanoukist not only because he 
is my father , but because of what he represents for us as Cambodians. In 
particular , you know during my father's era , you have around Cambodia 
war, war in Vietnam , war in Laos , and for 15 years my father succ essfully 
pre served Cambodia in peace. For the people of Cambodia, Sihanoukism is 
simply like this . But we cannot compare my brother , the King , to my Father 
... No one can be compared to my father and so for the people Sihanouki sm 
is this. lt !s more a practical way of thinking than a theory .526 
Sihamoni, as a purely const itutiona l monarch, cannot continue the political leadership 
of Sihanouk. As the foremost royal political party actor, Ranariddh is uniquely poised 
to incarnate these aspirations and continue the organic link between the people and 
the monarchy. Yet a fundamental problem to Ranariddh's claims to represent 
Sihanoukism is how Sihanouk has very much been his own presence - although both 
52
_. Epithets for Sihanouk. 
525 Sam . 2010 . Note of the Day 5. Thi s document , together with the document ' Liberal and 
Advanced Monarchy· , was said to form the base of the NRP political platform. See also Sam. 
2010. Note of the Day 15 
526Author ' s interview with Norodo m Ranariddh , 2 June 2011 
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as a constitutional monarch and Ki ng-Father, his liberty to make political statements 
has been circumscr ibed. Hun Sen has repeatedly drawn atten tion to this, claiming that 
some people are more Sihanoukist than Sihanouk himself. 527 This refers precisely to 
how claims ha ve been made in the name of Sihanoukism - yet these claims have lost 
force by their lack of corroboration by Siha nouk himself. 
Prince Thomico. meanwhile. disso lved the SJFP in 2007 and returned to Sihanouk ' s 
side as his head of cabinet . He now declared himself to be satisfied that the CPP had 
picked up Sangkum as its model, emphasising how the Sangkum provided a national 
legacy that could be taken up by any political party: 
Before 1970, Cambodia was the most advanced country in the region. We 
were the first to have the Olympic Stadium. We had beautiful architecture, 
famous landmarks in Phnom Penh were buill. These were the symbols of 
what the Sangkum ReasfJ• N(yw11 tried to give to Cambodia. There was the 
culture of urbanism. Phnom Penh today is in large part a legacy of what 
Scmgkum Reasfl• Niy11m tried to give Cambodia. The parks, the urbanism, the 
boulevards. Those are the models that have to be looked to by all the 
political parties. They have to take this - it is not the legacy of one singular 
pa1iy- but it is the legacy of the nation. The Cambodian people have to go 
back to the 1970s to find the heritage that was left by their parents and build 
a new vision from there, a modern one. 
528 
Thomico now redefined the role of the Cambodian monarchy to advocate a truly 
constitutional monarc hy. He claimed that the task of royalists was now to give this 
new image and mission to the Cambodian monarchy. Sihanouk, as a reinstated king, 
had still had a political mission, and the public still considered the king as head of the 
government. The new task for royalist parties was therefore to exp lain the 
circumscribed role of the constitutional monarchy to the people. 529 
527 For example, in 2005 , rebuking FUNCfNPEC demands that more power be given to the 
Supreme National Border Council (SNBC) headed by Sihanouk, Hun Sen stated that ·The 
problem here is that we have people who have proven themselves more Sihanoukist than the 
former King himself, or more Royalist than the monarchy.' Hun, Sen. 2005. Selected 
Responses to the Press afier the June 24 th Cabinet !Vleeting. 
528 Author's interview with Sisowath Thomico, 20 May 20 I 0 
5'° fbid. 
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This redefinition reflected, of course, how Thomico's or iginal intention s had been 
outmanoeuvred. It was the end of a process that had started with Ranariddh being 
substituted as FUNCINPEC leader by non-royal s, a move that had eclipsed the 
practice of politics as legitimised by the inherited ability to embody the nation. Whilst 
Thomico had tried to reverse this proce ss by making royalis m relevant through 
revival of the Sangkum legacy, he had met a dead end. As an ideology, this legacy 
was easily appropriated by the CPI' and a FUNCINPEC under CP P control; both of 
these parties asserted the mandate of the monarch y as strictly constitutiona l, and 
questioned the involvement of royal s in politic s. 
This exposed candidly how references to the Sangkum legacy reflected a royalist 
failure to invent an up-to-dat e royalist identity. The backwards look to Sihanouk 
indicated the royalists' inab ility to work out an independent identity that transcended 
his legacy, and developed into nothing short of an identity crisis. In the aftermath of 
these events, one prominent royalis t politician expressed his frustra tion in these 
wor ds: ·We are only the derivatives of Sihanouk. We are the brother, the son, the 
daughter of Sihanouk ... We are not the reference. We are merely the derivative. 
When Sihanouk disappea rs. there will be nothing \eft."' 530 
Concl usion 
Thi s chapter has outlined a series o f attempts to esta blish credible link s between 
political royali sm and the nation , attempts which ultimately failed. It illustrates how 
political royalism shifted from being something meaningful at the start of the Second 
Kingdom, when the FUNCINPEC emerged victo rious in the first multi-part y 
elections, to something substantially meaningless two decades on. It suggests that this 
demise was bound up with thoroughgoing problems in transposing legitimacy 
associated with the monarc hy to a party political fonn of royal ism 
530 Author's intervie'VI\ 10 July 2011. 
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This crisis of representation centred on the transfer of regal legit imacy from the 
monarchy to a party po litical form of roya lism, in general, and , in particular , from 
Sihano uk to his son Ranariddh , as leader of FUNCfN PE C. Ranariddh anc hored his 
claims of represe ntation in historica l ideas of embodiment related to the monar chy, 
atte mpting to mobilise the electora te around a pol iticised identit y as the embodiment 
of the nation. These ideas mod ified both of FUNC\NPECs foundationa l and oft-
repeated claims to legi timacy: represe ntation of the principle s of libera l and plura list 
democracy , and restoration of a constit utiona l monarch y. FUNCfNPE C d id ne ither 
unequi vocally ad voca te a strictl y const itutional monar chy nor a libera l democracy 
along Western lines, in spite of elements within the party who would hav e prefe1Ted 
thi s to be the case. At the mos t basic leve l, the decay of a party polit ical form of 
royal ism ca n be understood in terms of the roya lists ' failur e to modify the ir c laims to 
representation through embodiment to fit the far more marginalised way in whic h 
they act uall y related to the modern nation , resulting in a wide , ac tual discrepancy. 
As a reinstated cons tituti ona l monarchy , in whic h politic al royalism was to be finnl y 
locate d in the part y po litica l context , Cambo dian roya lists had to handle a series of 
tensions in drawing on regal legitim acy. Firstly, polit ical royalists had to negotia te a 
tension betwee n royali sm as a suprapolitical force versus royali sm pertaining to a 
particular political party. Whil st a tension between a suprapoliti ca l and parti san rol e is 
something monarchies in the region, and elsewhere, have had to confront following 
the end of absolute monar ch ies, then in contexts such as Th ailand, the claim of Thai 
roya ls to be unambi guo us ly ·above pol itics· has been crucial to suppo rt the ir abilit y to 
interve ne on the nat ional political scene. 531 In Ca mbodia , by contrast , po litical 
royal ists sought to legit imate their ro le as party polit ical actors. Yet royal ist 
legitimacy continued to be bound up prim ar ily with royal ism as a suprapolit ica l force, 
which limited the age ncy of FUNCfNPEC as a partisan politica l ac tor. Since roya list 
nationali sm was increa singly bound up with the idea of a supra -po litical conscience , 
thi s ecl ipsed the political party form ofroyal ism. 
531 Winichakul (2008): 15. 
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Secondly, reconciliation of kingship with a party political form ofroyalism was 
problematised by how the Sangkum had uprooted the institu tional monarchy and 
compromised the political involve ment of royals. Whilst Ranariddh tried to overcome 
thi s challenge by alluding to ideas of embodiment and how he had inherited this 
ability by virt ue of his royal ancestry, these claims were not only compromised by the 
fact that Sihanouk still constituted a fonnidable presence, but arguably also by 
changing conceptions of the legitimacy of inherited versus elected lead ership. Both 
the CPP and the se lf-identifi ed democrats advanced conflicting readings that, in 
different ways , stressed the legitimacy of elected office. 
The failure to agree on the content s and mandate of political royalism helps explain 
why political royalists took recourse in the legacy of the Sangkum and the notion of 
Sihanoukism. Carol ine Hughes argues that ' FUNCINPEC has attempted littl e in the 
way of adapting the inherited rhetoric of Sihanoukism to new realities. The party 
continues to campaign almost exclusively on the notion that Cambodian voters will 
always vote for the King , as the lynchpin of the nation.° 532 This chapter has suggest ed 
a more tonnented relationship between poli tical royalists and Sihanoukism. 
FUNCINPEC and other royalist parties relied so heavily on a Sihanouk ist langua ge 
that they reinvented Sihanoukism in different ways. Sihanoukism provided the 
language for negotiating change as royalists imbued their reading of the Sangkum-era 
with particular meanings in order to transpose them onto the present era. Yet 
reflecting the paucity of underlying vision, the resulting bids were increasingly void 
of meaning and equally unsuited to new realities. These references meant hugely 
different things in the contemporary context than during the Sangkum. Ranariddh 
remodelled Sihanouk ' s ideas of a national union and middle path to justify 
cooperation with the ruling CPP. This compromised the royal stance of Ranariddh 
and spl it FUNCINPEC internally. The hostility to the idea of an opposition entail ed 
the abandonment ofa domestic identity as ·nation alist opposition ' .533 Royali sm was 
left hovering in the middle, neither leader, nor opposition. Moreover, FUNCINPEC 
under Ranariddh continuously referred to the ability to provide as an integral part of 
democratic legitimacy, in spite of the fact that the party did not have the means to 
530 Hughes (2009): 50. 
533 Hughes (2001c): 311- 12. 
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deliver on it. When the royalists were outperfonned by the CPP, who had the material 
base to fulfill this logic, it therefore led to a real democratic deficit. This highlights 
the importance of a material base for regal legitimacy and, particularly, to back up 
claims to embodiment. The real ability to provide , and to make decisions, more 
convincingly supports claims to embody the nation than references to an intangible , 
innate ability. 
Finally , attempts to inject meaning to royalism through offering an ideological 
identity highlighted tensions as to what extent Sihanoukism, and the legacy of 
Sangkum, was able to provide a party political ideological identity , rooted in deeper 
tensions in the royalist project between embodiment and doctrine. In this, 
Ranariddh ' s fear of disembodiment of the Sihanoukist legacy proved well-founded. 
Ultimately. by turning ' Sihanoukism · into an ideolog y, the new FUNClNPEC (under 
the influence of the CPP) could claim to represent Sihanoukism in a way that became 
complicit in separating political royalism from royal family members. The 
Sihanoukist legacy , as a practical manual for concrete policies, was easily and 
credibly taken up by the CPP. Meanwhile , Sihanoukism , as a doctrinal identity for the 
new FUNCINPEC, was ultimately unengaging, as it corresponded neither to a real 
ability to provide, nor to legitimacy through an inherited ability to embody the nat ion. 
This suggests a failure by leaders of FUNCINPEC to reinvent their identity to make 
credible claims to representation. Yet it also asks questions of the limited options 
available to royalist actors , other than to draw on historical ideas of kingship that 
were ultimate ly ill-matched to their actual political role. The discourse of kingship, in 
this sense , provided a constraint rather than a resource. In particu lar, Sihanouk's 
ideological legacies were, in some sense , hopeless. The ambiguous mandate of the 
modem monarchy and political royalism left by Sangkum unsettled the very idea of 
political royalism as a separate force, and made it difficult for political party actors to 
move beyond Sihanouk and the Sihanoukist legacy. The celebration of Sangkum was 
indicative of a deep crisis of contemporary royalism rooted in questions of 
embodiment and representation. Representing the nation, to a large extent, became a 
matter of representing Sihanouk - the irony being that he was , of course , better suited 
to represent himself. 
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Democrats: Democratic Discourses and the Post-PP A Natio n 
Whi lst all Cambodian politi ca l partie s competing electorally in the KOC claimed to 
be democratic. ·democratic· wa s the main political identity ofa certa in set of po litica l 
party actors. These ·democrati c parties· (konapiik pracheathipat ey) included the 
Buddhi st Liberal Democra tic Party (BLDP} , the Son Sann Party, the Khmer Natio n 
Party (KNP) which turned into the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP}, and the Human Rights 
Party (HRP). This cha pter iden tifies the nexus betwee n democracy and the nation as 
central to their national imaginings , and explores the con sequence s of their partic ular 
understanding there o f for broader politi ca l imaginations and practi ce. It thus offe rs an 
exam ination of the ir nationali st vis ion thro ugh the lens of the broad er reassessment of 
the relationsh ip between democratic imaginings and the nation in contemporary 
Cambodia n political discourse , whic h this dissertation propose s. Whi lst pre viou s 
chapters have out lined how democracy rem ained a cruc ial notion in rival pol itical 
imaginings that tied it to distinct national imaginings in different ways, this chapter 
del ves further into this nexus with particular focus on self -identified ·democra ts'. 534 
At a difference from pre vious chapters , th is focus here expose s national imagining s of 
a primari ly future-orient ed , utopian characte r. ft also uncove rs important similarities 
between the se lf-id entified democrats and the CPP. 
The democrats have disappointed foreign observers looki ng for dome stic bastions of 
liberal democratic thought. In acade mic writing on the Cambo dian democratic 
oppos ition, not ions of·democracy" and ·nationalis m· are largely treate d as oppos ites. 
The democratic oppo sition is under stoo d to carry out double-faced politics -
embracing on the one hand ·d emocrati c·, and on the other , ·ra cist" , ' xenophobic·, and 
·ultra- nationalist" tend enc ies. Accent uat ing the contradis tinc tion between the two , 
Hughes argues that, for the SRP as wel l as FUNC fNPEC , the primary identity at 
hom e is that of nationalist resistance , wherea s the primar y ident ity abroad is that of 
democratic oppo sition. 535 The se contrasting tendencies in SRP part y disco urse are 
genera lly explained by refe rence to how the SRP plays · the nat ionali st card·, pinned 
534 In the following , I will simply refer to these as ·democrats' 
m Hughes(200lc ): 311- 12. 
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down as anti-Vietnamese discourse and xenophobia, to triumph over the CPP-led 
governmen t, which is tainted by its association with Vietnam. The ·ultra -nationalist" 
rhetoric has been understood to primarily serve a mobilising purpose, as ·a strategic 
response to Cambodia"s co nstricted political environment ' ,536 or, more spec ifically , 
an advantageous strategy in rural campaigning to connect with the rural electorate. 537 
These accounts depict particularly the SRI' as an opposition force that cap ital ises on 
xenophob ic nationalism and makes incon sistent references to a democratic identity. 
This has served to cement the notion of ·nation alism · as an opportun istic and shallow 
catego ry in contemporary politics, which stands in straightforward oppos ition to 
·democracy· and obliterates any remaining hope for it. 
To some extent , the distance between the ·democratic' and the ·nationalist' poles has 
been bridged by the notion of ·populism·. Un writes that , to critics , · Rainsy is not a 
genuine democrat, but rather a populist manipulating democratic processes and nonns 
in order to achieve his political objective: the capture of state power· ;538 whilst 
Hughes identifies the ·opposition· as heirs to a populist discourse revolvi ng around 
the relationship between ruler and ruled and the defense of sovereign territory. 539 The 
notion of populism suggests that notions of popular representation are key to SRI' 
discourse, yet stops short of interrogating further into the particul ar way in which 
such notions go to the heart of the contemporary opposition - and sta te- democratic 
projects. 
A look at the historical eme rgence of the democratic notion and contemporary 
examp les of·democratic' politics around the globe sugge st that the juxtaposit ion of 
democrac y and nationalism is unsurprising. Rather than a contradiction, the 
relationship is better thought of as a tension, which follows from the democratic 
project as it historically evolved . · Democracy ' means rule by the people. But in 
modem times, Michael Mann writes, democracy has come to mean two things: the 
first is the ordinary people , the masses; the second is the ·nation·, or the et/1110s, an 
ethnic grou p. Thi s conflation between the popular masses and the nation spread 
536 Un (2008): 105. 
5r Hughes (2002c): 129: (2001c): 306. 
538 Un (2008): 114. 
519 Hughes (200 I a): 54. 
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worldwide with ideas of democracy, as democracy began to entwine the denws, 
people, with the domin ant e1hnos, genera ting multipl e conceptions of the nation and 
the sta te.540 The institution of democracy is tied to nat ional fonns of exclusion , and 
the entwining of the demos wit h the dominant elhnos has been a hallmark of the 
spread of democracy. 541 Thi s sugge sts that surpri se at the confla tion betwee n the two 
has more to do with con temp orary Weste rn dominant liberal democratic discou rses, 
which no long er celebra te narrow , excl usive notions of the nation, bu t rather broad, 
inclu sive ones of multiculturali sm. Whil st Un and Hughes criticise the assumptions of 
the Western libera l democ ratic project infonn ing internationally sponsore d 
Ca mbodian post-conflict democracy-building , which sees democra cy and nationalism 
as antithetical, they also reprodu ce these assumptions, or at leas t remain within their 
confines, by treating the notions as co mplementary rathe r than inquirin g into how 
they are mutu ally supportive . 
The conflation in democratic imagining s between representation of the people and 
repre sentation of the nation has been a feature of successi ve Cambodian post-
independence political projects. Mann argues that two democratic construct ions of the 
people may be distingui shed : a stra tified people and an organ ic peop le. The view of 
the people as diverse and stratified under lies libera l conceptions , which posit that the 
state's main role is to mediate and conciliate between competing interest groups. 
Organic conception s, on the other hand , view the people as one and indi visible. '" 
Cam bodian post-independ ence state and oppos ition projects have shared a large ly 
orga nic conce ption of democra cy, which views the people as one and indi visible, 
united, and integral. 543 Th is mass has been imagi ned as the natio n . The notion of 
democracy has remained tied to ensuring national preservation, whilst ethnic notions 
have been variou sly emphas ised or down played. 
In the conte mporar y co ntext, this dissertation seeks to show that all Cambodia n 
polit ical parties have laun ched democratic discourses, parall el to appeal s to libera l 
demo cracy, which share in com mon with eac h other- and with man y contemporary 
540 Mann (2005): 2. 
w Ibid.: 3 
s-n Ibid.: 55 
543 Hughes (200 I a): 45. 
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discourses of libera l democracy, wh ilst not sharing other imp ortant charac teristics -
that they tie together bids for representation of the people as a ma ss wit h a nationa l 
vision. 544 The CPP . since Hun Sen·s rise to prominence which was associated wit h 
the party abando nin g its previous Marxist-Leninist identity, ha s been und erstood not 
to have replaced their fonne r identity with any other poli tical identity in partic ular. 
This chapter argue s that the incumbent CPP, under Hun Sen , has adva nced 
·populism · as a hith erto over looked regim e identity. cla imin g popular representation 
through a truly national fonn of democrac y. It then turns to examine the ways in 
which self -identified democrats simi larly conflated democracy as representation of 
the people-as-mass wi th the people -as-nation, wh ilst also emphas ising the ethni c 
dim ension of the nation. Their agenda was not an amalgamat ion of ·democratic· and 
·nationalist" concerns, but rather represented an intens ification of said nexus. Thi s 
found exp ression in their core imagining of representing the ·p eoples w ill" Thi s 
provides an alternative explanation for why Caro line Hughes finds SRP and 
FUNC INPEC discour se to ·awkwardl y · conflate what she conside rs libe ral views of 
the people·s will as an ·amoral and neutral construct facilitating the delegation of 
authority" , with a view of the ·peoples w ill" as a ·moral imperative to liberate the 
nation from alleged ··traitors"'.'" Rath er than manifesting a liberal discourse to 
which has been added morally -based, xenophobic elements, this con flation arguabl y 
stems from a political analysis that is rooted in a more fundamental conflat ion 
between notions of democracy and notions of the nation. Thi s chapter lays out the 
negotiat ion of this nexus in democratic political imaginings and the impl ications of 
acting on these imaginings.546 
5
-'-' Libera! conceptions that posit the stare·s main role to be media tion among competing 
interest groups underlie the liberal democratic conception of elections as expressing the 
people's will as the aggregate of plural individual choices. whereas organic conceptions of the 
people in possession of one singular conscience underlie a view of self-determination as the 
·collective fulfillment ofa moral duty·. downplaying elections (Mann (2005): 55: and Hughes 
(2001 ): 544-45). According to this definition, all Cambodian political actors advanced 
discourses belonging to the second category. (Even if applying a minimal and procedural 
definition of liberal democracy as ·a political system where multiple political parties compete 
for control of the government through relatively free and fair elections' (Foweraker & 
Krznaric (2000), particularly CPP and FUNCINPEC discourses, as outlined above, have 
oRposed this in different ways.) 
'' Hughes (2002a): 539. 
s.ui Given the limitations of space, this chapter pursues a strict focus on the consequences of 
imaginings of democracy as popular and national representation, and does not delve 
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In what follows, I sta rt by briefly sketching the ways in which the sh iftin g meaning s 
of democracy have been tied up with national imaginings in modem Cambodia wit hin 
this framewo rk. I argue that ·de mocracy' has been emp loyed to support the 
nat ionalist claims of success ive post-indepe ndence projects , which have in com mon 
their tendency to tie democracy to no tions of people-as-mass and people-a s-natio n. I 
then reassess the way the incumbent CPP-led regime under Hun Sen engages in 
contemporary discourses of democracy , exploring its 'populis m' in term s of how it 
cons trues the Cambod ian people , the relations hip betwee n the people and the political 
leadership , and the nature of politica l participation. I then tum to exam ine the 
democra tic imaginings of the se lf-id entifi ed democrats . Th ese have responded to and 
co ntested the practices of· peop le's democracy ', which , for them, were sym ptomatic 
of the regime's alleged mutating communism. Building on their understanding of 
how the incumbent regime impacts on the chances of national survival, I re-evaluate 
how this analys is has produced a particular amalgamate of national ism and 
democracy as mutually supporti ve. I then trace the consequences of their particul ar 
under standing of the relationship betwee n these notions, in tern1s of: identif ying the 
people's will , at the backdrop ofa grow ing d isenc hantme nt with electoral practice s in 
conte mporary Ca mbodi a under the CPP reg ime; projecting a nat ional democratic 
agenda, whilst predomin antly read ing loca l grievances; and relatin g to the monarc hy, 
as the relationship between fonner resi stance , democ rat and royalist identit ies 
evo lved. Each of these has been crucial to the negotiation of Second Kingdom 
democratic ident ity, deriv ing from the fundamental prob lem of repre sent ing the 
nation. 
Contested Cambodian Discourses of 'Democrac y' and ' People 's Democracy ' 
under the CPP 
Connors demonstrates how, in neighbouring Thailand, democratic imaginings and 
national identity ha ve eme rged in tandem since the end of the absolute mona rchy. 
The Thai state developed a democratic ideology that transcended Western-style 
specifically into related, prominent aspects of the discourses of self-identified democrats, such 
as territorial imaginings (see, for example, Harris (2010)). 
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parliamentary democracy , conceptualising democracy as an •idea l psychological, 
almost sp iritual , condition of the people and their capacity to be se lf-governing·."' 
He terms this ·democrasubjection·, as a disciplining practice of governmentality that 
has produced a ·Thai democracy ', privileging dependent subjects over popular 
participation. ln post-independence Cambodi a, punctuated by discontinuity , there was 
never one hegemonic , transforming ·national ideology ' of democracy such as 
Connors identifie s in Thailand. The notion of ·democracy' (pracheathipatey) was 
finnl y integrated in all post-independence political projects and employed to support 
the nationali st claims of each one of these, in ways following their internal political 
logic. Wh ilst there was never one nationa l ideology, these different projects thus still 
shar ed the fusion of nat ionali st and democratic claims. As in Thailand , these different 
articula tions of democracy , phra sed as distinctly Cambodian, matched democracy 
with the needs of the ·people, largely viewed by the state as well as opposit ion 
project s as an ·undiff erentiated mass of Khmer s imbu ed with a se t of inherited and 
larger than life propen sities and dispos itions'. 548 
Post-independence Cambod ia clearly manifests just how closely notion s of 
democracy are bound up with national imaginings, as subsequent regimes have 
employed the language of democracy as a bid for identificati on with the people , 
constituting regime brands of nationalism. Both Sihanouk and Hun Sen have 
portrayed their regimes as popular democracies, claiming them to be more truly 
·Cambodian ' fonns of democracy than str ict models of parliamentar y democracy 
along Western liberal democratic lines, and sneering at the accompanying notion of a 
· loyal opposition'. Sihanouk em ployed the voca bulary of ·democracy' 
(pracheathipatey) as a legitimising language when proclaiming the dissolution of 
parliament and assuming al l power s through the 1952 Royal Mandate , end ing 
Cambod ia' s first brief experience ofpa rliamentarism by reproaching the 
parliamentarians precisely of ·playing with democracy' .549 Similarly , Sihanouk , when 
abdicating in I 955 to enab le the institution of Sangkum Reastr Ni yum which 
effectively substituted parliamentarianism, spoke of· the promotion of a truly 
m Connors (2003) : 2 
;,s Hughes (200 I a) : 45, 48 
;,, Baruch ( 1967): 6. 
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democratic syslem , putt ing an end to a situation in wh ich the powers of governme nt 
were concentrated in the hands ofa small group of privi leged people which you cou ld 
not say that they repre sente d the interest s of the people, which they were exploiting. 
My end is to make the power s exercised by the peop le themsel ves ( ... ].' 550 Sihanouk 's 
direct democracy was, by defin ition , opposed to the concept of a · loyal opposition·, 
making itself out as a national un ion for all citizens, regardless of their po litical 
opinion. 551 Though not fornially outlawed, the political oppos ition was pushed into 
clande stine action. 
The Khmer Republic , Democratic Kampuchea , and the Peop le·s Repub lic of 
Kampuchea made successive bids for the reali sat ion of democracy , tied in different 
ways to their nationali st claims. The Khmer Republic ·sought 10 bui ld a new 
democratic Cambodia , free from the strictures of the past , and independent of French 
cultural domination' , merging patriotic enthusiasm with democratic ideals in an 
'experiment in Khmer democracy· .552 For Democratic Kampuchea , relying on 
universa l Marx ist-Leninist and communist mode ls, the assimilat ion of all 
nationalities into a ' classless Kampuchean people' was integral to the achievement of 
democrac y defined along those lines.553 For the PRK , which emphasised the 
impl ementation of Marxi sm- Len inism as a joint lndo-Chine se agenda, the link to a 
·national" fonn of democracy was more tenuou s, yet there are indications tha t such 
links we re attempted by how the regime built itse lf through immed iately upon seizing 
control organising the people into the Kampu chean United Front for Natio nal 
Salvation (FUNSK), down to the local leve l, with the task of popul arising 
government policies through mass movements. 
554 
550 Ibid.: 10 
;;i Sangkum set up its ow n ·counter-government' in 1966. tasked with making the opposition 
stance known to the government. which, in turn, was required to cooperate with the counter-
government to ·accelerate democratisation·. Baruch (1967): 27. 
' " Corfleld (! 994) : ix. 
553 1-ieder (1997): 109 
554 Slocomb (2003): 161 quotes Heng Samrin in 1979: ·111 order to help the people at all levels 
broaden, deepen, intensify their love of nation, to depend on themselves, to support 
themselves, to have awareness of mastery over their destiny and the country, to increase 
solidarity and consensus in activities to push ahead the revolutionary movements of the 
masses[ ... ] the Central Comminee of the Front must open wide and gather the important 
people, intellectuals, patriotic monks into the Front in all provinces[ ... ].' 
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In contemporary Cambodia, the CP P-led regime is generally under stood to pay half-
hearted lip service to liberal democracy , whilst, in practice, contradicting its 
principles at will. 555 What has been overlooked is how, parallel to his appeals to 
liberal democracy, Prime Minister Hun Sen claim s ·populism' as the politica l identit y 
of his regime , and has advanced the concept of·people·s democracy' 
(pracheathipatey pracheachun) as the base of CPP policies , as we ll as his own 
political thinkin g.556 The prevalent assumption, that Hun Sen has not put forth a self -
identified political identity , is therefore incorrect. 557 The notion of ·p eople"s 
democracy ' makes claims to popular represen tation through a truly national fonn of 
democracy, which dev iates from the liberal democratic model. Despit e its recurrence 
in public discour se, this concept has been overlooked by existing scholar ship trying to 
make sense of the natur e and direction of democracy under CPP leadership. 558 Yet an 
acknow ledgemen t of this identity is arguably crucia l for reading regime practices , in 
tenns of how it construes the Cambodia n people, the relationship between the people 
and the political leadership, and the nature of political participation. 
Hun Sen offers the following definition of ·people· s democracy": 
What I try to do is the best service for the people, the majority of the people 
who are the poor people. When we started the struggle to liberate the 
citizenry, we targeted the people so that the majority of the people will get 
rich after the genocidal regime. From bare hands we made sure that people 
start liv ing again and that people have better living conditions. Our policy 
towards the farmers is that we have never taken tax from them. I have told 
my colleagues not only not to take tax from farmers, but that we must also 
intervene to help the people. We have to build infrastructure for the people 
including irrigation, roads, canals, house for the people, schools, and clinics. 
555 Cp. Heder (2007b ): 161-6 2; Peou (2000); Sanderson & Maley ( 1998); and Springer 
(2010) 
556 Hun Sen, himself, explains people's democracy and populist democracy as interchangeable 
concepts. See author's interview with Hun Sen. 
557 As is asserted by Slocomb (2006): 395. 
558 See, for example, Hun, Sen. 2005. ·Selected Comments at the Graduation and Presentation 
of Diploma to the Graduates from the Asia-Europe Institute.· Cambodia New Vision 90 (July); 
also Hun, Sen. 2007. ·Keynote Address: 
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People acknowledge that we are the one to end the war by himself. 559 The 
old generation created the war , but we are the one who put an end to the 
war. Only this opportunity, peace, provides people in general whatever are 
political opportunities in order to develop society"s economy. Th ese are 
some of the points related to the basis of our policies, that is, people's 
democracy.560 
Three point s stand out in thi s definition. Firstly , the peop le are concep tualised as the 
·poor' , and parti cu larly as the majority farmer population. 561 Secondly , soc ial and 
eco nomic development is cast as service provision in turn envisaged as charity, rather 
than in tenn s of the state acco unt ability associated with taxation in libera l tradition. 
Thirdly, soc io-eco nomi c deve lopment is integrat ed into the regim e's peace-building 
agenda . The language of service provision as gift-giving , associated with different 
clientelist and pate rnalistic reg imes in the region , appl ies here to CPP prac tices, 
which have been demon strate d to insert patronage logics into post-refonn 
Cambodia s democratic syste m in comp lex ways. 562 These include the distr ibution of 
donations from the CP P to rural communit ies, known as choh moulothan ('go ing 
down to the base'). This strategy orig inated in the 1980s, when party cadres brought 
pro-socialist, anti-Khm er Rouge propaganda to the grassroots, until , with the advent 
of a multi-part y democratic sys tem, its meaning chan ged to bringing in donations, 
which were under stood to increase in the event of CPP elec toral vic tory. 563 This has 
559 Hun Sen used the pronoun y1111g, whic h can be variously translated as ·we· or · J ' . That the 
official translator at this interview chose to translate the clause as 'we are the one to end the 
war by himself, was presumab ly intended to convey some of the amb iguity of this wording, 
which cou ld appl y to either Hun Sen himse lf, or the FUNSK , which the CPP leade rship has 
emerged from. 
560 See author's interview wit h Hun Sen. Thi s definiti on corresponds to elaborations on the 
concept given in Hun Sen's speeches (e.g. Hun , Sen. 2005. ·Sele cted Comme nts'; and Hun , 
Sen. 2007 . 'Keynote A ddress' ), indicating a consistent usage of the term. 
561 A notor iously imprecise concept, ·populism· is generally associated with mass-level unity , 
anti-elitism, and, sometimes, a ·trans-class' coalition wherein a charismatic leader appeals to 
the publ ic with pledges of material redistribution. A ll of these elements figure, to varyi ng 
extents, in Hun Sen's definiti on of his brand of populism, as is explored below. Othe r defining 
features of Asian populism , such as anti-in tellectualism and anti-foreign sentiments (Mizuno 
& Pasuk (2009)), do not. 
56
:! Hughes (2006). On Tha iland, see, for example, Ande rson, Benedict.201 1. ·Outsider view 
of Thai Pol itics.' Presented at Ch iang Mai U niversity, Chiang Mai. 
563 Un (2005): 221-22. 
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been shown to be a crucial strategy for the CPP's continued hold on power. 564 Hughes 
argues that gift-giving is not merely a transaction that swaps material goods for 
support , highlighting its coercive and symbo lic dimen sion as a kind of·invented 
tradition' that co-opts discursive and material resources whilst adding an element of 
menace. 565 The integration of such pract ices of service provision cast as gift-giving 
into the discourse of ·people's democracy' mean s that they are not confined to their 
own clearly-delineated spher e of harnessing tradition to underpin contemporary 
political power, but are central to the regi me ·s version of democracy as propa gated to 
the general public. These practice s are cast as part of a larger framework of· peopl e's 
democracy' , providing the foundation of the diverse policies of the CPP-led regime. 
The notion of people' s democracy rests on an idea of national unity that intimat ely 
links such practices of soc ial development wi th peace-building. Whilst the end of war 
in the above quote by Hun Sen crea ted the conditions for socio-economic 
development, thi s socio-economic development is also vita l for peace-building and 
the achieve ment of true national reconc iliati on in the wake of lengthy civ il war. 
Rather than the PPA, Hun Sen therefore credits the socio-economic development 
associated with people's democracy, alongside the win-win strategy, with bringing 
about real peace and national reconciliation. 566 Whilst the win-win policy targeted the 
reintegration into national society of po litical opponents starting with the former 
Khmer Rouge and later includin g other opposition forces, ' peopl e's democracy' 
serves to integrat e all segmen ts of soc iety into one national whole , and preclude 
oppos ition to the regime. Hun Sen claim s to have stud ied how to end war through 
socia l and technical develop ment from Malay ex-Premier Mahathir , who used rural 
development and poverty reduction initiatives , rather than force, to make the 
564 Hughes (2006); and Un (2005). Since the publication of these two accounts, the err 
working groups have constituted an increasingly important and well-structured channel of 
assistance. Each of Cambodia's 170 districts has a working group, headed by one Minister. In 
this top-down structure, a Deputy Prime Minister is responsible for the province level, a 
Minister or Secretary of State (SS) for the district level, an SS or Direclor General of Mini slry 
for the commune level, and a DireclOr of Ministry (or equivalent rank) for the village level. 
The working group generally visits their districts on the weekends, together wilh sponsoring 
business paI1ners, to offer developmental assistance. Frequently, their achievements are 
broadcast in the media. See author's interview with Ok Serei Sopheak 
;o; Hughes (2006) 
566 Hun, Sen. 2005. ·Selected Comments· 
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oppo sition forces join him , then brought his party to successive electoral victorie s.567 
Peopl e' s democrac y is described primaril y as the redistribution o f land and fishing 
lots, non-taxation of fanners, and investment in rural infrastructure, including roads, 
schoo ls, and health clinics. 568 The choh moulothan initiati ves, which offer benevolent 
help from government officials, are the defining feature of such practices. 569 This link 
between development and democracy echoes reg iona l discour ses of 'developmenta l 
dem ocracy · and invokes Sihanouk's Sangkum Reas tr Niyum, which Hun Sen 
describes as ·a simil ar concept to' peopl e's democracy. 570 Development and 
democracy -building are expl icitly put as diff erent faces of the same co in, as the 
democratic political pro gram has to ' respond to the actual needs of the peop\e'. 571 
Yet, reversely, this fram es the very existence of a political oppo sition as socially 
divisive and detriment al to soc io-economi c deve lopm ent. Oppo sition activit ies act 
aga inst the peac e-buildin g effo rts in the wa ke of lengthy war , and, thu s, serve to 
perpet uate conflict , perhap s even prov okin g a relapse into war. By inserting the 
di scourse of war into the democratic debat e, a particular understanding of an 
integrat ed nat ional community is produced , which contradicts the prin ciple of a 
politi ca l opposition. 
The not ion of·peop\ e's democracy ' can also be under stood to pro vide a discur sive 
and concept ual brid ge in regime identit y from the PRK to the KOC era of capitali st 
tran sfonnation. Hun Sen first de veloped the notion in his doct ora l thesis on the topic , 
written during the PRK era, which discusse d the evo lution of Camb odian regim es and 
567 Au thor's interview with Hun Sen 
563 Hun Sen has repeatedly stated that no tax will be re-imposed on farmers as long as he 
remains in power. See, for example, Hun, Sen. 2006. ·Visit to Bridge Construction Sites in 
Kompong Thom.· Cambodia New Vision I 00 (May). 
569 Hun Sen explains the difference between people's democracy and previous Cambodian 
regimes in terms of this choh 111011/othan strategy: ·The situation of nooding in Ca mbodia. 
when I was young I saw my parents crying. II is different from the flooding in Cambodia in 
2001, 2002 and 2011. Before, there was no one helping us when we faced diffic ulties , no one 
would go to help the people. We have never seen any government officials or members of the 
national assembly durin g that time going to help the people. ' (Auth or' s interview with Hun 
Sen). 
570 See Hun , Sen. 2007. ·Keynote Address.' 
571 Examples abound in Hun Sen's speeches of how he puts democracy-building in an 
exp licitly developmenta l context. See, for example, ' Interview given by Hun Sen to Sam 
Bor in from Radio Free As ia (RFA).' 2 December 2002. 
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state-society relations since the time of the French protectorate onwards. 572 In the 
thesis , a re-reading of Cambodian history using Marxist-Leninist concepts and 
categories, democracy is finnly integrated as part of revolutionary history as the 
unchanging goal of 13 decades of a Cambodian revolutionary quest. The Cambodian 
revolution is laid out as but one continuous process over the last 130 years, whilst 
changing to respond to various evolving contradictions. 57 3 Yet through these changing 
contradictions , democracy remained the revolution·s goal - from its very first stage in 
the pre-protectorate era, when the newborn ·democratic revolution ' (padevo/1 
prach eathipat ey) is said to have been fighting for ' democratic freedom' (seripheap 
pra cheathipat ey). To consider just how far back Hun Sen may mean to trace the 
contemporary notion of ·people·s democracy', it is instructive to look at the concepfs 
genealogy. The tenn people ' s democracy first appears in the phrase ·the people ' s 
democratic national revolution ' (padevo/1 proch eacheat pra cheathipatey 
pra cheachun) , and refers to how the revolution , gone awfully wrong in the horrors of 
Democratic Kampuchea (DK), was remade through the December 1978 creation of 
FVNSK , the front which with Vietnamese backing would overthrow the DK.574 The 
specific meaning of pad evo/1 pra cheathipat ey prach eachun is thus defined as the 
elimination of Pol Pot's ·slave mode of production ' to creat e a new political regime 
with a new mode ofproduction. 575 Yet this people ' s democracy forms a basic 
continuity with previous stages of the evolving democratic national revolution as one 
distinct phase of the pad evo/1 pra cheacheat , linking it back to the very origins of the 
572 See author's interview with Hun Sen, as well as Hun, Sen. 2005. 'Selected Comments. ' In 
the latter, Hun Sen describes his doctoral dissertation on people's democracy as a software, 
which, since one writes it oneself , one does not forget easily, seemingly casting the 
dissertation as a manual for later political action. Hun Sen's doctoral thesis was entitled 
Lokklt(mah pis es day laek nei domnaurkar pad evott Kampuchea ('The Special Characteristics 
of the Progress of the Cambodian Revolution'). Pai1s of the thesis were published as the book 
13 tusev ott nei domnaur Kampuchea(' I 3 Decades of Cambodia ·s Evolution·) , which is 
i ~oted he~e below. 
J., Following these contradictions, the revolutionary struggle was directed against feudalism 
and the French during the protectorate era, against capitalist principles within a feudal 
framework and French influences under Sihanouk's Sangkum Reastr Niyum, against the 
continued fusion of capitalism and feudalism and US-neocolonialism under the Khmer 
Republic. until, eventually, the revolution was betrayed by the 'Pol Pot group'; it was then 
reoriented under the 'people ' s democratic revolution' . Hun (1991): 61, 76, 149, 172. 
574 Hun (1991): 238- 39. 
; 7; Ibid. 
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revolution. 576 The difference from the previous stages of the revolution , rather than 
anything qualitative , is primarily that democracy is now a heightened priority. Whilst 
the pracheacheat pracheathipatey previously gathered to solve nationa l problems and 
democratic progress was only gradual, in the padevott pracheathipatey pracheachun, 
national problems and democratic progress are resolved together at the same time. 
In the Seco nd Kingdom, the notion of ·people's democracy' perpetuates this close 
interlinking of democracy , revolution, and the nation , providing the language to 
negotiate the quality and contents of the transfonning regime. Democracy is made out 
to fonn a cont inuit y linking past and future regime practices - even though its 
Marx ist-Leninist contents have been wiped away. Whilst the question of whether 
democracy is also intended to retain a revolutionary aura is more vexed, I would 
suggest that the answer is yes. By reference to his PRK-era art iculat ion of this 
concept, Hun Sen puts democracy in an explicitly revolutionary context. Indeed, it 
would not be far-fetched to think of people 's democracy as the latest stage of the 
evo lving Cambodian revolutionary quest towards genui ne democracy, in which the 
Marxist-Le nini st stage has been supe rseded, yet the dialectic moves on undisturbed, 
so that the practices of'peop le·s democracy ' are best suited to handle the new, 
emerging contradictions. This is perhaps most succinctly expressed in the phrase 
quoted by Anderson,' Revolution is con tinuity ' , although in a very different sense to 
what Anderson imagines. 577 Ande rson uses this phrase to refer to the manifestation of 
what he understands to be a particular Javanese cyclical intuition of history, which, 
under Sukarno, turned the idea of revolutio n into one of restoration. In Hun Sen 's 
account, on the othe r hand, the revolution is progress ing and transforming as it 
con front s changing realities - so that the only continuity lies in the notion of 
576 
The diverse concepts introduc ed are padevotl pracheatliipatey, for the pre-protectorate era 
(p. 21). T he term padevott pracheacheat pracheathipatey is first introduced for the struggle 
against the Japanese colonialists (p. 44), then consistently employed until the introduction of 
the term padevott pracheathipatey pracheac/111n for the remade revolution from 1978 onwards 
{p. 238) . Hun Sen wr ites that, ·the character of padevott pracehacheat and the character of 
padevott pracheathipatey pracheac/11111 has the same meaning and have to be solved at the 
same time[ ... ] saving the nation and getting rid of the reactionary, controlling head of the 
machine, getting rid of the influence of Chinese ideology, and of the slave relations of 
f;?!~~!~:~n(~i~i~; : 148, quoting Lance Castles in Castles, Lance. (1966) ·Notes on the 
Islamic School at Gontor.' Indon esia I (April): 33 
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revo lution itse lf. One of the clearest exa mples of such a cha nging revo lutionary 
imagining is the complex image of Sdech Kan, discussed above, who is a 
revolutionary primarily in the sense that he does away with the notion of hereditary 
leaders hip, yet ultimate ly is a king himself. Indeed, Sdech Kan is said to have 
introd uced precise ly ·peop le·s de mocracy' as the first democratic beliefs in world 
histoy. 578This narrative thus offe rs a new genea logy of the notion. It posits socia l 
mobil ity as a centra l component of democracy, ampl ifying the CPP leaders· frequent 
stress on their simple origins. In advancing it, Hun Sen responds to a new 
contradiction - posed by the pr inciple of the monarc hy- which emerged as a novel 
threat to the CPP in the KOC, arg uing in the language of revo lut ion and democ racy, if 
not from the perspective of Ma rxism- Leninis m . 
By perpetuating revolutionary language with modified meanings, the notion of 
·peop le's democracy' allows the regime to retain a separate identity from Weste rn 
liberal democracies - thus respond ing to the second novel threat posed by the post-
1993 framework. The transfonnation into a new political and economic system is 
managed precisely through the reorie ntation of the notio n of ·peop le's democracy' to 
frame the novel regime practices- such as gift-giving - associated therewith. 579 Hun 
Sen contrasts ·peop le's democracy ' with the · feudal fonns of democracy' 
(pracheathipatey sakdephoum) of cap ita lists.580 This serves to guarantee that no other 
country can be a democrat ic model for Cambo dia. Yet capita list deve lopment under 
the regime follows no Marxist model, and, consequently, its language must 
metamorphose to accommodate the shifting class composition and increasing social 
stratificatio n resulting from the particular capitalist developme nt under the KOC. 
Hun Sen reconciles this by argu ing that there necessarily needs to be differences in 
income to carry out different roles in society: 
578 Hun (2007): iii 
579 Hughes (2006): 469 traces the practices of gift-giving to the beginning of Cambodia's 
political and economic reform processes, around 1989, when policies of resource extraction 
emerged as an imperative for the government. 
sso Although the fusion of capitalist and feudal systems may seem odd according to orthodox 
Marxist analysis. this is in line with Hun Sen·s previous analysis of society under Sangkum 
Reastr Niyum and the Khmer Republic, which were both said to contain capitalist principles 
within a feudal framework. Hun (1991): 108; 146 
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Please don't confuse the people's democracy that we are implementing with 
that of the Pol Pot regime. Pol Pot used the word democracy in order to 
make all people live equally. In order to have them live equally, they made 
the rich become poor. Now we cannot stop the establishment of the middle 
class. There is still a big gap between the middle class and the poor people, 
which remain at 26% in Cambodia. But we cannot make the rich become 
poor. We need to use the rich people to pay tax, and then take this tax to 
serve the poor people. In the world there is no country where all people live 
equally and that all people are the boss. If all people are the boss, then no 
one will become the workers. If there are no rich people to build the 
factories, how could we have the workers? We need to make use of the rich, 
so that they use the capital for investment. Then the poor people have work 
to do, and generate income.[ ... ] \Ve have to try our best to reconcile. so that 
the rich will not become the enemy of the poor, and the poor will not 
become the enemy of the rich. We have to make a reconciliation so that the 
rich and poor share with each other for the sake of national developmenl. 
Here , Hun Sen appea ls to a middle gro und, reminiscent of the Sihanoukist third way, 
between a full -fledged capitalist syste m associated with liberal democracies, and the 
other extreme - extreme communism, such as that under Democratic Kampuchea. 
Peo ple's democracy is fom1ulated in oppos ition to the ' democrac ies of cap italist 
people', and its associated prac tices , therefore, serve to imp ly a measure of 
egalita rianism and conceal resulting tensions. 
In spite of how it aims to bestow continuity on the regime from its previous Marxist-
Lenin ist identity, ·populism· can be understood to primari ly fill the shoes of this 
previous ideology. · Populism· is particu larly tied to Hun Sen and his rise with in the 
CPP, which was associated with the pushing aside of Marxist-Leninist ideology. As 
part of this, pragmatic tech nocrats came to replace previous Marxist-Leni nist 
ideo logues in govemment. 58 1 ·Popu lism' and 'peo ples democracy' are refe rred to as 
the reg ime identity by the Prime Minister, and the gove rnm ent c ircles c lose to him , 
many of whom were origina lly part of the pragmat ic technocrats rising to power with 
581 Heder(2007b): 159. 
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him during the PRK. 582 Meanw hile, parts of the senior membership of the CPP who 
are not part of these circles, st ill claim a Marxist-Leninist identity. 583 
This brand of ·populi sm' can be understood as a kind of supra-ideology, which 
transcends all other political ideologies and identities. It equates the CPP with the 
aspirations of the people, and, therefore , incorporates and supe rsedes any other 
political identit y. This is made clear in the following speec h by Hun Sen: 
To my value , a true democrat does not have to declare him/herself so. S/he 
also would not have to claim oneself to be a true patriot or a true royalist. (If 
one listens to their campaign) we do not have a place because they claim ed 
all - patriot, royalist, Sihanoukist, democrat, human rights activist, etc. 
What is left for us is populist then. Jn fact judging from our actions, what we 
have done so far has truly revealed the nature of populism, which stays as 
the Cambodian People·s Party"s true policy. It is a part of peop le 's 
democracy that is included in my doctoral thesis. We never self-proclaim to 
be so and so but our actions have clearly defined who we are. Our 
philosophy is clear that cla iming to be so and so is not necessary. We belong 
to the Cambodian People's Party and have implemented successfully the 
policy of populism. We devoted our altention on rural road. By end of the 
first decade of the twenty first century, we are thinking about making rural 
roads that we have built (in the past decades) asphalted Whether the 
opposition consents to this action or not it is their problem What we are 
doing is a true effort for advancement. 584 
58
:! See author's interviews with Minister of Com merce Cham Prasidh; Ministe r of Education, 
Youth and Sports Im Sethy; and Minister of Labour Suy Sem 
583 For example, the Deputy Head of the CPP Commissio n for Propaganda and Education. 
responsible for controlling political thinking wilhin the Party , claims that lhe CPP is Mar xist-
Lenin ist. See author 's interview with Ker Bunkheang. By contrast, Minister of Co mmerc e 
Cham Pra sidh, when confronted with this, dismissed this by refe rence to the C PP party 
structure , which has maintained a committee responsible for Marxist-Leninist education 
whi lst ·the government is no more talking about that [Marxism-Leninism]', co nc luding that 
now ·we have to just disso lve them [the CPP Commi ss ion for Propaganda and Educa tion]' 
See author·s interviews with Ker Bunkheang and Cham Prasidh 
SSJ Hun, Sen. 20 I 0. ·20 I 0 Rura l Development Review.· Cambodia New Vision 154 (December) 
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Here, what the CPP has done equa ls pop ulism, and populism equa ls what has been 
done by the CPP. As tied to Hun Sen, populism or people 's democracy mean s 
anyt hin g that the Prime Mini ste r says it does. Thi s works by completely equat ing the 
nation and the people with the CPP - or perhaps, given how he is behind the notion, 
with Hun Sen, its Premi er.585 Because of this, ·other· ideologi es are made redundant. 
A further strategic reaso n for avo iding reference to ideology beyond this equa ting 
not ion is arguably that this provides less opportu nity for critics to hold the reg ime to 
its own words, using the discou rse of the elite as a vocabulary inverted for 
resistance. 586 Populi sm under Hun Sen thu s functions to transcend appea ls to po litica l 
ideologies.Ye t, arguably , the divide Slocomb places between ·30 years of ideo logy' 
( I 955- 1984) and a ' post-ideological' era assoc iated wit h Hun Sen is meaningful on ly 
in a narrow sense.587 Hun Sen's notion of populism is, in fact, not dissimilar from 
Sihanouk 's Buddhi st socia lism. Both no tions serve to eq uate the leader with 
democratic represe ntation of the peop le and the nation. Largel y se lf-ju sti fying, both 
Buddhist soc iali sm and people·s democracy have been prim arily what Siha nouk and 
Hun Sen have defined them as. In both , development and serv ice provis ion have been 
cruc ial for cementing the bond betwee n the nation and democrac y. There are 
therefore important simila rities in tenns of notio ns of democracy as popular and 
national representation , rather than ideology, per se, functioning as a core of political 
di scours e which enab les the leade r to equate his polit ical project with the nat ion . 
Thi s help s qualify our understand ing of the CPP 's stance vers us liberal, multi -party 
parliame ntarian democracy. Hun Sen repeated ly claims to defe nd liberal democracy; 
and multi-pa rty elect ions , which are integral to the liberal democratic process, have 
served as an important legitimising tool for the CPP domestically. 588 Yet ·peopte·s 
democracy ', which Hun Sen claims as his regime identity, co nstrues the Cam bodian 
peo ple , the relationship between the people and the political leade rship, and the 
585 Hun Sen's personal identification with the nation is also highlighted in his statement, 
'So metimes people wonder what is Hun Sen really[ ... ]. In communi st countries I was called a 
liberalist and in liberal countries I was called a communist. Finally I had to tell myself Hun 
Sen is Hun Sen. Hun Sen belongs to the Cambodian people.' See ·Hun Sen Moves Ahead.' 
Asimve ek, 21 May 1999, cited in Slocomb (2006): 394-95. This quote also demonstrates how 
~p
6
e~~~/(1i~~~~1tir transcends the past communist/liberal dichotomy 
587 Slocomb (2006): 388. 
588 Hughes (2009) 
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natur e of political parti c ipati on, very differentl y. The ·peopl e' is equated with the 
·majority fanner population·. The very existe nce of a political oppos ition is seen to 
pose a threat to an integrated national community, as it is considered socially divisive 
and detrimental to soc io-economic development and peace-building. As a post-
Marxi st-Le nini st iden tity, it serves to guarantee that the regime can maintain a 
separate identit y from Western liberal dem ocrac ies. This model of ·people 's 
democracy· can therefore pro vide an alterna tive reading of practices that would 
otherwise be characteristic of the liberal democrat ic proce ss . Th e differenc e between 
the two log ics is not necessar ily clear-cut. For exam ple , Hun Sen repeate dly 
empha sises how his right to rule is a conseque nce of how he has received a majorit y 
of the peop le's votes. 589 Yet these claims arguab ly collapse the distinction between 
the two log ics, given that Hun Sen has repeat edly made out his electora l support as a 
consequence of the regim e ·s soc io-economic po licies or its direct identifi ca tion with 
the peopl e.590 Mor eove r, elections have been promoted as proof of Hun Sen 's ability 
to organise them;591 and Hun Sen has repeatedly abstained from participating in 
election campaign s, suggest ing that he is abo ve the electora l process. 592 These latter 
dynam ics are mor e c lose ly in line with his ·populi st' discour se of democracy. At 
other occas ions, the presence of a log ic in clear confli ct with the logic of liberal 
dem oc racy is clearly manifest , suc h as in Hun Sen·s public disdain for the notion ofa 
loyal oppos ition .593 The DIFID strategy ('d ivide, isolate, finish, integrate and 
deve lop') , origin ally app lied to the Khmer Rouge as part o f the win-win policy, is 
ope nly recognised by Hun Sen as a strategy he emplo ys towards the opposition in 
general; and his stress on the need for integrat ion into one, undifferentiated nationa l 
community has bee n qualified by an accompa nying threa t that ' develop' may be 
589 See, for example. Hun. Sen.2011. ·Graduation Ceremony at the Vanda Institute.' Cambodia 
New Vision 155 (January). 
590 See, for example. Hun, Sen. 20 11. · Interview with .. Le Point" on July 14. 1998.' Cambodia 
New Vision 8. 
591 Hughes (2009) 
592 As noted by Hughes (2006) : 475. For example. in his · interview with "Le Point" on 14 
July 1998', Hun Sen refers to himself. Chea Sim, and Heng Samrin not as 'players· but as 
·coaches·, who, having produced a •winning team'. wi ll not be changed and will not take pa11 
in the election campaign. 
593 Phoak Kung (20 1 !) :. 21, notes how Hun Sen lectures the opposition parties on his divide 
and conquer strategy on televised broadcast. 
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substituted by ·destroy• if the opposit ion parties persist in opposing the 
govemment. 594 
The contemporary opposition ·democratic' identity and bids to popu lar representation 
must be understood in this context of the current, and past, state project 's particu lar 
ways of synthesising democracy and national identity. With it, the opposition can be 
see n to share an articu lation of·democracy· based on identification of the will and 
need s of the people . Like the CPP and royalists, the democratic op po sition 
co nceptualises the ·people' as the majorit y ·poor'; however , contrary to these it doe s 
not purport to represent a part icularly Cambodian fonn of democracy, but instead , 
largely identifie s with a global democratic movement - whil st following particular 
Cambodian conditions. In this, their dem ocra tic imaginings turned precisely against 
the practices associated with people's democracy, and most of all, its revolutionary 
heritage which the y saw in terms of continuity rather than tran sfo nnation 
Democratic Opposition Starting Points - Dictatorship, National Survival, and 
Democracy 
The framework and institutions introduced by the early 1990s external ly encouraged 
democrat isation proce ss, epitomised by the 1991 Paris Peace Accords (PPA) and the 
resulting 1993 constitution, were celebrated by the self-identified democrats as 
guiding document s for the new era. The UNTAC -era fonnation of politi cal parti es 
had been envisaged as a tran sfonna tion from a conflict over fundamentals to an 
electora l contest betw een policy platfonn s. Yet political part y contestation continued 
to centre on a reinve nted civil war-era conflict over fundamental s, now one that 
revo lved around contending interpretation s and manipulation s of the const itution and 
594 See , for exa mpl e. Hun , Sen. 2003. ·Selected Ad-lib Address at the Groundbreaking 
Ceremo ny to Build Roads and Bridges in the District ofKhsach Kanda!, Kanda! Provinc e·, in 
which Hun Sen thr eatens to use the DIFID strategy aga inst the political op positio n, changing 
the meaning of the final ·o· from ·deve lop' to ' destroy'. Th is is accompanied by a range of 
overt measures to weaken opposition parti es, including planting the idea of rival opposition 
parties as puppets of the C PP to sow distrust withi n and among them. For example, in Ma y 
2009, a secret conversation between Kem Sokha and Hun Sen was leaked, which the SRP 
interpreted as proof of collusion between the C PP and HRP. See the SRP cab inet's message of 
response, entitled ·The Sam Rain sy Party is the on ly hope when Hun Sen cap italizes on Kem 
Sokhas duplicity' , dated 3 1 May 201 1 
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electoral organisation. 595 The democratic opposition calls for the correct 
imp lementat ion of the PPA were co ncerned with establishing the democrat ic ·rules of 
the game·. To an equa l extent, they atte mpted to establish the political arena as a 
forum of debate between the PPA signatories, where each actor would ha ve voice and 
weig ht. As part of this, they fought to disseminate a historiography in which the 
signing of the PPA on 23 October 1991 marked the end of civil war , rathe r than 7 
January, whic h is celebrated by the CPP as the nation·s second birthday. The civi l 
war era anti-communist, anti-Vietnamese framework was perpetuated as democrats 
cont inued to analyse the nature of the CPP- led regime as a communist dictatorship 
(omnach phdach kar), pointing to the CPP's KPRK and Khmer Rouge origins and 
that the regime had been insta lled with the help of the Vietnamese Commun ists. 
Politically, in their analysis , this was demonstrated by: the conflat ion between the 
CPP party and the state; the long hold on power by the executive; the interference of 
the executive in the legislature and judiciary; and the strong power of the executive 
over the legislature. Economically , it referred to CPP -led development , which left a 
bulk of the citizenry economically marginalised. 
In their analysis, the CPP-led state was a puppet under Vietnamese dominion. 
Reactive to contemporary dynamics , it a lso built on deep -sea ted perceptions of threat 
to the very survival of the Cambod ian nation and territorial state- a discourse that , in 
its different incarnations, has been cruc iall y bound up with Cambodia's post-
independence political trajectory. Students of Cambodia are often taken aback by the 
strength of these perceptions of threat to national su rvival. 596 Thi s discourse of 
impending nation al extinct ion has been traced back to the French protectorate, which 
constructed a herit age of·national' cu lture centred on the cult of the Angkorean era, 
in wh ich the history of the Cambodian nat ion ever since was one of gradua l decay. 597 
Yet Cambodian nationalism emerged not only in response to French colonial ism but 
was also related to Cambodia's historical experie nce as a sparse ly populated buffer 
595 Hughes (2002b): 165~8. Hughes draws on Giovanni Sartori's distinction between conflict 
over fundamentals and conflict over issues, suggesting that consensus over fundamentals, 
eanicular\y procedures for resolving conflict, permits peaceful conflict over issues. 
':: Cp. Barnett (1990): 101. 
) On protectorate-era myth-making , see Edwards (2007). 
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state between the Thai and Vietnamese states, predating the colonial exper ience. 598 
The resulting fear of natio nal extinction was taken up by all three pre-1979 political 
regimes, most calamitously by the Khmer Rouge , but also by Sihanouk's Sangku m 
Reastr Ni yum and the Khmer Repub lic; and thereafter, as the Vietnamese-installed 
PRK seemed to substantiate the wors t nightmares of Vietnamese hegemo ny, became 
associated with the non-communist resi stance. 599 As successors to the resistance, the 
self-identified democratic opposition came to voice this discourse in the KOC . They 
were concerned wit h protecting the territorial boundaries of the Cambodian state , and 
particularly preoccupied with Kampuchea Krom (the southernmost region ofpresent-
day Vietnam), sometimes aiming to ·reclaim· this terr itory, or, at least, to ensure the 
safeg uarding of the rig hts of the ethnic Khmers living in that area .'°0 
Whilst contemporar y territorial imaginings warrant more academic attention in their 
own right, ! limit myself here to consideration of how such perceptions ofa threat to 
national survival info1111 democrats· understanding of the significance of democracy 
in the contemporary Cambod ian context. Conte mporary democrats have a real sense 
of an imminent threat to the very survival of the Cambo dian nation, grounded in both 
historical and contemporary realitie s. Asked to define his perception of ·nationalism·, 
prominent democrat Son Soubert defined Cambodian nationalism as a kind of·self-
defe nse·, as opposed to a ·call for grandeur' .6"' This ana lysis places contemporary 
dynam ics in the longer perspective of neighbouring Thai and Vietnamese historical 
expansionism , as a primarily geopolitical analysis of the predi cament of a small 
country locked in a regional conflict complex. Sam Rainsy has offe red the following 
corn pan son: 
There are two countries I would like to compare Cambodia to. One is 
Poland. Poland [once] upon a time disappeared because of two big 
;,s Grabowsky ( 1997). 
599 Ki ernan (2001 ): 188. For an account of how the K hmer Rouge envisaged the revoluti on·s 
role in this ·111y1h·, see Kiernan (200 I). See also Th ion ( 1980); and Chandler ( 1983). 
600 On Cambodia's borders, see, for example, Chhak Sarin ( 1966): lhe publications of the 
Cambodia Border Commission (2004) (a group of Cambodian exiles in France); and Amer 
( 1997). On contemporary border contestation, see Harris (20 I OJ. On contemporary 
contestation over the Lao-Cambodian border, see Baird (2010). On Kampuchea Krom, see, 
for example, Keo ([ 1971] 2006). 
601 Author's interview with Son Seubert 
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neighbours, Russia and Germany. You can understand why Polish people 
are so nationalistic - they fight for their identity, and have lost their country 
Cambodia also. Cambodia is squeezed between Thailand and Vietnam, and 
Cambodia would have lost the country as a nation had the French not 
intervened under Napoleon Ill. After the French left, the process started 
again. The problem with Thailand on the one hand. with Vietnam on the 
other hand resumed. Another comparison is Lebanon. You cannot solve the 
problem with Lebanon within Lebanon. There is Syria, Israel, Iran. [ ... ] 
Cambodia is the same. Democratic or 1101. ir is beyond the issue of 
democracy for Cambodia. fr is rhe issue of survi\·al for Cambodia. It is the 
balance of power in that region.[ ... ] This is the fate of small countries in the 
middle of much bigger countries. ( Italics author's own.)60~ 
The basic problem facing the nation is a threat to its survival - a problem more 
fundamental than , and analytically prior to, the question of the implementation of 
democracy, 
Whilst not syno nymous, the strugg le for national surviva l and the struggle for 
democracy are imagined to go we ll together. This follows the democrats' particu lar 
understand ing of democracy, which cen tres on the idea of the ·peop le's will ' .603 Sam 
Rain sy has offer ed the following defi nition of democrac y: ·The will of the majority 
can preva il. You do not oppr ess people . You ca nnot go against the will and the 
interest of the majorit y. ' 604 Whil st national survival is the most basic priority, 
democracy is a means to ensure survi va l. Th is follows from how democrac y is 
equaled to the w ill of the Cambodian people (who sure ly want their own survi va l) 
This view is laid out by Sam Rainsy, as follows : 
Democracy will ensure survival because the will of the Cambodian people is 
to survive. So if the will or the Cambodian people prevails then Cambodia 
will survive. In order for the will of the Cambodian people to prevail, we 
602 Author's interview with Sam Rainsy. 
603 Hughes (2002a): 360, studying the 1998 elections, argues that the ·people·s will' . as a core 
concept of liberal democracy promoted in Cambodia, has been appropriated by the SRP and 
FUNCINPEC to ·exclusionary and xenophobic purposes· 
604 Author's interview with Sam Rainsy. 
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need democracy. It is interrelated - definitely democracy and survival is the 
same battle.605 
Without democracy, on the other hand , the incumbent CPP would continue to cling to 
power with the backing of Vietnam , which would be continuing its expansionist 
march westwards , compromising chances of both democracy and surviva!. 606 
The conte mpo rary period has brought particular complicat ions for how democracy 
and national survival are to be reali sed . The situation since 1979 is conside red to 
differ radically from previous periods, insofar as Vietnamese anempts at hegemony , 
through the power Vietnam is believed to exercise over the KPRP-turned-CPP, have 
penetrated the core of the Cambodian state. 607 This has shifted the contempora ry 
democratic agenda, bringing a new set of problems in relation to identifying the 
people's will in the post-PPA setting of multi-party democracy. Thi s follows from 
democrats· conceptuali sa tion of democracy as the will and interest of the majority. 
The power dynamic s, whereby the Vietnamese and their ·puppet s' control the 
Cambodian state, are imagined to pull a wedge between the natural hannon y between 
the will and the intere st of the people , thwarting the functioning of democratic 
institutions in the post-PPA nation and problematising the task of popular 
representation. The following sect ion discusses in greater detail how the KOC' s 
democratic parties have envisaged democracy, popular representation, and national 
survival. The following four sectio ns then proceed to explore a series of problems and 
tensions arising from how their abo ve analysis of the post-PPA period has borne on 
the relationship between democracy and the nation they have envisaged, and how 





Democratic Identity and Popular Representation 
The BLDP. the Son Sann Party and the Human Rights Party. 
The first ·democratic' political party to emerge af ter the PPA came directly out of the 
Khmer People 's Na tional Liberat ion Front (KPNLF), ·th e democratic faction· of the 
tripartite resistan ce during the 1980s civil war, which tran sfo rmed itse lf to the 
Buddhi st Libera l Democrat ic Party (B LDP ) ahead of the 1993 elect ions under the 
leade rship of ·Ta ' (Grandfat her) Son Sann. A short-lived enterprise, the party rapid ly 
disintegrated , yet is significant , as the very first se lf-id enti fied ·democratic· party in 
the KO C, with ties back to previous demo cratic projects. 608 Afte r the implo sion of the 
BLDP , a similar agenda was advanced by the Son Sann Part y competing for the 1998 
e lect ions. The BLDP politi cal platfo nn included individual freedom s and right s, the 
rule of law , electio ns, democracy, pri va te propert y, and a soc ially-oriented mark et 
econo my. The party was dominated by Son Sann , one of the founders of the 
Democrat Part y (DP), a close confid ante of Sihanouk's during the Sangkum Reastr 
Niyum , and later Pres ident of the KPNLF. 609 His close associate , Kea t Sokun, later 
exp la ined Son San n · s idea of democracy as follows: 
Son Sann was very clean and democra tic. He taught me that doing polit ics is 
easy:just do 111/,mever you r subjec ts wmu. He taught me two things. Firstly 
that politics sho11!d be to do whatever yo ur subjects want. Secondly that the 
economy must be de\·elopedfrom the grass roots. not from the top .610 
Thi s quote clearly demo nstra tes an und ersta ndin g of dem ocracy as following the wi ll 
of the people. For Son Sann and the BLDP , there was a clear and unambiguou s way 
to es tabl ish ·what the people wa nted' - through parliamentary democracy. Thi s was 
to be accompa nied by soc ial and politi cal deve lopment based on agricu lture. Th e 
BLDP argue d against excessive pri vate sector deve lopm ent and based the ir envisaged 
608 The BLDP quickly imploded over a split between Ieng Mouly and Son Sann, over 
participation in the I 993 elections. With the ri ft, Son Sann, Keat Sokun, Son Soube1t, K em 
Sok ha, Thach Reng, and Say Bory were expelled. 
609 Son Sann served as part of Sihanouk's team at the negotiations of Geneva, as Minister of 
Finance ( 1950-51 ), Governor of the National Bank (I 964-{i8), and Sihanouk's Prime Minister 
( I 967-68). He was also one of the signatories of the PPA. 
610 Au thor·s interview w ith Keat Sokun. 
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rural development on the idea of providing the majority farmers loans against interest, 
empowering the rura l populac e through capitalist mechanisms. 6 11 Whilst the CPP has 
styled itse lf as a farmers· party , politicians associated with the BLDP later charged 
that the CPP had been half-hearted in prioritising agriculture, wh ich refl ected the fact 
that they did not consider the CPP to have properly empowered fanners to be 
financially independent. Son Soubert , Son Sann· s son, later reminisced about arguing 
that Cambodia should be developed from the agricultural base when debating the 
1994 law on investme nt: 
Sok An said that this is Khmer Rouge ideology. J said, you travelled around 
the world but you didn't see that in the developed world the farmers are the 
rich? You cannot build a sound economy if it is not based on agriculture 
We have the garment sector- but there are conflicts. We have tourism - but 
it is volatile. \Ve cannot base our economy on these.61~ 
The BLDP styled itself the lates t avatar ofan indigenou s democratic tradition. The 
credibility of this claim was anch ored in ho w the part y leadership originated from the 
KPNLF and the DP. Son Sann was one of the founders of the DP , before becoming 
Sihanouk ' s trusted aide and Prime Mini ste r.613 The Vice President ofBLDP , Ieng 
Mouly, had been an activist for the DP as a student in Cambodia in the ea rly 1970s, 
thereafte r joining Son Sann in France. 614 Both were founding members of the 
KPNLF. Apart from through these two individual s, the BLDP cou ld claim cont inuity 
with the old DP , primarily throug h virtue of being the successor of the KPNLF , the 
611 This focus was reflected in the portfolios assigned to the BLDP in 1993: ·Rural 
Development·. headed by the late General Thach Reng; ·Youth. Sports and Women's Affairs', 
'\~aded by K~at So.kun; ~nd ·Parliamentary Affairs', under Say Bory. 
6 
- Author's 111terv1ew ith Son Soubert 
613 Chandler (2000): 188; and Chandler (1991): 167. After Son Sann retired from government 
in 1969, he maintained a neutral stance between the Democratic Party, which was revived 
during the Khmer Republic, and Sihanouk, so as to be able to mediate between them. Cp 
Chandler (1991): 230---31. 
61
-1 Ieng Mouly had worked with Chau Sau, President of the DP since 1973, which convinced 
Son Sann to make Ieng Mouly a close associate. Author's interview with Ieng Mouly. [ 17 
Nov. 2009]. 
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leadership of whic h formed more of a direct line with the old DP than that of the 
BLD P.615 
ln leadership imaginatio ns, such a continu ity stretc hin g from the DP to BLDP 
existed. The DP had ·promoted a notion of political authority as appropriately 
democratically legitimised' with a platfonn that demanded independence and 
democracy and attacked nepotism and con-uption, and they env isag ed the post -
colonial sta te to achieve a ·Europe an- type parliamentary system with a maximum of 
democratic tights ', with constitutionalism the foremost political princ iple of the 
nation. 616 In between , the KPNLF' s main identity had been anti -Vietnamese and anti -
communist, with a platfonn limited to outlining future parliamentary elec tions and 
buildin g a market econo my. Son Sann·s son, Son Soubert, later identified the 
continuity stretching from the DP to BLDP in terms of the belief in ·d emocratic 
values ' based on parliamentary democracy and a const itu tiona l monarchy. 617 The 
BLDP set out to build an identity as the DP' s succe sso r party, manifest in its claim 
when regis ter ing the party to be a descendant of the DP. Even the BLDP party 
symbo l, crea ted by Ieng Mou ly, sugges ted a straightforward genealogy; it was a 
fusion of the symbols of the DP and the KPNLF - an elephant head with thre e 
lotuses, symbolising the three Buddhist gems, or the trinity of nation, religion, king, 
over Angkor Wat. Th e sea rch for an earlier democratic identity was also refl ec ted in 
the pa rty name . According to Ieng Mouly, Democratic was meant to reflect that the 
platfonn was bu ilt aro und the old DP platfonn , including the belief in popu lar rule, 
whereas Buddhist was meant to indicate that it represented the majority-Buddhist 
people with the connotations of· traditional' morali ty this bestowed. 
615 Most of the top leadership of the KPNLF came from the DP, including President Son Sann, 
former DP Prime Minister Huy Kanthoul, former DP Prime Minister Chean Varn, Chay 
Thou!, Thonn Ouk, and Nuong Kimny. These were members ofan informal committee of 
·wise men·, established as a consulting body by Son Sann. In this committee, only Schan 
Kuoy had not been a member of the DP. See author 's interview with Hu y Vora. A majority of 
these leaders did not become members of the BLDP, both because of their age, as well as the 
factionalism that had resulted in Sak Sutsakhan breaking away to found the rival Liberal 
Democratic Pa,ty (LDP) ahead of the 1993 elections. 
616 Hughes (2009): 35, quoting Chandler(1991): 36, 38 and Vickery (1982) : 91. 
617 Aut hor's interv iew with Son Seubert 
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The third keyword, liberal, referred to the belief in a liberal democratic system, of 
which economic liberal isation was a key component. 618 Cambodia's ongoing 
transition to a free market system provided the main impetu s to fine-tune the party 
identity to contemporary realities. The party leaders were concerned about how the 
emerging free market economy threatened to derail into wild capitalism. The BLDP 
advocated a social market economy, inspired by a Gennan Christian democratic 
model. They envi saged thi s to prevent the excesses of an unregulated market and 
accommodate dialogue between leaders of enterprises and workers. 619 
The 2008 creation of the Human Rights Party (HRP), appeared as a resurrected 
BLDP in tenns of its leadership , which comprised Son Soubert and Keat Sokun, 
rallying behind Kem Sokha. 620 HRP has since carried itself as a revived BLDP, 
carrying on the same reform philosophy indictin g corruption under ·communist'-style 
cap italist transformation, reflected in the party 's four main pol icies: targeting living 
conditions, economics, and social affairs; protecting human rights and strengthening 
citizens· power; abolishing ·the dictatorship ' ; and fostering domestic and 
international cooperat ion. 621 It also refers to a conception of leadership in which the 
leaders are the servants of the people, reflect ed in the HRP motto , which is identical 
618 Author's interview with Ieng Mouly, (17 Nov. 2009]. 
619 The influence provided to Son Sann and Son Seubert by German Christian and liberal 
democrats is reflected in their ties to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, associated with the 
German centre-right Christian Democratic Union, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 
associated with the German liberal Free Democratic Party. Son Seubert also became a 
member of the Moral Re-Armament movement in the l 970s, a movement with Christian roots 
that cast off its religious mantle and transformed into a network of people with an animating 
idea, described by Soubert as, ·a process of change, through changing individuals changing 
family and then society'. This suggests the broader influence of centrist European ideas of 
democracy. Author's interview with Son Seubert. 
"
0 Son Seubert was the son of the late Son Sann. Keat Sokun had supported the KPNLF from 
Sydney during the PRK, returning to Cambodia to become BLDP Minister of Youth, Sports 
and Women's Affairs in 1993. Kem Sokha had worked for the KPNLF in the early 1980s, and 
became a BLDP Member of Parliament for Takeo in 1993, then Party Secretary of BLDP in 
1994. He later created the Cambodian Commission of Human Rights in 2002, building his 
reputation through this independent NGO. All three had sided with Son Sann in 1995 and 
joined in the creation of the Son Sann Party. They were joined by Pen Sovann, the disgruntled 
former PRK Prime Minister. 
6
::
1 HR.P, Policy 
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to that ofK PNLF - ·to se rve, to defend and to build '. 622 The HRP has con tinu ed the 
focus on agriculture, carrying itse lf as a fanner's party, and its leader, Kem Sokha , 
claim s pri vileged knowledge of farmers· needs by virtue of his fanner ·s 
backgroun d.613 
A New Voice: From the Khm er Nat ion Partv (KNP) to the Sam Rain sy Part y (SRP). 
The group that wou ld become the main voice of the democra tic opposition in KO C 
started as a small group of people without close ties to either the BLDP, KPNL F, or 
DP. The co re was a close -knit , small group of forme r per sonal advise rs to Sam 
Rain sy, FUNCINPE C Mini ster of Finan ce, around whom friends, acquaintances, and 
urban inte llectu als without prev iou s histories of poli tical engagement quickly 
gathered. These inc luded Eng Chhay Eang , Yim Sok.ha, Yim Sovann , and Chamroeun 
Ros. 624 They had suppo rted FUNCINPEC , rather than the BLDP , primarily becau se 
the part y enjoyed greater popula rit y and therefore stood a better chance o f defeating 
·the communists';, reflecting how anti-communism was their main political 
priority. 625 ln May 1995, Sam Rainsy and his assista nts were expe lled from the 
Ministry of Finance. At first planning to return to Paris, where he had lived for most 
of the last three decade s, Rainsy was convinced to stay and set up a new party. Many 
of those pledgin g with him were friend s, and uni versity and high schoo l classmates of 
the co re group, who became co-founders and members of the new party .626 Eng 
Chhay Eang later reca lled: ' We didn"t need to recruit members. We knew each other 
620 Leaders of the HRP believe themselves to have the support of most of the old KPNLF 
supporters, as they view their party as a sort of· resurrected BLDP. Author·s interviews with 
Kem Sok.ha, Son Seubert and Keat Sokun 
''.'. Cp. HRP policy first point (Kl ). 
6
- Eng Chhay Eang and Yim Sokha had been close friends since adolescence, studying 
together from high school to university (both studying medicine), supporting. first, the 
Sereika, then FUNCINPEC, before both becoming assistants to Sam Rainsy at the Ministry of 
Finance in 1993. Yim Sokha recruited his brother, Yim Sovann, a graduate from the Institute 
of Economics, to join as Assistant to Sam Rainsy. Eng Chhay Eang was Secretary General of 
the SRP from I 999 to December 2005, and September 2007 to the end of 2008. 
625 In addition, by I 993, the BLDP had already suffered an internal split.Author's interviews 
with Eng Chhay Eang and Yim Sovann. 
626 For example, several members were recruited by Yim Sok ha and Eng Chhay Eang from the 
Faculty of Medicine, leading to a high representation of medical doctors in the party. Yim 
Sovann also recruited his wife, Ke Sovannroth, whom he had met at the Faculty of 
Economics, who would later become the SRP Secretary General (2008-) 
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from person to person. ' 627 These un ivers ity graduates could readi ly relate to Sam 
Rain sy's political ideas, whic h were conceived as support of democrac y, freedom of 
speech, and human rights.628 In November 1995, they submitt ed the application to 
found the Khm er Nat ion Par ty (KN P) to the Ministry of Interior. When the party was 
annou nced, a number of senior CPP, FUNCINPEC , and othe r minor party leade rs 
joined. 629 The part y changed its name to the Sam Rain sy Party (S RP) in 1998. 
Animated by contemporary concern s, the K.NP sha red with the BLDP a ·democratic 
identit y' strongl y equated with anti -com mu nism. Its slig htly younger leader ship had 
grown up under the DK and PRK., and their political consciousness had been directly 
spa rked by a bipol ar Cold War ana lysis, which posited a communist system aga inst 
the free world. Many claim to have bee n motivated by per sona l expe riences of 
comm uni sm , such as Eng Chha y Eang, who remembers how: 
In 1979 I started thinking about the new regime under the Vietnamese 
control. I though1 that maybe it [the regime and its living conditions] was 
the same in all different countries around the world, because we were like a 
frog in the well. I researched in school and came to know that other 
countries were different. I found out that there are two different types of 
countries: communist and free [serey] And we live in a communist 
country. 630 
In his autob iogr aph y, Sam Rainsy writes that his love for democracy is derived from 
when his fa ther, Sam Sary, showed him photos of the Soviet crushing the 1956 
Hun ga rian upris ing. quo ting his fathe r· s wo rds: ·The abse nce of democrac y is 
intrin sically bound up wit h the communi st Barbar y, th is dictatorial regime which 
respects ne ither indi vidual s nor the people that it purports to represent· .631 Other KNP 
617 Author's interview with Eng Chhay Eang 
628 The members included Thach Setha, Sok Seng, Kimsour Phlr!th, Kuoy Bunroeung, Dam 
Sithy, Yim Sokha, Thun Bunly, Meng Retha, La Thavudh, Haem Yipea, and Hao Sopheap. 
" ' CPP leaders included Kong Konn, Pit Thach, and Sam Sundun; FUNCINPEC leaders 
included Khieu Rada and Nguon Soeu; and minor party leaders included Cheam Channy of 
the Khmer Neutrality Party, and Bouv Heuw. 
630 Author's interview with Eng Chhay Eang. 
631Sam (2008): 45-46 
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lead ers who had served under the PRK regim e were j ust as prone to mak e a 
comm unist versus non-communi st analysis. Ho Vann had been cultural attache to the 
Cambodian Embassy in East Berl in when Gennan y was reunified. He claimed 
insp iration from how , in Gennan y, the peopl e had succee ded in overturning the 
commu nist sys tem without blo odshe d; think ing of this as a model for peacefully 
overturning the ·communist ' syste m in Cambodia.632 Kong Konn was another person 
strengthe ned in anti-commun ist reso lve by his expe rienc e worki ng for the PRK . 
Konn was recruited to the PRK in February 1979, quick ly becoming Head of 
Pol itical Department at the Mini stry of Foreign Affairs, amb assado r to Hanoi (198 1-
1982), member of the KPRP Politburo , and Mini ster of Foreign Affa irs in 1986 
durin g the time of Vietnamese doi moi renovation. He claim s to have upset the 
V ietnamese by wanting to negotiate with the tripartite resistance rather than continue 
fighting whilst negotiating, as the V ietnamese wanted, leading his position to be 
resumed by Hun Sen in 1987.611 In 1991 he left the KPRP because , in his own words , 
he ·cou ld not live wit h communi sm anymore. I had a chance not to live in a 
communist regime and do things to have a new regime. At that time , I hoped people 
who came from abroad might help the countr y insta ll dem ocracy and freedom.' The 
only high-ranking CPP official to join the KNP , Konn became its Deputy President. 
The KNP shared wi th the BLDP support for parliame ntar y democracy, 
constitutionalism , a const itutiona l monarchy , and agr icult ural development as 
corne rstones of their age nda, but radicalised their analysis to primarily foc us on 
emerging economic realities, imagined in economic and moral terms of ·corruption' . 
Port raying itse lf as a refo1111 movement of FUNCfNPEC , which defended its orig inal 
prin ciples from the anti -co mm unist resistance , it turned again st the FUNCfNPEC in 
consideri ng it to have j oined paths with the CPP. At the same time, party leaders 
widely perceived the party as representing a :new thinkini to confront emerging 
realities of rampant corruption victimising the people.634 These political imaginings 
connected patriotism (sneha cheat) and a democratic co nscience (outdomkot e 
pra cheathipatey seri) with protection of the national inter est (polprayoch cheat), as 
63
:: Aut hor·s interview w ith Ho Vann. Ho Van n returned to Cambodia in 1996 and j oined the 
KNP. 
633 A uthor's interview with Ko ng Konn 
634 Au thor's interview with Eng Chhay Eang 
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territorial integrit y and natural reso urce prot ection. Deriving from their corruption-
cent red analysis, the KNP set fort h I O core princip les (kol noyobay I Ok) as its 
plat fonn , a mani festo on how to deve lop the co untr y, which included inco me 
red istribution , fore st protection , and control of illegal immigr a tion and border 
encroachment in its ant i-corrupti on agenda. 635 In 2003, the 10 pri ncip les were 
deve lope d into a list of· 100 Practical Measures 10 be Implemented by a Sam Rain sy 
Government' under the five rubri cs of democrac y: ju stice and human right s; security; 
impro vement of li ving cond itions; a clean and effec tive gove rnmen t; and nat ional 
int eres ts an d the future of our country. 636 These two documen ts ha ve served as the 
SRP' s political plat fonn s since. 637 
635 I.) To abolish all violence in soc iety, in orde r to guarantee the complete security to every 
citizen and real peace to the nation. 2.) To protect and promote human rights , as written down 
by the United Nati ons, and to practi ce free democratic beliefs correctly and truly. 
3.) To abolish every form of corruption , especially to re-establish an incorruptjustice system 
in order to prov ide just ice to victims. 
4.) Promote social justice to help the poor so that they have living conditions that are adequate 
and dignified, increase the salary of all who work, and to help all of the citizenry to have equal 
opportuniti es in the building of one ·s future 
5.) To guarantee the neutrality of public governance (that is state powers in general on all 
levels), to be independent from all political parties , in order to serve the peop le without 
partisan discrimination. 
6.) To impleme nt the land reform (that is, reestabl ishing land administration) in order to 
protect the property of the people, and 10 divide the land that is free or that is being controlled 
by corrupt people and dishonest businessmen so that all farmers have enoug h rice-fields and 
land to support themsel ves and so that all families have adequate shelter. 
7.) To protect Cambodia 's border in the audac ious aspiration to guarantee the full protection 
of territor ial integrity 
8.) To so lve the problem of immigr ation, i.e . foreigners com ing to live on Khm er territory 
il!ega lly. 
9.) To end the destruction of forests and to pro tect and safeguard all national natural resou rces 
(such as fish) and cultural treasu res (such as ancient temples) 
10.) To reexami ne and to reform the contract betwe en the government and any independent 
company that is illegal and unjust for the people or doe s not ser ve the national interest. (See 
SRP, ·Kol noyobay 10 kh robas konabi\k Sam Rainsy' [10 political principles of Sam Rainsy 
Part y], undated.) Th e contact perso n for the drafting of the political principles was the late 
Chem Chansada, tho ugh a ll came together to disc uss them. Aut hor' s interv iew with Th ach 
Setha. 
636 SRP, · 100 meas ures to be impl emented by a Sam Rain sy government ', 2003. This 
docum ent was draft ed and approv ed by the steer ing co mmittee, after co nsu ltation •with 
internatio nal and Khm er expe rts abroad' See auth or's intervie w wi th Yim Sovann. 
637 Th e party has debated brushing these up but has conclu ded that they remain as relevant as 
at the time of\ vriting , suggesting that they are perceived as a conflict over deadlocked 
·fund amentals' in the KOC. Amo ng the 10 principl es, only the origina l, first princ iple, to ·st op 
fightin g between Khmer and Khm er', was modifi ed following the end of civ il war to ·abol ish 
all vio lence in society '. See author' s interviews with Tioloung Saumu ra and Eng Ch hay Eang 
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The main democratic opposition parties were thus made up of different groups of 
peop le with partly different histories. They shared in common a reading of democrac y 
that focused on anti -communism, which, increasingly, centred on protecting those 
victimi sed by capitalist develop ment under the transfonning regime. 638 Whilst the 
SRP can be understood to have reinforced and radicalised the agenda of earlier 
generations of democrats, the HRP 's age nda was indisti ngu ishable from that of the 
SRP whe n it appeared. The following four sectio ns explore a set of tensio ns resulting 
from the relat ionship between democracy and the nation the democrat s envisaged at 
the backdrop of their analys is of power dynamics in the KOC , in tenn s of identifying 
the democratic agenda, representing the age nda, and relating to the institutions of 
elec tions and the institution of the monarchy. 639 
'Reading ' the Peop le: Identifying the People 's \Viii under New Circumstances 
The first prob lem for the democrats was how to identify the people·s will and needs. 
This was bound up with deeper tensions permeati ng democratic debates , over the 
que stion ofto what extent leaders could transce nd their personal life stories in their 
bid for popular representation. It would be hard to exaggerate the significance of 
soc ial mob ility as a component of the symbolic contestat ion of democra tic imagining s 
in the KOC. As no ted above, the CPP leade rs often stress their simple origins to 
deli ver the message that, no matter how elevated they may be, each was, from the 
outset , trul y one of the people. The Sdech Kan narrative celebrat es socia l mobility as 
the ·true· meani ng of democracy. Thi s pro vides yet another so lution as to how to 
relate the body of the national leader to the body of the people - emp hasising the 
63s Unsu rprising ly, the sp lit of ·democrats' into different political parties, and manoeuvrings 
between them, can hardly be see n in terms of substantial policy differences. Sam Rain sy 
originally intended to join the BL DP after his expulsion as Minister of Finance. but was 
recommended by the BLDP to set up his own political party. both because BL DP was in 
government and because they perceived Sam Rain sy to be too uncompromising. The creation 
of the HRP ahead of the 2008 elections, according to Son Soubert, was sim ilarly because ofa 
lack of response from Sam Rainsy when Kem Sok ha wanted to join. According to Keat 
Sokun, he and Son Soubert supporte d Kem Sokha in sett ing up a new party with the intent to 
create a balance in the opposition, by having two opposition leaders preferably join up. See 
aut hor's interv iews with Keat Sokun and Son Soubert. 
639 In the following sec tion s, particular attention is pa id to the SRP as the largest and most 
influential of the democratic parties. 
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legitimate leader 's birth equality wit h the people, with only soc ial mobi lity, 
ultimately,justifying leadership. 
In con trast, the Cambodian se lf-identified democratic project's claim to democratic 
representation of the people has been partl y contradicted throughout its history by its 
elite-driven nature , entailing fundamental problems of connecting with the rural 
masses it has purpo1ted to represent.'"° KOC-era democrats were sim ilarly alienated 
from the electorate by their elite and transnational backgrounds. This was 
compou nded discurs ively, by how the CPP made a point of portraying them as 
returnee s who had escaped the sanc tion-induced suffe ring during the rRK-era civil 
war, which the KPRr , by contrast, had shared with the people , and that they were 
therefo re oblivious of domestic realiti es. It was also compounded materia lly, by the 
e rr penetration of rural areas through the conflation of party and sta te, which made 
the local state function effectively as an ann of the crr. 641 Looking back at the 
demise of the BLDP, Ieng Mouly later stated: 
This is why we failed. We didn"t make connections with the local pagodas, 
with the aclwrs [Buddhist priests] in the villages. \Ve didn't have the 
support of the people. We were only an elite group with certain ideas. The 
CPP, on the other hand, are in power because of their contact with the 
grassroots. You can say that the CPP are only strong because they wield 
power and because they have money. But they are in power because they 
have bases everywhere, on the local level. The government representatives 
in the village are also CPP representatives. That is why they know what 
people need and can provide it to them. I f they need a school, they can give 
a school. You can say that they are corrupt, and we, we are not corrupt. But 
640 The founders of the Democratic Party were a progressive group of French-educated 
returnees, and the elite-nature of the 
party was reflected in its motto, ·Use the elite to serve the king and the people·. Cp. Chandler 
(1991): 30; Hughes (2009): 35; and Corfield ( 1994): 10-11. Whilst urban intellec1uals rallied 
to the pany because of their ideological commitment to democracy, the difficulty of 
mobilising the rural electorate led the DP to instead employ strategies based on ·exploiting 
networks of local administrative control and through tapping into customary structures of 
authority'. See Hughes (2009): 34-36. See also Baruch (1967): 5, who, although writing from 
an explicitly pro-Sihanoukist perspective, was perhaps not far off the mark in arguing that the 
DP interested only a minority of civil servants, leaving the people indifferent. 
6
" See, for example, Slocomb (2004) 
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since we don't have any money, we cannot help anyone. You can say that 
this is the po/irics of charity in Cambodia. They are corrupt and wealthy, but 
they give a little to the people, and so they help the people - that is why they 
have their support. People like us, who have no money, cannot even help the 
people.6-i:: 
This statement is important because, beyond the awareness of having foundered 
because of failing to connect with local power brokers, it manife sts the clos eness, or 
even intersection, of the CPP and democrat logics resulting from their shared focus 
on provision. [n the context of overwhelming poverty, provision is easily identified as 
the primary satisfaction of the ' people's will'. Thi s quote underlines how deeply 
problematic it was for the democrat s, following from the nature of the democratic 
project itse lf, which posited the ·people's will' as its very raison d'etre , that the 
CPP's penetration to the local level gave the party the capacity to identify and satisfy 
peop le' s actual need s, whereas by contrast, democrats lacked this ability. 
The emphasis on birth origin, moreover , has even been employed for parti san tivalry 
within the democratic camp. Kem Sokha has claimed pri vileged knowledge of 
fanners needs , by portraying him self as a middle ground between the two extremes 
of the SRP and FUNCrNPEC high-c lass, educated leaders from abroad, and the CPP 
leader ship from sim ple backgrounds and with low educat ion. Kern has pointed to 
how, like the CPI' leade rs, he is offanner origins , and how he lived in Cambodia 
during much of the PRK , and, therefore , understands ·the real problems' of the 
grassroots. On the other hand , Sam Rainsy , he has stated, is, with his aristocratic 
background, unable to grasp the situation of farmers; even referring Sam Rainsy·s 
work for factory workers to an intere st sparked by his higher education in 
economics.643 
64
:! Author's interview with Ieng Mouly, 7 Nov. 2009. Though Ieng Mouly's statement can be 
read as an attempt to justify his own involvement in the demise of the BLDP and his 
subsequent defection to the CPP, for whom he now serves as Senior Minister, this is arguably 
also indicative of more profound tensions in the democratic project. 
643 Author's interview with Kem Sokha 
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Ever since the beginning s of KOC multi-party politics, however , the leaders of the 
self-identified democratic parties were acutely aware of how they were set apart from 
the general public by their elite status and their transnational life trajectorie s. 
Animated by ideas of representing the people's will, they therefore engaged in a 
range of strateg ies to identify the needs of the people by understanding their living 
conditions. When Sam Rain sy and his assistants were expelled from the Ministry of 
Finance in 1994, their first move was to travel around Cambod ia to learn about living 
conditions in different provinces, before establishing the KNP. 644 Similarly, KNP co-
founder and wife of Sam Rainsy , Tioloung Saumura, state s that her political interest 
was awakened by when gradually start ing to invol ve, •Little by little , I [Saumura] 
discovered the sufferings of the Cambodian people . Tioloung Saumura outlines hers 
and Sam Rainsy 's dilemma as follows: 
What our party does in really based on the needs of the p eopl e. Because we 
have 110 idea about it. Cambodian society is very feudalistic. You have a 
group of people with a very privileged life, who do not even want to interact 
with the rest of the population. It is like the Indian caste system - you are 
born in one caste and don't interact with the others. Especially for me, l am 
Western educated and returned from abroad. How do I know about their [the 
people's] needs? I have to listen to them. otherwise I have no idea. \Vhen I 
go to meet the voters, what should I tell them? In the beginning, I didn't 
know. I just had to listen. \Ve have to listen to people, listen to the way they 
protest. Then we can find out about their way of life and their priorities. Of 
course we also try to influence them. ( Italics author's own.)6-H 
Thi s quote vividly illustrates the difficulties involved for Saumura as a returnee , 
having spe nt nearly 30 years in France, in identif ying the needs of the people that she 
aimed to represent. It is also significant that it explicitly situates the KNP and later 
SRP involvement with protest movements as responding to the spec ific purpose of 
the party leadership of learning about the peopl e's needs. Thi s, therefore, sugges ts 
that a conscious attempt to learn about the people ·s living conditions in order to help 
6.w Author's interview with Eng Chhay Eang 
6
-1
5 Author's interview with Tioloung Saumura 
203 
articu late their vo ice gu ided the leaders of the KNP to identif y the part y agenda. Just 
how pronounced a dynamic th is was is exemplified by the manner in which the 
wor kers movement- now fanning a backbone ofS RP support-was effective ly 
created by the young KNP. fn late 1995, Saumura was brou ght to see some KNP 
female gannent workers. This was a who lly new area for Saumura, as she exp lains: 
·None of us was a specialist on worke rs or un ions. ln France I always voted right-
wing. I always felt very privileged. I had a good educat ion , very high sa lary, worki ng 
in banking. I was never interested in strike s. '°'6 At her first meeting wit h the workers, 
she was told stories of their mist reatme nt that defied her wildest imaginations. She 
conv inced Rainsy, who was at first reluctant , to join in orga nising the 4000 factory 
workers by electing representatives and preparing them to strike , with the promise to 
pay their wages in case they were fired.647 When this indeed came to pass , a strike 
was called. The KNP leaders had the workers march the seve ral kilometres long road 
from the factory grounds near Pochentong to the Royal Palace , in a singing and 
dancing procession that, according to Saumura, more resembled a feast. A petition 
was then handed over to then King Sihanouk to demand his arbitra tion , which was 
followed by a series of meetin gs in the Royal Palace between the workers, Rain sy, 
representatives of the government and the Malaysian Embassy. For Saumura, the 
sign ificance of this event was the empowerment of workers who had been relegated 
to what she describes as slavery, reinstating them as citizens. Saumura parti cular ly 
reca lls one of the workers representatives with the wor ds, ' She was just a simple girl 
working in a factory- she wou ld never have drea mt of ever being allowed into the 
Royal Palace. This , I think , is really empowerment. This is trne democracy. I think 
that probably we haven't realised yet the revolution this triggered in those girls' 
minds." The democrats sought to identify specific needs and reali ties with the specific 
purpose of restoring all members of society to equa l status as cit izens, for democracy 
to be realised. 
°'6 Ibid 
647 Particularly noteworthy , in hindsight, is Sam Rainsy's reaction to this suggestion, in 
Saumura·s words: ·He didn't want to go. He said ··What should I say to themT He wasn·t that 
interested. He didn't see the social worry that could turn into a politi cal movement with 
repercussions for our party.· This neatly illustrates how crucial the process of identifying the 
people's needs was in shaping the democrat's political agenda, in ways not anticipated by the 
KNP/SRP pany leadership itself. 
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Thi s dynamic thus went so far as to some extent detennine the se lection of issues that 
would become the very cornerstones of the democrat political agenda. Even the shape 
the democratic project took - heavily geared towards popular protest - can be 
und erstoo d as a direct consequence of this quest for representation. The KN P and 
later SRP promotion of popular protest has been understood to inadvertently offer 
space for individuals to insert their own agendas.6-t8 Yet this suggests that it was also 
embedded in the very nature of the democratic project, at the heart of the democratic 
attempt at representation, fonning a response to one if its cha llenges . ·R eading' the 
people, by identifying the ir soc io-economic need s, can be understood as a 
funda menta l ' democrat ic ' imagini ng of how to relate to the nation. To trigger change 
necess itate d that the democrat leaders insert themse lves in peop le's rea lities to 
channel their demand s and empower them. In this, democratic leaders built on their 
selec tive knowledge to chann el the demands they took up. Whereas Sam Rainsy and 
Tiol oung Saumura modelled labour organisation on Western European str ike 
practice s, they were j oined by an emerging group of workers· movement leaders who 
had learnt how to organise labour in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe ." 9 This 
strategy of ' reading· entailed its own fundamental problem of ·legibility'. It tested to 
what ex tent the ·democrats· could purport to read the people· s will beyond 
identifying the straightforwa rd, immediate needs of particular const ituencies - a 
problem that I turn to now 
The Limits of Electoral Democracy 
Another tension emanating from the democrats" particular democratic imaginings was 
found in the realm of designing institutions that adequa tely represented the peop le's 
will. If we conside r the democratic project to be one of ' read ing· the people , this 
dilemma followed precisely from a problem of the ·legibilit y' of the peop le. The 
defense of parliamentary democracy has been a hallmark of successive generatio ns of 
648 Hughes (2002b): 174-7 5 
649 Progressive ly, the wo rkers' move ment was taken over by young returnees w ho had studied 
in socialist countries. The Free Trade Union of the \Vorkers of the Kingdom of Cambodia 
(FTUWKC) became institutionally independent whilst the personal links between the party 
and the movement remained strong. Its leaders were strengthened in anti-communist resolve 
by their experience in socialist countries, whilst, paradoxically, they had also learnt socialist 
methods of organising labour, which they employed 
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Cambodian democrat s. Yet con sec utive CPP electoral victories posed a fom1idable 
probl em for the democratic opposition and made it suspicious of the efficacy of 
elections in guaranteeing democracy. 650 Levit sky and Way have referred to the 
contemporary Cambod ian regime under the label of ·compet itive authoritarian ism', 
defined as ·civilian regimes in which fonnal democratic inst itution s exist and are 
wide ly viewed as the primary means of gaining power , but in which incumb ents' 
abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-a-vis their opponents' .651 
The se regimes are ·competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions 
to contest seriou sly for power , but they are not democratic because the playing field is 
hea vily skewed in favor of incumbent s·, throu gh measures such as electora l 
manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state resources, and varying degrees of 
harassment and sta te power. 652 In the Second Kingdom, elections have increasi ngly 
become the main or, as some argue, sole forum for politica l competition, yet with 
their own limitation s.653 The democrats are acutely aware of what Heder calls an 
·elec toral system with many un-free and un-fair aspects· , which he sugges ts, ·together 
with the CPP's monopoly of force , its control of the courts, its perfonnance 
legitimacy and the patronage reso urce s generated for it by the resumed eco nomic 
boom , helped along by Hun Sen's benefactions to soc iety', elec torall y marginalises 
the opposition. 654 
The central probl em for the democrats was to make sense of why Cambodians would 
vote for a party that , in their eyes , did not promote the objective interest of the peop le, 
but instead pursued inequitable development , which impoverished the majority. 655 
Many of their efforts ha ve been directed at ensuring free and fair elections, to correct 
650 This suspicion is confirmed by recent scholarship. See above, Slater (2008). 
651 Levitsky & Lucan (2010): 5. The following argument confirms Levitsky and Way's 
argument that competitiveness is an important regime characteristic that affects the behavior 
and expectations of political actors under less-than-democratic onditions (Levitsky & Way 
(2010): 16), demonstrating how elections have served to reshape democratic imaginings and 
the political game. 
65
' Levitsky & Way (20 I 0): 5. 
653 Karbaum (201 I): 111. 
'" Heder (2012) : 113. 
655 For discussions of the impact of current government policies on the poor, cp. Hughes & 
Conway (2003); and Pou (2012). 
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this alleged bias. 656 Yet the problem of representation was seen as one that could not 
be solved by electoral mechanisms alone, since it stemmed from more fundamental 
problems at the core of contemporary society. Cambod ian democrats explained the in 
their eyes cou111erin1ui1ive electoral behaviour of Cambodians with reference to how 
they thought the CPP-led regime to blind the people of their interests through materi al 
as we ll as ideological modes of domina tion, creat ing a climate of fear. 
Sam Rainsy and his suppo rters have repeatedly argued that the Hun Sen regime , in 
important respects, continues the politics of the Khmer Rouge movement they came 
out of, with the differe nce being inten sity rathe r the nature of the regime. They have 
summed this up in what is known as the 'three k', so named after the initi al ·k· of 
eac h of the three compo nent words of the fonnula: kh/ach ('fear'), kh/ean ('hunger'), 
and kh/01· ('ignorance'). The ·three k' has been identified by some as a Khmer Rouge 
strategy of government to ensure comple te con trol of the popu lace. In public 
discourse, Sam Rainsy and other democrats have repeated ly charged that the CPP 
regime purposely em ulates this model. 657 In his 2008 au tobiography, Sam Rain sy 
provides a lengthy elaboration on this, identifying , in contemporary Cambodia: 
widespread fear, through CPP -led politically motivated intimidation, threats and 
constraint fom1ing a weapon of political domination; hunger, charging that the CPP 
prefers 10 maintain a ·Jink of subjection· with the people by offe ring food donation s 
656 The SRP advocates a number of specific measures designed to safeguard the interests of 
the opposition in elections . such as outlawing coercion into membership of any organisation, 
including political parties: reviewing the composition of the National Election Committee 
(NEC); enforcing a rule that Members of Parliament and Senators cannot be expelled for 
political reasons; allowing independent candidates to run for parliamentary seats; limiting the 
mandate of the Prime Minister to a maximum of two terms (or maximum ten years): and 
granting Khmer citizens living overseas the right to vote. SRP 100 measures, nr 6, 8, 11, 12. 
14. Similarly, the Human Rights Party (HRP) advocates reforming the NEC; introducing 
name lists in elections: allowing independent candidates; having the Senate. provincial 
governors, village chiefs. and judges appointed by general elections: limiting the term of 
office of Prime Minister to two mandates; and allowing overseas Khmer citizens to participate 
in elections. HRP policies, principles 11-14. 
657 For example, at the 2010 passage ofa law allowing MPs to be charged with criminal 
offenses without the lifting of their parliamentary immunity, Sam Rainsy compared this move 
to the culture of fear prevailing in DK, which he traced to the ·rhree k'. McDermid, Charles 
and Cheang Sokha.20 10. ·Gagging MPs likened to Khmer Rouge.· Asia Views 35:3 
(September). See also Rainsy. Sam. and Rado Tylecote. 2006. · ·'Be vigilant .. on human 
rights. warns Cambodian opposition leader. Special report: Rado Tylecote talks with 
Cambodia's opposition leader Sam Rainsy in Phnom Penh.' April 24. 
http://www.conservativehumanrights.com/media/articles/samrainsy.html (October 26, 2012) 
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rather than crea 1ing viable job s; and ignorance , charging that the CPP does not inves t 
sufficien tly in nationa l educatio n, purpose ly resuilin g in 1he co ntinued high leve ls of 
rural illiteracy an d the absence of social and political conscience and crit ical 
thought. 658 
The purpo se here is not to eva luate the plausibility of these claims, but instead to 
conside r how thi s under standing of the contemporary social and polit ical order, in 
turn, bore on the democrats' understand ing of democracy in this context. Sam Rainsy 
has offered the following defin ition of democracy : ·The will of the majori ty can 
prevail. Yo u don ' t oppress people . You canno t go against the wi ll and the interest of 
the major iiy.' 659 Thi s conta ins an all-important distinction, and poss ible tension, 
between the will, and the object ive interest, of the majorit y. Asked about the 
democratic prospect s in a scena rio in which the people are una ware of its objec tive 
intere sts , Sam Rain sy rep lied precisely by reference to the ·three k': 
That is why it is blurred. The trick of the Hun Sen regime is to make the 
people poor, to kill the human spirit. It is the similarity between the Khmer 
Rouge regime and the Hun Sen regime, and Hun Sen as a former Khmer 
Rouge can understand that. There are three words of the Khmer Rouge 
regime that characterise it: kh!ac/1 - fear, khleaJ1 - hunger, kh!ov -
ignorance. This is typical of extreme dictatorship. To make the people 
afraid, and hungry, because then they can command the people by just 
giving people a bowl of rice, because people are so hungry, so poor, and 
ignorant. Look at Hun Sen. Kh!ach, [now] they are not kl,/ach as under the 
Khmer Rouge, but still, the people are afraid of being supporters of the 
opposition. Kh/ ean - [under Khmer Rouge] they will die of starvation. But 
the Hun Sen people are making people poor. They lose their land, their 
fishing zone, with poor salaries like factory workers, with commercial 
monopolies making an increase in the price of commodities. This is the new 
system to control the people through the economy, through the basic needs 
of survival. Then they depend on donations, on handouts, and forget the 
national issue. So Hun Sen can appear as a good man, giving donations, 
658 Sam (2008) : 228-29 
659 Author·s interview with Sam Rainsy. 
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while he jeopardises the future of his country. He blurs the line . It is why 
the fight against corruption, the fight to improve living conditions, to allow 
people to live with job creation, [so that] you depend on your salary, and not 
on handouts - all these are interrelated, then the human spirit can thrive 
because you are not prisoner of your stomach. But Hun Sen holds the 
people's stomachs hostage. (Italics author' s own.)660 
In this analysis there is a rift between the will and interest of the Cam bodian people 
today , cause d and ob scured by the poli tics of the ·three k' . As a conse quence , the 
pro spect s of democra cy under the incumb ent government are unsett led, and wo uld 
remain so eve n if free and fair elections were to be guarant eed. Even elections 
withou t any irregular ities, that is, would not suffice to express the democratic will and 
inte rest of the people. Ensuring the smo oth functioning of an electora l democracy is 
the refore not the endp o int of the politi ca l game. This anal ys is concretely in fonn s SRP 
politic al ac tion and stra tegy, wh ich, since the KNP days, has championed 
impro vement of genera l living conditions, re flec ted in a part y program that put s 
stron g em pha sis on phy sical secur ity and food sec urity, and include s demands for a 
minimum sa lary for teachers. 661 Cornerstone s of the SRP age nda, including anti -
corruption, improvement of living conditions, and job creation, are, as outlined by 
Sam Rainsy, above, not only part of a national economic plan, but also measures 
und ers tood to address a particu lar democratic deficit caused by the ·three k' disto rting 
the popular wi ll. Th e larger asp irati on of this political progr am is to bridge the 
artific ial rift between the popular will and interest to set the democratic game straigh t. 
Th e belief that the govern ment purpo se ly keep s the people in po verty is widely 
shared among ·democrats·. In this analysis, unequal capitalist transfonnation serves 
to ceme nt CPP political leade rship as an on ly superficially revamped comm unist 
regi me. This , in turn , promotes a ·f eudal' mentality under which Cambod ian people 
have lived for hundred s of yea rs. Sam Rainsy has therefore referred to the incumbent 
regim e as ·nee-feudal ' or ·feudal-communi st'. 662 In this analy sis, the changing 
660 Ibid. 
661 SRP ·100 measures'. 2003, Sections II and lll. 
66
:! See, for example, Sam Rainsy's millennium message in Ahmad (2000); and Sam (2008). 
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politi cal economy of the Cambodian state hid larger continuities in terms of the 
promot ion of a subservient popul ar mentality. For this reason, the demo crats not only 
objected to Cambod ia's present development path , on the basi s that it was seen to 
disadvantage a large segment of the populac e, but , of equal importance was how they 
considered unequal deve lopment a direct politi cal tool , upro oting the ability of 
elections to serve as an exp ression of the popul ar will. 
This further probl emat ised assessing the people' s will, for which election resu lts were 
irrelevant. Democrats finnly believed their own political faction to enjoy the peop les 
support. Among the democra tic oppos ition , there is widespread conviction that their 
own grou p enjoys the support of the vast majority of peopl e. Why this is not 
expre ssed in overwhelming success at the polls is explained by a mix of reaso ns in 
line wi th the ' three k', ranging from tangible o nes- such as the benefits involve d in 
voting for the CPP - to intangibl e ones , premi sed on how the people, kept in poverty 
and ignorance, are unaware of their actual preferences. In this last line of reasoning, 
the people are beset by a false con sciousness of sorts. Thi s is given proof of in the 
followin g quote s by SRP MPs: 
This government is not popular. They need the police to help with elections 
Village chiefs are appointed by the paity, and there are handouts through 
local government. lfpeople don't suppo11 the CPP, they wouldn't benefit. It 
is a trick that was used by the Khmer Rouge too: fear, starvation, and 
keeping people ignorant.663 
So far, our polit ical platform is still very popular and supporte d by many. 
But we could not win anything. Since the CP P control everything, control 
the NEC. The cou11s are not independent. There is intimidation. People do 
not have access to information. Education is limited and the poor cannot 
afford newspapers. Only a few people in the towns can know what is going 
011.66-1 
663 Author·s interview w ith Son Chhay 
66
-1 Author's interview with Yim Sovann. 
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Again, the purpose here is not to assess the various and complex reasons for the 
CPP's consecutive electoral successes weighed by an academic debate , which are to 
some extent visited above, 665 but rather to consider how the democrats· ana lysis of 
the reaso ns bears on their democratic imaginings. The difficulties they ident ified in 
reading the people' s will encouraged a tendenc y to equate their own agenda with that 
of the general populace , reflected in their often inflated figures of claimed support. 666 
Undoubtedly of strateg ic value , self -confident esti mates of popular support arguably 
also reflect a ·democrat' identity that equals the representation of the economic 
intere sts of constituencies with enjoying the support of those constituencies. Put 
differently , there is the expectation that all constituencies whose objec tive econo mic 
inter es ts are promot ed by the ·democrats' also support the democrats , in turn ; or, at 
least, were they to receive education on the ·rea l' situation , they su rely would. 667 ft is 
in this context that we can under stand the SRP's ex hortation s to voters to vote 
' according to their conscience'. 668 More problematically , this also high lights tension 
in a project self-defined by popular representation in assessing the popu lar will, seen 
in a discrepanc y between self-perception and val idation. In this sense, the democrats 
can only ever make convincing claims to represent a nation in becoming, rather than 
an actual , accomplished nation. 
Their disenchantment with what they considered a fraudulent electoral democratic 
game and search for alternat ive so lutions to represent the people' s will and interest 
climaxed in the SRP discourse of2011 to 2012. In self -impo sed exile since 2009, 
marginalising the opposition ahead of the 2013 national elec tions, Sam Rainsy took a 
665 Suffice to say that the academic debate evaluates the different elements of the democratic 
opposition's analysis. Cp . Hughes (2006); Hugh es (2002c); Karbaum (201 I); and Heder 
(2012; 2005a; 2007b) 
666 Heder (2012): 113 notes that the SRP, in 2011, •implausib ly claimed to have 500 000 
members', quoting ·Rainsy Still Atop Party.' Phnom Penh Post, 12 September, 2011 
66
~ The equation of economic interest and political suppo11 is proven here: 'Deve lopment 
under Hun Sen has made only 2% of the people richer - you will see that those 2% are those 
who say they are happy with Hun Sen·s economic policies, because their living conditions 
have improved. But 98% say no, we remain poor, and we have become even poorer.[ ... ] We 
know that the majority of the people are unhappy, so how come the CPP wins a landslide 
victory? It is through manipulation.· See author·s interview with Sam Rainsy. 
668 The SRP routinely admonishes voters to cast their ballot according to their 0111domkote 
('ideal·) or moneakseka cheat (·national conscience·). Sec, for example. Sam, Rainsy, 2012 
·Message to the people for the 3 June 2012 khum-s5.ngkat elections.· This admonition has 
been documented since the 1990s. See Hughes (2009): 36. 
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keen interes t in the Arab Spring as a model for ·people ·s power' in Cambod ia. In his 
analysis , growing popular discontent over inequ itable ·communist· deve lopme nt 
created the preconditio ns for a popular uprising. 669 The SR P quoted the Tu nisian 
trans ition as an in spi ratio n for ·count ries under dictato rship as Ca mb odia 1, sa id to be 
awaiting a Lotus Revo lution, wit h Sam Rainsy even paying Tunisia a visit to consult 
with pro-democracy activists in order to assess the possibility of such a popular 
uprising .670 Hun Sen sw iftly reto 11ed tha t he had come to power through elec toral 
vic tory and would step down only if voted out. 671 Shortly thereafter , the SRP party 
congress approved a strategy that listed ·participation in the 2012 and 2013 polls 
whi le fighti ng election irregularities and unfairness according to our means·, as we ll 
as ·popu lar up rising inspired by the Arab Spring and other forms of Peo ple Powe r i f 
the fort hco mi ng electio ns remain fundamentally biased and continue to serious ly 
distort the wi ll of the people· .672 Rainsy later repea ted his de mands for a refonn of the 
NEC an d his safe re turn to Cambodia, charging tha t the fai lur e to imp leme nt electora l 
refonn co uld help spark a popu lar uprising, as the population would stop believing in 
elections. 673 This demonstrates the SRP exasperation wit h the current electoral ga me, 
and, in partic ul ar, the exte nt to whic h the party found itse lf chal lenge d by how 
electio ns con tributed to the CPP's overall leg itimacy. 674 Their priority became 
stripp ing the incumbe nt govern ment of electoral legitimacy , both external and 
interna l. I.n tum , this was pre mi sed on their own party- as representative of a nat ion 
in becom ing - represe nting the popular wi ll. 
Representing the Democrati c Agend a: Determinin g a Politica l Identit y 
A fur ther tensio n concerned the democrats· political identity. This section examines 
how democratic aclors have tried to projec t the ir own poli tical project, and, in do ing 
669 Author' s interview with Sam Rains) 
670 SRP Cabinet. 2011, Sam Rainsy in T1111isia to Prepare People PO\rer in Cambodia 
67 1 ·Hun Sen Issues New Warning on the Opposition Regarding the Jasmine Revolution,' 
Cambodia Express News, 22 July, 2011 
672 SRP. Fifth Party Congress. 201 I. Reso/11tio11 ['(_ 
673 Author·s interview with Sam Rains). 
6
- -1 Ibid. Sam Rainsy"s pronounced preference for electora l reform, as docume nted here, 
stemmed , in part, from his lack of faith in the material conditions for a popular uprising in 
Cambodia (i.e. lack of internet access). 
2 12 
so, also examines the ir politica l identity as under stood by democratic actors 
themse lves. Thi s incorporat ed a tension betw een the locali sed and interest-based 
agenda which beca me disti nctive of the democrat political project , versus the national 
agenda, which these imaginings emerged from, yet, ulti mate ly, was difficult to 
proj ect. Although the democratic leaders identifi ed close ly wi th a global democratic 
agenda , the democrati c parties did not prior itise liberal democratic orthodoxy , and 
were ultimately susceptib le to appearing fragmentary and personalistic. 
In their searc h to identify the people·s needs , filtered through their political and 
economic ana lys is of contemporary Cambod ian soc iety , the SRP , in particular , 
embarked on a process of trac ing local grievances to defend the people's intere sts 
against the transgressions oftransfonning communism. In their analysis, Cambodia's 
economic liberalisation serve d only the political elite, their business associates, and 
Vietnam, whil st vict imising the overwhelming majority of the popu lation. Whilst 
they reacte d to new rea lities stemming from Ca mbodia 's rece nt deve lopme nt, pre-
existing percepti ons of a threat to national surviva l reso nated pow erfully. 675 The 
reg ime and SRP political projects were made out as two different concept ions of 
deve lopment. From an ear lier focus on workers· rights , land came to be paramount , 
reOecting the escalation of land conOict dur ing the 2000s. Under the notion of 
apill'oarh kos, ·unju st developmen t', the de velopme nt path taken by the CPP was 
made out as a threat to national survival. 676 The CPP-led government's awarding of 
fann ers· land to comp anies as concess ions was contraste d with an SRP model of 
reinstating fanners as owne rs of the land and, instead, inviting investors to buy their 
produce for processing . At the 5'" SRP congress, the part y pledged to ·return to the 
Khmer people all the goo ds that have been sto len from it·. Land, the property of the 
nation, was to be returned to its ' true owners ', the Khmer people , and indi viduals and 
private compan ies that forcibly se ized land were declared ·enemies of the Khmer 
people· .677 Sam Rainsy claimed that , ·th is faulty development is in conOic t with the 
675 Cp. Golay (1969). In Aceh, Edward Aspinall (2007): 952 similarly found that claims about 
unjust exploitation of natural gas resonated powerfully because they reinforced a pre-existing 
•discourse of deprivation· that infused Acehnese identity. 
6
'
6 Cp. SRP. Fifth Party Congress.2011. Reso/111io11s 
677 Ibid., Resolwion II. 
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Khmer people and kills the nat ion' .678 The SRP would, by contras t, realise ' a true 
development for the people·, which included protecting its property , annulling land 
concessions and giving land property rights to every citizen. 679 
The democrats embarked on a process of tracing local grievances stemming from 
Cambodia's current development path , seeing each as a repre sentative pan of the 
ailing nation . In what can be understood as a parallel discourse to roya list 
conceptualisations, which play with the idea of the royal body as a stand-in for the 
nation, every local suffering ·victim' was interpreted as a microcosm of the ·victim' 
nation. For the SRP leadership , there was no conceptual gap, as they perceived the 
conflict over fundamenta ls in contemporary society as continuously manifest in local 
issues. 680 The process of tying local, often rural, grievances to national imaginings 
was effortless - from the macro-perspective of the leadership , they were local 
manife stat ions of a national drama. Participant s in urban prote st movements with 
close links to the SRP have been found to be moti vated by a variety of grievances. 
Hughes argues that ideas of·innocence· and ·guilt' were useful in negotiating 
part icipation in such protest movements becau se they ·linked the problems of the 
indi vid ual into a plurality of narratives with great mobilisational power. ' 681 Whilst the 
framing of specific interest-based and local issues as national ones certainly served to 
mobili se the popu lace, this was arguably a direct consequence of the particular 
democratic imagining s of the lead ersh ip. From this followed also the reverse 
tendency- to dismantle the national agenda into the identific ation of distinc t interest 
group s, each to be represented separately in order to cater to its needs. 682 
.-, lbid. ,Author·s l'ield .\ 'ote 
679 fbid., Resolution IV 
6so Rural grievances are known to be reframed into ·nationalist" issues by the SRP, as they 
approach rural protesters in Phnom Penh. See Hughes (2006). Cp. how Hughes (2002b): 165-
67 found that, whilst political parties remain mired in a conflict over fundamentals, their main 
function has been to produce political space for protest movements to press for concrete issues 
and policy, and interest-based agendas. The above analysis suggests that, in fact, the 
democratic leadership relied on identifying particular, local issues for identifying the people's 
will, whilst understanding them to be primarily representative of fundamentals. 
681 Hughes (200\b): 53- 55. 
682 One striking example of this tendency is how, at the establishment of the KNP, Sam Rainsy 
suggested that Tio loung Saumura form a separate women·s party. She declined, pointing to 
how women make up a majority of the population. See author's interview \Vith Tioloung 
Saumura. This is arguably indicative ofa more thoroughgoing tendency to split the political 
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This national-local nexus stemmed from how democratic contestation was imagined 
to remain over the fundamental · rules of the game·, the constitution and electoral 
organisation. Local grievances, such as land seizures, were understood in tenns of 
how they ultimately amounted to a vio lation of the 1993 constitution. 683 This had 
importa nt consequences in terms of how the democrats re lated to a liberal democratic 
agenda. Observers have noted the discrepancy between the SRP political program and 
discourse and liberal democratic ideology.68" Yet, in leadership imaginings, there was 
no substantial conflict. The conflict over fundamentals was considered the national 
manifestation ofa global search for democracy, and they expected Cambodia to join 
what they imagined to be a worldwide trend towards democrac y. Addressing the 
conflict over fundamentals equaled the translation of global democratic concerns into 
Cambodian realities. 685 This was reflected in the sRP·s affiliation with international 
liberal democratic associations.686 The concern for translating democratic concerns 
into Cambo dian realities overshad owed any strict measuring of the SRP party agenda 
against liberal democratic orthodoxy, which was considered out of tune with 
Cambodian realities. Asked about the nature of sRP·s democratic beliefs and 
different tendencies within the party , Sam Rains y replied: 
agenda into representation of particular interest groups, doing little service to the development 
of one overarching political identity. 
683 See. for example, Cambodia Herald. 2012. ·Cambodia Marks Constitution Day · 
September 24. http://khmerization.blo 0 spot.co.uk/2012/09 cambodia-marks-constitution-dav-
does.html (October 26. 2012). 
6
" See Un (2008); and Hughes (200 I a). 
685 By contrast, Kem Sokha claims the basis of his ·democratic· thinking to be drawn from 
both ·our own democratic philosophy", in terms of Buddhist theory, and. since 1993, from 
global liberal democratic discourses. According to Kem Sokha, his intention was to change 
the mindset of Cambodians by educating them in the terms of their past histoty and Buddhist 
theory, which would be easily accessible to them. He claimed to include three elements in 
public speech: Cambodian and international histor): Buddhist morality: and ·international 
theor) ·. referring to liberal democratic theory. See author's interview with Kem Sokha 
Similar to the SRP, the HRP thus combined a proclaimed belief in liberal democratic values 
with a specific twist of adjusting them to Cambodian realities. yet was further removed from 
the liberal democratic identity than the SRP, which imagined its agenda to completely overlap 
with a liberal democratic one. 
686 The SRP is a member of the Council of Asian and Liberals and Democrats (CALO), the 
Liberal International, and the Transnational Radical Party. Sam Rainsy has emphasised the 
SRP·s belonging to a ·world liberal family·. See Liberal lmemational Newsletter 228. 2011 
·Sam Rainsy Meets with Liberals Across Scandinavia'. Senior party officials (Yim Sovann) 
stress how they have learnt political lessons from participation in these organisations. 
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Th is is too sophisticated. [ think the base is - do you believe in the human 
sp irit or not? [ ... ] If you are stro ng, yo u are in th e pos ition to lead the people 
to stand up against something wh ich is not good. But this ·perversion of 
democracy' is just too intellectual , it is discussing for the sake of 
discussing. 687 
This clearly shows Sam Rain sy's weariness of (primari ly foreign) accusations of 
diverting from the libera l democrat ic path. Fur ther than this , howeve r, it also 
indicates how the democ rati c strugg le was imagined to go beyond that of 
impl ementing an ideo logy or doctrin e. Since democracy was envisaged as 
transcendi ng a polit ica l ideology, mos t dem ocrats were wary of this language, 
imag ining democracy to be concerned with more bas ic questions of the relat ionsh ip 
betw een the peopl e and the po litica l leadership. Another SRP MP expressed it this 
way: 
Everyone has an ideology, but sometimes you need to change the menwlity 
because of great obs tac les . \Ve have to help ·]e petit peuple· to fight against 
the rich people who abuse them. You have rights, to liberty, to justice. to 
land, to be confident. It is not Communism or democracy. It is the habit. the 
habit of how to live, and how to think . Now it is like that of the communists 
I don't want to speak about ideology , but about the habit. 688 
Since the democrats did not recog nise their opponents as conten ders inside the 
democratic game , effec tuating change of popul ar attitudes was paramount. The 
envisage d means of effect uating soc ial and political cha nge throug h contestation of 
fundame ntals was a cal l for change in popul ar mentality to a 'culture of citizenship · , 
conc eived as an ant idote to the ·begga r mentalit y' imagin ed to be promot ed by the 
incumbent government: 689 
687 Author's intervi ew with Sam Rainsy. 
688 Author's inter view with Ho Vann. 
689 Thi s re frames Hughes' (200 I b): 54-55 disti nct ion between a ·mys tic· app roac h, whic h 
emph as ises individual change, and a •militant ' one, wh ich •aims to ensure the triumph of 
innocence over the guilt through the reclamat ion of the agencies of state from the brutal and 
greedy by the innoce nt and oppr essed·. Whilst she ack now ledges that most refo rm activ ists 
are influenced by both, the SRP agenda would correspond to the one she has dubb ed as 
216 
The SRP is crying to empo\\·er pt!ople as citizens. 1 ot as subjects. not as 
bt!ggars. Hun St!n promo1es a beggar mentali1y. A beggar cannot afford to 
be critical But a citizen is by definition critical. because he is part of the 
po,,er.690 
The discourse of citizenship thus followed directly from the SRP's misgivings about 
state-society relations. their disenchantment with the electoral system, and their 
belief that the citizenry. if allowed to develop critical thinking, would free themse lves 
from the blurred vision that the policies of kh/ach, kh/ea11, kh/o,· had imposed on 
them. to clearly perceive of their interests and bridge the rift between their will and 
interest. The SRP has framed this as a pledge to move from an ·elective democracy' 
to a ·panicipati,·e democracy'. defined as a system ·where citizens continually 
participate in a decision-making process affecting their daily life .601 The SRP 
pledged to educate citizens about their rights and duties for ·effective participation in 
good governance and social development . through a ci,·ics and democracy education 
program at school.691 
SRP leaders routinely express their belief in the necessity of profound changes in 
Cambodian popular mentality to achieve this cu lture of citize nship. In this. they 
typically invoke Western models: 
\\'e ha,·e to change the mentality of the people. \\'e think 1hat in Cambodia. 
1he obstacle to social de, e\opment is corruption. All political leaders ,, hen 
they were in po,,er became corrupt. In other countries, they do not allow 
impunity. but here yes. So we learn something from de,eloped countries. 
•militants· Whereas the distinction between these two axes of change is no doubt useful. 
analytically. the above argument suggests that a crucial part of the SRP agenda is to engender 
change b)-creating precondi1ions for the development of individual critical thinking among 
citizens. collapsing this distinction 
690 Author·s interview with Sam Rainsy. 
691 SRP 100 measures. nr 2. Relatedly. the SRP advocates measures ofa •direct democracy' 
type. including the promotion of referenda as a direct means for citizens to decide on major 
national issues. and the holding of a National Congress as a · forum for the people to learn 
directly about issues of national interest, and t0 raise problems. and to make suggestions to the 
authori1v·. SRP measures 3 and 5. 
6°' SRP.100 measures. nr 10. 
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civilised countries. We should build a new generation of political leaders. 
Like children when they are small. My son came to Japan with me. Now he 
still looks for trash bins in the street to throw litter, because he got used to it 
because of the law there. This is because of law implementation.693 
To change the system peacefully, you need to change the mentality of the 
people. In Cambodia, it is like the traditional, ancient states. We need to 
educate and say - you are the people, the masters of the country's destiny. 
Every day, I have to educate the people that I meet to make them change the 
mentality. I f we speak about democracy, they understand nothing. That is 
my opinion - we need to change people·s mentality and especially that of the 
youth. We need to educate them about anti-corruption, how to fulfil[ their 
tasks as citizens. I have the technique, I am a pedagogue.694 
I think Cambodian people are learning what democracy is all about. We have 
the exposure to Western thinking and try to introduce it to our members 
Then it is up to them to decide, not us.695 
Thi s didactic element is per se not surprising. Envisaging democratisation as a change 
of mentalit y is widespread in regional democrati sing contexts, whe re elites have 
drawn on Western democratic theory to insert new notions of citize nship , in order to 
remould the relation ship s bet wee n population s and the state. The se democrati c 
notion s did not stra ightforwardl y emulate a We stern model. In Thailand , Co nnor s 
find s democratic ideology to hav e transcended the focus on procedures and fonn for 
notion s of democrac y in Western political science , to instead conceptualise 
democracy as ·an idea l psychological , almost spiritual , condition of the people and 
their capacity to be se lf-govem ing'. 696 In contemporary Cambodia, as illustrated by 
the above quote s, the emphasis is simi larly on empowe ring the people for se lf-
maste ry over applying a We ste rn libera l dem ocrat ic model by the book. 
693 Author·s interview with Yim Sovann. 
694 Author"s interview with Ho Vann 
695 Author·s interview with Son Chhay 
696 Connors (2003): 1- 2. 
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In Thaila nd , suc h notion s came to underpin ' democra sujection· , what Connors 
describe s as the emp loyment of elite-defined libera l democra cy as a disciplining 
practi ce to secur e hege mony over the population. 
In contemporary Cambod ia, given that the demo cra ts (unlike thei r Thai counterparts) 
are not in power , this dynamic cannot be identified. Yet in other parts , the projects are 
not dissimilar. Elite s are needed to steer the proce ss of this change of mentality; and 
the common good, which the ideal citi zens are envisaged to work toward s, remain 
elite-d e fined. In thi s se nse , dem ocrat ic elites have primaril y represe nted a nat ion in 
becoming , rather than an existing one; a future nation whic h they have actively tried 
to crea te and shape . 
The fuzziness in definin g the SRY s brand of democracy was compound ed by how 
capita list economic development under the all eged ·communi sts' confou nded 
politi ca l labelin g . Tio loung Saumura explain s this as follows: 
You cannot position us within the framework of the western left and right 
scale. Y ou can say that we are conservative , because we are happy with 
Buddhism being the state religion.[ ... ] \Ve are also liberal and capitalists. in 
our work for Human R ights. and in supporting a market economy . We see 
profit as the engine for human development as well as economic 
development. You could also say we are also socialist. in that we champion 
social justice - the reallocation of the fruit of economic growth on a social 
basis, which liberals and the most extreme right-wing wouldn't like, and 
champion workers' rights.697 
In a con text where political contestation increasing ly revolved around the degree of 
sta te intervention in the market , the CPP has alleged that the democ rats were 
interventionist, and, by extension , soc ialist or even commun ist . One CPP Senior 
Mini ster remarked , ·We are all capital ists . We either have capitalism with sta te 
intervention, or laissez -faire capitalism. It is now HRP and SRP that think that the 
state should inter vene more. The old communi sts support laissez faire more , beca use 
697 Author's interview with Tioloung Saumura 
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some of them are rich. ' 698 Hun Sen has intermittently insinuated that Sam Rainsy·s 
accusations of the CPP-led regime being communist rather apply to himself, as Sam 
Rain sy is the one to sugges t the state to interfere in the free market through 
centralised price-s etting. 699 
Thi s quasi-sociali st identity was adopted, if not imposed. Several SRP leaders 
described the party as reluctantly socialist, so lely because the CPP-led government 
had failed its task of pro viding for the populace . Whilst the appropriateness of liberal 
or social ist labe ls per se is less interesting, it is important in what it betrays about how 
democrats imagined a ling ering contestation of fundamenta ls to distort the political 
land sca pe so that Western-derived political concepts could not be applied without 
qualification.' 00 The opposition had to first con-ec t fundamentals, before moving on 
with a further agenda. Asked to define the party identity of the SR.P, Son Chhay 
replied: 
Sometimes it is so difficult to answer, because we are missing a kind of 
responsibility of CPP, because of government corruption. Taking care of 
farmers, workers, and unions to protect them should be their task. To look at 
it, our party is kind of social ist then. But as a contrast, we are liberal in our 
approach. 701 
698 Author's interview with Ieng Mouly. 17 November 2009 
699 Cp. Hun. Sen. 2005. ·Selected Com ments.· ·A few days ago some politicians sa id ifh e 
were to get elected he would reduce the price of fuel to 3000 Riel per liter. He accused this 
and that of being communist but he have proven himself to be the one as he set up the price. 
You all are economists, taxation experts, accountants and auditors you may have a better 
judgment from what he'd said - what kind of politician and ideology does he belong to? In 
mark et eco nom y, there are no impositions in terms of pr ices by the state.' See Hun Sen. 2008. 
•First Cambodian Bio Energy·s Ethanol Factory.' Cambodia New Vision 129 (November). 
700 Recognising the potential diversity of tendencies within the SRP , once fundamentals had 
been accomplished, Son Chhay foresaw how, in the future, the SRP was likely to split into 
several groups, such as socialists, liberals, and greens. This reflected a view of Cambodian 
political society not yet sufficiently developed to contain these debates , and the expectation of 
a political landscape to which Western-derived political concepts could be applied to develop 
later. In this view, all these future groups were seen to represent different ways of democracy, 
according to the Western ·rules of the game· It betrayed a conviction that each of these would 
emanate from the SRP (as other political actors played according to fundamentally different 
logics), which would not allow them to develop into the Western-style directions that the SRP 
would. 
701 Author's interview with Son Ch hay. 
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Far more se rious than Western -derived political labe lling, in ten11S of developing a 
poli tical identity carrying domestic weight , was how to make the democratic project 
appear as some thing more than a pro test movement. The CPP regularly accuses the 
SRP and democrat ic parties of hav ing little more ofa politica l agen da than simply 
cri ticising the governmen t.702 The focus on local grievances compounded the risk of 
the democrat project appearing piecemeal, withoul the overarching national agenda 
backing up government developmen t proj ects. It is in this co ntext that the C PP 
strategy of push ing oppos ition parties to rename the mselves after their party leade rs 
shou ld be understood , making them appear personalist ic. In 1998, Sam Rainsy lost 
the name· Khme r Natio n Party" to his then pro -CPP de puty Kong Mo ny by a court 
order , and the party adopted the name 'Sam Rainsy Party· to preve nt the situat ion 
from repeating itse lf. 703 In a parallel fash ion , the BL DP party name was cla imed by 
two diffe rent parties from 1995 until, according to Keat Sokun, CPP Minis ter of 
Inter ior Sar Kheng sugges ted to rename it the ' Son San n Party' ahead of the 1998 
electio ns.704 Wh ilst the name change worked better for the SRP than the already 
moribund Son Sann Party (in tenns of bringing party stability) ,705 SRP party officials 
are consc ious of its disadvantage- making the party appear ·undemocrat ic 1 to fore ign 
observe rs and marginal ised to the domestic electorate. 706 Sam Rainsy has tried to 
counter this by making a point of invoking his name as a stand-in for national values. 
Di scussi ng the SRJ' success in the 2012 senate e lec tions, Sam Rainsy remarked: 
Hun Sen had been told by his advisers that the SRP with Sam Rainsy being 
abroad will go down the drain, the party would just disintegrate, because 
they thought the SRP was a one- man show. [ . . . ] But the senate elections are 
a demonstration that the party holds well , and that there are millions of Sam 
Rainsys in Cambodia. A Sam Rainsy is any person who believes in the 
702 See, for example, National Democratic Institute (2010): 9. 
703 Roberts (200 I) : 176- 77. 
70
-' Roberts (200 1 ): 178; and author's interview with Keat SokLm 
705 Years later, Sam Rainsy maintained that this had been the right decision, as it had allowed 
the pany to remain stable, whereas it would otherwise have been split or destroyed. Author·s 
interview with Sam Rainsy. 
706 To counter this, party officials frequently volunteer to explain the change of party name. 
See, for example, author's interviews with Yim Sovann, Thach Setha, and Uch Serey Yuth. 
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values we are talking about - the desire for freedom, the desire for justice. 
and the desire for human dignity. 707 
The name issue is c learly put in the context of countering perceptions that reduce the 
party to being repre sentative of Sam Rain sy as an individual. Whilst the SRP 
vo lunteered the name change , it ha s had to consistently counter perceptions of itse lf 
as personalistic. 708 In con tra st , the very name of the CPP purports to represent the 
Cambodian people , whereas the opposition parties appear as the factional groupings 
of single individuals. 
Nation, Religion , King and Democratic Identity: Transforming (Post-) 
Resistance Identities 
The ·d emocratic ' identity in the KOC, as it had in the past, was articulated in a 
process intertwined with ideas of the appropriate role of the Cambodian monarchy; in 
this way developing in tandem with royalist ideas. Never straightforwardly corre lated 
wi th a royalist or republican stance , the tension between limiting the powers of and 
defending the monarchy has marked the democratic identity throughout the post-
independence period. As successors to a shared civil war resistance identity, this 
tension conti nued into the KOC between self -ident ified democrats and royalists who 
conti nued to come together in a joint democratic opposition identity over the 
contestation of fundamentals. Yet democratic and a royalist identities also developed 
in different directions , cementing themselves as two separate discourses in novel 
ways. Restricting prospects for cooperation, this would ultimately work out to the 
disadvantage ofroyalists 
During the PRK , the KPNLF and FUNCfNPEC, although maintaining separate 
political identities , were united in their shared anti- commu nist , anti -Vietnamese 
agenda , which subsumed differences under an overarching resistance identity. In the 
KOC, political party contestat ion has been demonstrated to continue to centre on a 
101 
In the 2012 senate elections, the SRP lost no potential seats. in spite of the CPP being 
expected to attempt vote-buying. 
708 Author's interview with Yim Sovann 
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conflict over fundamentals, revolving around contending int erpretat ions of the 
constitution and elec toral organisation. 709 The civil war resistance identity was 
transfonned into a shared democratic opposition identity, uniting the opposition now 
competing under royalist and democratic banners, when there was the percep tion that 
those fundamental ·rules of the game· had been violated, such as at the 1997 July 
events , and repeatedly following national elections. 710 Royalists shared the core 
·democratic' sta rting points, outlined above , which upheld the PPA and constitution 
as the yet-to-be-implemented-correctly fram ework for national politics. Yet, as has 
ben argued , there was also a rift amongst royalists between those who stressed a 
distinct role for the monarchy and royalists , and those who identified more closely 
with a democratic opposition identit y. 
It would be incorrect to take the shared focus on fundamentals to equate the projects 
of self-identified democrats and royalists, even in the limit ed context of these 
demands. Even whil st fighting over the same democratic ·rules of the game ' , in tern1s 
of contending interpretations of the constitution and electoral organisation, this was 
argued by virtu e of competing logics. By and large, royalists saw these shared 
concerns through a prism that , ultimately, accorded the monarchy a saving role in this 
quandary. For those who primarily self-identified as ' democrats·, the PPA had value 
as a framework that prepared for the drafting of the constitution and the establishment 
of a multi-party democratic syste m along Western liberal democratic lines. For 
royalists, the PPA primarily proved Sihanouk, as President of the Supreme Nationa l 
Counc il (SNC) , to be the father of national conciliatio n, without whom the 
contending factions could not have been reunited, and subsequent elections not 
held. 711 
709 Hughes (2002b): 167~8. 
710 The SRP, FUNCINPEC, and Son Sann Party contested the 1998 elections results jointly , 
and the SRP and FUNCfNPEC contested the 2003 elections jointly, resulting in the creation of 
the · Alliance of Democrats' (see Heder (2005a)). In 2008, dynamics were different, as the 
FUNC!NPEC was by then under de facto CPP infiuence following the 2006 ousting of 
Ranariddh, and because of the rift between the SRP and FUNCINPEC following the 2004 deal 
between FUNCINPEC and the CPP (see above) 
711 See, for example, author's interviews with Norodom Ranariddh and SisO\vath Ayravady. 
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The shared contestat ion over fundamenta ls is but the latest reimag ining of an 
amb iguous relationship betwee n democracy and the Cambo dian monarchy, and 
examining it from the viewpoint of the se lf-identified democrats sheds light on the 
criteria that their notion of ·democracy ' revo lve around. From the ou tset, whi lst 
democratic discourse targeted the power of an absolute monarchy , it has been a 
para lle l, poten tially compat ible discou rse to that of roya lism, wh ich, in its centrist 
articulat ions, envisaged the mo narc hy, if str ict ly constitut ional, as part of its 
democratic project. 712 Following the ambiguities with wh ich the Cambod ian 
monarchy evolved (partic ularly Siha nouk·s po litical dominance during Sangkum as 
an abdicated monarch), the Cambo dian democrats· positio ning vis-a-vis the 
mo narc hy deve loped in a simi larly amb iguous fashion. In this process , the pe rsonal 
sta nce of Son Sann beca me particu larly fonnative for democratic identity. Son Sann 
is generally understood to have been pe rsonally loya l to Sihanouk , sometimes 
dista ncing himself from the DP that he had he lped to found, a lthoug h op inions are 
divided as to what ex tent. 7ll During the PRK res ista nce, in spi te of their sha red 
res istance agen da, a wedge was driven between royalists and democrats by the fact 
that the KPNLF, headed by Son Sann, included fonner Republican activists who 
remained fervently ant i-Sihanoukist, making up most of the cabinet and anny. 714 The 
KPNLF was understood as a Republican movement by obse rvers - and by Siha nouk. 
It is beyond the scope here to revisit the balance between those neutral to the 
monarchy and Republ ican tendencies in the KPNLF. What is of interest is the 
language employed by contemporary pol itical actors, emanating from the KPNLF and 
711 Whilst the DP centre supported a constitutional monarchy, the party also incorporated anti-
royalist rightist and leftist elements 
713 Serving as Sihanouk's Minister 1951-68, Son Sann offered to mediate between Sihanouk 
and Lon Nol during the Khmer Republic, although this never came to pass. At Son Sann·s 
death in 2000, a state funeral was held. altended by Sihanouk. 
714 Whilst the movement was riveted by internal divisions, the 1985 split between Son Sann 
and Sak Sutsakhan was not primarily a conflict ofa Republican versus a Sihanoukist group, as 
understood by some foreign observers, but instead rooted in personal conflicts of interest. To 
some limited extent, the split also went back to how some felt that Son Sann had orchestrated 
the 1952 coup de force against then DP Prime Minister Huy Kanthoul. Regardless of the cause 
of the original split, when this crystallised into a 1993 split between the political parties 
Liberal Democratic Party (LOP) under Sak Sutsakhan and the BLDP under Son Sann, most of 
those who joined the LD P were young returnees from France and the US who leaned towards 
republicanism. See author"s interviews with Ieng Mouly, 17 Nov. 2009, Dien Del, Huy Vora, 
and Keal Sokun 
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invo lving in the BLDP , HRP , FUNC IN PEC, and NRP , in re interpreting their past 
political involvement. Whil st they doubtle ss ly attemp ted to smoot hen and naturali se 
how man y of them now moved back and forth between the democratic and royal ist 
ca mp s, thei r reinterpr etat ions also lay out the discurs ive boundarie s they place d on 
democracy . Fir stly, the fonner KPNLF leaders hip genera lly refer back to the KPNLF 
po litical identity as ·democratic·. In their accounts, Son Sann remained unfailingly 
loya l to Sihanouk throug hout the civ il war - even the creat ion of the KPNLF was 
with the intenti on of handin g the movement over to Sihanouk. 715 The fonn er 
leader ship c laims that the Republi ca n image of the KPNLF was orchestrated by 
externa l acto rs, and they claim not even to hav e known why the KP NLF was 
percei ved as Republican throughout the civi l war .716 Secondly , ·democrati c' was not 
tak en to entail a choice between royalism and Republicanism per se.717 The se 
accounts cut across camps. Whi lst the gro up previo usly around Son Sann cont inued 
to stress the compatibi lity between democracy an d the co nst ituti ona l mo narchy, the 
fo1111er, Republi ca n-l eaning e lements, argue the same compatibility between being 
democrat and Repub lican. In bot h cases, these acto rs cla im to have been · democratic' 
by follow ing popular preference. 718 For democra ts support ive of the monarchy , their 
emp hasis on ·d emoc racy' meant that their supp ort of the monar chy, rather than 
express ing the unconditio na l suppo rt of the monarch y per se, was de rived from 
fo llowing the popu lar prefere nce . Republican s, on the other hand , explain ed their 
stance in tenn s of the monar chy lack ing popular support. 
715 Author's interviews with Son Seubert and Ieng Mouly, 17 Nov. 2009. 
-
16 Author"s interviews with Son Soubert, Ieng Mouly, 17 Nov. 2009, and Dien Del. 
Particularly the date of proclamation of the KPNLF on 9 October, the date of proclamation of 
the Khmer Republic, was claimed to have given Sihanouk the wrong signal. According to Son 
Soubert, it was their Thai hosts who made the group proclaim the creation of the front on 9 
October 1979, after having refused it on 5 October, Son Sann·s birthday. Son Seubert later 
claimed this to have been orchestrated by the international commu nity, wanting to set up the 
resistance in such a way as to be able to rely on people from as different backgrounds as 
possible. According to Son Soubert, Son Sann never understood why Sihanouk thought the 
KNP LF to be ·republican' rather than 'democrat'. and it was not until after Son Sann's death 
that Sihanouk alerted Seubert to this issue. Y et Republicans in the KPNLF were certainly 
aware of its symbolic significance. According to Dien Del, former Republican Prime Minister 
In Tam, who rejoined Sihanouk at\er 1979, purposely informed Sihanouk about the day of the 
creation of the KPNLF to make him distrustful of the front. 
717 Author·s interview with Ieng M ouly. 17 November 2009 
718 Author·s interviews with Kem Sokha and Dien Del. Admittedly. such statements by forme1 
Republicans who later defected to royalist parties could be seen as a later invention to 
naturalise their changing side-taking. Yet arguably, the very language they chose to employ is 
significant in the distinction they establish between ·democratic' and Republican. 
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This reasoning was also offered to explain dynamics in the Second Kingdom. When 
the Son Sann Party dissolved to merge with FUNCfNPEC, an important reason for 
the merger was the shared resistance background now again calle d on following the 
Jul y 1997 eve nts, which made it critically important to take sides between Hun Sen 
and Ranar iddh. In this, assumed popular support for the monarchy was a crucial 
consideration, a logic also offered by prev iously staunch Republicans j oining camp s 
with the royalists. 719 Fo,mer Republican General Oien Del ,jo ining FUNC INPEC and 
later the Norodom Ranariddh Party , referred it to how non-communist nat iona lism 
necessari ly meant a union between self-identifi ed democrat s and royalists, given the 
popular support for the monarchy ." 0 In such statements, the logic of followi ng the 
popular will was indistinguishab le from strategic ca lculations. They also reflect 
fonner Republican s· easier accepta nce of a weakened monarchy. This was later 
faci litated by Sihamoni eme rging as a strictl y constitutional monarch , whilst their 
republicanism was made out , perhaps reinvented, as primarily anti-Sihanoukist, rather 
than anti -monarchical per se. 
By the same token , this same set of political actors evaluated royalist parties as either 
·democratic· or non-democratic , with the criterio n being the perceived extent of 
representat ion of and responsiveness to grassroots voices. Son Seubert outlines the 
difference between different roya list projects as follows: 
FUNCrNPEC is not democratic - it does not work from the base, it does not 
listen to the grassroots. lf royalists are democratic - then thl!y are ok. Some 
royalists are democratic , not all. We have to go along in rhe H·a_v of the 
people. Prince Thomico is a democrat. Sihanouk was a democrat when he 
set up the National Congress.7'.~1 
The ties between roya lists and self-identified democrats thus reflected lasting bonds 
from their fonner shared resi stance ident ities and political imaginin gs that these 
impli ed, thought to constitute a shared identit y vario usly conceptualised as 
~
19 Author's interview with Huy Vora 
720 Author·s interview with Dien Del. 
rn Autho r's interv iew wit h Son Seubert. 
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·democratic ' or ·nationali st '. The interaction be tween Prince Thomico·s Sangkum 
Ja tiniyum Front Party and the gro up of fonner BLDP lead ers before the establishment 
of HRP further testified to the strong link s between the fom1er BLDP group and 
roya lists who self-id ent ify as ·d emocrat s ' ."' The blurring bet wee n royalists and 
democrats was eviden t in the fluidit y between the factions, which was also found at 
the leve l of the top lea der ship. Kem Sokha join ed the BLDP rather than 
FUNCIN PEC, because only Son Sann (an d not Ran ariddh) accep ted to meet him. 723 
Meanwh ile, Sam Rainsy and his clo se associates came out of FUNCINPEC. 
Conve rse ly, severa l of the royal ists who remained close to the demo cra tic parti es had 
belonged to the KPNL F and/or sided wi th the Khmer Republic , and now fluctua ted 
bac k to the royali st side of the divide - perhap s out of a newborn sense of famil y 
loyalty. Th e fact that previous sta unch Rep ubli cans joined them also test ifies to the 
weakness of party loya lty, and the stren gth of shared resista nce identities, over 
forging links with a new ge neration of democra ts dominating the SRP. 724 
The relationship betwee n the SRP and politi ca l royalists shifted the democratic 
ident ity to one that was in more open conflict with that of the royalists. The decline of 
tru st between the SR P and FUNC [NPEC followed its own distinct trajectory , 
mirr oring power machinations between Ranariddh and Hun Sen. When Ranariddh 
called off the Allianc e o f Democrats in 2004 to again ente r into a coa lition 
gove rnment wit h the CP P, trust was fundam enta lly ruined, marking the end of 
prospects for cooperation; this was lat er compounded when Ranariddh agreed to have 
Sam Rainsy exiled. When , in 2006, Sam Rainsy , afte r being allowed back in 
Ca mbodia , sign ed the cons titutional am endm ent requiring a simpl e majority rather 
than a 2/3 majority to pass laws in the Natio nal Asse mbl y, making FUNC INPE C a 
72::? According to Keat Sokun, the SJFP was set up by Thomico as a party that Ranariddh could 
take over and change into the Norodom Ranariddh Party. Ranariddh wanted Son Soubert or 
Keat Sokun to be Vice Preside111 and they were both initially involved, but after it was clear 
that the SJFP had failed. they decided to instead support Kem Sokha in setting up the HRP. :!: Author's interview with Kem Sokha 
· In the KOC, there have been some attempts at commemorating the shared resistance 
heritage. This has included yearly commemoration at a stupa in Kien Svay district, Kanda[ 
province, with the inscription of the names of KPN LF fighters who fell during the resistance. 
Cp. Brady, Brendan and Kouth Sophak Chakrya. ·KPNLF Commemoration: Former 
Resistance Leaders Stand by Antagonism Towards Vietnamese,' Phnom Penh Post, 6 March 
2009. 
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redundant coalition partner for the CPP, this was understood as his revenge against 
Ranaridd h. 
As the group around Son Sann, Sam Rain sy ' s political views did not differ greatly 
from the group of roya lists who identified close ly wit h a shared democratic age nda ." ' 
Yet the att itud es of SRP members differed from those of the group around Son Sann. 
A majority became politically involved spec ifically because of their support for Sam 
Rain sy's agenda. They associated more closely with global libera l democratic 
identit ies than the former resistance did, and , in this spir it, they supporte d a 
const itut iona l monarchy along Western lines. Political royali sm seemed outdated to 
them, and they treated such ideas wi th disinteres t. 
The sing le most importa nt factor shaping the SRP· s relation ship to royalists was Sam 
Rainsy's family"s tom1ented relation ship to Sihano uk. Both Sam Rainsy' s and 
Tio loung Saumura's fathers had been close allies of Sihanouk, and their famili es we re 
closely soc ially linked with the royal fam ily.'26 A prominent poli tician and Deputy 
Prime Minister in Siha nouk·s government in the 1950s, Sam Rainsy"s father, Sam 
Sary, suffe red a fall from grace and became deadlocked in a public confrontation with 
Sihanouk, ultimately escaping underground to joi n the Republican ·Khmer Serey', 
before disappearing. Royalists understood Sam Rainsy to blame Sihanouk for his 
father°s disappearance and death, privatel y quoting Rain sy·s perceived vindictive 
ulterior motives as precluding any closer cooperation. 717 Just to what exte nt this 
hampered contemporary collaboration was testified to by Sihanouk's attempts to 
restore Sam Sary's reputation when trying to unite the oppositio n. In April 2003, 
ahead of national electio ns, Sihano uk released a royal commun ique referring to the 
incident that caused Sam Sary·s fall of grace as a misun derstanding; in it, he called 
Sam Sary ·a great and genuine patriot' who had given proud service to Sihano uk and 
ns Rainsy and Norodom Sirivudh had been ousted at the same time in 1995, whilst not for the 
same reasons, and maintained friendly links. It was Norodom Sirivudh who proposed the 2003 
'Al liance of Democrats' between the SRP and FUNCINPEC. As noted, Sisowath Thomico. 
Tioloung Saumura and Sam Rainsy had also militated together in Sereika. 
726 For example. Ketty Tioulong. Saumura's sister. married Prince Chakrapong in 1965. See 
·Ro)al wedding.· Kamb11ja 19 (November) 1965. Sam Emmarane. Rainsy"s sister, danced in 
the Royal Ballet and served as a lady-in-waiting at Suramarit's coronation. Sam (2009): 24 
727 Autho r's interview s. 
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the nation during the first years of Sihanouk's reign and of Sangkum.'2 8 Royali st 
suspicions of lingering rancor appeared to be con finned by the publication of Sam 
Rainsy's 200 8 autobiography , Rooted in Stone (Des racines clans la pierre), which 
was sharply critical of Sihanouk. In the book, Sam Rainsy tried to restore his father·s 
reputation, and outlined his father·s painful quest to placate a relentle ss Sihanouk. He 
described how his father ' s escape co uld not co ntain Sihanouk·s fury, who conti nued 
persecuting the family , forcing Rainsy's grandfa ther and uncle to resign from politics 
and imprisoning his mother, before having the whole family thrown out of Cambodia 
in 1965.729 ·Too much power can become perversity', Rain sy concluded ." 0 Together 
with a book by hi s sister, Sam Emmarane, which was publi shed in 2009, Rain sy"s 
book was was important for confir min g royalist suspici on of Rain sy to be anti-
royalist for these personal motives. 73 1 This cemented a rift between SR P-brand 
democratic and royalist identities. 
"' See letter from Norodom Sihanouk, 26 April 2003 , in Sam (2009): 14. A second letter from 
Sihanouk, dated 28 April 2003 (ibid.: 14-15) , confirms the important role played by Sam Sary 
in the Royal Crusade for Independence(! 952-53), the Geneva Conference of 1954, and the 
first years ofSan gkum. and concludes with Sihanouk's intention to give justice to Sam Sary 
for all he has done for the nation and for Sangkum. 
7
:::!
9 Sam (2008) : 52- 56, 43. For Sihanouk's account of the London incident, see Ria/ires 
Ca111bodgie1111es, 20 Janu ary 1959, partly reproduced in Sam (2009): 57 
730 Sam (2008) : 58- 59. 
731 Sam Rainsy's sister Emmarane, in her 2009 book Cambodge: Histoire d'11ne vengeanc e 
roya/ e (/958-65), takes an even tougher stance as she sets out to map Sam Sary 's fall from 
grace and the tragic consequences for his family. She states that ·the principal cause of the 
Cambodian tragedy was the too personal participation of Sihanouk in national politics and the 
overlapping of Sihanouk and the Khmer nation. Sihanouk considered himself infallible 
because he incarnated --Cambodia'', both country and nation, particularly through the National 
Congress· (pp. 70-71 ). She describes Sangkum in the following damning words: ·Once upon 
the time there was Cambodia , a country blessed by heaven where everyone could live happily 
and where everyone knew that the price to pay was to ignore the political and social problems 
of the country. There reigned a skillful and charismatic Prince. Demagogue, he practiced 
towards his people a politic marked by ·'paternalisme bon enfanC. A majority of the people 
were peasants with little education and used to hear nothing by the prince, who they venerated 
like a God-King and gave him the name Samdech Euv (Monseigneur Papa). This one vested 
himself with a sacred power, personal and political which provoked a vivid reaction from the 
intellectual elite of the country. To channel it, he created the Sangkum Reastr Niyurn (People's 
Socialist Community) destined to be the only political party born of the dissolution of others, 
except from the Democrat Party and Pracheachun. The opponents of the princely regime were 
thrown into prison or subject to intimidations. He showed his faith in Buddha, but to his 
adversaries he ignored magnanimity and compassion taught by our Master' (pp. 15- 16). 
Emmarane's book, like Rainsy's, was taken by royals as a proof of how inflamed the question 
of Sam Sary's death and Sihanouk's presumed involvement in it remained for the Sam family. 
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The SRP advocates a co nstitutional monarchy , wh ilst remaining largel y silent in its 
party program on the mandate of royals beyond this. 731 SRP relations with roya lists 
were fundamentally tied up with the changing debates on a constitu tion al monarchy. 
In his auto biograph y, Sam Rainsy reappraised his father as co nsiste ntly supporting a 
constit utional monarchy- thereby dismissi ng allegatio ns of republica nism, and 
referring to a pro-monarchist heritage. Rain sy set out to prove how Sam Sary 
rem ained resolutely loyal to the constit ution al monarchy until his death. Sam Sary·s 
crit icisms were directed at Sihanouk·s 'ant idemocratic' stance , rather than the 
monarchy as such, referring to how Sangku m approac hed · personalistic rule ' through 
the national congress and his Buddhist socialis m, which both outfla nked 
parliamentary democracy. Instead , Sam Sary wanted Cambod ia to be a real 
parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy along the lines of Thailand 
or Great Britain. 733 Key to this was fannin g an oppos ition loyal to the Crown under 
his leadership_7l4 The king ' s exit from politics would confer upon him ·a great 
symbol ical, immutable power for the who le nation· to make him unanimou sly 
respected , and a suprapol itica l arb iter ofcontlicts. 735 Sary soug ht to ensure the 
surv ival of the monarchy through diversifying its basis of suppo rt beyond that of the 
per sona l popu larity of Sihanouk , by educating royal family members to enab le them 
to take on leader ship roles based on their forn1ation, rather than birthright. 736 
Meanwhile, Sam Sary's love for Western-style democracy and an ti-communi sm led 
him to cri ticise Sihanouk's rapprochement with North-Vietnam and China, econom ic 
dependence on China and the Soviet Union, acceptance of Vietna mese communis ts 
on Cambodian territory, and the 1960s nationali sations. 737 
~J.'.! Out of the SRP's 100 measures, only number five mentions the monarchy, advocating a 
National Congress presided over by the king. The I 0 principles remain silent on the topic. 
733 Sam (2008): 47. 
'.'.' Sam (2009): 225. 
J:i Sam Sary resisted Sihanouk's political influence. since he considered Sihanouk to be king 
even a tier his abdication. See Sam (2009): 19. 
736 Cp. how Emmarane quotes a 1959 letter from Sam Sary to Sihanouk: ' I recognise the 
necessity of the monarchy and my duty is to defend it ' Sary aims to give a special education 
to princes that will replace the inequality of birth with their superior intellectual and moral 
formation. He pleads with Sihanouk: ·Y our present politics builds the prestige of the 
monarchy only on your personal popularity without a solid and durable base. Father of 
independe nce. don't be the destroye r of the monarchy. ' See Sam (2009): 223. 
737 Sam (2008): 46-48. 
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Yet the meaning of constitutional monarchy in the KOC, as argued above, was not 
straightforward. Supporting a cons titutional monarchy in the early days of the KOC 
primarily meant defend ing the very existe nce of the reintroduced monar chy, and this 
was high on both FUNCfNPEC's, and the BLDP·s (as the then democratic 
alte rnati ve), agendas. Yet the contours of this constitutional mon arc hy were always 
fuzzy. Most crucially , whilst royalists pledged their support of the reintroduced 
constitutional mon archy, they did not envisage a constitutional mon archy that limited 
their political involvement, as argued above. Whereas a more purely constitutional 
monarchy has been in place since the 2004 ascension to the throne of Sihamoni, the 
CPP pushed the idea ofa ·con stitut ional monarchy' further, to mean the overall end 
of involvement of royal family members in politics increa singly vocally from 2006 
onwards. The CPP's call for a bill barring royals in politics, making them politically 
neutral 'to ensure a ll people's respect', was support ed by Sam Rain sy, who referred 
to an internation al model of consti tution al monarchy. 738 That Sam Rainsy chim ed in 
with this particular under standing of ·constitutional monarchy· testifies to his 
fundamental suspic ion of the involvement of royals in politics. The impl os ion of 
political royalism in the after math ofRanar iddh 's ouster has further reinforced the rift 
between ·democratic· and ·royali st' identitie s." 9 
Rea ssess ing his father as an advocate of constitutional monarchy thus chimes in with 
Sam Rainsy's contemporary objective to limit the political mandat e of royals, argued 
on pro-monarchic grounds. Claiming that his father after his 1958 demise represented 
738 Sam Rainsy stated that: · J want to see Cambodia with a strong and noble monarchy 
respected by all people.[ ... ) I wa nt Cambod ia to have a monarchy like in Thailand. Spain. 
Belgium , Sweden , Netherlands , Norway, Denmark , Japan and so on. In those countries their 
people pay very high respect to the monarch and to the royal family. However, most countries 
have a stipulation for this respect - members of the royal family are not involved in politics. 
[ . .. ] For people to respect the royal family. the royal family must not participate in politics. If 
you want people to look to you as the symbol of national reconciliation and national dignity 
you must not dabble in politics.· See DPA. 2006. Cambodian Opposition Joins Calls for 
Royalry to Quit Politics. 
739 For example, when in July 20 12 the SRP and 1-IRP formed an electoral alliance ahead of 
the 20 I 3 national elections (later transformed into the Cambodia National Rescue Party), Kem 
Sokha stated that neither the 1-IRP nor the SRP had ever called FUNCINPEC or NR.P 
'democratic' parties, and that what was distinctive of the ·democratic· political project was 
that it centred around ·democratic principles' rather than a prince or strongman.20 12. ·Human 
Rights Party Stance on Merging with Sam Rainsy Party.· June 7. http://ki-
rnedia.blo0spot.com/20 l 2/06/human-rights-partv-stance-on-mer0i 11° .html (October 26, 2012). 
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the democratic opposition, made Rainsy the successo r in stra ight line to this agenda. 
This entail s a compet ing national historiography to the Sihanoukist one , which 
emphasises the importance of the 1954 Geneva confe rence over Sihanouk"s Royal 
Crusade for Independence in achieving nation al independenc e.740 Sam Rain sy has 
reappraised his father , as a representative at the Geneva Conference , as one of the 
main architects of Cambodian independence. 741 This further points back to a common 
legacy between Sam Sary and Nhiek Tioloun g, Sam Rain sy·s and Tioloung 
Saumura ' s fathers , as · artisans of national independence· who sat together at the 
negotiation table at the Geneva conference, then ·marching together for more than 20 
years ' - some thing Sam Rain sy underlines in his autobiography. In this vein, some 
SRP MPs trace the party idea s from Sam Sary and Nhiek Tioloung: 
l think the ideas of the party came from Sam Sary and Nhiek Tioulong , 
through Sam Rainsy and Tioloung Saurnura. They have similar biographies 
and objectives. At the moment we are just taking their ideas. Both tried for 
independence from the French colonisers. Maybe Nhek Tioloung was too 
loyal to king Sihanouk. Sam Sary was freer.7~:! 
The SRP identit y is strongly defined by confrontation of contemporary realities over 
establishing continuity wit h earlier political projects, and this particular 
historiography has not been very actively disseminated. Still, this statement testifies 
to an und erstated yet pervasi ve se lf-percep tion among the SRP leadership , which 
contrasts the democratic agenda with a Sihanoukist one . 
Conclusion 
This chap ter ha s ske tched a different layout of the democratic discursive field in 
contemporary Cambodia than commo nly understood, by examining how notions of 
1·'° StiH, the KNP was founded on 9 November, the day of independence from France which 
concluded the Royal Crusade for Independence. 
"'Sa m (2008): preface. Emmarane also emphasised Sam Say·s role in the 1954 Geneva 
conference. which ·concretises Cambodian independence and lndochinese peace· Sam 
(2009): (preface) 
7-1'.! Autho r's interview with Kong Korm 
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democracy intersect with notions of the nation, or, more specifically, how discourses 
of democracy conflate popula r and national repre sentation. Observers have noted that 
the CPP"s alleged commitment to liberal dem ocracy is littl e more than half -hearted 
lip serv ice , whi lst the dem ocra tic oppos ition is understood to catTy out double-faced 
po litics, embracing democratic tende ncies on the one hand and ultra-nationa list 
tendencies on the other. 743 This chapter reor ients these under standing s by showin g 
how, in contemporar y Cambodia, the incumbent CPP-led regime and democrat s, 
alike, ha ve launched democrat ic discou rses wh ich share in co mmon with eac h other , 
as with many contemporary discourses of liberal democrac y, whi lst not sharing other 
important chara cteristics, that they confla te democracy as repre sentation of the people 
and of the nation. The CPP-led regime under Hun Sen claim s to represen t ' peop le·s 
democracy" as a uniquely natio nal fonn of democracy . For the democratic oppo sition , 
democratic and national imaginings are intertwined. 
Thi s suggests that the nexu s between democracy as represe ntation of the people and 
of the nation may be under stood as a sort o f core of contemporar y po litica l discourse , 
which can be emplo yed as a pri sm for bids to political repr esentat ion, rathe r than 
·ideolog y· per se. Populism under Hun Sen can be understood as a ·supraideolog y·, 
which transcends app ea ls to other political ideo logie s and identiti es. Meanwhile , se lf-
ident ified democrat s do not primarily conceptualise their pol itical project in term s of 
' ideo logy", but as a more fundamental project of sa lvaging demo cracy and the nation. 
At the same time, this also highlight s difficu lties in Sloco mb"s branding of the post-
1985 era as ·po st-ideo logica l", contrasting sharp ly with a previous era of •ideolog y· 
( 1955-84). 744 In fact, there are important similarities in regim e proj ects both befor e 
and after this divide, anchored in the continued centralit y of this nexu s. Hun Sen· s 
notion of·peop le·s dem ocracy" is not dissimilar from Sihan ouk 's Buddhi st soc ialism. 
Both notions served to equate the leader with the nation and with democracy. Large ly 
self -j ustifying , both were primaril y what Sihanouk and Hun Sen defi ned them as. One 
could argue that only the language of ideo logy is missing from Hun Sen's brand ; yet 
7'J On the CPP, see Heder (2007b); Peou (2000); Sanderson & Maley ( 1998); and Springer 
(2010). On the democrats see Un (2008); and Hughes (2001c). 
,.._, Slocomb (2006): 388. 
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even Sihanouk, in his days (as discussed above), was partly susp icious of the labe l 
· ideo logy". 
It is therefore significant rhar the se lf-professed CPP-regime identity under Hun Sen 
builds on notions of democracy and the nation , to which the notion of revo lution can 
be added. It has been argued that these three not ions served as a bridge in regime 
identity from the self-professed Marxism-Leni nism of the PRK era to the KOC era, 
in which a socialist identity has been abandoned , and large-scale capitalist 
transfon n ation is under way. Whilst it bestows continuity in tenns of linking back to 
democracy as the goal of a 130-year -old Cambodian revolutio n, today carried on by 
the CPP, it serves to substitute the previous Marxist-Len inist ident ity, yet retains 
from it a dialectic analysis of changing contradictions in society. This revolutionary 
democratic language is adapted lo confront new challe nges posed by the mo narc hy 
(through a discourse of equal opportun ity), and new practices bound up with a 
changing political economy (through cla iming to oppose· feudar fonn s of democracy 
of ·capitalists'), whilst engaging in capitalist development. In this , it serves 10 
guarantee prec isely that the regime can retain an identity distinct from Western liberal 
democracies. 
The self- ident ified de mocra ts did not, therefore, diffe r from the incumbent regime in 
tying democracy to popular and national representation , but only in the way they did 
so. For them, democracy meant rhe will and interest of the peop le, which natural ly 
desired national survival. This blutTed rhe boundaries between rhe ·democrat ic· and 
the ·nationar. Since they cons idered the contemporary Cambodian nation and 
democracy to be crumbling under mutating communism, the threats against 
democracy and national survival had but one and the same cure. Following from this 
analysis, however, a number of priori ties and notions emerged significantly 
problemalised. Identify ing the will of the people , thar the democrats purported to 
represent, was difficult, given that they were distanced from the grassroots both by 
their e lite and transnat ional backgroun ds, and by lacking the pr ivileged everyday 
closeness of the CPP-dom inated local stare. Regi me ideological and material 
domination was alleged to have driven a wedge between the people's will and 
interests, so that neither elections cou ld be considere d representat ive of the people's 
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will. Whilst local gr ievances were considered local manifestations of the larger 
victimisa tion of the nation , democrats were susceptib le to appearing as a protest 
movement without a national agenda. This was compounded by the way democrats 
also imagined themselves to be locked in a struggle that was large r than one between 
competi ng ' ideologies·, a more basic change in popular mentalities to a culture of 
citizenship. Moreo ver, the creation of democratic identity through tracing a 
democratic genealogy was never a priority, at the same time as the democrat identity 
increasingly evolved to contest political royal ism. In different ways, this 
problematised the political identity of the democrats. 
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Conclusion 
The findings of this dissertat ion can be co nsidered on a numb er of levels. Th is 
conc lusion be gins with an assessme nt of the impli cat ions of the findings from a 
theoretical perspective , with part icular attent ion paid to how the empirica l findin gs of 
the preceding chapters infom1 the theoretical framewo rk set out in the introduction. 
Thi s is followed by a discussion of the implications for the study of contemporary 
political contesta tion in Cambodia. Lastly, the discuss ion is expande d into the 
reg ional Southeast Asia n context. 
Competing, Unfinished Imagined Communitie s: Theoretical Implications 
Thi s dissertation finds politica l contestation in Cam bodi a following the 1993 
introduction of a multi -part y democratic system to involve a contesta tio n between 
differ ent articulations of the nation, making up competing, unfinished, imagined 
comm unit ies. To make politics mea n somethin g in post-PPA Cambo dia, all political 
party acto rs turn ed to the nation as the most important part of the answe r. Th is 
testifies to the strength ofa n Ande rson ian ·imagined com munity" in contemporary 
Cambodia, in the sense that these diverse project s appealed to an overarching 
Cambod ian national identity. imagined by the genera l public to unite them in ·deep. 
hori zontal comradeship' 745 Yet, in so doing , political actors equaled the nation 
exclusively with their own political project s, whi lst denying the shared nationali ty of 
their political adver saries , so that they thereby advanced rival ·imagined 
co mmunities'. These · imagined com munities' were el ite alleged, supposed. and 
desired versions of the Khmer nalion. They were competing imagined communities 
insofar as each strove to make a particular understanding of the true characteristics 
and contours of the nation hegemonic ; they were unfinished insofar as they were 
con tinuously subject to practice s ofre imagination of their partic ular histories. 
Whilst these dynamics have been shown to be particularly prono unced in Cam bodi a, 
they are not necessar ily exclu sive 10 Cambodia. Arou nd the world, one finds 
m Anderson (1991): 7. 
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'unfinished imagined communities', whe re discourses of national belonging remain 
contested with varyi ng inten sity. Imagination s of the nation, building on earlier 
histories of imagination, are necessarily reimaginations. Whilst striving to 
homogenise, they inevitably make up contentious imaginings. The ·imagined 
community' thu s remains a model for the modern nation. rathe r than a fail accompli 
By consequence, a main challenge for the study of contemporary nations is to 
conceptualise reinventions of unfinished imagined communities, which (in Cambodia 
as in many other contexts) take place with in a multi-party political framework , with 
electoral vic tory being the main objective of political action 
The findings of th is disse rtation confirm the relevance of Benedict Anderson's 
conceptualization of the nati on as an ·imagined community'. whilst simultaneously 
proposing modifications of his framework , for theorising the making of the 
contempora ry Cambod ian nation and by extension per haps also other similar 
contexts. Firstly, the national imaginings advanced by the contending actors 
discussed here all conformed to Anderson's definition of the nation as ·an imag ined 
polit ica l community·. imagined as both inherently limited and sove reign. 746 They 
were imagined. in the sense that the members. they claim ed . ·w ill never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them , or hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the 
image of their communion·. These actors imagined the Cambodian nation as limited, 
in the sense of having ·finit e. if elast ic. boundaries. beyond which lie other 
nations· 747 Each imagined the nation as sovereign, seeing (in confom1ity with 
Anderson·s theori sat ion) the ·gage and emb lem· of its freedom as the sove re ign state; 
therefore , each competed electorally to lead the sta te. They also each imagin ed the 
nati on as a community, in Anderson's sense. that · regardless of the actual inequality 
and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, 
horizonta l comradeship'."' The se parallel effor ts testify to how the imaginative 
boundaries of the nation hold sway to delimit the collective political imaginings 
med iated and promoted by the full range of party political actors. 
"' Ibid· 6 
747 Ibid.: 7. 
"' Ibid 
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Secondly, these findings reconfinn the construc tivist insi stenc e on the need to pay 
attention to historical processes in creating and shaping national imaginings and 
identilies. This dissertation has outlined, in detail, the contentious makings of the 
Cambodian nation as an empi1ical1 historical question, tracing contemporary debates 
to define the nation in relation to earlier elaborations on sometimes straightforward, 
sometimes meandering ways. Much scholarship in the constructivist vein has been 
dedicated to revi siting the impact of colonial state formation on local societies· 
national imaginin gs, and Cambodian studies have benefited from Penn y Edwards 's 
wort hy contribution in thi s respect. 749 Yet studies on contemporary Cambodian 
national imaginings have been largely unconcerned wi th tracing out the longer 
historical context these are situated in, in favour of the imm ediate , mobili satio nal 
value and function associated therewith. 750 One of the consequences of thi s has been 
the neglect by these studi es, important in their own right , of more deep- seate d 
debates, negotiated across the political spectrum, which this dissertation argues are 
central to current negotiations of the nature of the Cambodian nation. In particular, 
this dissertation has shown how events and debates just preceding independence , and 
in the immediate post-independence era, hav e cruc ially shape d subsequent 
imaginings, rewriting and introducing tensions that are still negotiated today. Hun 
Sen· s revival ofSdech Kan can be understood as the latest reconfiguration ofa 
contested relation sh ip between 'nation, religion. king· , which is characteristic ofpost-
independence Cambodia, following on and interacting with earlier such 
reconfiguration s. Meanwhile, Sihanouk 's Sangkum Rea str Niyum, and the tension 
between merit and genealogy , and inherited and embodied leadership it entailed, left 
an indelible mark on the search for national legitimacy by royalist parti es. 
Thirdly. these findin gs reconfirm Ande rson's insis tence that nationalism is best 
understood as being on par with categories such as kinship or religion, and that it is 
not an ideology, yet st ill needs to rest on an ideological base. Thi s gives analytical 
spac e to explore the flexibilit y of Cambodian nationalism, which was never one , 
unitary project, but instead linked to a successive, co-existing and interlinking string 
of po litical projects, each animated by more or less genuinely held ideol ogical beliefs . 
"' Edwards (2007) 
750 See, for example, Edwards ( 1996); Jordens ( 1996); Hinton (2006); and Poethig (2006) 
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Existing scholar ship on nationalism in contemporary Cambodia concentrates its study 
to the politica l opposition. 751 Yet, this thesis lays out how contemporary Cambodia n 
nationalism is a widespread logic shared equally across the political spectrum; 
something that the plasticity and reach of nationalism, as concep tuali sed by 
Anderso n, can account for. This is no t to argue in favour of the reification ofa 
separate notion of•ideology' , no more than we should capitalise ·nationali sm' . On 
the cont rary, this dissertation has outlined how the very concep t of ·ideology· has 
remained hotly debated as part of efforts to define the nation , offering a reassessment 
of the limits and meanings of notions of•ideolo gy' in the contemporary Cambod ian 
context. Yet Anderson·s approach accounts for the close intertwining of national and 
other political belief s, consistently framed in the language of ideology, in the political 
projects discussed here. 
Yet, in this regard, the Cambodian example also highlights crucial omissions in 
Ander son·s theori sations. These contending pairings of national and ideological 
belief s form the fabric of contemporary rival imagined commu nitie s, and are 
therefore bound up with division and contestation. To the extent that Anderson pays 
attention to confl ict, he mainly co nfines him self to ethnic politics and the creation of 
majorities and minorities, which he contrasts against the allegedly more bene vo lent 
politics ofnationalism. 752 This distinction has been criticised by postcolonial 
scholarship, pointing to how nationalism has become contaminated by ethnic 
politic s.753 The empirica l evidence in this dissertation offers a further critique by 
outlining cleavages not within the nation among ethnic lines, but rather between rival 
imaginations of the same nation. Anderson's locating ofcontestation to a sphere 
separate from that of the nation does not address the emergence of rival national 
imaginings that is observed here, with each positing alternative ones as fraudulent. 
In Cambodian articulations of nationalism, notions of genuiness and authenticity 
were, as outlined, centra l; political actors competed over defining the nature of true 
representation , true democracy, and, what was truly Khmer. This concern with 
notions of authenticity conforms to a pattern whic h John Sidel identifi es as common 
rn Hughes (200 I a; 2001 c; 2002a; 2002b); Edward s ( I 996). 
752 Anderson (1998): 29-45. 
753 Chatterjee (1999): 130. 
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to mainland Southeast Asia, where existing nation-states, as well as those aspired to, 
are ·understood to repre sent the timeless existence and time-tested endurance of core 
ethnies', and assumptions of a common identity or nature are widespread. 754 By 
contrast, in island Southeast Asia, Sidel finds identities to generally be conside red to 
be incomplete and in the making. 755 In the Cambodian context, where a common 
Khmer identit y is assumed and the underlying premise of nationalism is the 
·continuity and conservation o f identit ies· . politica l contestation has come to centre 
on defining the contents of this assumed shared identit y. This is achieved through 
invention and aspiration, making up contentious imaginings. 
Offering a critique of Anderson·s ass umption of the spread of national imagining s as 
an agent of homogenisation, the empirical evidence presented here also suggests 
avenues for extending his framework to theori se difference and contestation. 
Re framing the question. ·whose imagined community?·. posed by post-colonial 
scholar ship, it demon stra tes the need to shift the focus from passive to active 
imaginings by outlining the role of political elites in reimaglning the nation.756 This 
disser tation has outlined how the riva l imagined Cambodian nations moved in 
·salvational", rather than ca\endrical, time, showing how processes of recovering, 
reassessing and redeeming the past was an integral part of the making of all 
contending national imagining s. Yet, it also finds that Anderson·s theor isa tion s 
contain possible so lution s for its shortcoming s. Anderson·s insistence on the 
structural and material rootedness of nationalist discours e supports the consideration 
of contemporary nationalisms as existing in a dialectical relationship between their 
particular histo rie s and the practice of imagination. 757 Thi s, in tum , opens the field of 
research to contemporary diversity and contention between competing imagined 
communities, as elite imaginings strive to become hegemonic and gain popular 
acceptance. It gives analytical space to examine how these imaginings are necessarily 
u,ifinished, being continuously subject to practices ofreimagination of their particular 
histories. 
754 Sidel(2012): 116-117. 
755 
Ibid. Side! traces these two patterns of trajectories of nationalism to diverging patterns of 
state formation 
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Reassessing Political Contestation in Post-PPA Cambodia 
Two decades after the PPA, which were intended to transfom1 the civ il war conflict 
between combating factions to political comp etition between political parties that 
recognised each other as legitimate conte nders on the electoral arena , difficulty of 
reconciliation between political partie s persists. The failure to tum elections into a 
basis for agreeab le power sharing between political partie s has been traced back to 
the or iginal forcing of domestic parties into a politica l 'shotgun wedding' through the 
PPA.758 The multi-party elect ions that followed have come to exacerbate conflicts of 
identity , leading politica l parties to mobi lise aro und politicised ident ities. 759 
Meanwh ile, political parties do not primarily phrase their programs in the language of 
ideology , and policy differences between parties are obscure to voters. 760 This 
dissertation sheds new light on the cont inuous failure of political parties to reconcile 
by charting how identity-ba sed conflict , exacerbated by the new multi -party system , 
was tied up wit h competing national imaginings. Political , or politicised, identities 
were defined by their competing constructions of the nation, and the coro llary ways 
in which those flaunting these identities were made out to represent the nation. Rather 
than a battle of ideologies or policy platfonns, this contestation over national 
repre sen tation involved questions of embodiment and incarnation , the elected leader 
versus genealogy and the moral require ments of leadersh ip. 
This reassessment of political contestation in the KOC has imp ortant consequences 
on a numb er of level s. 1 explore these below , firstly, with regard to the implications 
for reassessing internal legitimisations, the role and status of elections, democratic 
debates and how these , in tum, provided resources and constraints on Cambod ia·s 
democratisation. Second ly, 1 turn to assess the implications for questions of 
continuity and change in Cambodian elite-level political imaginings. Demonstrating 
the structural and mat eria l rootedness of national imaginings, 1 show how they 
transfonned in importa nt, yet hitherto overlooked ways from the previous PRK era. 
"' Croissant (2008): 661; and Roberts (200 I): 47. 
759 Hughes (2002b ): I 67. 
760 Un (2005): 222: and Ojendal & Lilja (2009b) 303. 
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Thirdly , I assess the impli ca tions in tenn s of the very ca tegor ies in which political 
contesta tion took place, by examining conte mporary ideas of ·ideo logy·, doc trine and 
embodime nt. Thi s is followed by, fourth ly, a discuss ion on the popular appeal and 
acceptance of these elite-level imaginings. 
Legitimacy , Discourses of Democracy and Ca mbodia 's Democratisation 
Nat ional imagining s were linked to a sea rch for political legitimacy. Thi s dissertat ion 
argues that bid s for internal legitimacy, of the regime and its opponent s al ike, thus 
continued to revolve around nationa l imaginings, as they had in the past. Th is 
contradicts the assump tion of international policymakers that the holding of elections 
wit h proper procedu res of electioneering is the hallmark of internal leg itimacy. 761 It 
also contributes to prev ious schola rship that has agreed that, whilst procedural 
democratic legitimacy has given the CPP a degree of external legitimacy, it is a more 
vexed que stion whether this has also bestowed internal legitimacy. 762 Showing that 
the holding of elections per se is not sufficient to settle questions of internal 
legitimac y, this dissertation has laid out how all competing political party actors 
wit hin the electoral framework turned to strategies of establishing unique bonds wit h 
the nation as the ultimate object and means of legitimat ion. Whil st this served as a 
mean s to gain votes and thereby ens ure success within the electora l framework, it 
a lso served as an alternative basis of legitimation that went beyo nd the legitimacy of 
the electoral process per se. 
The contend ing sou rces of leg itima cy discussed here were all aspir ing ·democra tic· 
fonns of legitima cy in the sense that they were finnl y integrated into contending 
democratic imaginings and phrased in the language of democrac y (pracheathipet ey). 
This dissertation thus prov ides a reassessment of Cambodian dom estic political 
debates. Cambod ian political parties did not merely pay occasiona l lip service to 
liberal democracy, whi lst deviating from it in practice. The main politi cal parti es also 
adva nced alternative articulat ions of democracy. Whilst these discour ses certa inly 
addressed and had a cruc ial bea ring on notions and issues contained in liberal 
761 Hughes (2009): 32. 
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democratic discourse, they were engaged, to some extent, in a parallel debate over the 
proper organisation of nationa l society and the relationship betwee n the people and 
the political leadership , phrased in the language of democracy. Caroline Hughes 
writes that, in a bid to retai n disti nctive ness and party identity , the SR_P and 
FUNC IN PEC have de nied the CPP the status ofan equally ·democ ratic' co ntender. 
refus ing to admit the CPP into the legit imising ' democratic' arena. 763 The above case 
studies show that flaunting a democratic ide ntity was so crucial that Hun Sen and the 
CPP also constructed their ow n ·democratic· arena, inacce ss ible to polit ical 
contenders, in order to retain distinctiveness and legitimacy. Moreover, the SR_P and 
FUNCfN PEC, in spite of intenni ttent attempts by some to create one such common 
arena, ended up creating largely separate ones, each casting their own political project 
as the only tru ly democratic one. The reshaping of democratic identities was therefore 
a more far ranging and crucial dynamic than hitherto believed. 
Since they turned to the natio n to imbue po litics with mea nin g, all polit ical parties 
relied on democrat ic imag inings that were tied up with national ones. Each of these 
discourses referred to national imaginings that accorded their own political party or 
party acto rs a unique role in fulfil ling the nation·s democratic aspirations . This can be 
understood as a consequence of how the KOC era was nominal ly democratic. 
Politica l imaginings were therefore readi ly phrased in the language of democracy. 
Another reason for this goes further into the national project, relat ing to how nationa l 
imag inings provide a defin ition of the pol itical community, the bou ndaries of which 
all democrac ies need 10 establish. Natio nal and democratic imaginings, therefore, 
readi ly partner. As Michael Man n has shown, the con flation between the popular 
masses and the natio n spread worldw ide with ideas of democracy. 764 This disser tat ion 
shows, in contemporary Cambodia, tha t the ma in po litical parties, in line wit h a 
historica l pattern , share a largely orga nic conception of society, mak ing the people 
out as an undifferentiated mass, in resonance with the Andersonian imagined 
community charac terised by a se nse of deep, hor izontal comradeship. This 'organic 
view' of the peo ple enab led all contemporary co mpeting po litica l parties to make 
claims to the unique representation of the homogenous, indivisible people. The 
763 Hughes (200 I c): 302. 
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particu lar claims to representatio n of this made-out-to-be organic people were, 
however, vast ly different. The CPP"s notion of peoples democracy assumed the 
uniform needs and desires of the people. Whilst this could have been unsettled by 
paralle l notions of soc ial mobility , it rather se rved to rever se a hierarchy that 
nonetheless remained in place . An organic conception of the people underlay the 
royalist portrayal of the people as one body , indivisible from the monarch y, enab ling 
the peoples embodiment - as it did for Hun Sen. Whilst self-ide ntified democrats 
separated the population into different int erest groups , the will of the people was still 
assu med to be hannoniously conso nant; this assumption was doubtlessly aided by 
how the democrats represent ed no t an accomplished nation , but rather a hazy one in 
becoming. 
Charting these domestic political discourses helps reframe cutTent scholarship on 
ongoing political chang e in Cambodia. Providing an account of how different 
political party actors associate concepts such as democracy with a multitude of 
different meanings , this disset1ation·s epistemological premises differ from the bulk 
of scholarship on Cambodia"s political deve lop ment . Thi s scholarship predominantly 
employs democracy as a stable benchmark following universal under stand ings of 
what democracy entails, in orde r to analyse Cambodia"s ·democratisation' follow ing 
the introduction ofa multi-part y democratic syste m and, particularly, why liberal 
democracy, according to its universal understanding, has failed to consolidate.
765 
The 
domestic elite imaginings here discussed , however, certainly provide resources and 
constraints to political change in Cambodia, which help put these debat es into 
per spective. Th e shared 'orga nic" view of the people , which thi s dissertation has 
ident ified , arguably underlies political part y leaders· views of democracy as 
·compri sing the co -optation of the broader population into elite-detem 1ined political 
traj ectories' .766 The national articulations associated with the incumbent CPP 
corresponded to actual practice , linking democracy to the de facto curbing of royal 
power , and the notion of·people"s democracy ' addressed real practices ofregime-
people interaction s. The national articulations by royalists and self-ide ntified 
m E.g. Brown and Timberman, eds. ( 1998); Karbaum (2011 ); Croissant (2008); Peou (2000): 
Roberts (200 I); Sanderson & Maley ( 1998); and Un (2005; 2006). 
766 Hughes (2002c): 126 
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democrats , in turn , defined the nature and boundaries of their demands for 
·democra tic refor m·. 
Thi s empirica l ev idence shows that , if con sidering democratic legitim acy as 
procedural democratic legitima cy, these bid s for legitimac y were not dem ocrat ic. 
Different political part y actor s did see k to harn ess legitim acy primaril y in order to 
ensure success within the electoral framework. Yet their legitimising discourses 
cannot be sa id to add up to pro cedural demo crat ic legitima cy. This is not , primaril y, 
bec ause of their content. Discourses that include ethnic chauv inism and stereoty ping 
of insiders and outside rs of the nationa l community are part of election campaigns 
worldwide. As Hughes argues, whether these contend ing sources for leg itimacy add 
up to, or are at leas t co mpatibl e with , procedura l demo crat ic legitimacy , is a que stion 
of whether they are used to mobilise sup port wi1hi11 the confines of the e lection 
proce ss or whether they are used to lrnmp il.767 
Th e prece din g chapt ers ha ve outlined how co ntending sources for legitim acy have 
been used, by all political party actors, to und ermine the legit imac y of electoral 
pol itics as such. Thi s was not a straig htforw ard reject ion of the elec toral proc ess - a 
proce ss that all political actors indeed gave support to in differ ent ways. The CPP has, 
after all, decid ed to stick with elect ions, which remain crucially import ant for the 
pa11y"s (and Prim e Mini ste r Hun Sen "s), legitimacy. Roya lists and democrats. 
meanwhile, by regularly contesting election processes whilst claiming to advocate 
freer and fairer elections, clea rly and publicly give value to the electoral process. Yet 
the preceding chapt ers have out lined a mor e ambiguous relationship to elect ions 
across the politi ca l spectrum , comp romi sing and atten uating the legitima cy of 
electoral politi cs. Through his reincarnation as Sdec h Kan , Hun Sen replaces the 
ailing monarchy and plunges himself into a series of associations, ultimately 
repr ese nting the nat ion. Whil st the narrati ve ce lebrates elected, non-hereditary 
leader ship , it is finnly tied to the person of the Prime Mini ster, whom it pos its as the 
legitimate national leader by virtue of his personal merit, and is part of the 
per sonalisat ion of symbolic and politic al power give n to the Prime Mini ster. His 
767 Hughes (2009): 32. 
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leadership role can therefore be understood to be co nfinn ed by, but not reducibl e to, 
the legitimac y bestowed by electio ns. On their pan , Ranariddh and other roya list 
actors have spoken out against representative democrac y and the institution of the 
political party as a bas ic unit of popul ar representation. Ranariddh has critic ised 
·elections· as the instrum ent of represe ntati ve democracy , charging that they hav e 
sco pe only to the exte nt that they refl ect a ·real consensus' by the peop le. Democracy, 
here, stands to signify organic unity and national consensus, unfailingly tied to the 
Cam bod ian monarchy. The se lf-identifi ed democrats , meanwhile, not on ly considered 
electioneering practices skewed and election results therefore biased, but, moreover, 
charg ed that the people were blinded of their rea l interest s by CPP materia l and 
ideological dominati on. The refor e, whilst their intention was to refor m the electora l 
system, electoral refonn , alone, was deemed insufficient to achieve dem ocrati c 
representation. Meanw hile. their read ing of the peoples will depended on their own 
efforts to identif y what they understood as the peo ple 's object ive interests rather than 
results in the poll s. Support for the electora l proce ss was therefor e neither 
stra ightforward nor unconditional , but qualified, contingent, subo rdinat e, secondary 
and derivative. 
Moreover, this analysis suggests a diff erent interp lay betwee n externa l demands for 
democratisation and the domestic realm than is commonly understood. Changing 
perception s and real ities of democrac y in the Cambodian context of post-conflict 
reco nstruction are genera lly analysed in tenns of the Western-led democracy -buildin g 
project , initiated in the ea rly 1990s, which was large ly ·im posed, enforced, inserted 
and disco nnect ed' and, therefo re, ·to some exte nt a11ificial' .768 The discursive 
land sca pe laid out in this thesis demonstrates the presenc e of a contestation over what 
democracy must mean in the contemporary Cambodian context, which is not solely, 
or even prim ari ly, represe ntat ive ofa process of·loca lization ' of external demand s 
for democratisation. That the Western -led democracy -building project has by no 
means defined contemporary realities is a point made elsewhere by w1iters pointing 
to the failure to achieve liberal democracy. 769 This dissertation shows that , wh ilst 
faced with an internat ional di scourse in support of liberal democracy, with which they 
"
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interacted in different ways, domestic acto rs engage d in a contestation over the 
meaning and nature of democracy quite on their own tem1s. This shows an even 
further discrepa ncy between libera l democrati c language and domestic political part y 
agendas. As repeat edly argued, Cambodia n el ites were not democrats at hea rt, in the 
sense that they did not endorse liberal democratic principle s." 0 But neither did they 
purport to be. Yet democracy, articulated on quite differe nt tertns , remained an 
important languag e for negotiating political development s and cha nge in 
contemporary Cambod ia. 
These domestic d iscourses also testify to the importance of moral cl aims in party 
pol it ical contestation in conte mporary Cambodia. A key assumption of the 
internati ona l community involved in the peace and democracy building project in 
Cambodia was that the holding of elect ions would gradually erode diff erent mora l 
claims to power ."' This thes is shows that this has not been the case, and that, on the 
contrary , contending moral claims to power remain important within and beyond the 
multi -party electoral syste m. The seco nd chapter has outlined the importance of the 
incumben t pow er holder to create a moral political identity for himse lf, to accompany 
his identity as a strongman. Hun Sen·s cha lleng ing of the royalis t parties on moral 
grounds demonstrates a rivalry over a morally based political identit y, shift ing part y 
political contes tation to a moral arena. Suitability for national leadership is 
detennined exclusive ly on moral grounds , which we ighs heavier than results at the 
poll s. This disse rtation thu s show s how the ·remaking of moral wo rlds'. which 
scholarshi p has traced in the aftermath of decade s of violent conflict, went st raight to 
the heart of party political contestation. It adds to the small eme rging body of 
scho larsh ip concerned with how polit ics, religion and moral order are interwove n in 
co ntemporary Cambodia, 772 by demonstrating how moral debates are an integral part 
of party political co ntestation. It shows how party political actors engaged in active 
attempts to redraw and reshape the moral order of the natio nal community. This study 
thus opens up new research direct ions by offering avenues for exploring the 
interaction between popular , rural imagination s, which sc holarship on processes to 
"° Heder (2007b): 155; and Gainsborough (2012): 38. 
771 Hughes (2009): 32. 
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recover moral order in Cambodia has been ma inly concerned with,773 and elite 
imaginations. 
Continuity and Change 
By chart ing the discourses of the Cambodian political elite , this disse rtation is 
int imately concerned with larger questions of the role of political culture in shapi ng 
contemporary political realities. Accounting for democratic outcomes post-PP A, the 
large bulk of scholar shi p has stressed Cambodian political culture , understood to be 
based on absolutist notions of power , rigid soc ial hierarchie s and patronage systems, 
as unreceptive to and incompatible with Western -style democracy. 774 In these 
analyses , such phenomena are typically cast as stemming from a ·traditiona l' 
conception of power. Gainsborough identifies el ite political culture, next to money 
politics , as the sing le most important factor for explaining the lack of commitment to 
liberal val ues in contemporary Cambodia, Viet nam and Laos. Understanding elite 
political culture to be infonned by elitism and paternalism, he argues that thi s sheds 
light on the character of elec tion s in all three countries. as power holders here ·treat 
voting less as a contes t of alternatives than as a chance for the citizens to confim1 the 
intrin sic merits of their leade rs' ."' By offering a fine-grained study of the discourses 
of competing political actors, this dissertation also suggests a lack of commitment to 
liberal values in contemporary Cambodian elite imaginings. Spelling out, above, the 
precise and different ways in which Cambodian political actors treat elections, it 
offe rs nuanced and em piri ca lly solid ev idence in support ofGainsborough"s assert ion 
that these are treat ed primarily as confi1111ation of the intrin sic mer it of leaders. 
Further, important similarities across the political spec trum , such as a sha red 
'o rganic" view of the peop le, a re identifi ed. 
Yet the findings of this dissertation a lso problematise the notion of·polit ica l culture, 
if understood as static, unitary , singular and uncontested. This is done, firstly , by 
outlining the important differences between competing political actors; and secondly, 
773 E.g. Guthrie (2004); Ledgerwood (2008a); Satoru (2008); and Zucker (2008). 
m Mehmet (1997): 676: Kim (2007): 4; St John (2005): 4 I 5; Mabbett & Chandler ( 1995); and 
Blunt & Turner (2005). 
775 Gainsborough (2012): 39. 
248 
by demonstrating the malleab ility of concepts and the innovati veness of political 
actors. Th is calls into question the emphas is on what Gain sborough read s as ·cu ltura l 
assumptions about the proper relatio nship betwe en the state and its citi zens, or 
betw een rulers and the ruled', whic h he sees to defi ne elite po litical cu lture, in favour 
of an emph asis on how such cul turally embedded notions are picked up and 
remoulded for politi ca l gain ." 6 Hughes and Ojendal have ca lled for a reassess ment of 
the role of ·cultur e· in Ca mbodian political life, cha llenging scholarship to engage 
with ·the ways in which Cambod ians under stand the process of reform and link th is 
understa ndi ng to internally reproduced noti ons of ··cultu re· ' . 777 Thi s dissertat ion 
contributes to such a reasse ssment by outlinin g the ways in wh ich Cambodian 
politi ca l actor s nego tiate the interpla y of cultur e and power by linkin g their agendas 
to compe tin g reinvention s of culturally transm itted notion s. Whil st my analys is 
stresses the differences betw een the conte mporary Cambodi an political scene and a 
liberal democra tic model , grounded in uniqu e Cambod ian historical and cultu ral 
realities, it does not support an interpretati on that ascribes Cambo dia 's contemporary 
po litica l deve lopment to the unrelenting workings of a par ticular politica l culture. 
The insistent message that has asse rted itse lf throughout these pages is the dynamic 
manipu lation of histo ricall y inherited notions by politica l actors. Competing dome st ic 
democratic discourses, it shows, built on the selective revival and reinvention of 
Ca mbodian historica l and cultura l notions in order to promot e vastly different 
political orders . Their sheer diversity indicates the prese nce of many competing 
historical logics in a cu ltural and political context marked by disco ntinuity , so that no 
single one could be deem ed more ·traditional' than anot her. Th is highlight s not only 
the adap tabil ity and flexibilit y of Cambod ian ·poli tical cul ture·, but also the prese nce 
of competing cultural notions that are neither static nor homogenous. This is more in 
line with how Steve Heder, invoking the richn ess and compl ex ity of historical 
models, has argued that 't raditional' in the Southeas t Asian co ntext wou ld mean 
today·s men of prowess embra cing the g lobal mode l of libera l democracy in line with 
a historical pa ttern outlined by Clifford Geert z and Oliv er Wo lters. 778 Rath er than 
con tempo rary Cambodian electio ns bein g represe ntati ve ofa ·traditi ona l' political 
776 Ibid. : 38 
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culture, as in Gain sboro ugh 's analys is. Heder finds them to radically deviate from 
historical models and instead serve as ·a cosmetic cover for an ugly metamorphosis·. 
whereby election vio lence displays unchecked bureaucratic might. 779 This dis sertation 
chans how contemporary political projects, whilst often appealing to tradition or 
history, imbued supposed ly traditio nal notions with novel meanings to serve 
contemporary purpo ses. It therefore demon strates the need to histor icise continuity 
and change within different national imaginings, calling into question preconceived 
notion s of ·traditional· versus ·modern·. Secondly. it outlines ho", whilst the 
redefinition of cultural notions was partly constrained by their historical meaning , 
there was also space for their renegotiation. Hughes and Ojendal write of cultur e and 
tradition ·as landscapes of strugg le in which ce11ain historical features are embedded, 
prevent ing the free play of interpretation, but in which, equally , space is available for 
differences of perspective, emphasis and engagement to meet in conflic1 and 
negotiation, and to combine over time to comprise significant trajectories of 
change' .780 This dissertation charts the liiriits of reinterpretation, outlining constraints 
by history and contemporary material circumstances. 
Political party actors rein vented historical concepts to respond to changes pertaining 
to the contemporary era. Each sought to reconcile panicular tensio ns and 
co ntradic tions specific to the KOC period. For the CPP and Hun Sen, this tension 
centred on the mandate and nature of legitimate leadership in a post -socialist context 
whi lst building on their revolutionary legitimacy of the recent past. For royalists, their 
central dilemma was how to reconcile the reinstated constitutional monarchy with 
political royal ism. Self -identified democrat s, in tum, struggled to represent a nation 
not yet exis ting, but rather in becoming , by voicing the will of a people blinded by 
CPP ideological and material domination. To confront these new challenges, the 
political parties reinvented national imaginings and corollary bids for representation, 
with the resu lt that these differed in important ways from the previous PRK era. 
The CPP invented a complex post-socialist identity, to replace what observers have 
noted as a part icularly hollow self-professed Marxist-Lenini st reg ime identity under 
no Ibid.: 162. 
780 Hughes & Ojendal (2006): 419 
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the previous PRK. Heder has catego rised the PRK regime as an · ideo logical fake , 
constructed on insincere play-acting and theatrics, and a cover for rising personalised 
networks of Cambodian bureau cratic , military and eco nomi c power. Thi s was tied to 
the rise of Hun Sen , who over saw a shift from bureaucratic socialism to nascent 
authoritaria n crony capitalism. 78 1 App rehens ive of communi sm and the Vie tnam ese 
pre sence, Hun Sen sidelined cadre s who genuinely believed in Marxi sm- Leninism 
and replaced them with a group of pragmati c technocrats - man y of whom , today, 
hold important government positions. 782 In I 991, the notion of revoluti on and the 
remaining pret ence of socialis m was publicl y dropped. 783 Still, in working out a post -
soc ia list regime identity for the C PP under Hun Sen in the KOC, this disse rtation 
finds, notion s of revo lution and democracy remained central - only in nov el ways. 
The C PP under Hun Sen continues to po sit these notion s as interdepend ent , whi lst 
remodeling their contents. Th e revolutionary language was thus never dropped, 
merely lyi ng dorm ant for a while before be ing reinvent ed. The notion of ·p eople's 
democracy' se rves as o ne suc h discursive and conceptual bridg e in regim e identit y. 
Democracy , durin g the PRK , was integrated as part of Cambodian revolutionary 
history, as the revolution 's unchanging goal. The precise not ion of'people ·s 
democracy" referred to the 1979 defeat of the Khmer Roug e and the PR K reg ime that 
thi s hailed in. Peop le's democ racy, in its contemp orar y incarnation. then. is nothin g 
less than the late st stage of the evo lving Cambod ian revoluti ona ry que st towards 
genuin e democrac y. Thi s pro vides anot her take on Anderso n' s phrase. ' Revo lution is 
continuity' _m The co ntemporar y Ca mbodian revo lution invoke d by the regime is a 
revolution that has outlived Marxism-Lenini sm; a revolution that has been voided of 
its Marxist-Lenini st contents. In line with a Marxist-Lenini st dialectical analysis, it 
tackles new emerging contrad iction s in society, ye t the so lutions offered are not 
Marxi st-Lenini st. The notion of ' people' s democracy ' engages w ith th e newly 
introduced nominally liberal democratic framework and new capitali st transfonnation 
und er CPP dire ct ion. It serves to guarantee that the regime ca n maintain a separate 
political identity from We stern liberal democracies , at the same time as practices of 
781 Heder (2007b): 158-59 
7
" Ibid.: 159; and Gottesman (2003): 212-16. 
783 Heder (2007 b): 159; and Gottesman (2003): 345. On PRK-era KPRP historiography, see 
Frings (I 997). 
"' Anderson ( 1990): 148 
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gift-giving and patronage central to the new economic system that has emerged, are 
framed as an integra l part thereof. Neit her of this is Marxist-Leninist , per se, yet 
these practice s are phrased in the language of revolution and democrac y. Anothe r 
changing revolutionar y imaginary is that of Sdech Kan. Kan is a revolutionar y in the 
sense that he does away with the notion of hered itary leadership yet he is ultim ately 
made king himself. Whilst dra wing on historical Cambodian idea s of ove rturning 
leader ship deemed unjust , then as a king , he is hardly an orthodox Marxi st-L enini st 
hero. This narrative also engages with new contradictions in contemporary society, 
particularly the resto ration of the monar chy and the return of royalists to the political 
stage. It ties the revolutionary imagin ary to a distinct articulation of demo cracy, by 
positing soc ial mob ility and non-h ereditary leade rship as centra l components. 
This contain ed layers of continuity, as the new political identity was based on notions 
of democracy and revolution that intera cte d strenuously with the socia list discou rse 
they originally emanated from. h also involved thoroughgoing change, as these 
notions were emp loyed in new ways to engage wit h novel realities. ln this, the KOC-
era rea rticulati ons of notions of ideology can be under stoo d to be mor e intim ate ly 
bound up with actual poli tical deve lopments than their artic ulations during the 
preceding PRK regime ever were. ln 1989, the yea r that the PRK crumbl ed, Hun Sen 
asse rted that the exte rnal appeara nce of his reg ime should be understood as a mer e 
costume. 785 Two decades later , whi lst a pragmat ic approach to politics has been 
retained. the external appea rance of Hun Sen 's regi me communica tes importa nt 
messages about ongoing political developments. This is not to say that emerging 
narratives and remodelled se lf-pro fessed ideo log ica l tenets shou ld be understood at 
face value as strictly defined ideo logy finnly guiding political practi ce. Just like 
during the PR.K, these narr at ives and ideolo gica l cons tructs act as a cover for (and, as 
demons trated , even promote ) the politic s of personalised netwo rks. Yet , unlike the 
PRK era, this ideological facade is not dictated by the Vie tnamese, but defined by the 
incumb ent power holder s, themselves. Whereas notions of revolutio n and democra cy 
struck a false note in their PRK- era articu lations, their KOC-era rearticulation s are 
thus more representa tive of actua l intents and politica l pract ice than (a largely 
m l-leder (2007b): I 59. 
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externa lly defined) socialis m ever was. These narratives and constructs, as has been 
demonstrated, are directly associated with real regime practices. The revolutionary 
language was reinvented to support Hun Sen·s increasingly personal hold on power 
and to champion new regime practices particular to a new cap itali st econo my; 
thereby, it was actively used to negotiate change. All of these practices are 
consistent ly phrased in the language of democracy, in an attempt to influence 
domestic understanding of what democracy must mean in the contemporary 
Cambodian context. 
The political identity of actors corning out of the civil war-era resistance factions 
changed substa ntially from their PRK -era artic ulations. In contradistinction to 
Hughes, who has stressed the simi larities between FUNCINPEC and the SRP sharing 
dual identities as democratic opposition, internationally, and nationalist resistance, 
domestically, this dissertation has outlined how royalists primarily engaged in 
political contestation from within the parameters of a separate, royalist , identity ." 6 
FUNCINPEC and political parties such as the NRP and SJF P first and foremost self-
identified and portrayed them selves to the elec torat e as royalist. Thi s is important 
because the wide-ranging differences between the self -identified royalists and the 
self-identified democrats provide an exp lanation for their failur e to come together as 
one political force, and because it allows for exploration of the negotiation of separate 
royalist and democrat identities. 
For royalists, establ ishing historical continuity was crucial. On the most basic level , 
they attempted to establis h the historical co ntinu ity of nation , religion and king in a 
way that gave meaning to political royal ism. Their most celebrated model to this end 
was Sihanouk· s Sangkum Reastr Niyum, whic h they claimed as the blueprint for their 
con temporar y political project. Yet royalist politics was charac teri sed not by 
continuity, but by discontinuity . Second Kingdom conditions were new, in that it was 
the first time that political royalism had to stand comple tely separate ly from the 
monarchy. Ironi ca lly, considering the increa singl y desperate references to Sihanouk 's 
Sangkum Reastr Niyum, it was precisely the ruprure of the Sangkum that proved 
786 Hughes (2001 c): 311-12 
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impossible to overcome. Political ac tors revi sited the Sangkum to find a so lution for 
how to imbue poli1ical royalism with meaning , drawing on the monarchy, yet the 
Sangkum had partl y suspen ded suc h quest ions. Political royalists failed to move on 
from this paradox. As a result of this incongruence , their resulting political bids were 
all phrased in Sihanoukist language, yet referred to vast ly different things from those 
advocated by Sihanouk during the Sangkum. 
Tracing these •Sihanoukist ' reinventions is important becau se they unmask problems 
internal to royalist politics. Whilst the CPP reinvention of notions of revolution and 
democracy can be understood to be laden wi1h meaning , in that in infonned concrete 
regime practic es, the rein vent ion of Sihanouki st language fared differentl y. Whilst 
this language was also used to frame distinct political moves, no consensus on the 
fonn, nature or contents of Sihanoukism was reached among royalist actors. lt could 
thus never offer an authoritative bid for remodelling idea s of legitimacy. Ultimately 
hollow , the fai lure of reviving Sihanoukist language in a meaningful way and the 
more thoroughgoing lack of a common royali st vis ion this evidenced was therefore 
bound up with the decay ofa party political form ofroyal ism. 
Self -identified democrats, in compa rison the most uncon cerned wi th establishing 
continuity with imagined predece ssors , were also those who most self-con scious ly 
sty led their political project as finely attu ned to changing realities. They turned 
against what they understood to be transfonning communism, representing those 
victimised by Cambodias capitalist development. This under standing guided their 
attempts to ·read' the will of the people, whilst the peculiaritie s of Cambodia's 
electoral demo cracy blurred the line of how this was to be assessed, and unju st 
development called for an interventionist stance. This is important becaus e it shows 
the shift ing challenges pertaining to their political project , as compared to earlier, 
se lf-identified democratic proj ects. Parliamentar y democrac y, the cornerstone of 
success ive Cambodian self-identified democratic project s, was put into question. 
How to identify the peop le's will thus emerged sign ificantl y problemat ised . 
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Political Ideol ogy, Politicised Identities and Representation of the Nation 
This dissertation also shows a conte mpora ry co ntesta tion over the very catego ries to 
define the nationa l vis ions of political part y actors compe ting electora lly. 
Con temporar y political contestation does not primar ily emp loy the uni versal languag e 
of ideology that spread wit h the idea of the nation. 787 Transnational ideologies such as 
liberalism and Communism were once important motors of nationalist struggles 
across Southeast As ia;788 and left their indelib le mark on Cam bodia .'89 In 
contemporary Cambod ia, these transnationa l ideologies have lost mu ch of their 
power. This is less em phati c in the case of se lf-identified democrats, who associate 
closely with a libera l democrati c iden tity, and to some ex tent can be sa id to be driven 
by the ·transnational networks , movements and horizons· Sidel ident ifies as long 
having driven Southeast Asian nationalisms.790 However, the democrats considered 
their mission to transcend the implementation of liberal democratic ideolo gy . lndeed , 
contemporary actors routine ly emplo y categor ies other than ideology to express 
national political imaginings , such as historical idea s of embodi ment. Western-
derived political notio ns read ily part ner wit h other such fonns of claims to 
representation. Notions seemingly phra sed in the language of ideolog y, suc h as 
Sihanoukism , differ substant ially from the concept of ideology in the Western sense. 
Moreover, the very notion of politica l ideology and its applicabi lity to conte mporary 
political contestation was debated in the KOC, and came to be direct ly po ised against 
notions of representatio n throu gh embodim ent. 
Prev ious scholarship has shown ideas of embodiment to hav e continued relevance in 
conte mporary Cambodia n society , by consideri ng contemporary sta tuar y, spirit 
perfonnances and, to a lesser extent, how such ideas have been refl ected by 
Sihanouk·s political activ ities as reinstated king and in FUNC IN PEC discourse . 791 
This dissertation has shown how a debate over ideas of embodiment goes to the very 
core of contemporary po litical contestation, rema ining an important claim to politica l 
787 Anderson (1998): 29. 
788 Side! (2003): 23. 
789 Heder ( 1997) 
790 Side! (2003): 23. 
791 Thompson (2008): 203-6; Thompson (2004): 108- 10; Hang (2004); Kent (2008); Hughes 
(2001c): 308; and Hughes (2002c): I 19. 
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legitimacy. Since Cambodia ' s tirst election s in 1946 and up through the post-colonial 
period , these que stions of whether political contestatio n was to be based on ideolog y 
or embodi ment remained unresol ved. ln contemporary Cambodia , this tension 
between ideas of ideology and embod iment has come to a head. These categories are 
not mu tually exclusive. Claim s of embodiment are accompanied by appeals to a 
doctrinal identity , both by royalist actors and Hun Sen. Yet whether doctrine is used 
to acco mpan y claims of embodiment, such as for Hun Sen , or to supp lant these, 
increasingly the case for roya lists, seems to be the defining difference . The first 
fonnula is the successful one , testifying to the relevance of claims of embodiment. 
Developments in royalist discourse , with the increasing sidelining of claims of 
embodiment in favour of a doct rinal identit y, would seem to indicate an increasing 
move towards the nec essity to phrase politic s in the language of ideology or doctrine . 
Perhaps in line with democrati sa tion , this would do away with the exclusivity of 
embodiment. Yet the continued salience of embodiment is evidenced by both 
Ranariddh' s repeated use of the language of incarnat ion and Hun Sen' s claims to it. 
That embodim ent failed as a strategy for royalists, historically associated with such 
idea s, does not ther efore mean that the idea of embodime nt was nece ssar ily 
anachronistic or redundant in the KOC. Rather , the royali st failure can be traced to 
the Sangkum paradox , which firmly tied legitimacy to the body of Sihanouk , and , 
moreov er. the roya lists· lack of a material base to back up their embodim ent claims. 
Therefore, their claims were exposed as fictiona l. By contrast , Hun Sen , with his 
overwhelming dominance over the body politic, could credibly claim to incarnate the 
nation, with claims made in the language of reincarnation. This suggests the need for 
a mater ial base to support claims of embodim ent of the nation. 
The allegiance to embodiment as a fonn of political representation help s exp lain why 
political part y actors did not predominantly phrase their programs in the language of 
ideology, and why political parties · policy differe nces, views and ideo log ies did not 
appear well-defined to voters. Secondly, th is further demons trate s and ex plains the 
conti nued role of indi vidual stro ngmen , rather than political parties , as mobilisers of 
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opinion. 792 Th ese strongm en were holders of legitimacy, firmly invested in their 
individual bodies, and on ly by extension did this personal legitimacy reflect on the 
politica l party they were associated with. Because of the continu ed personal nature of 
claims to politic al leg itimacy, leg itimacy-building was not primarily associated with 
party-building. This help s exp lain the continuous weakening of the institution of 
political parties as objects of popular loyalty. 793 
Attention to these levels ofcontestation parallel to ·ideology ', policy differences and 
po licy programs , also shows Cambodian contemporary politics to be heavily 
preoccupied with a debate betwee n inherited and elected legitimate national 
leaders hip. An age -old stand -off in Cambodia, this issue gathered new urgency after 
1993. The debate has arguably been at least temporarily settled in favour of elected 
leadership. Hun Sen ' s narrati ve ofSdech Kan exal ted the idea of soc ial mobility and 
the designation of the leader on the basis o f relative merit rather than her ed itary right. 
Whilst royalists made appeals to genealogical lines , these appeals to hereditary power 
turned out to have little or no legiti macy. Ranariddh's attempt to link de mocracy to 
the Cam bodian monarchy by pointing to the elective nature of the Khmer Crow n 
shows how the idea of elected leadership had become widely hegemonic. Yet , whilst 
these cla ims could perhaps support the legitimacy of a con stitutional monarchy, they 
did not support that of politic al royalists. Royalists attempted to transfer legitimacy 
from Sihanouk to Ranariddh and the wider fami ly not by emphasising an elected 
element, but throu gh creating a doctrinal identity of ·Sihanoukism' ultimately 
suscept ible to hijacking by the CPP; and through embodiment , claimed by 
genealogical lines , which, since they lacked the material base to support this idea , 
ultimately also was a dead end. As noted abo ve, the idea of elec ted leader ship was 
advanced in a broader sense than liberal democratic multi -party elections, both by 
Hun Sen and royalists. Whilst the designation of leadership is based on indi vidual 
achie vement , it is not primarily detennined by results at the polls, but through a 
different nomination process. For royalists , the election of the monarch is through the 
throne counc il. For Hun Sen as Sdech Kan , his achievements and the abi lity to lead 
'
92 Hughes (2000): 121 
793 As Peou notes. ·Cambodia·s party and patty system institutionalization remains extremely 
limited· Sorpong Peou, 'The Cambodian Challenge for Patty and Patty System 
Institutionalization· Cp Hughes (2002b): 170; and Hughes (2002c): 117 
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the nation that these evidence single him out as the national leader. His leaders hip 
role is confinned by national electio n results, but not reducible to a mere conseq uence 
of it. Secondly, the idea of elected leader ship is finnly situated in ideas of possess ing 
moral qualitie s. Th e Sdech Kan narrat ive const itutes, ultim are ly, a claim to posses s 
merit; that it is the mora l qualities of Hun Sen that designa te him as persona lly chosen 
to leadersh ip. The weakening of politic al royalists, on the other hand, is tracea ble to 
widespread corruption pre-empting any credibl e counter-narrat ives from royalists in 
mora l tenns. 
This is not intended to mystify contemporar y Cambodi an political discourse by 
sugges ting that it has yet to catch up with a ·modern· vocabu lary of politic s. Rath er. it 
testifies to selective atte mp ts by contempo rary actors, part icularly the CPP and 
royalis ts, to vest their political projects in historical legitimi sations tha t enjoy 
widespread soc ial legitimac y, whi lst using these to subtly manipulate their contents 
Hun Sen·s re incarnation ofSdec h Kan can be understoo d as a bid to articulate and 
cemen t an interpretatio n of leg itimate leadership, to define the present era and 
nego tiate futur e deve lopm ents, a concern that goes beyond that of conv incingly 
asp iring to be a neak mean bon or Preal, Bat Thommik. Ranariddh · s belabo ured 
claims to embodiment atte mpt ed to shift the basis of such claims to follow 
genealogical lines. 
Pub lic Appeal 
Thi s dissertat ion has outlined elaborate ways in which membe rs of the political elite 
interpret the nation and attempt to make the ir partic ular readings of the nat ion 
hege monic. Caro line Hughes has spoken ofa ·hazy vision ofKhmerness·. articulated 
by successive reg imes from Sang um Reast r Niyum onwa rds. 794 The visions outlined 
here were hazy in some ways , yet in others not. They were hazy in the sense that they 
retaine d a fantast ica l aspect, in that they reflected elite visio ns and attempts to 
manipulat e public disco urse, rath er than an accomp lished rea lity, as well as in their 
internal tensions and ambiguities. On the o ther hand, they were clea rly anc hored in 
794 Hughes (2009): 45 
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and bound up with real political development s and ongoing political proc esses . Hun 
Sen·s narrati ve was comp licit in circum scr ibing the role of the monarchy and the 
political royalists, and was accompanied by other political moves to the same effect. 
The changing idea s of the monarchy advanced by royalist s, meanwhile , reflected and 
were employed to negotia te these real changes 
One of the most striking paradoxe s that emerges from this study is how all these 
disco urses were very much articulated from above, whilst purporting to excl usively 
represe nt ac tual grassroots concerns, as we ll as how self-con tained some of the 
debate s were, never completely filtrating dow n to gra ssroo ts awarene ss. These case 
studi es illustrate how far remo ved elite imaginations were from ordinar y people , and 
the exten t to whic h these debates remained, ult imate ly, an intra-elite strugg le. A 
major reason for this is arguab ly the sheer ignoran ce of the elite regarding the 
political preferences of the electora te. Caroline Hughes has drawn attention to the 
·soc ial and politica l opacity of Ca mbodi a ' s post -war rura l electoral hea rtland'. 795 
Refe rrin g to Cambo dian voters as the •silenced majority' , she wr ites that ·Very little 
is known about the demographic s of Cambodian voter prefer ences in terms of cla ss, 
gender or ethnicity, or the mot ivat ions for voti ng ·. so that ·political parties continue 
to operate blindl y in this key site of democ ratic politic s·. Voters were. from the first 
democratic elections in 1993, encouraged not to speak open ly about their political 
preferences , in a stra tegy to red uce securit y problem s and spare interna tiona l 
democrac y promoters from engag ing with local level politi ca l party structures. 
Introduced by international democ racy supporters, this strat egy of silence has been 
promoted by Cambodian politi ca l parties, including the political opposition , which 
sup port it as a strategy to avoid intimidation by the CPP. 796 Cambodia's 
charac teristic s as an ·electora l democracy · have fu11her obscured popul ar political 
preferences , as expressed either at the polls or in eve ryday political beha viour 
between elections , making it diffi cult for politicians to assess the popular will. 
The imaginings of the nation and strategies of its representation outlined in this thesis 
can be under stoo d as a consequen ce of this opac ity, which has added up to a verit able 
795 Hughes (2001 b): 298. 
796 Ibid.: 303-4. 
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crisis of representation. The distance between political parties and the general public, 
which Hughes has referred to as ·the politics of non-representation·. has catalysed the 
emergence of these strategies of purported national representation as an attempted 
·politics ofrepresentation'. 797 In this sense. they are attempts at ·reading Cambodia'. 
made equally by the self -iden tified democratic opposition , royalists and the CPP. All 
party actors faced the dilemma of how to make national democratic politics 
meaningful in a context of overwhelming rural poverty in which a majority of the 
population found itself on the lower end of a steep socio -econom ic divide. The ·real 
problem· for Sangkum. Ranariddh writes , was not to caricature Western democracy 
but to integrate the peasant masses who were very far removed from classic 
democratic values into a system that listened to people and their real needs. 798 These 
words could have been echoed by any political party representative speaking about 
the contemporary context. To make their projects relevant in this context , their 
discourses all picked up on new exige ncies that they could expect to resonate with the 
times, and , in this sense , included attempts to some extent to follow what they could 
expect to be changing public attitudes. This is seen in Hun Se1 s emphasis on social 
mobility and equal opportunities. Royalist actors placed their hopes on what they 
believed to be the people"s nosta lgic yearning for Sihanouk and his Sangkum Reastr 
Niyum, envisaging its institutions to address contemporary issues. An example is the 
plan ofSisowath Thomico, in setting up the SJF P, for the National Congress to tackle 
what he assumed to be a contemporary conflict of generations and changing social 
composition. The self- identified democratic opposit ion tailored their agenda to 
champion the rights of those suffe ring under Cambod ia·s current development path. 
In this sense, these discourses are also elite fantasies of the elusive Cambod ian nation. 
Ultimate ly, though , they were constrained, if not straitjacketed , by particular 
ideological heritages and historiographies, and articulated as attempts to direct the 
masses into elite-defined trajectories. 
This begs the questions ofto what extent different actors have consolidated their 
nationalist discourses and how successfu l these discourses are as legitimising 
attempts. The imaginings of the nation and strategies of representation outlined in this 
797 Hughes (2002b): 170 
798 Norodom Ranariddh (1998): 136. 
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thesis do not make the political preferences of the Cambodian electorate any clearer 
The other ·unspoken· half of the story presented here is the interaction and 
renegotiation of these elite-level discourses in society. As they interact with the 
understanding of groups within socie ty, they are subject ro reinterpretation, 
renegotiation and , perhaps , resistance. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
investigate the wider societal penetration of these discourses, this thesis nonetheless 
sugges ts the shared limitations in claims to popular representation and conseque nt 
'de mocratic legitimacy' of the different actors. The political opposition and 
scholarship characterising Cambodia as an electoral democracy agree that election 
results do not accurately represent popular preferences. Yet, even further, this 
dissertation shows, all competing democratic imaginings were used to trump the 
election process. Electora l victory, per se , did not suffice to constitute democratic 
legitimacy for any political party, which all soug ht democratic legitimacy also by 
other mean s. This sugge sts a more shad ed and nuanced character of internal 
legitimacy that cannot be easily de1ennined and can only partially be possessed. By 
offering a finely tuned picture of elite-level discourses and imaginations, this study 
opens up the detailed and precise study of the interaction between these elite -level 
discourses and general society as a new direction for further research. 
Implications in Southeast Asian Perspective 
The findings of th is dissertation add to Southeast Asian literature's criticism of the 
assumption in ·globalisation literature· of there being a general move from a 
Westphalian to a post-Westphalian world order, where al legiance to nation states has 
been replaced by globalism and cosmopolitanis m. In Southeast Asia , these 
assumptions have been shown to be erroneous. as ·notions of nations, state-bu ilding, 
sovereignty and bordered territories have not been abandoned'. 799 This dissertation 
shows not only the continu ed prevalence , but also the heightened central ity of 
national imaginings in contemporary Cambodia following the introduction ofmulti-
party elections - one of the main effects of globalisation. Since globalisation has 
799 Ojendal (2005): 361; Sutherland (2010); Sutherland (201 I); Brown (2009): Kuhnt-
Saplodewo, Grabowsky & Grobheim , eds. (1997). 
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resulted in the promotion of procedural democracy (i.e . elec tions) in differ ent national 
contexts region -wide , this dynamic could be more widespread . 
The se finding s confirm that, whil st the disco urses and practices associated with the 
global spread of the liberal democratic model undoubted ly impact upon Southeast 
Asia, they do not immediatel y ero de instituti ons and va lues historically embedded in 
domestic contexts;800 instead, they encounter earlier democratic imaginings, the 
histo rical emergence of which are bound up with nation al constructions. Thi s 
dissertatio n therefore sugge sts that demo cratic discourses be examined through a 
historicised accou nt of the en tanglement of notions of democracy and national 
identity. A comparative regiona l acco unt of the arrival and subsequent development 
of these no tions, and ho w this has played out in later democratic and nat ional 
disco ur ses and realities, wo uld arguably help illuminate nationa l and regional 
traj ecto ries of political deve lopment. 80 ' Atten tion to th is nexus in dom es tic 
imaginings could also help uncover otherwise neglected domestic discourses of 
democracy. Democracy has been show n to dominate political imaginin gs in various 
national contexts in Southeast Asia, such as in Thailand and the Philippin es .802 
Applying this approac h in this dissertation has unveiled the extent to which this is 
also the case in Cambodia - and potentially an even more widespread dynamic. 
This dissertat ion thereby adds to the Southeast As iani st cri ticism of the widespread 
assumpt ion that globalisation causes convergence to liberal policies, joining the 
critici sm of scho larship that ·exagge rates the depth, scope. and determini sm of 
globali sat ion in Southeast Asia' .803 In the reg ion , the promotion of proce dural 
democracy has not produced unidirection al political trajectories and there has been no 
given outcome of these pro cesses. 804 Whil st this disser tat ion doe s not take election s, 
per se, as the object of study, it provides an account of how the introducti on ofa 
multi-party democratic system with multi-party elections has pla yed out in a dom est ic 
800 Ojendal (2005): 346-47; and Willford & George, eds. (2005). 
8°' This is so far limited to Michael Connors's (2003) study on Thailand. 
8°' Sukatipan (1995): 222-23; Franco (2004); and Guerrero & Tusalem (2008). 
803 Ojendal (2005): 346. 
804 See, for example, Taylor, ed. (1996); Loh & Ojendal, eds. (2005): Aspinall & Mietzner, 
eds. (201 0); Croissant (2004); and Side I ( 1996). 
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Southeast Asian context. It can thus be read as a Cambodian case study of a more 
widespread pattern of Sout heast Asian indig enisation of elections, both during and 
after the Cold War. Thereby , it responds to the question posed in a volume edited by 
Robert Taylor , which asks how electio ns are indigenised in Southeast Asia. 
Concentrat ing on whether the indigenisation process is part of the defanging of the 
potential empowennent of the people promi sed by elections, this volume provides a 
tentative yes, suggesting that , in the final case, it crippled rather than empowered the 
electorates. Taylor writes that , ·Wedo this th ing this way here and always have, so 
shut up· is the answer often given to tho se who ra ise doubts about the appropriateness 
of prevailing politica l patterns.· This leads Taylor to conc lude that: 
In order to understand the meaning and role of elections in any 
society, one need s to contextualise the election process. Elections 
have meaning only within a particular historical space and time, and 
to see them outside their context is to deny them any sign ificant 
meanin g. Discovering the meaning of elect ions is a genuine 
comparative project [ . .. ] The meaning and role of elections can be 
interpr eted differently ... within the same political structure s.805 
Whilst refu sing the languag e of cultu re as an explanatory variable for political 
processes in the region , this volume highli ghts the symbolic and contested importance 
of the electoral process across the region and the various meanings attached to that 
process , set in the context of eac h co untry's political economy. 806 Similarly, the 
introduction of elect ions in Cambodia did not entail a unidirectional political 
trajectory. Cambodian domestic elites, this dissertation show s, attached multiple 
meanings to elections, con finning the need for a fine ly contextua lised approach to 
find meaning in domestic election processes. In Cambodia, each competing 
co nstruction of the nation posited the role and mandate of elections differently. Since 
all, ultimately , relativised the importance of elections, if popular empowennen t is 
defined as the people being ab le to exercise their will at poll s, then all, in this sense, 
contributed to its defanging. Yet, there was also considerable diversit y among the 
competing constructions, each entailing its own intrinsic possibilities of popular 
empowerment and/or disempowennent , if understood more loosely in tenns of how 
these envisaged popular political invol vement. This suggests that we need to locate 
so; Taylor (1996): 8-9 
'°6 Cp. Kelly ( 1997): 461. 
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questions of the weake n ing vers us empowenne nt of electorates in exact processes of 
contestation. · lndigenisation · did not produce uni form outcomes of disempowen11ent, 
and the precise outcomes of suc h processes are ultimat ely an empirical question. 
The introduction of multi-party elect ions was thus not unequivocally a milestone on a 
presumed road to democratisation, but related in a much more comp lex manner to 
issues of politic al change . As a consequence thereof, this disse rtation shows, in 
Cambodia. following the introdu ctio n of elections. a ·democratic· stance shifted to be 
bound up with sceptic ism towards elections , similar to other national co ntexts in the 
regio n. It thus offers a further case study of·pro-democrat ic· poli tical imaginings that 
are scept ical of electora l democracy. 807 ln Thailand, Laothamatas identifies 
conflicting expec tations of democratic government between rural fanners, for whom 
democracy · is a means to bring grea ter benefits and offic ial attention to themselves 
and their villages' and the urban , educated middle class. which · firmly believes that 
electora l venalities result in the return of unqualified politicians to the corridors of 
power· 808 Voting is determined by patron-client networks, as voters elect politicians 
who help them cope with proble ms, attend village function s, make donations and 
bring in public programs, ra ther than on the basis of election platfonns. 809 The 
penetration of patron-client dynamics in voting behaviour has shaped the 
·democratic· imaginations of the Thai midd le class and the political parties they 
overwhelmingly support, to view electoral democracy as the rule of the co rrupt , 
turning instead to support the military. 810 In Cambodia , the penetration of money 
politics and the effects of patronage incentives on vot ing behaviour have simi larly led 
self-identified democra ts to highlight the shortco ming s of electoral democracy 
However, this has produced political imaginations quite different from those in 
Thailand. The disappointme nt with electoralism, whilst emanating from similar 
conce rns, produced demands for electora l refonn and resulted in a searc h to identify 
and represent the ·authentic· will of the people. The peop le were imagined to suffer 
from false consc iousness, resulting from CPP ideological and material domination. 
Therefo re, the po lit ica l strat eg ies of the ·democrats' were aimed at act ively 
807 On Thailand. see Laothamatas (1996): and Winichakul (2008) 
808 Laothamatas ( 1996): 202. 
809 Ibid.: 206-7 
810 Ibid.: 220-21. 
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attempting to identify the objective interests of the people, rather than preventing 
perceived democratic vices such as in Thailand. This indicates the importance of 
paying attention to particular ways in which political imaginations develop under 
similar conditio ns, and the resulting different meanings of democracy produced. 
The Cambodian case also highlights the imp ortance of monarchies, and royalis t idea s 
more generally , in defining understandings of democracy in the region. Whilst these 
dynamics are often overlooked in analyses of national politic s in the region , this 
dissertation sho ws that. in contemporary Cambodia, the ·spect re of the monarch y in 
pol it ics· remain s strong. 811 In the main study to date of the role ofSoutheast Asian 
monarchies in contemporary politics, Roger Kershaw suggests that Southeast Asian 
mona rchies ·may offer special assets to a polity in transition towards democracy'. "' 
Monarchies can promote democracy by restra ining the excesses of eithe r the power 
el ite or the 'excesses of an open democracy', abilities. in turn, derived from how the 
monarchy represents cont inuity with the nation' s past. its cha risma, and how it is a 
separate institution from leg islatures. 813 Whilst this is an analytical model from which 
Kershaw expec ts empirical cases to diverge to differing extems, he identifies this 
·ro sy ideal ' as ·clear ly confirmed· in the case of Thailand. followed next by 
Cambodia, where the main factor precluding the monarchy from realising its potential 
to act as a moderating force is how it is subject to the 4 Whirns of a well-organised 
power elite'. 814 Ye, the findings of this dissertatio n show a more complex role of the 
Cambodian monarchy in ·democratisation'. whether considered in term s of 
Kershmvs under standing thereof , or in term s of more commonplace understa ndin gs 
of solid ifying a procedural democracy- a role that is derived from the political stance 
and perceptions of the Cambodian monarchy and royalists, themsel ves, rather than 
the repressive force of the incumbent pow er elite. 815 
S!\ Even in Thailand, where the monarchy arguably has played an unrivalled role in shaping 
Thai democracy since the end of absolute monarchy in l 932, harsh Iese majeste laws and a 
view of the royal family as standing above politics have largely precluded unbiased scrutiny 
thereof. Some exceptions are Winichakul (2008); Hewison (1997); Handley (2006); McCargo 
(2005); and Streck fuss (I 995; 1996) 
"' Kershaw (2001): 159. 
813 Ibid.: 159. 162. 
814 Ibid· 160 164 
815 Ker~haw ;,ever provides a clear definition of democracy, and it is unclear what the 
·excesses ofa n open democracy· refer to and whether it incorporates e lectoral democracy - in 
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These findings are more in line with a literature that has outlined a similarl y complex , 
eve n problematic role of the monarchy and royalist ideas in other national contexts in 
the region, particularly in terms of promoting an anti -electoral view of democracy. 
Thai land, which Kershaw takes to prove his framework , is a case in point. Kershaw 
lauds the Thai monarchy as havin g an ·ext raordinaril y creative function', 
groundbreaking in tenns of how the King has facilitated democracy not only by 
restraining its ·exce sses · but also mobi lis ing his authority to actively intervene , so 
that the monarchy has emerged ·somew hat above the leve l of ·constitutional 
monarchy' in European sta tes. s16 His analysis om its what is perhaps the most 
notewort hy influence of Thai royalists- their di staste for electoral pol itics and how 
they have undem1ined electoral democracy by support ing the discourse outlined 
above, which casts electora l governmen t as co rrupt. in favour of 'c lean politics'. 
which builds on a view of the monarchy as the moral authority above other polit ical 
institutions. 817 In Cambod ia, royalists displayed a similar distas te for electoral 
politics, which they undennined in the name of a politics of consensus. Bu ilding on a 
Sangkum -derived understanding of democrac y propagated by Ranariddh, these ideas 
have had heightened resonance in the contemporary era of national reconciliation. 
Ju st as in Thailand, the Ca mbodi an royali sts· legitimacy was part ly derived from how 
the constitutional mona rchy transcended, or in Kershaw's words we re 'somewh at 
above the level of. the const itutional monarchies found in Europe. s's At a difference 
from their Thai co unterparts, however , the Cambodian royal s did not exert their 
in fluence from a position claimed to be unambiguous ly ·above po litics· - what has 
been identified as crucial to the Thai royals' power to intervene on the national 
political scene. s" Instead, in the KO C, a long-standing debate of whether Cambodian 
which case ·democracy', for Kershaw. would mean just about anything that national 
monarchies say it does. Regardless , my argument still stands, in that the Cambodian 
monarchy·s and royalists· political stance and perceptions did not unambiguously act to 
uproot the legitimacy of the power elite , and, whilst they were anti-elec tora l, notions of ·direct 
democracy· , the ·socia l opening· and the ;national union ' did not seem to counteract the 
excesses of an ·open democracy' that Kershaw refers to 
816 Kershaw (200 I): 160, 162 
817 Winichakul (2008). 
818 The current Thai constitutional monarch, Bhurnibol, is widely perceived as a dlwmmaraja, 
a righteous King with particular moral power. barami. See Winichakul (2008): 2 l. 
819 Winichakul (2008): 15. 
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royals were ·above polit ics· or part of it, was resumed. Royali sts tried to assert 
themselves as party political actors whilst simu ltaneously bui lding on earlier 
discourses of regal legitimacy bestowing the moral high ground. Compared to their 
Thai counterparts, they therefore faced a fortnidable task, since they had to justify 
their political involvement as party politica l actors. As equal political contenders , the 
CPP was in a position to overtake their appeals to legitimacy and advance them more 
forcefully. Meanwhil e, politica l royalists advanced a political agenda that opposed 
and undennined the legit imac y of electoral democracy. The Cambodia n example, 
therefore , highlight s how deeply problematic it was for contemporary Southeast 
Asian monarchie s of a Theravada Buddhi st tradition to relate to the electora l 
democrat ic fram ework. Even in Cambod ia, a context in which royal ists tran sfonned 
themselves into a party political force, their discourse served to undennine electoral 
democracy by drawing on ideas of legitimate leadership ultimately derived from rega l 
legitimacy. 
These discourse s of Buddhist kingship also influence contemporary ideas of 
leadership. Just as in Thai democra cy, this disse rtation shows, in contemporary 
Cambodia, the moral character of the leader is considered an important element of 
leadership , transcending policies and ideas - perception s closely associated with 
historical idea s of kingship. 820 In Thailand, as disi llusion with electora l politic s has 
grown. the monarch's moral authority has come to be considered supe rior to elected 
ones. In Cambodia, on the other hand , royalist political discourse has reinforced the 
importance of moral legit imac y, making their failure to successfu lly imbue these 
moral claims with meaning even more devastating. Meanwhile, Hun Sen's claims of 
moral superiority have bestowed him with a regal aura. Thi s shows the flexibility of 
such discours es of moral legitimacy associated with the monarchy, which do not 
necessarily remain co nfined to the monarchy and royalists but can also work to the 
detriment of royalists. 
The findings of this dissertation thus help shed light on aspects associated with 
processes of reconfigu ration of legitimacy through changing concept ualisations of 
800 On Thailand, see Winichakul (2008): 18; and McCargo (2002): 5. 
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histo rical kingship observed throughout Southeast Asia. In the region, the revival of 
ideas of kingship has been under stood as part ofa larger move towards 
·retraditionalization·. Cambodia differ s from other countrie s in the region in two 
respects . Firstly, this renegot iation of king ship took place wi thin the framework of a 
reinstated constitutional monarchy , which was unique in Southeast Asia. Secondly , 
different meanings of kingship and legitimat e leadership were offered by different 
com petitors in a multi-party democratic sys tem. Thi s differed from Laos and 
Vietnam, which are one -part y sta tes where these rein vention s were tied to the part y 
sta te and encountered no political party oppo sition. 
At this backdrop , the Cambodian case can add to the regional debate in several 
important respec ts. Firstly , the Cambodian exa mpl e highlight s certain characteri stics 
of emp loying king ship as a historical model. In Laos and Vietnam, the communi st 
one -par ty states used ideas of king ship to pro vide a politica l identity after the end of 
the Co ld War, in a bid to appropriate earlier, regal legitima cy. 821 In both these 
countries , the royal famili es had long been outmanoeuvred , prominent royal family 
members ex iled or killed and royali sts extinguished as a politica l force. The scholarly 
debate has therefore centred on making sense ou t of attempts to transfer earlier , 
·exhau sted ' rega l leg itimac y to cont emporar y political acto rs o f a post-communi st 
brand, who repla ce monarchies and face no serious politi ca l chall enge . The 
Cambodian reinv ention, by contra st, took place in the cont ext of circ umscribin g a 
reins tated monarch y and royalist politic al part y. It thereb y uniquely shows how ideas 
of king ship can be used to trump a king on the thron e. Thi s highlight s how king ship , 
or idea s thereof , is not something absolutely , or even primarily , tied to the monarc h. 
It rather serves as a historical mod el of leadership and is therefore superbly flex ible. 
Thi s explain s the ease with which such ideas ha ve been appropriate d by communi st 
projects in the reg ion. Grant Evans has argued that. in Cambodia and Laos, ·becau se 
of the historica lly close relationship in these count ries betwe en king ship and 
Theravada Buddhi sm, any cult of per sonal ity drifts dangerou sly in the direction 
formerly occupi ed by the former monarch' .822 The Cambodian case confirms that, 
indeed, legitimi sat ions did drift toward s king ship as the histor ica l model of 
''.'. Grabow sky & Tapp e (2011) ; and Jeltema (2007). 
'-- Evans (1998): 31 
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leader ship. Yet , this shift was hardly dangerous for the Cambodian reg ime- a 
country with an act ual reinstated monarch; let alone , then , this suggests, in Laos and 
Vietna m, whe re the regimes faced no such challenges. 
Second ly, following from how kingshi p is a flexible historica l model of leaders hip 
integrat ing diffe rent connotations and tensions specific to each historical context, 
kings hip is not one indi visib le entity but rathe r an aggregate of compo nents. In the 
Cambod ian contex t, king ship is bound up with ideas o f embo dim ent, inherited versus 
elected lead ership and moral achie vement and merit. Th is disag grega tion of kingship 
ope ns the resea rch agenda up to re inventions of king ship in other Southeast Asian 
contexts. Re invent ions do not have to buy the whole ·pa ckage' of a ll that kingsh ip 
entails . In the Theravada Budd hist countr ies , similar ques tion s of embodiment are 
entai led in rei nventio ns, and can perhaps be pursue d as a research direction. 823 Mo re 
broad ly, this points to the importance of disting uishing between what aspects or 
qu al itie s o f kingship are emphasi sed in different reinven tions, to chart their exac t 
meanings. 
Thirdly, the Cam bodian case demon stra tes the importanc e of regi onal influences and 
regional models in th is regard. Hun Sen has referred to Laos unde r fonner Preside nt 
Kay so ne as a major influence for his reinvention of the ro le of the monarchy. This 
shows the need for charting reg ional flows of ideas and political models in 
contemporary Southeast Asia . Whil st, once underway , these rein ventions follow 
dist inctly national trajecto,ies, they do not take place in se lf-contained national 
contex ts but are influ enced by regional develo pment s. 
823 In Burma, it is rumoured that Than Shwe believes himself to be the reincarnation ofa 
Burmese monarch, and analysts point to how the General styles himself this way. See 'Burma 
The End ofan Era or a Dynasty"s Beginning?·, The lrrm vaddy . 28 Jan, 201 I. In Thailand, 
Irene Stengs (2009) finds that the cult of King Chulalongkorn, peaking in the 1990s, not only 
contributed to the general promotion of the Thai monarchy but exalted expectations on 
kingship under King Bhumibol, so that images of and veneration for Bhumibo! gradually 
came to replace those of Chulalongkorn; this testifies to the interconnectedness of the two 
figures as ideal personifications of·m odern Buddhist kingship' \Vo11hy of note is that 
General Sonthi, leader of the 2006 anti-Thaksin coup, had been identified by a ·political· 
astrologer as the reincarnation ofa general under King Taksin who had saved the nation after 
the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767, and therefore destined to save the Thai nation yet again. Pasuk 
Phongpaichit & Chris Baker, 2008. 
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